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PREFACE
        This monograph, is a compendium of the individual works of 
seventeen students enrolled in a newly cross-listed course NR 545 (EIH 
575). The focus of this course, like prior years, is captured in its 
title Population-Environment Dynamics: Toward building a Theory.  The 
course began with an examination of alternative theoretical constructs 
useful in studying the interaction between human populations and the 
environment. Also, at the beginning of the course, each participant was 
asked to select a topic of inquiry and a geographical setting for their 
study. This selection then became their major focus for the entire semester.
Students participating formally in the course this fall had a delightful 
mixture of backgrounds and interests. Schools and colleges represented 
included the School of Natural Resources and Environment, School of 
Public Health, School of Business Administration, College of  
Engineering, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, and College of 
Literature Sciences and Arts. One undergraduate, fourteen masters and 
four Ph D students participated formally.  Others sat in from time to 
time, including participants from previous years seminars. Disciplines 
represented included biology, economics, sociology, architecture, 
anthropology, mathematics, law, engineering, urban planning, public 
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health, forestry and natural resources. Participants included colleagues 
from the Continents of North America, Europe, Asia, and Africa.  In 
addition, several U. S. students had spent considerable time living and 
working in countries such as Russia, Benin, Costa Rica, India, Thailand 
and Nepal.
A very important element in the seminar was the use of data sources which 
recently have become available in machine-readable form. These data 
sources permitted the students to quickly gain exposure in handling 
longitudinal datasets, especially those which were not amenable to 
modeling with linear functions.  As a consequence, part of the course 
required mastery of non-linear curve fitting techniques.  The most useful 
and user friendly dataset provided participants was The World Resources 
Institute Data System (1994-95).  Another tool used in the course was 
state-of-the-art PC-based Geographic Information Systems. The GIS package 
selected as most helpful, was ATLAS GIS version 3.0.  The digital maps, 
used as separators of monograph chapters, help to unify monograph content 
as they depict, taken together, a spatial view of population-environment 
dynamics. New to this term was the availability of the Digital Chart of 
the World.  Dr. Sandra Lach Arlinghaus, adjunct professor in The School 
of Natural Resources and Environment, provided instruction in curve 
fitting, GIS and ongoing individualized support to all participants. 
A new feature of this terms course was the use of  outside reviewers. 
These reviewers, all faculty in major teaching institutions, provided an 
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additional level of academic feedback to participants. Papers included in 
this monograph had completed this review process by the time of 
publication. Remaining papers will be published at a later date.
The success of the course resulted largely from the enthusiasm of the 
participants. As in previous years, extra sessions were held near the end 
of the semester, which often extended beyond scheduled meeting times. 
Feedback from fellow participants was provided in these sessions. In 
addition, each student was asked to develop a brief synopsis of how their 
study related to the other participants in the class. These thoughtful 
remarks are presented as the main body of the concluding chapter.  This 
monograph was published during the winter term in the academic year 1995-96.
                                                                             
William D. Drake
                                                                          
University of Michigan
                                                                           
Ann Arbor, Michigan
`                                                                             
February 1996
 INTRODUCTION
This volume is a collection of separate but related studies focusing on 
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the relationship between human populations and the environment. The 
effort consists of this introduction followed by seventeen chapters each 
written by a seminar participant which investigates a different aspect 
and geographic setting of the population-environment dynamic. A 
concluding chapter provides comments written by each participant relating 
their work to those of the others. 
In this introduction we present a synopsis of the common framework, which 
we call a family of transitions. In addition to the common framework, 
this introductory chapter presents the abstracts for each ensuing chapter.
Readers of the monograph reporting last year's work should note that the 
material in the following section on a family of transitions is repeated 
here for background and therefore can be skipped.
1.    A FAMILY OF TRANSITIONS 
One way of viewing the complex dynamic relationships between population 
and the environment is to visualize them as a family of transitions. That 
is, not only is there a demographic and epidemiologic transition but also 
a deforestation, toxicity, agricultural, energy and urbanization 
transition as well as many others. In this chapter it is argued that for 
each transition there is a critical period when society is especially 
vulnerable. During that period, rates of change are high, societal 
adaptive capacity is limited, in part, due to this rapid change, and 
there is a greater likelihood that key relationships in the dynamic 
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become severely imbalanced. The trajectory society takes through a 
transition varies, depending upon many factors operating at local and 
national levels. Transitions not only are occurring in many different 
sectors but also at different scales, both temporal and spatial. At 
times, a society experiences several transitions simultaneously, which 
can raise social vulnerability because of how they amplify each other.
1.1 TYPES OF TRANSITIONS
The Demographic Transition
Let us begin with a review of the ideas behind the widely accepted 
demographic transition. At the onset of this transition, births and 
deaths are both high and are in relative equilibrium with each other. 
Historically, births exceed deaths by small amounts so total population 
rises only very gradually. Occasionally, famine or an epidemic causes a 
downturn in total population but in general, changes in rates are low.  
During the transition, however, death rates drop dramatically, usually 
due to a change in the health condition of the population. This change in 
health is caused by many, often interrelating factors. After some time 
lag, the birth rate begins to drop and generally declines until it is in 
approximate balance with the death rate again.
The Epidemiological Transition
The term epidemiologic transition was coined to describe the changing 
source of mortality and morbidity from infectious diseases occurring 
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primarily in the younger age groups to degenerative diseases in older age 
groups.  As with the demographic transition, there is considerable 
volatility during the transition.  At the onset, infectious diseases 
begin their decline usually due to extensions of health care and 
sanitation by the national or local government. Single vector programs 
such as malaria control and immunization programs are often the first 
implemented because they are capable of ready extension and do not 
require as heavy a commitment to education and other sustained 
infrastructure - especially in rural areas. These single vector programs 
are then followed by broader-based health care which demand heavier 
investment in infrastructure. But an entirely successful move through 
this transition does not always happen. At times, other sectors in 
transition overpower the health care delivery system. 
The Agricultural Transition
For several hundred years, worldwide agricultural production has been 
rising in relative harmony with population. Overall, increases in 
production have kept up with and even outpaced growth in population. The 
two factors that have been responsible for these increases are 1) 
extensions of land under cultivation and 2) improvements in 
productivity.  At times changes have been dramatic. Formulating an 
agricultural transition reflects the condition that, in general, sources 
of increase in production shift from extending land to intensifying 
file:///C|/545/1995/introduc.htm (6 of 15) [6/18/2008 10:56:25 AM]
file:///C|/545/1995/introduc.htm
production on land already under cultivation. 
The Forestry Transition
At the onset of the forestry transition generally a large percentage of a 
region is under forest cover. Rapid deforestation occurs during the 
transition and finally forest cover stabilizes at a lower level 
determined by many factors such as the local region's needs, the state of 
the local and national economy, climate and soil characteristics. In most 
settings this transition will end in a steady state equilibrium balancing 
growth and harvest. Again, how society handles the vulnerable transition 
period often determines in a profound way the quality of life for the region.
The Toxicity Transition
The toxicity transition can be considered a composite of many 
transitions:  global atmospheric, local air pollution, surface water, 
ground water and solid waste to name a few. Again, there are at least two 
sets of factors operating in tandem. The transition begins with low 
levels of industrial or agricultural production and correspondingly low 
levels of toxins. As production and population increase, toxic byproducts 
increase to levels which eventually become unacceptable to the general 
public. This in turn, causes a public demand for pollution abatement. 
After an environmentally costly time lag, remediation steps are taken 
which helps to bring pollution under control.
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The Urbanization Transition
The urbanization transition is driven by the dual forces of rural to 
urban migration and central city population growth. The early stages of 
the transition are characterized by rapid growth of urban population; 
however, in later stages, growth declines and may reverse. Rural to urban 
migration is a product of many forces - both  "pull"  and "push". In 
terms of the population-environment dynamic, the urbanization transition 
often acts as an amplifier as it interacts with other transitions.
The Fossil Fuel Transition
The fossil fuel transition is a special case of the energy transition. 
Historically, many energy transitions have already occurred in different 
regions and time periods. Significant transformations began in the 
sixteenth century brought about by sail and later, by steam power. Today, 
we are now in the most universal and perhaps critical energy transition: 
fossil fuels. Studying this transition is especially instructive because 
the record on different societies' passage through the vulnerable period 
is varied and appears to be heavily influenced by public policy. 
1.2  GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TRANSITIONS
Similarity of Trajectory Across Sectors
We have attempted to show in the seven example sectors discussed earlier 
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that the notion of transitions apply across all sectors of investigation. 
Each class of transition, whether it be demographic, toxicity, forestry, 
agriculture, urbanization, energy or epidemiological have similar 
patterns. It is this perception that has caused us to posit the existence 
of a family of transitions possessing some common attributes useful in 
analysis. The first common attribute of all transitions is their 
trajectory. They all begin in reasonable stability, then move to the 
volatile transition period where change is rapid, and finally return 
again to relative balance. Analytically, these are clearly nonlinear 
systems but ones which have properties that lend themselves to 
well-understood mathematical functions. 
Applicability of Transitions Across Scales
The second attribute has to do with scale. One of the most interesting 
and at the same time vexing aspects of studying population-environment 
dynamics is that many phenomena manifest themselves at all levels of 
geographic and temporal scale. For example, data depict one demographic 
transition for an entire continent, a different one for a country within 
that continent and still other different transitions at the regional 
level. Local conditions may delay or advance the onset and or completion 
of the transition in relation to the larger body. Thus, moving through 
the demographic transition can take more or less time as the scale changes.
This same variation seems to exist in all other population-environment 
transitions that have been investigated. True, national or regional-level 
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determinants often set the stage for the local dynamic, but in the end it 
is these local conditions which determine the timing, magnitude and 
specific trajectory of the overall transition. 
One can think of our world, seeming to be chaotic, but instead consisting 
of a multitude of well defined transitions in many sectors, each with its 
own local characteristic. Different transitions begin at different times 
and places, but ebb and flow in an overlapping way, sometimes reinforcing 
one another and at other times dampening their dynamic. As adjustment 
occurs, occasionally useful niches are created which are then exploited 
by stressed elements of the ecosystem. Unfortunately, at other times, 
different sectors interact with each other in a harmful way to broaden 
and extend the susceptible period.
Societal Vulnerability
During transitions there seems to be a special vulnerability borne by 
society. Ample evidence indicates that key relationships are most likely 
to become out of balance during the transition. A primary cause of this 
vulnerability is the rapidity of change during the high velocity portion 
of the transition. Adaptive capacity is impeded because there is little 
time for systems to adjust and often there are limited feedback 
mechanisms operating which otherwise could help this process. Another 
contribution to social vulnerability during a transition is the 
amplifying effects created by transitions occurring simultaneously in 
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several sectors.  Rapid rates of change in several sectors could more 
easily overpower the available infrastructure which leads us to the next 
source of vulnerability during transitions: capital availability.
Capital or investment capacity can either amplify or reduce societal 
vulnerability during a transition. If there are financial resources 
available to deal with the effects of rapid change, remediation is easier 
to implement. Africa which is trying to deal with a difficult demographic 
transition has almost no capital available for its use and will therefore 
undergo great hardship. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are 
struggling to find financial resources to deal with their flawed toxicity 
transition. Another dimension of transitions which affects societal 
vulnerability is the degree of interconnectedness. How closely is the 
local village connected to the regional and national economy? How much 
does what happens in one location determine what happens in another? 
There is no question that interconnectedness is increasing worldwide. We 
also know that under some circumstances linkage creates dependencies 
which in turn, increase vulnerability. However, it can work in the 
opposite direction as well. These very same links to a larger domain can 
also act as a safety net. If there are connections, resources can be 
brought to the stressed area more easily to mitigate the local adversity. 
The final and perhaps most important dimension of transitions affecting 
vulnerability is feedback.
Analytic Properties of Transitions
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We have seen that many characteristics of transitions are common across 
all sectors and geographic scales. The question then, is whether there 
are analytic techniques which might be useful in describing this family 
of transitions. If so, these techniques may be helpful in portraying 
transitions in a way that facilitates comparison and thereby increases 
our understanding. In this quest we are especially interested in 
techniques and functions which reduce complexity and at the same time 
provide a reasonably accurate portrayal of reality 
Functions which are candidates for consideration include exponential, 
exponential to the limit L, logistic, Gompertz, and the power function. 
Bounded functions which fit data more precisely but cannot be used for 
predictive purposes may also be helpful in uncovering patterns.
1.3  POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSITION THEORY
But what does it gain us to fit an exponential or logistic or for that 
matter any function to transition data? The answer lies in our ability to 
gain insights by relating different transitions to each other. First, 
consider the transitions within a given sector and at a given scale. We 
know there are transitions in a sector which some societies have already 
experienced while others have yet to endure. If the nature of these 
experiences can be captured in general form, it is more likely that 
knowledge can be transferred to other settings where a transition is 
first starting. Of course, each civilization or local culture has its own 
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unique characteristics but any one emerging transition may be comparable 
to one or more of those which have occurred before because conditions are 
similar.
Second, there may be useful comparisons across different scales. We 
already surmise that a national-level transition, perhaps now in process, 
is actually comprised of a myriad of local transitions also in process or 
which have recently occurred. But there may be other locales in the 
region for which the transition has yet to happened. If similar patterns 
emerge because of similar local conditions, a useful prediction could be 
made about the nature of the passage through the transitions yet to appear.
Third, there may be insights gained simply by the process of fitting a 
function to historical data. Different mathematical functions often have 
very specific underlying characteristics which can provide useful ideas. 
The next potential use of transition theory is to facilitate analysis 
across sectors. There is, of course, no good reason to expect the 
trajectory of, say, a forestry or agricultural transition to mimic an 
epidemiologic transition. However, for any society at a given time, there 
may be similarities in the rates of change across sectors. Developed 
economies have slower rates of change in their agriculture sector than 
developing economies when conditions are favorable. Rural based cultures 
may be expected to have urbanization transitions which are steeper than 
non-rural cultures. In short, it is worth testing to see if patterns can 
be empirically determined which would be helpful in predicting the shape 
of future transitions, given a stated level of intervention.
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We have already mentioned the special societal vulnerability associated 
with several sectors being in rapid transition simultaneously.  From a 
modeling perspective this simultaneity a very difficult condition to 
describe and analyze, which may be why less progress has been made in 
this area to date. However, being able to portray these multiple 
transitions with specific functions could be helpful. There is no 
question that each transition interacts with the other. And to the 
analyst this means that a reliable model must be structured as a set of 
simultaneous relationships. Describing transitions as functions 
facilitates this manipulation.
Another potential benefit of transition theory lies in the identification 
of lead indicators. If success is achieved in fitting transition data to 
an appropriate function, then for a given condition and point in time, 
the future trajectory can be predicted more accurately. Identifying lead 
indicators is facilitated because with an orderly function, only one, or 
at most, two parameters need to be determined to define the trajectory. 
This advantage is even more evident when several functions are considered 
simultaneously.
Finally and perhaps most importantly, transition theory may permit more 
informed public and private intervention. At one level we find ourselves 
believing that the trajectory of a transition is somehow fixed by an 
immutable law of nature. But at another level we know that this is not 
the case. Public and private policy can make a difference as we have seen 
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from some of the cases discussed in this book. Rates of change can be 
influenced by policy redirection and consequent resource allocation. To 
the extent that we can link historical rate differentials with historical 
policy implementation, a better determination can be made about which 
intervention mix works best in dealing with problems facing society today.




        The Komi Republic is an autonomous region located in northeastern 
Europe and is part of the Russian Federation.  Komi is a region about the 
size of New England and is composed of 20 districts, governed in a 
hierarchical system from the Moscow government seat.  Komi is a region of 
vast natural resources which includes natural gas, oil, wood products and 
precious metals.  The emphasis of the paper focuses on strategies that 
will effectively influence a change in the administration of 
environmental policy in the Komi Republic.  It is unreasonable and 
ineffective to regulate environmental policy, with little or no allowance 
for variation, directly from the Russian Federation seat in Moscow.  The 
primary reason for the ineffectiveness emanates from the large land area 
and tremendous ecosystem diversity which exists in the Russian 
Federation.  The Komi Republic also exhibits significant ecosystem 
diversity.  This paper assert that the Komi Republic should formulate, 
administrate and enforce its own environmental policy.  This contention 
is supported by the interpretation of quantitative data collected from 
many sources including the World Resource Database.  Transition dynamics 
calculated from data compiled about the Soviet Union graphically 
illustrate anomalous behavior in the years leading up to its collapse in 
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1991.  Environmentally-related data similarly compiled  for Komi will 
likely display similar trends which portend a serious threat.  
Mathematical projections of environmentally related health issues such as 
hepatitis and upper respiratory problems in Komi represent increasing 
trends to which officials must pay attention.  Dynamics involving the 
Komi government, International Corporations, the Russian Federation and 
environmental organizations truly reveal a complicated political 
situation.  Drawing from the ecosystem diversity, transition dynamics of 
the Soviet Union, health projections in the Komi Republic and complicated 
political dynamics a case is built and presented which logically 
justifies the need to formulate a specialized and localized environmental 
policy in the Komi Republic. 
Birkelund
        The nexus between trade and the environment is only just 
beginning to receive attention.  As global cooperation and international 
trade agreements become more common and more powerful, trade policies are 
starting to have a profound effect on the natural environment.  The 
tropical timber trade in Indonesia and Malaysia serves as a prime example 
of how trade can interact with the environment.  As a whole, this paper 
illustrates how international and domestic trade policies can worsen or 
alleviate pressures on resource consumption and become a major policy 
factor in population-environment transitions.  
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        Both Indonesia and Malaysia are countries naturally endowed with 
tropical forests.  At the same time, they are also both subject to the 
high population pressures and have not yet completed their demographic 
transitions.  As a result, population pressures are magnifying the 
effects of trade on the environment in this area.  By taking into account 
the dynamics between timber exports, deforestation, and population 
trends, government policies can work towards achieving sustainable 
methods of managing their forests.  
        More specifically, the governments in these countries need to 
focus on enforcing logging regulations, reforesting depleted forests, 
lifting export restrictions, and reducing the growth of their 
populations.  As the tropical forests are often considered a "global 
resource", the international community should contribute financial 
support to this endeavor.  Furthermore, the international trade community 
provides the appropriate medium for establishing sustainable forestry 
practices world-wide.  The International Trade and Timber Organization is 
an example of the current efforts to promote global regulations on forest 
exploitation.  In conclusion, it is imperative for Indonesia and Malaysia 
to deal with their forestry transitions in the near future if they wish 
to stop their tropical forests from being completely degraded.  
Additional research is needed to refine the relationship between the 
timber and trade.  The tropical timber trade will be a critical factor in 
determining the final state of the tropical forests in this region.
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Cheatham
        With a population approaching one billion, the need for fertility 
reduction measures in India has never been greater.  It can no longer be 
assumed that simply meeting latent demand is a sufficient means of 
reducing birth rates; the government must adopt policies that provide 
couples with economic incentives to reduce family size.  One such measure 
would be to encourage private firms to increase female representation in 
their work forces; when women are employed in gainful wage-labor, the 
opportunity costs associated with multiple pregnancies are greatly 
increased.  By employing women at a lower wage than men, the individual 
firm can increase its profits by cutting its costs of production; in this 
way, private industry can provide a social good (reduced fertility) by 
engaging in normal profit-maximizing behaviors.  It is the role of 
government to provide potential employers with sufficient incentive to 
overcome strong cultural predilections opposing the employment of women.  
Cunningham
        While it is almost without doubt that global warming is occurring 
due to human activities, its full effects on humans and the environment 
are not known.  The South Sahel region of West Africa (made up of 
Northern Benin, Burkina Faso and Southern Niger) is highly susceptible to 
the negative effects of global warming because of the tight linkages 
between the people of the region and the environment.  Possible effects 
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of global warming are investigated in terms of transition theory 
including, but not limited to,:  increased impoverishment of the soil and 
subsequent decreases in agricultural production, increased rates of 
infectious and nutritional disease, and increased birth and death rates.  
No Regrets policies should be implemented by the South Sahel governments 
to benefit their societies now while at the same time protecting them 
against the possible effects of global warming in the future.
Frank
        This study looks at the linkage of population growth and 
urbanization. Generally speaking, population growth and increasing 
urbanization seem correlated. Their causal relationship though is complex 
and urbanization factors differ from place to place. In comparing 
urbanization trends for 42 countries, the study identifies three 
different stages and pattern of urbanization. National urbanization 
trends however cannot be extrapolated to the local level. Despite overall 
increasing urbanization, individual cities may still decline. A major 
interest of the study is in the spatial dimension of urban growth. Urban 
shape and form is the physical manifestation of urban growth. Cities grow 
in different fashions. Urban form and shape is dependent on parameters 
such as size, growth rate, topography, available technology etc. It is 
the authors hypothesis that the time at which urban growth occurs will be 
greatly influence the shape and form of the urban area. Furthermore, it 
is assumed that there are more and less sustainable and harmonious 
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pattern of growth. An attempt is made to devise a morphology of urban 
growth pattern to assist policy development regarding urbanization.
Gupta
        Although the demographic transition India is undergoing is well 
known, with references to its population problem being quite frequent, 
the other transitions India is undergoing are less well known. Several of 
these key transitions, such as the agricultural, urbanization and 
forestry transitions are exist in a feedback loop exacerbating 
demographic problems. Policy decisions in India have historically paid 
only lip service, or altogether ignored pressures created by these 
transitions, however India is currently going through a critical phase as 
these transitions are experiencing rapid rates of change. A beneficial 
effect has been, the acknowledgment of economic and structural maladies 
by the authorities.  Consequently a New Economic Policy has been adopted 
by the government entailing a fundamental shift in economic and social 
thinking. In this paper this economic policy is analyzed and its possible 
effects on other transitions are discussed. 
Han
        There is a vast, untapped field of natural gas in the world.  It 
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grows in size every year, instead of diminishing.  And it can be found in 
every single country on earth.  This resource is, naturally, the 
landfill.  Technologies are currently being developed and improved upon 
to harness this energy that flows in the form of methane gas.  This 
process of energy recovery reduces odors, health risks, smog, acid rain, 
and ozone depletion while increasing income to the local community.  It 
is an ideal situation if the opportunity is exists.  This paper attempts 
to derive several methods that may be used to determine just that, that 
is, does the opportunity exist?  Problems and concerns with developing a 
landfill in the United States are examined along with possible solutions 
that may then be extrapolated to apply to various sections of the world.  
The major contributing factors are construction and operation, economics, 
social impact, and global feasibility.  Transition theory is applied to 
the last section as an important tool that may assist policy-makers in 
deciding where and when a energy reclamation system may be constructed.  
This is a new technology and may eventually be discovered to be an 
excellent local solution to a wide range of global problems.
Landweber
        This paper focuses on two epidemiological transitions in 
Thailand, one already past and one yet to come. Through governmental 
attention and infrastructure improvements, Thailand has faced its 
epidemiological problems directly, making great strides in reducing 
mortality for infectious diseases that mainly strike at the younger 
file:///C|/545/1995/abstract.htm (7 of 15) [6/18/2008 10:56:29 AM]
file:///C|/545/1995/abstract.htm
population. The successful accomplishment of that goal marked the end of 
the first transition, which is best illustrated by examining the war on 
malaria. However, Thailand now has an even greater problem: AIDS. Though 
the epidemic is only beginning to be felt in Thailand, predictions for 
the future point toward high death rates, particularly among the younger 
generations. This threatens to create a second epidemiological transition 
that would wipe out the progress made by the first, bringing with it 
catastrophic results for the nation as a whole. 
Lombard
        This paper traces the successes and failures of improved 
cookstove diffusion in India, Kenya and China.  Taking completely 
different approaches to cookstove dissemination, these countries together 
offer a short-list of necessary elements in effective cookstove 
programming.  The Indian government took a radical top-down approach to 
cookstove diffusion, heavily subsidizing hand-made clay stoves throughout 
rural India, resulting in the abandonment of millions of ill-constructed, 
low-quality stoves.  Kenya, by contrast, aided by development 
organizations, employed a gradual, cyclical refinement process to stove 
design and dissemination strategy.  Finally, by providing technical 
support and marketing for improved stove production, but allowing  local 
energy offices and entrepreneurs  to handle all aspects of stove 
production, the Chinese central government masterminded the most 
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successful cookstove program to date.  Although failures at diffusing 
cookstoves were plentiful in the 1980s, the last ten years indicate that 
cookstove projects can remedy past mistakes and provide fuel-efficient 
technology to large numbers of interested consumers.
Nabalamba
        In Africa, more than anywhere else, political and economic 
choices made by the state have had important implications on how people 
and the environment interact.  This paper will attempt to draw lessons in 
population and environment dynamics from the experience of two 
countries--Uganda and Tanzania- that adopted contrary economic and 
ideological paths after their independence and the implications of these 
decisions on national population growth and urbanization trends.  The 
paper will discuss development theories that influenced national leaders 
on the population question.  Data presented will show a direct 
relationship between the rate of urbanization and the fast deteriorating 
urban environment.  I will argue that the degenerating environment is a 
consequence of national and urban population growth, and infrastructure 
deficiencies resulting from the inability of developing economies such as 
Uganda and Tanzania to sustain the growth.  The paper will conclude with 
some policy suggestions intended to interrupt what is increasingly become 
a crisis situation.
OConnell
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        The country of Costa Rica is recognized internationally as a 
leader in conservation programs to preserve biodiversity.  The current 
government of Costa Rica plans to continue this emphasis on conservation 
by being  the first nation in the world to fully embrace sustainable 
development and development by implementing policy and institutional 
changes in accordance with Agenda 21 of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development.  Past and current rates of deforestation, 
and variables contributing to deforestation are analyzed in the context 
of the Costa Rican model of sustainable development.  Deforestation 
increased during the social and economic transformation in the decades 
following the 1940's, and peaked during the 1970's. A national park 
system was instituted to protect the remaining forests, and today, 
approximately 25 percent of Costa Rica's land is protected.  However, 
deforestation continues outside of the protected areas, and Costa Rica's 
current rate of deforestation may be one of the highest in the Western 
Hemisphere if the protected land is not included in calculation of the 
deforestation rate.   If current trends continue, Costa Rica's forests 
will be exclusively located in national parks and protected areas.  
Perry
        This chapter examines the effects of increased urban growth on 
the natural environment in Kenya.  First, the author looks at what stage 
of the demographic transition Kenya is, making generalizations about 
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population growth.  Then, specifically growth in urban areas is examined, 
including the phenomenon or urban-rural migration.  Once a correlation 
between population growth and growth in the urban population is 
established, the chapter moves on to the larger issue of how the natural 
system in Kenya is being affected.  The chapter seeks to answer the 
questions:  what is the relationship between population growth and growth 
in cities;  what effects do larger urban areas and an increasingly urban 
population have on the environment;  and what policies will be effective 
in improving environmental quality as well as improving economic development.
Preston
        Deforestation is increasing recognized as the number one threat 
to mountain ecosystems.  Despite the fact that the causal relationships 
between deforestation and human populations is still largely unknown and 
debated, policy makers continue to move forward with piece meal 
strategies to combat the problem.  The situation in Sikkim, India is no 
exception.  Sikkim is in the midst of a forestry transition yet very 
little data has been collected about the actual amount of forest cover, 
the rate of deforestation or the causes of deforestation.  However, using 
comparative case analyses, this study has determined that while 
deforestation in Sikkim is occurring at a more rapid pace than in other 
areas of the Himalayas, deforestation is also at a much earlier stage.  
Given that deforestation is only in the beginning stages, there is great 
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potential for Sikkim as a country to reverse these trends before they 
reach the levels of destruction that have been reached in other areas.   
The first step in reducing deforestation is to understand the factors 
that contribute to it.  This study examines the variety of contributing 
demographic factors as a means of illustrating the interrelationships of 
factors causing deforestation.  One aspect of the problem treated in 
isolation will not be effective.  Instead, policy makers need to 
understand the complexity of the problem and then develop comprehensive 
policies which address the full range of issues in an integrated 
comprehensive strategic plan.  This study outlines policy recommendations 
which could enable Sikkim to reverse its deforestation trend and emerge 
as a leading example of a sustainable mountain ecosystem and economy.
Rowe
        Nepal is a mountainous region with a number of Himalayan rivers 
flowing throughout the country, and there is no doubt that harnessing 
some of these waters will assist in improving the socio-economic 
well-being of Nepals people.  It is a country where more than half the 
population lives at or just above the starvation level, a fact that has a 
significant impact on the environmental degradation.  Its one abundant 
resource is water and its potential for hydroelectric power is great.  
However, there is an ongoing debate over small and large dam projects to 
be implemented.  Large dam projects are intended to bring in revenue to 
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the country, and small dams are designed to enhance rural development. It 
is Nepals task then, to recognize the trade-off that exist in 
implementing these different types of dams.  With dam projects, the 
positive and negative effects are influenced by and vary greatly 
depending on the environmental, social and political context within a 
country or region.  Potential dam construction will have a strong impact 
in many sectors, most directly effecting the agriculture, forestry and 
energy sectors. An examination of these sectors, and Nepals geography, 
environmental condition, and social and political status leads to the 
conclusion that  large dams pose too much of a risk for Nepal. 
Torng
        The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, 
ISTEA, designated $21 billion to extend the interstate highway system.  
Subsequently, a 158,000-mile national highway system has been proposed 
much of the extension of which will be built in metropolitan fringe 
areas.  Empirical urban development reveals that transportation and land 
use affect each other interactively.  Existing studies have discussed the 
aggregate effects of interstate highway systems on demographic and 
socio-economic evolution.  This research explores the intensity of 
interstate highway effects on suburbanization by examining the 
directional effects on growth and migration of population in the 
suburbs.  Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, is selected for longitudinal analysis 
over three decades of interstate highway and suburban growth from 1960 to 
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1990.  A major transition in the influence of spatial effects on 
suburbanization between 1970 and 1980 is detected.  The directional 
effect of highway systems on encouraging urban to rural migration is 
fading (i.e., spatial correlation effect).  Meanwhile, the expansion of 
urban areas is taking place evenly in all directions surrounding the 
existing urban areas (i.e., spatial neighboring effect).
Tracy
        The paper focuses on the possibility the existence of a 
sustainable building material transition.  It uses thinking similar to 
traditional transition theory.  It also attempts to describe the effects 
of the timing of other transitions on the sustainable building material 
transition.   In addition, the text makes recommendations on how to 
facilitate such a transition.
        It is of importance that this paper deal with the issues of 
resource use in the building industry.  Specifically, this paper will 
deal with the topic of renewable and nonrenewable resources as they apply 
to the materials used for the structure of buildings.  Of interest are 
the choices people in the United States make with regard to the way they 
build in the context of the environment as a whole.  Of particular 
interest is the comparison of the impact of traditionally popular 
methods/materials of construction and "Green" or "Sustainable" 
methods/materials of construction.
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        The Komi Republic is located in the northeastern corner of the 
European part of the Russian Federation. Its global position is 
approximately  590 north latitude to the Arctic circle and is on the west 
side of the Ural Mountains from 660 to 480 E longitude. (Refer to Map #1 
in Appendix)  Komi measures approximately 416,800 square kilometers, 
approximately the size of New England, with a population of nearly 
1,250,000 people.   The capital city of Komi, Syktyvkar, has a population 
of about 225,000 inhabitants.  It is nearly 200 years old, which is young 
by Russian standards.  Komi possesses its own cultural origins which 
researchers determined to originate in the Vwym River valley.  The 
culture is closely related to Eskimo culture due to its northerly 
location.  Aside from Russian language Komi also has its own language, of 
Finno-Ugric origin which is in the Uralic language family.  Komi was one 
of Stalins favorite gulag locations and, in fact, there are well over 
1,000 gulags located in the Komi Republic, some of which are still active 
as prisons.
        The Komi Republic is considered a part of Russia's Northern 
Economic Region which is noted for its forest products, mining and 
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fishing industries and the production of metals such as aluminum.    
Major natural gas and oil industries located in Ukhta create an 
interesting dynamic between Komi, Moscow , International or 
Multi-national Oil Corporations and environmental organizations.  Komi 
industries stratify the Republic as follows: north - coal mining and 
fishing; central - oil and natural gas; south - wood products.  
        The Komi capital of Syktyvkar is situated at the confluence of 
the Syssola and Vwychegda Rivers.  The surface and ground water resources 
surrounding Syktyvkar that are needed to satisfy industrial, agricultural 
and municipal demands are becoming incrementally less sufficient.   These 
two rivers along with the huge Pechora River are already significantly 
polluted by nutrients or industrial wastes.  In 1994, a major break in an 
oil pipeline severely polluted the Pechora and several other streams in 
the Pechora watershed.  
        Wildlife resources have been heavily depleted by industrial 
development and pollutants, as well as by decreases in critical habitat 
associated with widespread replacement of primary forests with secondary 
forests and draining of marshes.  Fish resources have been degraded 
because of deteriorated conditions for reproduction by pollution of water 
bodies and major and minor spills.  Within the boundary of the Komi 
Republic lies a natural reserve called a zapovednik. This reserve, the 
Pechoro-Illych, is located in the central taiga  and was designated as a 
biosphere reserve by the former Soviet Government.   The Pechoro-Illych,  
preserved strictly for pure research, is nearly 1.5 million acres of 
untouched wilderness.
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The Need for Environmental Standards
        The opening section of this paper provided a general description 
of the Komi Republic.  This section begins to build a case which  
supports the development of specialized environmental policy for the Komi 
Republic.  The paper relies on both historical data taken from literature 
and the World Resource Database (WRD) and current information gathered on 
site in Komi to justify my contention for restructuring the Komi 
Republic's environmental policy.
Case I
        Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 Komi has developed  
complex political and environmental interrelationships with the Moscow 
government seat.  Although such circumstances  are not uncommon in the 
Russian Federation,  Komi and Moscow display some unique dynamics.  The 
Komi Republic is rich in natural resources, which include vast natural 
gas and oil resources and the largest pulp and paper complex in Europe.  
The potential for exploitation of these resources by foreign investors is 
a genuine concern.  I foresee a complicated situation.  For example,  
companies in Komi may decide to enter into to contractual agreements with 
foreign investors for hard currency.  Moscow could decide to challenge 
these contracts on the basis of land and resource "rights" granted under 
the former Communist regime.  A dispute would likely develop between a 
Komi company, Moscow and foreign investor.  This dispute process would 
all but ignore a very important consideration, not only in Komi, but 
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throughout Russia: the environment.  Environmental remediation in Komi is 
at a standstill, as it is in the rest of the Russian Federation.  The 
cause of this standstill appears to be a chicken-egg relationship.  How 
does one address environmental problems without a stable economy and why 
should one not immediately undertake environmental remediation since, 
without it there may be a drastic, negative impact on the economy?  I 
suggest a strategy that incrementally addresses both, simultaneously.  
The general plan begins with the following narrative:
        Russia has a land area of 16,995,800 square kilometers, nearly 
twice that of the United States.  Its southern borders are located near 
500 N latitude and the northern borders are above the Arctic circle 
(66.70N lat.).  With this degree of geographical diversity one uniform 
set of environmental laws seems inadequate, yet this is exactly what one 
finds in the Russian judiciary system.  Refer to the map of forest biomes 
of the Russian Federation in the appendix.(Map #2).  The variation of 
ecosystems present in each of the different biomes virtually orders a 
policy structure that considers this variability and addresses it with an 
appropriate policy for each biome.  The pure size of the Russian 
Federation creates a substantial logistical problem for discussing the 
implementation of specialized environmental policy.   However, the Komi 
Republic is a more manageable model with which to defend the notion of a 
new, more specialized environmental policy that will enable local and 
regional economies to strengthen along with the development and 
refinement of a new environmental policy. 
           I contend that the optimal method of addressing these problems 
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is to allow each geopolitical region (such as the Komi Republic) to have 
the power and freedom to undertake necessary strategies specific to their 
geographical location, since each area will have a different set of 
problems.  The ultimate goal will be to allow the Komi Republic to 
structure its own environmental policy, with Moscow supplying only 
general guidelines.  Each geopolitical region will have more extensive 
knowledge of their own area.  Since the judicial branch of the Russian 
Federation is ineffective an alternative resolution strategy is 
appropriate.  The use of consensus-building strategies will afford Komi 
the decision-makers the opportunity to arrive at a mutually beneficial 
implementation plan that will address both economic and environmental needs.
        Refer to Map #3 and biome chart in the appendix to further 
understand the contention for specialized environmental policy 
structure.  The map delineating the biomes in Komi illustrates the 
ecosystem differentiation.  Six different biomes are located in Komi, 
including two variations of tundra.  Particular management practices or 
other external effects from human interaction will have a different 
impact on each particular biome.  Ecosystem management principles 
recognize the need to develop impact assessment for the biotic variation 
similar to that found among the different biomes in Komi.  It is  evident 
that management strategies developed for tundra regions vary from other 
areas  lacking the permafrost which defines the Arctic tundra.  
Therefore, it is imperative that the Komi Republic adopt an environmental 
policy which allows for the variation dictated by these different biomes. 
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        Komi not only is constrained by the general environmental 
standards issued from Moscow but is also constrained by the hierarchy of 
political structure.  The organizational chart (Chart I in Appendix) 
portrays the continued trend in one set of standards for environmental 
regulation from the former Soviet Union to the Russian Federation, of 
which the Komi Republic is a part.  The organizational chart also points 
out another weakness in the current system of management.   The map of 
Komi, which shows the 20 regions, (Map #4 in appendix) and the 
organizational chart are used to help explain the next contention.  Each 
of the 20 districts in Komi has an identical structure from the economic 
ministry down through the organization.  Therefore, each of the seven 
departments under the jurisdiction of the Economic Minister is also in 
direct contact with the Economic Minister in Moscow and, as the chart 
demonstrates, the Komi Economic Minister can be bypassed by directives 
received at the district level directly from Moscow.  The potential for 
duplication or confusion is very high.  In addition, the enforcement 
network and fine system for the Federation is antiquated and 
ineffective.  The Komi district map also delineates another weakness of 
their system.  Each individual district employ only three inspectors  and 
they each have a specific area of assignment, which makes a very 
inefficient system.  For example, if one inspector is a fisheries expert 
and happens to find a forestry-related violation he must contact the 
forestry specialist in his district to evaluate and deliver the penalty, 
usually a fine..  The system of fines is antiquated and has not kept up 
with inflation.  An accidental spill of to 1000 to 10,000 gallons of oil 
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into a waterway of any type carries a fine of 100,000 rubles - $20.00.    
Environmental incentives are non-existent with such a system. 
        The Constitution of the Republic of Komi states the following:  
Article 64, subsection (e), the use of natural resources; protection of 
environment and maintenance of ecological safety; especially protected 
nature reserves; protection of monuments of history and culture are 
common jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Komi.   
In order to establish a positive trend with environmental remediation  
there is need for significant policy modifications that will allow the 
Komi Republic to formulate, modify and enforce its own environmental 
policy. 
Case II
        The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 signaled a change in 
world order and precipitated a wealth of speculation about the future of 
the Russian Federation and  the other Republics of the Former Soviet 
Union (FSU).  Within the former Soviet system are also found a number of  
republics called Autonomous Republics.  They  were established under the 
Stalin regime but nothing changed except these republics were allowed to 
call themselves autonomous.  From Stalins  perplexing ideal of 
maintaining ethnic diversity originated this autonomous designation.  
Each republic still operated as required under the Soviet system.  The 
Komi Republic is one of these so-called Autonomous Republics and is the 
subject of this paper.
        The death of Constantin Chernyenko in March of 1985 and the 
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subsequent appointment of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev as the secretary 
general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) marks the 
beginning of a period of significant change in the Soviet Union.   The 
methodology of ideological reform under Gorbachev was not dissimilar to 
previous changes in Soviet thinking.  Gorbachev took on the task of 
uskornie (acceleration) of scientific-technical progress.  Launching 
reform of this type displaced developed socialism  rather than destroying 
it outright, consequently developed socialism was allowed a foothold by 
those unwilling to change.    Nevertheless, as we know, Gorbachev was 
able to displace or counterbalance the ideology of developed socialism 
with his uskornie of technical, social and economic reform.  Ultimately 
these were part of  perestroika (restructuring).
        It is productive to address the specific nature of the dynamics 
between the rapidly eroding Soviet Union and current problems in the 
Russian Federation and the Komi Republic.  I propose to use transition 
theory as outlined in Chapter 14 of  (Drake) , Towards Building a Theory 
of Population-Environment Dynamics,(Ness, Drake, Breslin, 1992) as an 
evaluative mechanism.  We know that the collapse of the USSR occurred in 
1991 and by using several indicators I surmise that the transitions will 
point to SOMETHING imminent during the years approaching 1991.  Since we 
already know what happened then the focal point is available.  Can the 
transitions be used as a predictive mechanism?   I hypothesize that  
transition theory will illustrate trends with which to make general 
predictions that  substantiate the fall of the USSR.  If similar 
transitional trends are evident utilizing environmental-related data 
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specific to Komi then I theorize an environmental abnormality exists. 
This abnormality must then be addressed through appropriate scientific 
investigation. Decisions based on these data may lead to policy 
modifications.  This paper  includes a more detailed narrative of the 
factors that led to the breakup of the Soviet Union.  Clearly, the 
transitions would not actually predict the breakup but the could 
illustrate, with different indicators, that something would happen within 
a few years or less.  By combining supporting data and transitions a 
correlation will appear that is mutually supportive.  In order to explain 
this presumption a number of transitions have been prepared from 
different subject areas.  If all of these areas indicate a change or 
continued trend in a direction that implies impending problems then it 
seems clear that transitions could be used as a significant correlative 
factor in an overall predictive mechanism.   The next part of this paper 
will explore the idea of transitions and their usefulness in more detail.
What led to the breakup of the Soviet Union?
        The election of Gorbachev as secretary general of the CPSU in 
March of 1985 testified to the Politburos recognition that the country 
was in a very serious long-term crisis which would eventually jeopardize 
its standing as a great power alongside the United States.  Gorbachev was 
the candidate of those who wanted change.   He realized that change could 
no longer be postponed.  Gorbachev intensified the goals of Yuri 
Andropov, his patron and mentor, to reduce party corruption and 
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investigate non-labor income,  that is, Gorbachev lobbied against people 
who received earnings not acquired in officially recognized employment.   
He also sharply restricted the sale of alcoholic drinks and banned their 
consumption on official occasions.  This was the first part of 
perestroika.  Gorbachev also launched glasnost (publicity) which was 
supposed to indicate less secrecy and eliminate censuring of the press.   
The catalyst for perestroika and glasnost occurred in April of 1986 - 
Chernobyl.  Foreigners were indignant that they should learn of an 
explosion affecting public health around the world from a non-Soviet 
source (the Swedes were supposedly the first to call attention to the 
increased atmospheric levels of radiation).    
        Gorbachev may have been the architect of the breakup of the USSR 
but it surely was in a more reactive role than a proactive one.  Once he 
loosened  the grip of the former Soviet system he and the socialist 
government were overwhelmed.  Shortly after Chernobyl Gorbachev held a 
meeting with a delegation of writers and told them to print the truth.  
They responded with attacks on censorship and on environmental 
pollution.  Books including Solzhenitsyns Gulag Archipelago were 
published and the realities of Stalins regime were revealed in their 
entirety.  Sakharov was released from exile in Gorky and immediately made 
his presence known, even to Gorbachev, who ordered his release.  
        Gathering momentum toward freedom throughout 1987 and 1988 the 
Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) started with sharp 
commentary about environmental issues and quickly moved toward the 
freedom lost in 1940 as part of the Nazi-Soviet Pact.   On March 11, 
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1990. Lithuania proclaimed independence and the Latvian and Estonian 
Supreme Soviets followed suit soon thereafter.   
        August 19, 1991, a small of group of opponents within the party 
attempted to take over the government in a coup attempt.  The attempt 
occurred a day before the Treaty of 9 + 1 was to be signed.   The 9 + 1 
describes a treaty with the 9 remaining republics (those republics which 
had no plans for complete independence) plus Moscow.   The treaty would 
allow for broader de-centralization of power and would virtually exclude 
much of the former Communist Politburo.  The Politburo was composed of 
men who made their livelihood from the Communist Party's abuse of power.  
They would not relinquish this power and their elite lifestyle without 
attempting a takeover.   This failed coup attempt left Boris Yeltsin in a 
position of power and effectively neutralized Gorbachev.  The failed 
attempt marked the official end of the USSR.
The Economic Facts Behind the Collapse of the Soviet Union
        When Gorbachev and his advisors took power in 1985 a national 
systemic crisis confronted them.  It was a crisis of effectiveness.  The 
Soviet Union was an economic disaster.  Its performance in almost every 
sphere but the military was below not only world standards, but the 
standards set by its own leadership.  Official party reports were 
completely inaccurate..  The party-state administration was highly 
bureaucratized, penetrated  by a corporatist spirit, and thoroughly 
corrupted  by  Mafia-like informal associations.  With regard to the 
economy, in a speech given at the Plenum of the Central Committee in 
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February 1988, Gorbachev summed up the state of affairs with a remarkable 
statement: In the 20 years previous to his accession to power, the Soviet 
national income, with the exception of production of alcohol, did not 
increase in real terms at all.    The combination of the trends of Soviet 
economic and technological stagnation with the explosive growth in the 
capitalist world was potentially, and in part actually, calamitous to the 
Soviet Union and to the domestic and international aspirations of its 
ruling circles.  During the mid-1980s the Soviet Union was falling behind 
major capitalist nations in key comparative economic indicators.  Most 
important, the technological gap between the Soviet Union and advanced 
capitalist countries was widening  with increased momentum.  The Soviet 
Union produced, for example, twice as much steel as the United States, 
with a GNP half the size of the United States, and still encountered 
chronic shortages of steel.  The explanation for this anomaly is quite 
simple: The Soviet Union wastes steel by engaging in an unnecessary and 
unproductive enterprise.  The amount of steel in Soviet capital and 
consumer goods is comparatively exorbitant. (This record of enormous 
waste is also true of lumber and other primary products, most notably the 
wasteful consumption of electricity and oil.)   Such practices, when 
combined with the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, served to further 
deteriorate an already huge imbalance between the military-industrial 
complex and the foreign/domestic economic situation. 
        The transitions found on the following page are graphic 
representations which, when combined with the narrative of the events 
leading up to the collapse of the USSR, make a clear representation of 
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the factors contributing to that collapse.  The figures which comprise 
the analytical base for the transitions were taken primarily from the 
World Resource Database (WRD).  The transitions portray parallel 
information which, in stable relationships, generally follow a parallel 
path, when A goes up B goes up and when A goes down B goes down.  The 
interesting behavior of the transitions occurs when the two parallel 
relationships either converge or diverge.  Something must have happened 
to cause this behavior.  Therefore, the transitions indicate some type of 
aberrant nature and underlying causality and, when combined with other 
factors, act as a reliable indicator or support predictive mechanisms.  
My examples focus specifically on the Soviet Union leading up to 1991.   
The curves primarily, but not exclusively, demonstrate economic trends.  
Those indicators graphically evince diverging or converging curves which, 
under stable conditions, display parallel behavior.    I theorize that 
creating similar transitions, but with the use of environmental data from 
Komi, will illustrate  behavior similar to the transitions from the 
Soviet data leading  to the collapse in 1991.   If the transitions from 
Komi do show similar dynamics then I contend that there are environmental 
problems which require further scientific analysis.
        The following six relationships graphically  delineate  trends 
which illustrate a change in the norm:  1)  external debt vs current 
borrowing;  2) total labor force vs agricultural labor force;  3)  energy 
production vs energy consumption;  4) energy exports vs energy imports;  
5)  roundwood imports vs roundwood exports. (6) crude birth and death rates:
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                (Information taken from the World Resource Database - WRD)      
Figure #1
        Figure #1 illustrates an increasingly diverging trend in external 
debt versus current borrowing from a point in time between 1987 and 
1988.  This trend continues and as the graph indicates the trend 
demonstrates a more pronounced divergence from 1990 toward 1991.  I 
consider this an indication of the increasing devaluation of the ruble on 
the world market.  In addition, the high debt makes the Soviet Union a 
poor risk to lenders, which causes the current borrowing trend to decrease.
 
                (Information taken from the World Resource Database - WRD)      
Figure #2
        Figure #2 graphically represents the relationship between total 
labor force and agricultural labor force.  I speculate that this graph 
explains the movement of the labor force from agricultural areas to the 
military-industrial complexes.  Agriculture is a labor intensive industry 
in the Soviet Union and the loss of this work force will necessitate the 
need for food importing.
 
                (Information taken from the World Resource Database - WRD)      
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Figure #3
        Figure #3 shows the relationship with the energy production 
versus energy consumption in the Soviet Union.  Notice the sharp drop in 
both production and consumption beginning about 1989.  A projection of 
this graph shows an intersection of the energy curves, which indicates 
the need for conservation measures or indicate the need for energy 
purchases from another source.
 
                (Information taken from the World Resource Database - WRD)      
Figure #4
        Figure #4 corresponds with Figure #3 regarding energy usage.  The 
energy production and consumption figures predicted an intersection.  
Measures were taken to correct this trend.  Energy exports were severely 
cut back.  Imports were reduced, again most likely due to the poor buying 
power of the ruble on the world market. 
 
                (Information taken from the World Resource Database - WRD)      
Figure #5
        Figure #5 above is another transition curve which also solidifies 
the fact that Soviet Union is in a critical economic situation.  The 
roundwood imports have been reduced and the projection line indicates 
that the imports  will continue to decline.  This transition again 
provides a graphic illustration indicating an economic downturn.
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                (Information taken from the World Resource Database - WRD)      
Figure #6
        Figure #6 has been projected manually simply to illustrate the 
significant trend in the crude birth and crude death rates.  1990 appears 
to be at the beginning of a transition which graphically represents a 
serious situation for the people of the new Republics formed from the 
Soviet Union.
        The previous six transitions (Figures #1 - #6) were created by 
data which,  when displayed graphically, delineated negative trends.  The 
transitions did not predict anything specific but when viewed together 
they made a compelling argument that something negative occurred or was 
beginning to occur.  By combining these graphic observations with 
existing history the transitions are consistent with what we now know 
about the collapse of the Soviet Union.  It is my theory that if 
environmental data gathered in the Komi Republic displays negative 
characteristics similar to transitions in figures #1- #6 then further, 
quantitative investigations are appropriate, and I theorize that these 
investigations will conclude that Komi's environmental situation has not 
stabilized but  continues to deteriorate.  Therefore, the Komi Republic 
has need to address this situation through environmental remediation as 
outlined by a specific environmental policy.  
        Two questions arise when reviewing the transition dynamics: (1)  
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Why didn't some officials within the government of the Soviet Union 
recognize what was happening?  (2)  How will the FSU finance remediation 
of environmental problems and reverse the serious downward trend of 
economic indicators?  Part of the explanation for both of these questions 
follows:  According to official statistics (which were later found to be 
false), Boris Gosteev, the minister of finance, reported in October 1985, 
that the Soviet Union had generated a budget surplus of 4.1 billion 
rubles.  Belatedly in 1988, he corrected himself to reveal that on the 
contrary, the 1985 budget had not run a surplus but a deficit of 37 
billion rubles, or about $59 billion.  Gosteev anticipated that in 1989 
there would be a budget deficit of 35 billion rubles or about $56 
billion;   the previous figures reflect an exchange rate of $1.60 = 1 
ruble.    Figure #7 below  illustrates the REAL, world-market value of 
the ruble during the time period from  1989  to the present.  (Breakup of 
the USSR occurred in 1991). 
 
                (Compiled from yearly trips to Russia by the Richard W. 
Aishton)        
Figure #7
Referring to Figure #7, Gosteev's deficit figures are far beyond 37 
billion rubles since the real market value of the ruble far in excess of 
his exchange rate of $1.60 = 1 ruble.   
        The Former Soviet Union (FSU) has broken into a fragmented 
economic disarray.  The Russian Federation is the main player with whom 
this paper is concerned because my interest relates to the Komi Republic, 
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which resides within the boundaries of the Russian Federation, yet to a 
degree has some freedom beyond Russia.  This is a complex relationship 
that has a unique dynamic, which will be explored.   Hedley Bull argues 
the point of anarchy and how it is incompatible with society in the 
international trade arena.    I understand where this could be loosely 
applied to the Moscow - Komi situation, or any other place in the Russian 
Federation.  Russia needs to become a permanent, reliable fixture on the 
international market yet its history also does not allow it completely 
sever with the past practices quite yet.  The old Communist elite are now 
entrenched in the new capitalism yet still do not fully understand how to 
separate from the anarchist/socialist model under which they lived and 
thrived.    Presently the situation has changed in the FSU, but has it 
really?  According to my interpretation of Double-Edged Diplomacy 
(Putnam, 1992), Russia may not be very far from its usual situation in 
world trade.  For most countries involved in international relations, 
whether it is trade or dispute resolution the politicians or 
decision-makers were involved in a two-level game.  The decision-makers 
are required to make decisions based on what constituents at home desire 
(aka. domestic table) and another set of decisions and rules are needed 
to deal with what politicians and businessmen from foreign countries are 
asserting (aka the  international table).   Question:  Does Moscow 
actually care about domestic policy or is it too busy trying to get into 
the international arena where Russia can stand to make political and 
economic gains?  According to my theory based on proposals discussed in 
file:///C|/545/1995/aishton.htm (18 of 31) [6/18/2008 10:56:36 AM]
545\aishton
Double-Edged Diplomacy (Putnam, 1992),  Russian Federation government 
officials face decisions on an international level that conflict with 
domestic interests.  These officials make decisions based on improving 
economic gains and consequently they ignore domestic problems, which 
include the terrible environmental conditions.  A more free press in 
Russia and greater world media attention creates a forum in which 
government officials are more exposed to criticism.  President Boris 
Yeltsins heart condition has jeopardized his political future.  Current 
acting President Viktor Chernomyrdin, a former businessman, must now  
devise a strategy in which to address both the economic and environmental 
conditions in the Russian Federation.
Case III
        The economic situation for the average Russian citizen is still 
bleak but another specter looms in the shadows of the Russian country - 
environmental degradation.  In the wake of Soviet Communism  the Soviet 
Union  has left a legacy of inconceivable and potentially irreversible 
environmental damage.  In land area, the Soviet Union was the largest 
country in the world.  In population in 1990 it ranked third, after China 
and India.  For decades it was the leading producer of oil and steel, the 
owner of a quarter of the planets forest reserves and an equal portion of 
its fresh water.  Yet it beggared itself by endangering the health of its 
population - especially its children and its labor force - the 
productivity of its soil and the purity of its air and water.    The 
simply unbelievable environmental legacy left to the people of Russia 
defies the imagination.  Not only are five regions - the Urals, East and 
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West Siberia, Central and North Russia - on the brink of ecological 
disaster, but, where air quality was monitored, it is theoretically 
impossible to live in every seventh city.  There is 20 times as much 
nitrous oxide as the normal international standard in the air of Gorky 
(Nizhny-Novgorod), Smolensk and Omsk; 33 times as much sulfur dioxide as 
the normal international standard in Nikel; 183 times as much methyl 
mercaptan as the normal international standard in Volzhsky, 289 times in 
Arkhangelisk, 478 times in Novodvinsk; the benzopyrene content in 
Novokunetsks air is 598 times above the maximum permissible by 
international standards.  The air in Novokuznetsk, in fact, ranked on as 
the fifth most polluted in the USSR.    Most of these cities are in a 
Catch-22 situation whereby the large industry is such an integral part of 
the economic structure of the city that closing the factory down to 
retrofit it with proper pollution control systems would disrupt the flow 
of funds for the municipal budget, throwing the city into economic chaos. 
        Stalins desire to demonstrate Soviet superiority led to the 
acceleration of industrialization while leaving behind all other aspects 
of development including health and environmental safeguards.  The United 
States followed a similar developmental strategy but in the early 1960s 
the US had the benefit of people like Rachel Carson  (Silent Spring, 
1961) who had a democratic forum in which to raise questions that 
initiated scientific research.  Decisions based on this research insured 
proper stewardship of the earth.  Unfortunately, the Communist society 
was interested only in being superior, at all costs.   The price the 
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Russians and other Republics of the FSU have paid is far beyond the 
benefits.  Health minister, Aleksei Yablakov, has completed a two-year 
study which shows a bewildering array of ominous health trends including 
increases in anemia, tuberculosis, infectious hepatitis and acute upper 
respiratory tract infections which are linked to the intensity of 
pesticide use, water pollution and suspended particulate matter well in 
excess of established international norms.   The  graphic representation 
below  illustrates the trend of infectious hepatitis.
        
                (Compiled from data in Ecocide, Murray Feshbach, 1992.) 
(Figure #8)
        Figure #8 projects the trend in the occurrence of hepatitis.  
Hepatitis (which includes both hepatitis A & hepatitis B) is commonly 
used as a reliable indicator for water quality.  Figure #8 illustrates an 
increasing trend which projects continued poor quality water for the 
Russian Federation.  This trend demonstrates the need to formulate a 
program designed to remediate the poor quality of water in Russia.  It 
also adds another component to the overall environmental picture of Russia.     
        The environmental situation in the FSU is serious, and with the 
addition of nuclear waste problems the situation is grave.  The 
eventuality for all of the indiscriminate use of nuclear technology is a 
somber future for the citizens of the former republics of the USSR.  As 
many as 120 civilian underground explosions have been carried out in the 
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USSR over the past four decades and about 1,000 more under military 
operations.  There are 54 civilian nuclear power plants in the former 
USSR, operated in ways that would be considered less-than-safe by 
International standards.  There are many radioactive waste sites, even in 
densely populated areas: 636 in Moscow; 200 in Omsk and 1,400 in St. 
Petersburg.  These commonplace sources take a toll in morbidity, as do 
the dramatic events, such as the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986.  
Over 650,000 people were exposed to radiation at Chernobyl and a 1992 
commission found 1,700 cases of thyroid cancer (200 of them children) 
believed to have resulted from that accident.   Currently, the average 
life expectancy in men in the Former Soviet Union is lower than the 
pension age.    Compare the following graphic projection, which further 
delineates future trends in birth and death rates in Russia. 
 
        (Information taken from the World Resource Database - WRD)      
Figure #9
 
        (Information taken from the World Resource Database - WRD)      
Figure #10
        When one compares the previous two curves (Figures #9 & #10) the 
differences in the projections do not appear to be serious since the 
deaths project a range of deaths from 4000 to 5500 (using linear or 
exponential methods) in the year 2030. The births projected to the year 
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2030 are estimated reach approximately 5800 to nearly 6000.  The erratic 
nature of the births curve is a concern..  The births have displayed this 
behavior since 1950 and would appear to be normally eccentric in the 
Russian Federation (and FSU) population.  I submit, however, that this 
erratic nature is a product of decades of environmental problems and will 
be more susceptible to increasing  spikes and valleys as the 
concentrations of pollutants increases.
        The Komi problem described earlier in this paper is duplicated 
all over the Former Soviet Union.  In this particular instance there are 
clear data projections and a definite potential program to reverse the 
environmental destruction that so defines the legacy of the FSU.  The 
Komi Republic has some unique features that make it both attractive and 
practical to begin a new environmental program.  The remoteness of its 
location make it necessary to govern more independently.  Its remoteness 
has also contributed to the fact that less environmental damage has 
occurred there than in other regions of the FSU.
        Komi is the site of the cleanest water in Europe (located in the 
Pechoro-Illych Biosphere), which is something worth saving.  The mighty 
Pechora River is the last stronghold of virgin Atlantic salmon 
fisheries.  The city of Ukhta is the focal point of the oil and natural 
gas extraction coming out of the Siberian oil fields.  The largest pulp 
and paper complex in Europe is located 10 miles from the capital city of 
Syktyvkar.  This paragraph illustrates the conflicts  and potential for 
conflicts among environmentalists and capitalists in the Republic.  Since 
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the people have long been oppressed it is only natural to ignore the 
environment for economic gain which
        
would make them at least comfortable.  The Komi people realize that the 
land exists for future generations.  They have a very active Green Party 
in Komi and have a published newspaper called Cheesta Pechora. (Literally 
translated this means clean Pechora)  Officials in the Troitsko-Pechorsk 
district (see map #2 and attachment in appendix) have taken measures to 
further protect the Pechoro-Illychsky biosphere which is located within 
the area of this district.  A one-half kilometer wide buffer zone has 
been delineated on the ground around the entire perimeter of the 
biosphere to insure protection against encroachment from logging.  Legal 
pressure is limited, but the citizens of the district apply public 
pressure to maintain the pristine conditions of the biosphere and in this 
district the pressure has had a positive effect.  However, long-term, 
legal solutions to the environmental problems seem less positive since 
policies and laws originate within the government and the bureaucratic 
snarl that pervades the legacy of the Communist Party.  
        The Komi Republic has taken a positive initiative by developing a 
project name of Eckom.  The project, infused in the educational system, 
is teaching children at all grade levels about the dangers of improper 
ecosystem management. But without significant policy modifications or 
changes even this worthwhile project may be rendered useless.  
        The following two graphic projections pertain specifically to the 
Komi Republic.  The curves confirm that Komi also appears to be 
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consistent with data from the Russian Federation and FSU.  In both 
instances the curves indicate trends that require further attention and 
more sufficient quantitative analysis.  The  first set of curves (Figure 
#10) relates the frequency of upper respiratory infections in the Komi 
Republic which are presumably linked to air pollutants from pulp and 
paper complexes, coal mining facilities and other industrial complexes 
with insufficient or non-existent pollution abatement equipment. 
 
        (Information from the Komi Government - Tentakov, 1995) Figure #11
        Although the death rate does not appear to seriously accelerating 
it nevertheless indicates an increasing trend. Trends such as this are 
not considered serious but when combined with other data a complete 
picture is constructed which indicates serious long-term, health 
problems.  Poor health is directly proportional to poor environmental 
conditions.
        (Information from the Komi Government - Tentakov, 1995) Figure #12
        As one can see there is an increasing trend in both curves.  
Unless remediation strategies are implemented  this trend will continue 
and may begin to accelerate.  The ecosystem variation dictates a varied 
environmental management program.  However, the only method to initiate 
such a program is to bring about a change in policy at the government 
level.  With mathematical projections illustrating negative trends it 
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seems logical to explore other relationships to determine if similar 
trends are evident.  When more data becomes available for the Komi 
Republic transition dynamics will be applied as it was for the Soviet 
Collapse.   If these transitions display similar behavior to those 
transitions explored in the collapse and quantitative data support the 
transitions' behavior then there is a need to implement timely and 
fundamental policy changes are necessary.   The legacy of the CPSU 
(Communist Party of the Soviet Union) still maintains a hold on the 
bureaucratic process.  It will be a difficult task to persuade the 
Russian government to allow Komi and other regions in Russia to develop a 
new  set of specific environmental laws and regulations, with an active 
and efficient  enforcement arm.  By utilizing the processes described in 
this paper along with additional quantitative data perhaps changes in the 
environmental policy structure can be realized.  
        The following summarizes desirable policy recommendations for the 
Komi Republic based on the interpretation of data acquired during research:
1.      The Russian Federation has such a huge land area and such 
ecosystem diversity it is not reasonable to try to administrate 
environmental policy with one general guideline.  Therefore, it is 
incumbent upon the Russian Federation to consider modifying the structure 
of policy administration.  The Federation could model their policy 
similar to the United States.  Moscow  would supply general guidelines as 
a baseline with which to work.  The environmental policy structure would 
be decentralized and the responsibility for the development of specific 
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environmental standards would be the task of the administrative apparatus 
located in the seats of government at the Republics level.
2.      The development of the enforcement section of the judicial system 
in the Federation Government will be slow.  Therefore, I recommend that 
at the Republics level a task force is assembled, with appropriate 
distribution among government officials, technical experts, 
environmentalist and industry representatives.  This task force can begin 
to formulate a workable plan to allow  for environmental remediation and 
still maintain functional economic standards.  What is the incentive for 
this type of consensus-building?  Agreements which originate from this 
type of consensus process would be "grandfathered" out of new laws 
enacted by the Moscow government at a later date.   Of course there would 
be limits to this exemption.
3.      The Komi Republic needs to adopt specialized regulations which 
reflect the ecosystem diversity in the Republic.  A "biome environmental 
policy" should be considered as one alternative.  Technical assistance 
for such a policy is easily obtainable from the Ural Division of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences in Syktyvkar.
4.      Refer to the organization chart of the Komi government (In the 
Appendix).  The minister of natural resources must have direct contact 
with Moscow.  The current organization creates the potential for 
confusion and redundancy.
5.      Each of the 20 districts in Komi must have the freedom to form 
planning boards and to adopt local ordinances which are, in turn, 
recognized and aided by the Komi and Moscow governments.  Local 
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enforcement will be successful only if backed up by government policy.
6.      The number of inspectors in each of the districts must be 
increased.  The geographic size of the districts and poor road systems 
create inefficiency.  A larger number of inspectors will alleviate some 
of the inefficiency problems.  The inspectors should be required to have 
a strong scientific and environmental background with practical 
experience and university backgrounds preferable. And they should be paid 
accordingly.  Their work will have a significant effect on the overall 
environmental policy and remediation process.
        The Komi Republic is a unique area in the Russian Federation.  
Due to its vast wealth of natural resources it has enjoyed relative 
prosperity compared to other areas of the Russian Federation and the 
FSU.  The Komi people and the Russians who live in Komi share the common 
goal of maintaining  Komi as a sustainable society.  Poor economic 
conditions and environmental degradation threaten this sustainability 
unless properly addressed.  By combining the ideas outlined in this paper 
with other innovative ideas from the Komi residents it is likely that 
Komi will succeed.  This success, however, is a function of environmental 
policy and decision-making strategies.  Komi and Russia are quickly 
approaching a critical period when poor decision-making could cause their 
serious environmental situation to accelerate towards disaster.   If they 
act quickly it not too late for resolution.
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        APPENDIX
Attachment:  Maps #1 and #2.
        APPENDIX
Attachment with Biome Map (#3)
Areas and delineations for  the forest biomes of the Komi Republic
                                        
Biome           Percentage              Square Kilometers       
                                of Area 
                                        
Mountain Tundra         10.2            42513.6 
                                        
Arctic Tundra           2.4             10003.2 
                                        
Wooded Tundra           6.4             26675.2 
                                        
Northern Taiga          40              166720  
                                        
Central Taiga           38              158384  
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Southern Taiga          3               12504   
                                        
                100             416,800 
                                        
APPENDIX
Attachment with Komi District Map (#4)
and flow chart
region  name of region  area    population      administrative  population
                1000 sq km      1000's of people        center  1000's of people
                                        
1       Syktyvkar       0.7     242.6   Syktyvkar       226.3
2       Vorkuta 24.2    209.7   Vorkuta 113.5
3       Vuktill 22.5    26.3    Vuktill 18.8
4       Inta    30.1    68.4    Inta    59.9
5       Pechora 28.9    92.4    Pechora 64.8
6       Sosnogorsk      19.4    62.1    Cosnogorsk      31.2
7       Usinsk  30.6    70.9    Usinsk  53.2
8       Ukhta   10.3    140.8   Uhkta   110.9
9       Ijem    18.4    24.3    Ijma    4.1
10      Knyajpogost     24.6    36.7    Emva    18.9
11      Koigorod        10.4    12.2    Koigorodok      3.1
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12      Kortker 19.7    27.7    Kortkeros       4.8
13      Preloz  13.2    29.4    Obyachevo       5.8
14      Syktyvdin       7.4     28.2    Vwilgort        11.2
15      Sissola 6.2     19.3    Vizinga 7.5
16      Troitsko-Pechorsk       40.7    25.3    Troitsko-Pechorsk       10.8
17      Udorsk  35.8    31.8    Koslan  4.2
18      Ust-Vweem       4.8     40.6    Aikino  3.8
19      Ust-Kulom       26.4    39.7    Ust-Kulom       5.7
20      Ust-Tselem      42.5    17.3    Ust-Tsulma      5.4
                                        
        Total   416.8   1245.7          
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TRADING AWAY FORESTS: INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA
Introduction
        International trade is no longer solely an issue for economists.  
As nations become more integrated in a global market, there is a growing 
consensus that trade has a powerful effect on all areas of society and 
the environment.  Recent developments in the international political 
arena have only just started to take into account the environmental 
ramifications of trade policies.    
        Although international trade by itself is not a direct cause for 
environmental degradation, it can profoundly affect patterns of natural 
resource consumption.  In the case of Indonesia and Malaysia, the 
tropical timber trade has been an influential factor in determining how 
these countries manage their forests.  Not only are the forests being 
logged for international interests, but the process of logging opens the 
way for other factors causing forest depletion and environmental 
degradation in Indonesia and Malaysia.
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The Importance of Tropical Forests
        The tropical forests in the Indo-Malaysian region contain some of 
the world's highest levels of biological diversity.  Indonesia alone is 
estimated to contain 25 percent of the world's fish species, 17 percent 
of the bird species, 16 percent of the reptile and amphibian species, 12 
percent of the mammal species, and 10 percent of the flowering plant 
species (Ministry of Forestry, 1993).  Consequently, there is a strong 
global environmental movement to protect the forests and maintain the 
ecological systems that support these diverse life forms.  There is also 
a growing concern that tropical forests should be preserved because they 
act as natural consumers of carbon dioxide and help prevent global 
warming.  At the local level, the forests play other important roles in 
preventing soil erosion, protecting watersheds, and maintaining 
micro-climatic conditions.
        Economically, the Indo-Malaysian region contains an especially 
valuable source of tropical timber from the dipterocarp tree species.  
The dipterocarp produce hardwood with a high commercial value, and the 
trees grow tall and straight making them easy to cut into long durable 
planks.  The forests in Indonesia and Malaysia contain high percentages 
of the dipterocarp trees.   
The Dynamics between Commercial Logging and The Forests
        The demand for timber on the international trade market provides 
a direct incentive to log trees for profit.  As a result of logging, 
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there is also a high level of secondary damage to the surrounding 
vegetation.  Within any forest there are numerous trees that have no 
commercial value either because they are too small or because they belong 
to unprofitable species.  The potential for the forest to regenerate 
after logging depends heavily on the methods of logging extraction and 
the extent of vegetation left to regenerate itself.  Industrial timber 
companies generally use heavy machinery to take out valuable trees and to 
establish roads for transporting equipment into the remote areas of the 
forests.  A fair amount of vegetation is destroyed just in the process of 
getting the logging equipment to the location of the trees.  Once there, 
companies pay little attention to the felling techniques used to cut the 
trees and as a consequence large trees often fall on and harm the 
surrounding vegetation.  Studies conducted by the International Timber 
and Trade Organization (ITTO) estimate that 60 percent of vegetation not 
directly logged is severely damaged or destroyed as the result of logging 
practices (Collins et al., 1991).
        Another effect of industrial logging practices is to provide 
locals with the means to enter otherwise remote areas of the forests.  
Once the logging companies have left an area, settlers often use the 
roads to go in and stake land which has already been cleared of trees for 
agricultural purposes.  Settlers also clear additional land beyond the 
areas exploited for timber.  Thus, the logging practices can be seen in 
conjunction with agriculture as the first step in permanently removing 
trees in many of these areas which do not have a chance to recover once 
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the logging companies have moved on.  
Historical Background
        Before the timber trade, the Southeast Pacific was almost 
completely covered with tropical rainforests.  With few exceptions, the 
large-scale deforestation of Malaysia and Indonesia did not begin until 
the 1960's and early 1970's respectively.  At this time, multinationals 
from the United States, Europe, and Japan invested heavily in this region 
and traded timber back to their home countries.  Initially, the 
governments in both the home and host countries encouraged foreign 
investment in these tropical forests.  As shown in Graph #1 and Graph #2, 
large-scale logging and the export of unprocessed timber (roundwoods) 





        Commercial logging and the timber trade was beginning to provide 
a steady income for Malaysia and Indonesia.  Oil remained the most 
profitable export good, but following the Oil Crisis in 1973 both 
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countries started looking for ways to increase their foreign export 
earnings.  Along with utilizing natural gas deposits, these countries 
targeted the timber industry for development.  The governments in 
Indonesia and Malaysia began charging more for the forest concessions 
they gave to logging companies.  In addition, they also increased the 
percentage of domestic firms that received these concessions.  By the 
late 1970s, Indonesia had started to restrict foreign investment to 
promote the growth of their domestic timber industry.  Realizing 
additional profits could be retained by exporting processed timber 
instead of roundwood, Indonesia banned the export of logs in 1980.  This 
resulted in a domestic increase in the production of sawnwood and panel 
forest products (Graph #1).  In response to international pressures, 
Indonesia lifted its ban on raw log exports in 1992 (export data after 
1991 is unavailable).  In Malaysia, the government also attempted to 
restrict log exports by raising tariffs in the 1980s.  However, unlike 
Indonesia, the Sabah and Sarawak regions of Malaysia continued to rely on 
the export of unprocessed timber and the overall roundwood exports in 
Malaysia have steadily increased to the present time (Graph #2).  
Although attempts to restrict log exports were not as successful in 
Malaysia as compared with Indonesia, the Asian bloc of countries 
increased secondary timber production steadily from the 1960s to the 
1990s.  While the percentage of roundwood and sawnwood exports 
fluctuated, the percentage of wood-based panels skyrocketed from 41 
percent in the 1961 to 90 percent in 1990 (Table 1).  
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TABLE #1                                                                
                                                                
Exports of Timber Products as a Percentage of Production in Tropical 
Countries (%)                                                           
                                                                
                                                                
                                1961    1970    1980    1990    
All Tropical Countries                                                          
        Industrial Roundwood                    15.6    27.1    18.2    11.1    
        Sawnwood                        15.3    17.3    16.2    12.0    
        Wood-based Panels                       34.0    33.0    32.5    69.4    
                                                                
Tropical Africa                                                         
        Industrial Roundwood                    23.8    23.3    16.3    9.5     
        Sawnwood                        32.1    28.5    12.7    12.3    
        Wood-based Panels                       34.0    33.0    28.6    21.9    
                                                                
Tropical Central and South 
America                                                              
        Industrial Roundwood                    1.6     1       0.2     0.2     
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        Sawnwood                        14.7    13.6    6.9     3.9     
        Wood-based Panels                       34.0    33      15.3    19.4    
                                1961    1970    1980    1990    
Tropical Asia and 
Oceania                                                               
        Industrial Roundwood                    22.2    44.2    33.4    20.4    
        Sawnwood                        11.9    18.5    24.5    117.5   
        Wood-based Panels                       40.5    39.9    49.4    89.7    
                                                                
Source: FAO (1992) in Barbier et al. (1994).
Despite the variations in the unprocessed versus processed timber 
exports, the international trade of timber products as a whole has 
steadily increased from the 1960s to the present day.
        
Economics- The Driving Factor
        As shown in Map #1, the distribution of tropical rainforests is 
found primarily in South America, Africa, India, and Asia.  The regional 
view of Indonesia and Malaysia shows that both these countries are 
heavily endowed with tropical rainforests.  Following David Ricardo's 
basic economic theory of comparative advantage, Indonesia and Malaysia 
would be well advised to sell tropical forests (which they have in 
abundance) on the international market in exchange for other goods and 
services.  Modern economics has since expanded on the theory of 
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comparative advantage, but there remains an underlying economic incentive 
for countries in the tropical areas to trade timber.  
        While in practice the tropical hardwoods exported from all of the 
developing countries only account for 3 percent of the total wood removal 
from these countries, in certain areas such as Malaysia, it is estimated 
that 68 percent of all wood removal enters into the world trade market 
(Collins et al., 1991).  More specifically, of the 25 million cubic 
meters (mn cu m) of tropical hardwood logs exported worldwide in 1986, 19 
mn cu m came from the Sabah and Sarawak regions of Malaysia; seventy 
percent of the world trade in sawn hardwood came from SE Asia; and 
Indonesia is now the world's largest tropical plywood producer (Ibid., 
1991).  
         Another worldwide study compiled by Barbier et al. (1994) 
measures the amount of forested land in tropical countries and the 
percent of area being deforested annually (see Table 2).  
                                                             TABLE 
#2                                           
                                                
            Tropical Forest Resources: Status and Changes in thousands of 
hectares                                                
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                                        Area    % of Area
                                        Deforested      Deforested
                        Land    Forest Area     Annually        Annually
                        Area    1990    1981-90 1981-90
Latin America                                           
        Brazil          845,651 347,000 3,200   0.92
        Peru            128,000 73,000  300     0.41
        Bolivia         108,439 55,500  60      0.11
        Venezuela               88,205  42,000  150     0.36
        Colombia                103,870 41,400  350     0.85
        Guyana          19,685  19,300  3       0.02
        Suriname                15,600  15,200  3       0.02
        Ecuador         27,684  12,300  60      0.49
Africa                                          
        Zaire           226,760 103,800 200     0.19
        Congo           34,150  21,100  22      0.10
        Gabon           25,767  20,300  15      0.07
        Cameroon                46,540  17,100  80      0.47
        Central African Republic                62,298  3,600   5       0.14
        Equatorial Guinea               2,805   1,200   3       0.25
Asia                                            
        Indonesia               181,157 108,600 1,315   1.21
        Malaysia                32,855  18,400  255     1.39
        Philippines             29,817  6,500   110     1.69
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Source: Schmidt (1990) in Barbier et al. 
(1994).                                                
Asia as a region suffered from the highest rate of deforestation 
throughout the 1980s with Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines having 
the highest rates per country.  To some extent these percentage 
statistics are more meaningful when there is a large total area of 
tropical forests in the country.  And indeed, Indonesia is second only to 
Brazil with a total of 109 million hectares (mn ha) of rain forests.  
Combined with Indonesia's 1.21 percent rate of deforestation this results 
in a loss of 1,315,000 ha of rainforests every year (Barbier et al., 
1994).  In order to understand why Indonesia and Malaysia are being so 
heavily deforested, it is necessary to look at the importance of forest 
products to their national economies.
        In 1989, the industrial forest sector in Indonesia and Malaysia 
accounted for 3-6 percent of the total gross domestic product, and forest 
based exports accounted for between 10 and 16 percent of the total 
exchange value of all exports.  In comparison, the industrial forest 
sector in most countries with tropical forests was less important and 
averaged below 2 percent of the total gross domestic product of these 
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countries (Barbier, et al., 1994).  An explanation for the heavy logging 
in Indonesia and Malaysia is the presence of the valuable dipterocarp 
species of tree.  Furthermore, this region has the highest density of 
tropical forests in the world (see Map #2), and it is relatively easy for 
companies to realize profits and reduce transportation costs when trees 
are located close to each other.  Both of these factors combine to make 
Indonesia and Malaysia the two leading countries in exports of forestry 
goods by a large margin over most other tropical countries, many of whom 
are net importers of tropical forest goods (Table 3). 
TABLE #3                                                                
                                                                
Forestry Products in Selected Countries- Thousands of US 
Dollars                                                                
                                                                
                                Imports Exports Net Exports             
Tropical Africa                                                         
        Cameroon                        35,412  99,833  64,421          
        Central African Rep.                    468     29,994  29,526          
        Congo                   4,500   106,087 101,587         
        Ivory Coast                     27,200  236,147 208,947         
        Gabon                   3,655   136,774 133,119         
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        Kenya                   23,594  4,054   -19,540         
        Liberia                 1,942   78,264  76,322          
        Madagascar                      8,546   534     -8,012          
        Malawi                  8,085   1993    -6,065          
        Nigeria                 33,083  1,680   -31,403         
        Tanzania                        15,700  1,539   -14,161         
        Zaire                   3,666   17,032  13,366          
        Zimbabwe                        5,765   4,169   -1,596          
                                                                
Tropical Central and South 
America                                                              
        Costa Rica                      40,020  21,895  -18,125         
        Cuba                    193,411 1,847   -191,564                
        El Salvador                     21,800  2,725   -19,075         
        Guatemala                       69,410  18,326  -51,084         
        Honduras                        137,921 31,061  -106,860                
        Mexico                  403,605 13,884  -389,721                
        Nicaragua                       10,566  2,569   -7,997          
        Panama                  76,979  3,988   -72,991         
        Bolivia                 4,060   22,160  18,100          
        Brazil                  299,402 1,750,981       1,451,579               
        Columbia                        104,056 20,060  -83,996         
        Ecuador                 157,834 24,373  -133,461                
        Paraguay                        13,055  24,971  11,916          
        Peru                    104,914 2,558   -102,356                
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Tropical Asia and 
Oceania                                                               
        Hong Kong                       1,752,273       705,535 -
1,046,738              
        India                   290,967 16,337  -274,630                
        Indonesia                       330,157 3,069,199       
2,739,042               
        Laos                    200     10,251  10,051          
        Malaysia                        483,372 3,040,884       
2,557,512               
        Myanmar                 4,721   148,084 143,363         
        Philippines                     173,662 123,119 -50,543         
        Singapore                       747,548 663,302 -84,246         
        Thailand                        1,002,371       101,551 -
900,820                
        Fiji                    7,804   22,775  14,971          
        Papua New Guinea                        5,504   115,500 109,996         
Source: FAO (1992) in Barbier et al. (1994).
Indonesia is now the leading exporter of processed tropical hardwoods.  
In 1992 Indonesia's timber industry was worth 4.6 billion US dollars; 
much of this went to directly employing 2.5 mn people in the timber 
industry as well as 1.2 mn people in complementary or related businesses 
(Ministry of Forestry, 1993).   By 1983, Malaysia accounted for 58% of 
the total global export of tropical timber (Cronau, 1993), and in 1988, 
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timber overtook petroleum as Malaysias main export commodity, valued at 
3.6 billion dollars (Davis and Henley, 1990).  Both Indonesia and 
Malaysia are prime examples of countries that rely heavily on timber 
exports to support their national economies.
Exports and Deforestation
        The qualitative relationship between exports and deforestation is 
captured in Graph # 3.  
GRAPH #3
 
While this only includes roundwoods, there is a strong correlation 
between the increase in roundwood exports and the decrease in forested 
area from 1961 to 1979.  The notable drop of exports in the early 1980s 
corresponds with the sudden ban on raw log exports in Indonesia and, to a 
lesser extent, on the higher export tariffs on raw logs in Malaysia.  The 
total exports of forestry products, including panel wood and sawnwood, 
has continued to increase steadily throughout the 1980s to the present.  
Therefore, while the data on exported sawnwood and panel wood is not 
available, the relationship between deforestation and exports is very 
strong if all forest products are considered. 
        It should be noted that a direct quantitative relationship 
between the exported amount of wood (in cu m) and the associated 
deforestation of land (in ha) has not been calculated.  This is a very 
difficult relationship to establish for several reasons.  As mentioned in 
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the section on the dynamics between commercial logging and the forests, 
not only are trees removed for direct use, but approximately 60 percent 
of the surrounding vegetation is destroyed.  Secondly, logging operations 
are seen as part of the process enabling local people to gain access to 
closed forests and destroy additional forests for agriculture.  And, 
finally, because of the wide practice of illegal logging, the true number 
of exported logs is likely to be much higher than the officially reported 
measurements.  Logging rules are commonly disregarded and illegal exports 
are common.  For example, between 1986 and 1990, the Primary Industries 
Minister Lim Keng Yaik of Malaysia reported that four states exceeded 
their logging quotas by as much as 300 percent (Lumpur and Tsuruoka, 
1991).  According to a study conducted in Indonesia by Skephi, a 
non-government environmental organization, "timber transportation 
documents are commonly reused two to five times, which would mean that 
unreported logging in some areas may range from 100 to 400 percent over 
the volume of reported logging" (US Embassy, 1994).  Because of the wide 
range of associated uncertainties, it is not possible to calculate a 
quantitative relationship between exports and deforestation in Graph # 
3.  
        Even with missing data, the overall growth of roundwood exports 
is best characterized by a linear trend that, if it continues, would 
reach over 40,000 cubic meters by the year 2010 (see Graph #4).
GRAPH #4
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This worst case scenario would have devastating effects on the remaining 
tropical forests in this region.  Furthermore, even if roundwood exports 
remain at current levels, the tropical forests will still continue to 
disappear at an alarming rate.  Domestic and international trade policies 
will be the critical factor in determining whether forest exports 
increase or decrease in the upcoming years.
Forests in Transition
        Having established some relationships between exports and 
deforestation, it is useful to think of the interaction between the two 
in terms of a forestry transition.  William Drake describes the concept 
of transitions in Towards Building a Theory of Population-Environment 
Dynamics: A Family of Transitions (1993).  To paraphrase briefly, the 
idea behind transitions is that societies are especially vulnerable to 
change in critical time periods which depend in part on the state of the 
population in these societies.  Moreover, government policies can act to 
alleviate the problems associated with these critical time periods.  When 
a sector, such as the forestry sector, enters a transition period it 
undergoes rapid change before returning to a stable state; the forestry 
sector in Indonesia and Malaysia is doing just that.  According to Drake, 
if we can recognize transitions, we can proscribe policies to help reduce 
the negative aspects of the transition and influence the final 
equilibrium state. 
        Applied to this paper, the theory of transitions explicitly 
recognizes that there is a dynamic relationship between deforestation and 
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the tropical timber trade.  This relationship started in the 1960s and is 
continuing today.  Judging from the continued rates of deforestation and 
forest exports in Graph #4, the forestry transition is far from over.  In 
regards to population trends, Indonesia and Malaysia reached their peak 
growth rates in the mid 1970s and mid 1960s respectively (see Graphs #5 
and #6).  
        Since then population growth rates have declined and are expected 
to continue declining into the 21st century.  However, because the birth 
rates and death rates in these countries have both fallen at relatively 
the same speed (see Graphs #7 and #8), the total population in these 
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Thus, the population transition is not yet over and is expected to 
continue into the 21st century. Modernization provides an indirect link 
between population changes and increased timber exports.  As modern 
medicine acted to promote the decline in death rates / birth rates, the 
modern market system acted to promote improvements in the economy, trade, 
and technology (all three are necessary to exploit timber resources).  
Commercial logging in Malaysia began in the 1950s about ten years before 
population growth rates reached a maximum, and commercial logging began 
in Indonesia in the 1960s about ten years before its maximum population 
growth rate.  The same technological and economical advances that spurred 
the logging industry also preceded the beginnings of the demographic 
transition.  The direct link between the demographic and forestry 
transition is easily found by examining the dynamics between logging and 
deforestation.  There are two major connections:
        1.) As the total population rises, landless peasants become more 
numerous and it becomes more difficult to stop them from contributing to 
deforestation as they follow logging operations and convert forested land 
into fields for agriculture.  
        2.) As the total population rises, there is increased pressure on 
the national economy to sustain more people.  In the short-term, this 
pressure can be partly alleviated by supplementing national incomes with 
an increase in the exports of forestry goods.  This in turn increases 
file:///C|/545/1995/birkelund.htm (18 of 30) [6/18/2008 10:56:43 AM]
545\birkelund
deforestation. 
        The effects of the timber trade on deforestation began with 
Indonesias and Malaysias exposure to the Western capitalist market 
system.  Furthermore, the exposure to Western medicine prompted the 
demographic transition which has magnified the problems between the 
timber trade and deforestation in these countries.  In order to 
effectively get through the forestry transition, Indonesia and Malaysia 
need to concentrate on getting through their demographic transitions as well.
The Missing Element- Reforestation
        Until deforestation begins to level-off and approach 
reforestation, the forestry transition will not reach a stable state and 
logging operations will continue to deplete the tropical forests in this 
region.  At some point, the forestry transition will reach an 
equilibrium.  Where this equilibrium is partly dependent on the ability 
of governments to implement reforestation management.  
        There is very little data on the reforestation of the tropical 
forests of Indonesia and Malaysia.  Much of the available information is 
from the forestry departments of the governments and can be notoriously 
unreliable.  In 1990, the worldwide extent of plantations in the tropical 
areas was estimated at 43.9 mn ha, or less than two percent of the total 
forested area of 1,715 mn ha (Barbier, 1994).  According to the World 
Resources Database (1994-1995), Indonesia and Malaysia respectively had 
8,750,000 and 116,000 ha of plantations in 1990 and were adding to 
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plantations at a rate of 474,000 ha a year in Indonesia and 9,000 ha a 
year in Malaysia.  Considering the average annual deforestation rate in 
the 1980s was 1,315,000 ha in Indonesia and 255,000 ha in Malaysia (see 
Table 2), the rate of reforestation to deforestation is less than 25 
percent in Indonesia and less than 10 percent in Malaysia.  The forestry 
transition will not be complete until the rate of reforestation equals 
the rate of deforestation.  
        One drawback to reforested plantations is they often consist of 
only one species of tree.  Sometimes this is not even an indigenous 
species.  For example, the Eucalyptus tree from Australia is a 
fast-growing valuable timber that is often chosen to replace native 
trees.  Plantations do little to preserve the biological diversity of the 
traditional forests and can destroy the soil and water table as well.  It 
is therefore highly desirable for these countries to focus not only on 
reforestation, but also on preserving the integrity of the original 
forests.  Indonesia and Malaysia should attempt to move their logging 
efforts from areas of primary growth to reforested areas of secondary growth.
Domestic Policies
        In the 1983 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) was created to 
address the problems between trade and tropical forests.  Indonesia and 
Malaysia are both members of ITTO and have committed to the goal of 
sustainably managing all tropical forests by the Target Year 2000.  This 
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leaves the domestic governments with the task of balancing the short-term 
interests of the economy and logging companies against the long-term 
interests of the future economy and environmentalists.  The governments 
in Indonesia and Malaysia would like to improve the economic efficiency 
of the forestry sector without increasing the raw material growth of 
inputs or over-cutting the tropical forests.  In the past, one strategy 
pursued to promote this goal is to add economic value to their forests by 
restricting roundwood exports and processing lumber into secondary 
products before exporting it on the international trade market. 
        There are several problems with the strategy to export processed 
lumber.  While on the one hand it may be effective at adding monetary 
value to wood products before selling them, it also requires the 
countries to restrict trade on raw log exports.  Initially it might be 
expected that by cutting out foreign sales of raw logs the deforestation 
rates might go down.  However, as seen from the 1980 ban of log exports 
in Indonesia, deforestation rates were not reduced.  Roundwood production 
remained steady while sawnwood and panel wood production rose rapidly 
(see Graph # 1).  From an economic perspective, trade barriers decrease 
the market value of raw logs for the domestic wood processing 
industries.  When the price of logs goes down, domestic companies can 
purchase greater numbers of logs and this could actually cause an 
increase deforestation.  According to the World Bank, Indonesia's ban in 
log exports pushed the price of domestic logs to half the world level and 
resulted in over-cutting and over-investment in secondary wood production 
in Indonesia (Schwarz, 1992a).  When a natural resource loses market 
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value it becomes less valuable to protect as a long-term source of 
income.  The second point made by economists is that because domestic 
industries are shielded from competition with foreign wood processing 
companies (foreigners cannot buy raw material from these countries), 
export restrictions cause inefficiencies.  According to Marina Whitman, 
an international trade professor at the University of Michigan, 
international competition is essential for promoting the most efficient 
production of goods on a global level.  Trade restriction have proven 
unreliable for decreasing deforestation and can hinder the development of 
efficient domestic industries.  This runs contrary to the governments 
overall objective of increasing efficiency and maintaining the levels of 
raw material consumption.
        Another problematic domestic issue is the abuse and corruption 
that undermine the enforcement of logging regulations.  The governments 
in Indonesia and Malaysia are notorious for accepting bribes and showing 
preferential treatment to logging companies with personal connections to 
powerful officials.  Enforcement of national logging rules is poor at 
best.  As noted earlier, the illegal export of raw logs is also 
widespread.  The governments need to make a firm commitment to stopping 
corruption and enforcing their own logging regulations.
        Finally, the domestic policies for granting timber concessions to 
logging companies need to be reviewed.  Typically the governments grant 
timber concessions to logging companies for relatively short periods of 
time -- approximately 20 years.  This encourages companies to take as 
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much as they can from the forest before they lose their timber 
concessions.   It takes 35 to 40 years for dipterocarp trees to re-grow 
to commercially valuable sizes.  Therefore, the companies are not 
expected to get a second harvest from any particular concession (Schwarz, 
1991).  There is little concern by business for the future productivity 
of their forest concessions.
International Policies
        Until recently, the international political structures affecting 
deforestation in Indonesia and Malaysia were mainly due to market demand 
in other countries.  Companies in industrial nations would purchase 
tropical timber for their own hardwood processing and subsequently sell 
products to consumers in industrialized nations.  Although this continues 
to be the case, in the past two decades, a number of new political actors 
(international organizations) have started to put pressure on Malaysia to 
sustainably manage its tropical forests.
        Internationally, the response to concerns over the global 
destruction of tropical forests have led some foreign countries, such as 
those in the European Union, to impose trade restrictions-- import 
tariffs or non-tariff barriers on tropical forest products.  In 1986, the 
European Union imposed restrictions on the import of tropical wood.  
These restrictions required timber to be "certified" from "sustainable 
forests".  Most of the logs exported from Indonesia and Malaysia can not 
meet these requirements (Tasker and Ai, 1994).  If implemented on a 
global level, trade sanctions could theoretically limit the amount of 
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forestry products exported from Indonesia and Malaysia and potentially 
reduce deforestation rates.  However, as the demand for trees goes down, 
the forests become less "economically valuable", and much of the 
financial impetus for sustainable management disappears.  According to 
Alastir Fraser, a Briton working with Indonesia's Ministry of Forestry, 
"It would be tragic if trade stopped.  The forests would become less 
valuable and there would be less incentive to protect them" (Schwarz, 
1992b).  Foreign trade restrictions can distort the true economic value 
of the forests in to these countries.  Instead of reducing deforestation, 
foreign trade restrictions in the long-term could decrease the economic 
incentives to preserve the forests.  Admittedly, some policy makers are 
not convinced trade restrictions are a cause for environmental damage and 
would argue that Indonesia and Malaysia make more money from restricting 
log exports and selling secondary wood products instead.
        However, even if trade restrictions were effective at reducing 
deforestation, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is 
slowly working to phase tariffs and other trade restrictions out of the 
global economy.  In 1992, the lift in the ban on log exports in Indonesia 
was partly the result of pressure from the GATT.  Thus, it would be 
difficult to coordinate a world-wide trading ban on forest products 
produced in this region.  This would go against the predominantly free 
trade atmosphere currently advocated in international politics and the GATT.
        In the place of trade restrictions, the GATT is promoting 
multinational trade agreements that involve all countries.  In the 
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Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, environmental issues have become 
increasingly important in discussions, although substantial global 
environmental regulations have not been established.  As it relates to 
Indonesia and Malaysia, the obvious advantage of multinational agreements 
over unilateral trade restrictions is to take into account the views of 
both importing and exporting nations.  This does not necessarily mean 
environmental protection.  But, environmental solutions for reducing 
deforestation could be framed by GATT in an economically and socially 
beneficial system for both Indonesia and Malaysia with international 
support.  This might entail international financial support to implement 
management programs that provide viable alternatives to using old growth 
forests.  Management programs that focus on reforestation and 
intensification of land that has already been deforested.  This would 
reduce the pressure to log old growth forests.  ITTO is an example of an 
international organization that has encouraged developed nations to 
co-operate with developing nations with the common goal of promoting the 
sustainable management of tropical forests.  The World Bank is currently 
looking at a proposal to employ a foreign company to help Malaysias 
government monitor logging operations.  However, to really have an 
impact, international organizations need to make stronger commitments to 
support these countries in their attempts to curb the current problems of 
deforestation.  GATT, ITTO, and the World Bank have not yet had a big 
effect on deforestation rates in Indonesia and Malaysia.
Conclusions
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        Although the international timber trade is undoubtedly an 
important part of the economies in Indonesia and Malaysia, it is 
difficult to quantify the exact relation between exports and forest 
deforestation.  Given the limitations of data, the relationship of 
exports to the forestry transition is captured in Graph #3.  There are 
two major areas affecting the forestry transition in these countries: the 
demand for exports and the lack of reforestation.  In effect, if exports 
continue to increase or even remain at constant levels without improved 
rates of reforestation, the forests in Indonesia and Malaysia will 
rapidly disappear. 
        There are several domestic policies that should be advanced to 
reduce deforestation rates.  Because of the geographical, environmental, 
demographical, and political similarities between Indonesia and Malaysia, 
both countries are in very analogous positions and should follow the same 
general strategies to prevent deforestation.  First, they should remove 
any remaining restrictions on the export of raw logs.  This will provide 
the economic conditions that favor the most efficient use of timber goods 
on a global level.  While the domestic industries may lose money in the 
short-run, in the long-run the country will benefit from utilizing its 
resources more efficiently.  If these countries continue to restrict 
timber exports, they will face retaliation measures from the 
international community and the GATT.  Trade retaliation could harm the 
other important sectors of their economies including oil and natural gas 
exports.  In addition, the domestic governments need to cut down on 
file:///C|/545/1995/birkelund.htm (26 of 30) [6/18/2008 10:56:43 AM]
545\birkelund
corruption and improve enforcement of the current logging regulations.  
This will involve a financial commitment to enforce logging rules and a 
moral commitment by government officials to decline bribes from powerful 
logging industries.  And finally, the current terms of granting 
short-term forest concessions should be increased to provide an incentive 
for companies to start reforesting and sustainably managing the forests.  
Changing the policies for granting logging concessions is beneficial to 
all parties involved and should be relatively easy to implement.  
Finally, Indonesia and Malaysia both need to work on controlling 
population growth.  If populations continue to increase rapidly, their 
will be pressures to use deforested land for agriculture instead of 
reforesting it for future timber production.
        From the international level, countries need to move away from 
unilateral restrictions and work towards developing common forest 
management goals.  ITTO is a step in the right direction, but 
negotiations could start to include mechanisms for enforcement as well.  
The GATT, while still a long-way from having an international enforcement 
arm, could provide this service sometime in the future.  To be 
pro-active, the international community needs to provide more financial 
aid to these countries to help with the costs of sustainably managing 
forests.  It is also possible to develop a set of internationally agreed 
upon forestry practices, whereby the demand for forestry exports could be 
reduced to what can be provided consistently over generations.  The 
sooner this agreement is reached, the more tropical rainforests will be 
left when the forestry transition is over.
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        As a whole, this paper serves to reinforce the importance of the 
relationship between international trade and the forests of Indonesia and 
Malaysia.  Hopefully future studies can provide additional data to 
support the general policies proscribed here and provide more specific 
guidelines for the domestic governments and international community.  The 
relationship between trade and the environment is still an evolving study 
with many unanswered questions.
        
REFERENCES
Anderson, K., and Blackhurst, R.  The Greening of World Trade Issues, 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.
Barbier, E., Burgess, J., Bishop, J., and Aylwar, B.  The Economics of 
the Tropical Timber Trade,      Earthscan Publications Limited, 1994.
Collins N., Sayer, J., and Whitmore, T.  Asia and The Pacific: The 
Conservation Atlas of Tropical  Forests, Simon and Shuster, 1991.
Cronau, Peter.  Penan Face Powerful Forces. Sydney Morning Herald, 7 
August 1993.
Davis, Wade and Henley, Thomas.  Penan: Voice for the Borneo Rainforest. 
Western Canada  Wilderness Committee. Vancouver, British Columbia, 
file:///C|/545/1995/birkelund.htm (28 of 30) [6/18/2008 10:56:43 AM]
545\birkelund
Canada: 1990.
Drake, William.  "Towards Building a Theory of Population Environment 
Dynamics: A Family of   Transitions", in Population Environment Dynamics, 
University of Michigan Press, 1993.
Lumpur, K. and Tsuruoka, D.  "Cutting down to size" in Far Eastern 
Economic Review, July 4, 1991.
Ministry of Forestry.  Tropical Forests in Indonesia: A Country Paper a 
report for The International    Timber and Trade Council, Republic of 
Indonesia, Nov. 1993.
Nectoux, Francois.  "The Timber Trade" in The Ecologist, vol. 17, no. 
4/5, 1987.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).  The 
Environmental Effects of        Trade, OECD, 1994.
Schwarz, Adam.  "Timber Is The Test" in Far Eastern Economic Review,  
July, 1992.
Schwarz, Adam.  "Trade For Trees" in Far Eastern Economic Review, June, 1992.
Schwarz, Adam.  "Wood for the Trees" in Far Eastern Economic Review, 
file:///C|/545/1995/birkelund.htm (29 of 30) [6/18/2008 10:56:43 AM]
545\birkelund
December, 1991.
Simon, H., Fattah, A., Sumardi, Dipodiningrat, S., Iswantoro, H.  One 
Century of Sustainable Forest   Management, in the International 
Symposium on Sustainable Forest Management, Sept. 1992.
Tasker, R. and Ai, B.  "Virgin Territory: Malaysia and Indonesia form 
huge forest reserve" in Far Eastern     Economic Review, Dec. 8, 1994.
US Embassy in Jakarta.  "Protection vs. Profits in Tropical Timber", East 
Asian Executive Reports, v. 16,         no. 5.  May, 1994.
Vatikiotis, Michael. "Clear-cut Mandate" in Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Oct. 28, 1993.
Vincent, Jeffrey.  "The Tropical Timber Trade and Sustainable 
Development" in Science, Vol. 256, June         1992.
World Resources Institute.  World Resources Database, 1994-95.




PRIVATE SECTOR SOLUTIONS TO FERTILITY REDUCTION IN INDIA
The Demographic Transition
The demographic transition is the very core of family planning theory, 
tracing the transition of a given society across time, from very high 
birth and death rates to very low ones, such that the post-transition gap 
between births and deaths is less than or equal to its level prior to the 
transition.  Conceptually, the demographic transition begins in an 
environment in which households, in need of familial labor and heirs, 
must compensate for high levels of mortality by producing large numbers 
of children; as the provision of public health and sanitation 
technologies increases, mortality should greatly decrease, cutting death 
rates far below rates of birth.  At this point in the transition, high 
birth rates are no longer being offset by high rates of death, and 
population will boom; the perceived value of having children will 
eventually change, and individual reproductive behaviors will adapt, 
lowering birth rates until the difference between birth and death rates 
is similar to, if not lower than, that which existed prior to the transition.
        In the transition experienced by most industrialized nations, 
mortality fell slowly and haltingly, relying on innovation and invention 
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to incrementally cut death rates; eventually, fertility followed this 
trend and, after two hundred years of transition (Demeny, 1989), Europe 
and the rest of the industrialized world eventually reached stable birth 
and death rates and a steady fertility rate at near replacement level.  
The experience of the developing world, however, has been quite 
different; not until after World War II, and the end of colonialism, did 
this region begin its transition.  Medical and public health technologies 
first discovered during the European transition had since been perfected, 
and were grafted into the transition of the developing world, cutting 
death rates to levels enjoyed by the industrialized world in a quarter of 
the time (U.S. Census Bureau, 1991).  Unfortunately, despite the infusion 
of large amounts of Western monetary and technological aid, birth rates 
have resisted most attempts at forced reduction, leaving a large gap 
between current birth and death rates.
        As a result, population in much of the developing world today is 
growing almost without bound.  As the sheer numbers of people within a 
given region reach and surpass levels that can be sustained by existing 
political, economic, or ecological systems, family planning becomes an 
issue of increasing importance.  Unfortunately, many fertility-reducing 
programs, both past and present, have generally been of limited 
effectiveness; although a number of programs have been able to cut 
fertility rates to some extent, most of the developing world continues to 
face frighteningly high growth rates and 
above-replacement-level-fertility.  One major limitation of past programs 
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was a concentration on supply-side marketing; family planners assumed 
that there existed a latent demand for contraceptive technology and that 
fertility could be reduced by providing a supply of this technology.  
This is not to say that these programs have been failures; many have 
quite effectively reduced fertility, but in each case, birth rates have 
reached some lower threshold, beyond which they simply cannot pass.
Building a Theory on Fertility Reduction        
        Family planning practices that seek only to meet latent demand 
will always reach a limit to fertility reduction which they cannot 
breach; this lower limit is, in fact, indicative of a saturation of the 
natural (latent) demand market.  Clearly, any family planning program 
that seeks to overcome limits to fertility reduction must be based not on 
meeting an existing, limited demand for contraceptive technology, but on 
the expansion of demand markets.  Supply-side theories fail in family 
planning because they disregard the externalities that exist within a 
given households decision to reproduce:  The social costs of high 
population, and therefore high fertility, are extremely high; yet, so 
long as large families are desirable, or profitable, to the individual 
household, the (individual) opportunity costs of high fertility will 
remain significantly below the (aggregate) social costs, and households 
will continue to produce large numbers of children.  Thus, effective 
family planning programs can exist only where the household opportunity 
costs of high fertility are more reflective of its social costs.  
Significant reductions in fertility come about only where reduced 
fertility is perceived as beneficial to the individual household; in 
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other words, family planning practices can only truly be accepted where 
they are seen as a desirable expansion of choice.
        The increasing prevalence of fertility reduction theories of the 
type outlined above amongst demographers and family planners (Coale; 
Knodel, 1984; Cleland, 1987) has generated a growing body of 
policy-related variables that effect fertility rates; one variable with a 
pronounced effect on fertility is womens education.  As women become 
increasingly educated, they begin to take on more of the skills required 
for wage-labor; the wages associated with female employment, because they 
would be lost to women rearing large numbers of children, provide a 
disincentive to high fertility by increasing the opportunity costs 
associated with large families.  The scatter-point diagram on the 
following page seems to support this hypothesis, showing a clear negative 
correlation between fertility rates (1990) and the percentage of females 
aged twenty-five or older who have completed primary school (1989) over a 
wide range of countries. 
        Although the conceptual link between womens education and 
fertility makes intuitive sense and seems to be supported by empirical 
evidence, it reveals only one part of a more complex relationship.  
Womens education, in this case, acts as a proxy for the somewhat vague 
concept of the value of women; specifically, the average level of 
education attained by females within a particular society should act as a 
flag, indicating the degree to which women participate in that society, 
including the value that is placed on their labor.  The level of 
acceptance of female education within a society should be correlated with 
that societys acceptance of female employment in the formal sector; in 
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other words, womens ability to develop their own human capital, in the 
form of education, must be linked to the market demand for female human 
capital.  Under these conditions, female education acts as a proximate 
measure of a given societys norms regarding the full participation of 
women in formal sector employment; this is part of what is meant by the 
value of women.  The link between market demand for female labor and 
fertility provides the same conclusion as the link between female 
education and fertility, only in a more direct way:  The possibility of 
losing the potential to earn a wage increases the opportunity costs 
associated with large families, and thus has a dampening effect on fertility.
Fertility Reduction in India
        The theorization laid out above is heavily biased towards solving 
the population problems of the developing world.  This concentration is 
characteristic of most theories in family planning and is by no means 
accidental; the population problems experienced in this part of the world 
are more severe than those affecting the industrialized nations, as are 
the consequences of ignoring them.  In so saying, the key to 
understanding the difficulties of this region is in remembering that 
these problems are not unique to the nations of the developing world so 
much as they are characteristic of the stage of the demographic 
transition which most of these nations have reached.
        The nation of India is suffering the effects of being trapped in 
the median stages of the demographic transition perhaps more than any 
other country in the developing world.  India currently enjoys a death 
rate of 10.07 deaths per 1,000 population (CIA World Factbook, 1995), 
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lower than that of 
both Europe and Russia (U.S. Census Bureau, 1991); yet, its birth rate 
remains unnecessarily high, at 27.78 births per 1,000 population (CIA, 
1995).  In a nation of almost 950 million people (CIA, 1995), a birth 
rate-death rate gap of over 17 births per 1,000 population produces a 
population increase of over 16 million in excess of replacement levels.  
A combination of strong political support on the national level for 
family planning programs and extensive Western aid has reduced Indias 
fertility rate to 3.4 births per woman (CIA, 1995), an enviably low level 
by developing world standards; unfortunately, in a nation as large as 
India, the population pressure of even this low a fertility rate is 
incredible.  The age structure of the Indian population adds an air of 
urgency to efforts to reduce fertility; thirty-five percent of the 
population is under fifteen years of age, and fertility rates must be 
reduced before this cohort reaches reproductive age.
        Unfortunately, there is little evidence to suggest that fertility 
rates in India will fall in the near future.  With national family 
planning programs dating back to 1951, no other government in the world 
has placed as much of an emphasis on reducing family size than Indias; 
however, these programs have generally failed to see the results that 
they could have.  Government family planning programs have ranged from 
offering incentives to couples for contraceptive use to forced male 
sterilization, yet none of these has brought about significant reductions 
in fertility, largely because the low social status of women has been 
consistently ignored.  Indian households bear a strong preference for 
male children; the son in the traditional Indian household not only 
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serves as heir and continuation of the family line, but also provides 
labor for the family and, according to Hindu tradition, must perform the 
parents sacred burial rites.  A daughter, on the other hand, represents a 
net economic liability because of the financial pressures that her dowry 
places on her parents.  The dichotomous relationship between the sexes 
creates a situation in which women are denied the property rights and 
control over economic resources that would increase their social value, 
relative to men.
A Free-Market Solution
        In a society where womens roles are marginalized, the value of 
their labor tends to be underestimated.  Where this is the case, the 
private sector has the ability to capitalize on this undervaluation by 
hiring women at a lower wage than that which is offered to men, thus 
capturing increased returns to production; the difference between actual 
female wages and the potential wage bill, had males been employed, 
generates a fiscal surplus that can be invested into capital expansion of 
the industry.  Now, if it is true that increasing the employment 
opportunities available to women has a significant negative effect on 
fertility, this implies that private industry has the opportunity to 
affect positive social change in the course of normal profit-seeking 
operations.  The situation at hand is beneficial to both society and 
industry alike.
        Where a firm hires women to capture the lower wages associated 
with female labor, that firm can experience lower costs of production 
without reducing the market price of its goods, in this way increasing 
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its returns to labor.  As other firms recognize the scale effects of 
increasing their female work force, they will hire increasingly more 
females, boosting the rate of growth of the female labor force.  The 
female labor force will grow increasingly until the environment of 
heightened demand begins to nudge the female wage upward; at this point, 
the growth rate of the female labor force will begin to decline.  The 
growth rate of female participation in formal labor will incrementally 
decline as the female average wage increases; eventually, the female wage 
will rise to a point where employers are indifferent between the sexes, 
and the female participation rate will stabilize.
        The increasing-then-decreasing rates of growth story is typical 
of models of innovations that lead to lowered costs of production; if the 
increased use of womens labor can be characterized as an  innovation, the 
growth of the female labor force can be mapped out in another way, one 
which is complimentary to that which is outlined above.  When a firm in a 
competitive market captures a lower wage bill due to the employment of an 
increased number of women, that firm will lower the asking price for its 
particular good, in an effort to expand its share of the market for its 
product.  Once several firms in an industry expand their female labor 
force, they will be in direct competition with each other to capture the 
greatest savings to production that this innovation can offer.  As more 
firms increase their female work force, the practice of hiring women will 
become more commonplace, and the original innovators will not see 
significantly greater returns to labor over their direct competitors.  At 
this point, these firms will begin to look to other sources of economic 
growth, and the growth rate of the female labor force will begin to 
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decrease.  Once female-to-male employment ratios are equalized across the 
industry, the individual firm will have nothing more to gain from 
employing more women, and the industrys female labor force will stabilize.
        Systems that experience growth rates that at first increase and 
then decrease to a steady state equilibrium of no growth can be 
replicated with the following generalized equation:
                 dY/dt = kY * (q - Y)/q (partial derivative)
Here, Y is the percentage of the national labor force that is female, q 
is an exogenously-generated upper boundary to growth, t is time, and k is 
the constant of proportionality.  The variable k is referred to as the 
constant of proportionality because the derivative of Y at any point can 
be explained, at least partially, as some proportion k of the original 
function Y.  That the partial derivative of Y is equal to some form of 
itself implies that this is an exponential function:  de^t/dt = e^t * dt, 
and above, dY = kY * dt * (q - Y)/q.  The second part of this equation, 
(q - Y)/q, is a forcing term, introduced to limit the growth of the 
exponential in this equation; this equation is attempting to predict the 
growth of a variable that is measured in percentages, and so we must 
necessarily impose an upper limit of one hundred percent, if not some 
even lower value.  The forcing term (q - Y)/q dampens growth by 
interacting with Y; where Y is a small number, the term is very close to 
one, but as Y increases, the forcing term approaches zero.  In short, 
this equation states that the female percentage of the labor force would 
grow exponentially over time (kY), if it were not for the existence of 
file:///C|/545/1995/cheatham.htm (9 of 27) [6/18/2008 10:56:49 AM]
545\cheatham
some exogenous limit to growth ({q - Y}/q); instead, it grows 
exponentially only up to a point, after which growth slows until the 
function stabilizes at a fixed value.
We can see that the equation laid out above is just another 
interpretation of the Verhulst equation:  
                                     
                       Y'/Y = (k/q) * (q - Y),                       -- 1
where Y'is another form of notation for the first derivative of Y with 
respect to t.
We can approach a general form solution of the equation by integrating 
equation 1.  We begin by multiplying through by Y
                  dY/dt = Y * [k - {(k/q) * Y}],                     -- 2
and then separating variables
                  dY/(Y * [k - {(k/q) * Y}] = dt.                    -- 3
In order to simplify the integration process, we want to separate the 
left hand side of equation 3 into the form:
           1/(Y * [k - {(k/q) * Y}] = A/Y + B/{k - (k/q) * Y},
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where A and B are as yet unknown.  To do this, we multiply both sides of 
the above equation by Y * [k - {(k/q) * Y}], to get:
               (A * k) - [A * (k/q) * Y] + (B * Y) = 1.
Now, where Y = 0, A = (1/k), and where Y = 1, [(1/k) * k] - [(1/k) * 
(k/q)] + B = 1, which gives us the solution B = (1/q).  Thus,
       1/(Y * [k - {(k/q) * Y}] = (1/k)/Y + (1/q)/{k - (k/q) * Y}.
(This can be checked by multiplying the equation through by Y * [k - 
{(k/q) * Y}], which produces 1 - (Y/q) + (Y/q) = 1.)
We now have an equation of the form
              [(1/k)/Y + (1/q)/{k - (k/q)Y}] * dY = dt.         -- 4
Integrating with respect to t gives us
         (1/k) * ln Y - (1/k) * ln[k - (k/q) * Y] = t + C,      -- 5
where C is the constant of integration.
Multiplying both sides by k and consolidating the natural logs produces 
the following solution:
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           ln[Y/(k - {(k/q) * Y})] = k * (t + C),               -- 6
which simplifies to...
   Y = [k * e^(k * {t + C})]/[1 + {(k/q) * e^(k * {t + C})}]    -- 7
This is the generalized form of the solution to the Verhulst equation 
above; it makes explicit the relationship between time and growth for 
this model.  
        Equation number seven is extremely useful in describing the 
growth of the female labor force in India, with some caveats; the most 
important of these considerations is that time is used as a proxy for 
attitudes towards womens labor.  The hypothesis, as stated, is highly 
time-dependent; womens labor is used increasingly over time as more of 
the individual players in the labor market recognize its value.  The use 
of time as a proxy for this phenomenon may be slightly misleading, but 
the malleability of time as a variable makes it a satisfactory measure of 
what is actually a rather nebulous concept.  Time is a valid proximate of 
any incremental change because it is measured in ordinal numbers; that 
is, each number in a time series measures only its location within a 
sequence, and does not have any particular value attached to it.  Thus, 
time will continue to be used in further transformations of the above 
equation, with the implicit assumption that it is a proxy for the 
changing intensity of use of womens labor.
        The generalized solution form makes explicit the relationship 
between Y and t, q, and the two constants k and C; however, in order to 
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generate solutions for specific data, k and C must be replaced with more 
definite values.  Conventionally, the constant of integration, C, is used 
only in indefinite integration; where at least one explicit relationship 
between the variables is known, this is definite integration, and C is 
assumed to be equal to zero.  If we use the most recent value for female 
labor force participation available from the World Resources Database and 
assume a specific upper limit to growth, we have values for Y and t, and 
q, respectively, and can assume C out of the equation, generating a new 
generalized form:
           Y = [k * e^(k * t)]/[1 + {(k/q) * e^(k * t)}].         -- 8
Unfortunately, the argument of definite integration is not, by itself, 
the most robust justification for assuming away C; the transition from 
equations 4 to 5 is actually one of indefinite integration.  This is 
because our explicit relationship between variables uses observed data 
from 1990; however, there is no reason to believe that any behavioral 
change occurred in 1990 to institute the growth that this equation 
describes.  Our 1990 data does not constitute any initial conditions, but 
instead acts as a baseline for speculation as to the general 
applicability of this model.  
        Nineteen-ninety data is used as a baseline value only because it 
is the most recent available; this by no means implies that the process 
described above commenced at this date.  We perform indefinite 
integration between equations 4 and 5 because the data we are using is 
clearly not the start of an historical example of the above process; were 
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it actual historic data, it would be referred to as initial conditions, 
and definite integration could be performed.  Instead, we use baseline 
values, plugging them into the variables in question to generate 
hypothetical scenarios as a means of testing the robustness of our model; 
we use indefinite integration to preserve the generalizability of the 
solution equation, allowing us to test the results of a variety of 
baseline assumptions.  We are now placed in a position where we have 
specific data, yet we have performed indefinite integration and, as a 
result, we have the constant C in our equation.  Yet, precisely because 
we do have specific data, we can still assume away C; we can do this 
because, in the following analysis, we treat each set of baseline values 
as if it were historical data, and we know that C is not included in the 
definite integration of historical values.
        Baseline values play their most important role in the 
determination of definite values for the constant of proportionality, k.  
The World Resources Database provides the following baseline data:  
Females accounted for 48.318% of the population, yet only 25.191% of the 
labor force of India in 1990.  Thus, Y = 0.25191 and, because 1990 is the 
baseline year in our iteration, time t = 0.  If we assume that, once a 
demand increase has been generated, the percentage of women in the labor 
force will expand up to but not beyond their proportional representation 
in society, then we have set our upper limit to growth at q = 0.48318.  
We now have the tools necessary to generate an estimate of k; we begin 
with the general form solution,
          Y = [k * e^(k * t)]/[1 + {(k/q) * e^(k * t)}]              -- 8
file:///C|/545/1995/cheatham.htm (14 of 27) [6/18/2008 10:56:49 AM]
545\cheatham
and include our baseline values, to generate the following:
      0.25191 = [k * e^(k * 0)]/[1 + {(k/0.48318) * e^(k * 0)}].     -- 9
Replacing e^(k * 0) with 1 and multiplying the right hand side of the 
equation by (0.48318/0.48318) produces...
            0.25191 = (0.48318 * k)/(0.48318 + k),
which provides us with a k-value of approximately 0.52630.  Thus, the 
general form of our solution for this set of assumptions is:
  Y = [0.5263 * e^(0.5263 * t)]/[1 + {(0.5263/q) * e^(0.5263 * t)}]. -- 10
        The equation now provides an explicit relationship between the 
independent variable t, the policy variable q, and the dependent variable 
Y, subject to the baseline assumption that Y(0) = 0.25191, q = 0.48318.  
The following graph details the convergence of this equation on the upper 
boundary of Y = 0.48318.  The accompanying table clarifies the growth 
pattern of the function, highlighting the fact that it infinitely 
approaches 0.48318 without actually reaching that value.  
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Year    1990    1991    1992    1993    1994    1995    1996    1997    1998    1999
%       25.10   31.19   36.41   40.40   43.20   45.04   46.20   46.92   47.35   47.61
L.F.       4       3       0       2       0       3       8       5       9       9
2000    2001    2002    2003    2004    2005    2006    2007    2008    2009    2010
47.77   47.86   47.92   47.95   47.97   47.98   47.99   47.99   47.99   47.99   47.99
   4       6       1       3       2       4       0       4       7       8       9
        The upper limit to this equation was arbitrarily set at 0.48318, 
the percentage of the total population of India that was female in 1990; 
however, this percentage has been growing steadily, although marginally, 
over the past twenty years.  This implies that our equation may be more 
reflective of the growth pattern it attempts to describe if the upper 
limit q of our equation were to be included as an increasing function of 
t instead of as an arbitrarily determined constant.  In fact, the 
regression of this data over the years 1970 to 1990 produces the function 
Y = (0.000026 * t) + 0.4823, which grows at so slow a rate that it can be 
legitimately approximated by any constant function at or about Y = 0.4823.
        Although it seems to be appropriate to estimate the upper 
boundary to growth with a constant function based on current estimates of 
female representation in the general population, the thinking behind this 
conclusion may be ignoring some rather serious considerations.  India has 
a long cultural history of son-preference between children, which may 
bias contraceptive and child-rearing techniques; although these practices 
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have become less prevalent in modern India, the proportion of females in 
Indian society in 1990 was still only 48.23%, less than the world rate of 
49.68% and significantly below the 51.54% faced by the industrialized 
world (WRD, 1994).  It may not be unrealistic to assume that some 
residual son-preference continues to exist within Indian culture, and 
that this is maintaining the proportion of females in society at an 
artificially low level; this sort of consideration is linked to the above 
model because the prevalence of son-preference amongst households is 
directly related to the value of women within a society.  Now, where an 
increase in womens employment is brought about in a climate of 
son-preference, it seems safe to assume that the increased potential for 
future wage labor that this places upon a female child may compensate for 
any cultural predilection towards sons; in this way, the growth of the 
percentage of females in the labor force may increase the percentage of 
females in the general population, thus expanding the upper limit q used 
in the predictive model.
        Any activity that reduces artificial constraints placed upon the 
size of the female population within a society is inarguably producing a 
public good; however, any points regarding the effects of this 
demographic change on the model may be moot.  As the graph shows, our 
predictive function converges with its upper limit in only ten iterations 
(iterations here are denoted as years because this is the unit of measure 
that seems to make sense, although other units of time could be used); it 
seems unlikely that behavioral patterns that are as deeply ingrained as 
son-preference could be changed in as short a time as ten years.  
Further, the delayed effects of changes in reproductive behaviors on the 
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labor pool ensure that any increase in the female population will occur 
long after the demand boom has passed, such that female employment rates 
are unlikely to be effected by an increase in the female population at 
this stage.  
        A more fundamental criticism of the model suggests that there is 
no reason to believe that the growth of the female labor force will be at 
all limited by the proportion of females in the general population; it is 
more likely that the female labor force will overshoot the proposed limit 
of percentage female representation in society.  If an individual firm, 
in the course of expanding its labor force, recognizes lower costs to 
production by employing women instead of men, there is little to prevent 
that firm from further reducing costs by replacing as many currently 
employed men as possible with women.  The only hindrance to this sort of 
mass replacement (if we can momentarily assume away contradictory 
cultural norms) would be a limited supply of sufficiently-educated women, 
and this constraint should weaken significantly once individual 
households begin to recognize the newly increased value of their daughters.
        It is difficult to determine the extent of the predicted excess 
growth of the female labor force; it is easy to believe that employers 
themselves will generally be male and will not be replacing themselves, 
and so the female labor participation rate could never reach one hundred 
percent.  In fact, most upper- and middle-management positions would be 
closed to women for this same reason; the most physically strenuous jobs, 
too, would almost certainly be denied to women.  This implies that some 
significant percentage of employment positions within the economy exist 
which are simply unavailable to women; that is, the demand for female 
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labor associated with this percentage is inelastically fixed at zero.  In 
1990, male representation in the work force exceeded male representation 
in society by approximately 23%; the fact that men, in a male-dominated 
society, are over-represented in the labor force by twenty-three percent 
seems to make this figure an appropriate estimate of the extreme-case 
upper limit to growth of the womens labor force.  This assumption implies 
a new upper boundary value of q = (0.48318 + 0.23) = 0.71318, which 
generates a generalized solution form of
  Y = [0.38948 * e^(0.38948 * t)]/[1 + {(0.38948/q) * e^(0.38948 * t)}],  -- 11
the graph of which follows.
Year    1970    1975    1980    1985    1990    1995    2000    2005    2010    2015
%       29.65   28.46   27.18   26.20   25.19   56.54   68.75   70.94   71.26   71.31
L.F.       0       0       1       6       1       8       6        1      4       0
2020    2025    2030
                                                         
71.31   71.31   71.31
   7       8       8                                                        
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Again, a table is provided for ease of reference.
        Growth of female representation in the labor force is staggering 
here, and probably not particularly realistic.  Lack of availability of 
data requires that time be expressed in units of five years, which may 
exaggerate the graphical representation of  the function; however, this 
does not negate the fact that the percentage of females in the labor 
force more than doubles between 1990 and 1995.  In order to make this 
data at all useful, the ordinal nature of time must be taken advantage 
of; if the difference between two years can be seen only as a difference 
of a few places in a generalized time series, then the model can begin to 
take on more meaning.  Where 1990 is viewed as simply the one thousand, 
nine hundred, ninetieth iteration of the series, then the span of a unit 
of time increases in its variability, and can take on values larger than 
a single year.  Although this assumption increases the applicability of 
the model, it does so at the expense of its reliability; more 
importantly, it fails to address more fundamental ethical questions 
associated with female employment overshooting female representation in 
society.
Policy Implications
        Sustainable economic growth occurs where new jobs are created; 
yet within this model, the primary engine for growth of female 
representation in the labor force is female replacement of males in 
existing jobs.  Where females simply replace males at a lower wage, the 
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individual firms operating costs fall, but social costs may actually 
rise; even if each displaced male worker were replaced by a female in the 
same household, the overall average household income will fall.  Only 
where male replacement frees up capital for expansion of the labor force 
can replacement dampen the social costs it incurs; unfortunately, this 
case increases the number of households earning a wage income while 
reducing the wage earned.  The true social benefits of replacement growth 
come from the reduction in birth rates that this generates; where female 
employment rises, fertility should fall, and, under any conditions, 
reductions in fertility will cut overall costs to society.
        It is quite likely that the population effects of female 
replacement may more than compensate for the effects of male 
unemployment.  In 1990, the labor force growth rate only marginally 
exceeded the rate of population growth, while a mere five percent of 
working-age Indians were employed in the formal sector (26 million person 
labor force, 503 million persons between the ages of 15 and 65, WRD); in 
a slow-growth, low employment economy, the sort of restructuring of the 
labor market that female replacement requires may incur only a minor 
social cost.  If this is the case, the benefits of fertility reduction 
should easily exceed the costs of male unemployment, leading to clear and 
direct benefits to society, at least in the short run.  Long run 
forecasting is more difficult because the long-term effects of male 
unemployment at the expense of females is unclear.  The direct effects of 
increased male unemployment in an environment of extremely high 
unemployment may, indeed, be minor, as discussed above; however, the 
effective gender transition of the households primary wage-earner, from 
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male to female, may produce significant disruptive forces in the 
pervading culture.  
        It should be clear that any increase in the value of women, 
especially one as significant as this, is acting in opposition to current 
trends and, therefore, must necessarily act as either the cause or the 
product of a significant cultural disruption, the effects of which could 
never be predicted in their entirety.  While this may seem to be a rather 
melodramatic conclusion to make, the uncertainty involved in the decision 
to consciously change a culture must be taken into full account; the 
risks involved in such endeavors must be clearly outweighed by the 
benefits.  In so saying, it does appear as if Indias population growth 
may warrant such strong actions:  the negative effects on society, 
culture, and the environment associated with large population growth 
rates cumulatively represent the greatest problem India has had to face 
to date.  Sacrificing an indeterminate, and possibly quite large, amount 
of culture for the preservation of society as a whole is hardly an ideal 
solution; it is not a first- or second-best solution, but an nth-best 
solution, the optimal solution subject to a large number, n, of constraints.
        One such constraint that has been excluded from discussion to 
this point is the fundamental lack of employment opportunities across 
both sexes.  Where only five percent of the working-age population is 
engaged in non-agricultural employment, it is conceivable that the sheer 
numbers of unemployed men would bid the male wage down to such a point 
that a significantly lower female wage would be infinitesimal; if the 
female wage were as low as this suggests, it would actually provide a 
disincentive for a given woman to leave the home, as her earned wages 
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could not compensate for the domestic work she would be sacrificing in 
order to enter into formal wage employment.  However, in a country that 
is 70% rural (WRD, 1995), yet concentrates a majority of its educational 
opportunities in urban areas, a majority of the 95% unemployed are 
actually agricultural laborers; any residual un- or under-employment may 
be composed mostly of rural immigrants to industrial centers who lack the 
education, and therefore the job skills, required for increasingly 
technical industrial jobs.  This implies what we already know to be true 
about all labor markets: there is no universal wage; instead, wages are 
graded across positions, based on the skills required to perform a 
particular job and the responsibilities entailed in it.  This model is 
meant to consider female entrance into higher-skill, and therefore higher 
wage, employment, where a womans wage can be less than that of a man 
without being menial; these are the types of job that have an implicit 
value attached to them and, by association, can raise the perceived value 
of women within Indian society.
        The policy implications of this sort of theorization are heavily 
dependent upon the amount and the type of economic growth that is 
stimulated by female replacement.  Where the implications to the firm of 
female replacement are extra-normal profits, the government should be 
concerned with how and where those profits are invested; the government 
has the capability to lower the interest rate through the central bank 
and to provide tax incentives for capital expansion, both of which are 
powerful investment-stimulating tools.  More importantly, the government 
is the only player in the market that has the power to confront 
traditional biases against women in employment; it must take the leading 
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role in the stimulation of demand for womens labor that should eventually 
generate the process described in the model.  The government has the 
ability to make female labor more attractive to firms by increasing 
female education opportunities, providing logistical and management 
training and support to firms transitioning towards a greater female/male 
ratio amongst their work forces, and continuing its long-standing 
tradition of encouraging female participation in all levels of government.
        It seems clear that this program could not succeed if the 
government were to focus on either the education of women or the 
generation of demand for their labor alone; both must be given equal 
attention, and a direct link between the two must be made at every stage 
of the process.  Although a number of approaches to this problem exist, 
the simplest and most direct may be the best option in the earliest 
stages; one example would be to increase the degree to which funding of 
public schools is based on female representation in classes and to 
provide tax credits to individual firms based on the income taxes 
collected from their female employees.  These types of policies are 
suggested not only because they reduce the costs to the central 
government that are generally imposed by recruitment campaigns, but more 
importantly, because they assign recruitment responsibilities in a more 
efficient manner; it seems likely that local public school administrators 
and teachers and the owners and operators of local industry would be more 
familiar and respected in their communities, and therefore better able to 
affect social change there, than unknown bureaucrats from economically, 
if not geographically, distant New Delhi.  Under its New Economic Plan, 
the Indian central government has very successfully turned over many of 
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its powers to more efficient private-sector groups; by concentrating more 
normative taxes on firms, the government can continue in this policy by 
privatizing away governmental responsibilities where it can be done at 
less cost or with increased efficiency in the private sector.
        The one policy implication that should not be garnered from this 
material is that a laissez-faire, free market approach to the economy 
will provide solutions to social problems.  This paper outlines a partial 
solution to Indias population problems that works in the private sector 
and probably only on a regional level, but only with governmental 
support.  Without significant government involvement, cultural 
predilections will continue to overrule profit-seeking tendencies, and 
the role of women in the labor force will always be inappropriately 
discounted.  Without continued government funding of its own and other, 
private family planning programs, the supply of contraceptive technology 
could not meet the increase in demand that would come about from the 
fertility-reducing effects of female replacement.  Most importantly, it 
is the role of government of the largest democracy in the world to 
regulate both the use of womens labor in its economy and the reduction of 
fertility in its society to ensure that its citizens are protected and 
that its policies create positive and lasting social change and economic 
development.
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THE EFFECTS OF GLOBAL WARMING ON THE POPULATION, AGRICULTURE, AND 
EPIDEMIOLOGY TRANSITIONS IN THE SOUTH SAHEL REGION OF AFRICA
        The Sahel cuts a swath across West Africa from Senegal through 
Chad.  It is the zone just South of the Sahara desert, and is the area 
into which the Sahara desert shifts in its movements southward (See Map 
following).  Due to expansion and contraction of the Sahara (Tucker et 
al., 1990), it is difficult to define where the southern border of the 
Sahel falls.  The Sahel is the major transition zone between the more 
humid tropics to the south characterized by two dry seasons and two 
growing seasons and the hot, dry, desert to the north. The southern part 
of the Sahel and the northern part of the humid tropics is the area  
under study made up of Northern Benin, Southern Niger, and Burkina Faso, 
called here the South Sahel region (see Map following). While there are 
some sociological and cultural differences in the different parts of the 
South Sahel region, the climate, lifestyles and modes of agricultural 
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production are very similar throughout.
        The region is labeled the Sudano-Guinean Climate Zone (Martyn, 
1992).  It is dry and hot, with three identifiable seasons:  The first, 
called the Harmattan, is dry and relatively cool, the second is hot and 
relatively humid, and the third is rainy and hot.   Rainfall is low and 
unreliable compared to the more humid south where there are two 
relatively stable growing seasons per year (Simsik, 1993).
        The people living in the South Sahel region are agriculturists 
for the most part, depending on the one annual growing season to provide 
the bulk of their income and nutritional subsistence each year.  
Agricultural labor is accomplished with  simple tools such as the short 
handled hoe and the machete (Simsik, 1993).  With only these inputs to 
production, labor is of high importance.  The land area under cultivation 
is fairly small for any given person or family due to the intensity of 
labor necessary to produce crops.  Most farming is of subsistence crops 
such as millet and sorghum and some commercial crops such as cotton and 
groundnuts for export (Simsik, 1993, United Nations, 1994).     It is 
important to study global warming in the South Sahel region in terms of 
the population-environment dynamic in order to develop policies which can 
be implemented by the governments involved to mitigate the societal and 
environmental problems that global warming 
exacerbates.  The region has a highly constrained ecosystem.  According 
to Agbo et al, "The greater number of types of ecosystem constraints 
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involved and the greater degree of constraint of these components, the 
more tightly linked the population-environment dynamic will be in any 
region (Agbo et al., 1993).  Tight linkages between population and 
environment mean that the more the environment changes, the more the 
population will be affected.  As the population changes (for example 
grows larger), the environment is highly affected (Agbo et al., 1993).  
Population and environment are inextricably linked, and must be 
considered in terms of each other before any policy changes can 
positively impact a constrained ecosystem.
        There are three types of ecological constraints that are apparent 
in the South Sahel region.  The first is geographical.  The South Sahel 
is geographically constrained in terms of water availability which 
dictates where people can survive.  The second type of constraint is 
ecological.  Poor soils mark the entire region, limiting the number of 
people who can sustain themselves in any given area.  Finally, there are 
economic constraints.  These include the populations dependence on 
subsistence agriculture, as well as their dependence on the fluctuating 
global market economy over which the local people have virtually no 
control for the sale of their cash crops (adapted from Agbo et al, 
1993).  
        Interactions between the population and the environment are not 
the only ones that affect the region.  In the world today, action or lack 
of action in one region can have a strong impact on other regions of the 
world.  An important case in point is global climate change.  The people 
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and production of the South Sahel Region have not contributed a great 
deal to anthropogenic (human generated) climate change, yet global 
warming (a more simple term for anthropogenic climate change) may 
strongly change the environment in the region (Glanz, 1992).  Through the 
environment, global warming may influence other sectors of the region 
such as the population, health, and agriculture. 
        An appropriate way to look at the population-environment dynamic 
is through the transitions framework, developed by Dr. William Drake.  In 
the physical world, there are a variety of factors which affect every 
sector.  Transition theory makes explicit the interdependence of sectors, 
and is an attempt to look at change in a realistic yet manageable fashion 
(Drake, 1993)  
        Given that the world is made up of interrelationships across 
regions and within them, it is admittedly impossible to foresee all 
aspects of change in any sector.  Transition theory gives a framework for 
examining some of the aspects that cause change.  There is a whole family 
of transitions which includes the environmental and population 
transitions, as well as the agricultural, forestry, urbanization, 
epidemiological and other transitions.  A transition can usually be 
broken down into many others, depending on the specificity of the study.  
For example, one could study the population transition alone, or one 
could break it down to investigate the fertility transition as distinct 
from the mortality transition.  A transition means a change from one 
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state to another, but does not imply either positive or negative change.  
In transition theory, change is from some point of stability to another 
point of stability which may be entirely different from the first.  For 
example, in marginal lands where scrub-cover is the stable state at 
present, the stable state following a forestry transition may be a 
desert.  Transitions occur similarly on many different scales, both 
temporally and spatially.  Transitions can and do interact with each 
other and affect each other.  From a policy perspective, it is the timing 
and speed of transitions that may be realistically possible to change, 
not the actual occurrence of any given transition (Drake, 1993).
        In general ways such as those stated above, transitions are 
similar across space and time, but at a local level, transitions occur in 
very different ways and are changed by a myriad of local occurrences.  In 
this paper, I will investigate three of the transitions occurring in the 
South Sahel, specifically the population transition, the agricultural 
transition, and the epidemiological transition.  I will look at the 
position of the South Sahel in each transition now, and then look at how 
global warming may affect the progression of the transition, and finally 
how the governments involved can positively influence the timing and 
speed of the transitions to ease their negative effects on the 
population.  
        Since data for the South Sahel specifically has not been gathered 
or calculated, I will use data from the three countries which each 
include part of the South Sahel.  While such an amalgamation is not an 
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exact proxy for the South Sahel, given the similarities of the region, an 
approximate average of the three countries rates and figures paints a 
close picture to what data collected exclusively for the South Sahel 
would illustrate.  Where possible I include data for all three 
countries.  Occasionally only one or two countries data is available for 
illustration and that is used as a rough guess of the South Sahels data 
itself.  
GLOBAL WARMING
        Leaders of  less developed countries often see the problem of 
climate change as far out of their realm of control.  Understandably, 
climate change is pushed to the side as something which, if it does 
occur, is seen as so far in the future, and is as yet so unpredictable 
that it is not necessary or possible to deal with at this time (Glanz, 
1992).  It is true that the effects of global warming on a regional scale 
are unclear.  It is also true that developing countries have not been a 
primary producer of greenhouse gasses (those gases which cause global 
warming to occur) (Glanz, 1990).  But climate change, whether human in 
origin or purely natural, highly affects those peoples who live closely 
linked to the environment (Agbo et al., 1993).  Subsistence farmers, the 
bulk of the people in the South Sahel as well as much of the developing 
world, are harder hit by climate change of any type than are populations 
that have more of a buffer between the environment and themselves.  This 
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is true whether that buffer is a personal savings account or improved 
technology which allows high levels of agricultural production in the 
face of climatic variation.  Policy makers in Benin, Niger, and Burkina 
Faso, as well as other developing countries need to address the possible 
impacts of global warming before they negatively affect their people.
        The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is made up 
of researchers from all over the world working with the UN to study the 
causes, effects, and possible future scenarios of climate change.  
According to the IPCC, climate change due to human activity is definitely 
occurring globally.  Anthropogenic climate change is caused by the 
emission of  greenhouse gasses (GHGs) which include carbon dioxide, 
methane, nitrous oxide, halocarbons, and hydroflourocarbons.  The most 
important of these is carbon dioxide (CO2) due to its high concentration 
and rate of increase in the atmosphere.  Greenhouse gasses are produced 
through industrial production and transportation that depend on the 
combustion of fossil fuels as well as land use conversion (IPCC Draft 
Report, 1995).  Once GHGs are released into the atmosphere, they act in 
much the same way as a greenhouse.  They trap some of the radiation 
coming from the earth in the earths atmosphere and do not allow the 
earths natural cooling process to work as strongly as it would without 
the high levels of GHGs (Benarde, 1992).
        As of yet, the full effects of climate change are not known.  A 
way to look at the possible effects is to set up modeling situations in 
which many variables at different levels are factored in, such as the 
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rate of GHG production into the future (Benarde, 1992).  Commonly 
accepted models point to a global temperature increase of anywhere from 
1.5-4.5 degrees Celsius eventually (Schneider, 1994), and 1-3.5 degrees 
Celsius by the end of the next century (IPCC Draft Report, 1995).  
According to the IPCC, In all cases the average rate of warming would 
probably be greater than any seen in the last 10,000 years, but the 
actual annual to decadanal changes would include considerable natural 
variability (IPCC draft report, 1995).  Experts on climate agree that 
temperature change is likely to be greater at the poles than at the 
equator (IPCC DRAFT Report, 1995).  The IPCC projects a rise in sea level 
from 15-95 cm. by the year 2100 due to thermal expansion of the oceans 
and the melting of some of the earths water currently contained in ice.  
Modeling on precipitation is less precise than on temperature and sea 
level rise.  Some models predict more severe droughts and floods, some 
models predict more severe precipitation events such as increased cyclone 
possibilities (IPCC draft report, 1995).
        While global effects of some degree are inevitable due to 
anthropogenic climate change, regional effects are highly uncertain to 
date, and the smaller the region of interest, the less certain the 
effects become (Stephen Schneider, personal communication).  The IPCC 
predicted in 1990 that in the Sahel, the temperature will eventually 
increase from 1 to 3 degrees Celsius.  Area mean precipitation will 
increase and area mean soil moisture will decrease in the hot season 
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(Suliman, 1990).  Soil moisture, as controlled by evapotranspiration, is 
extremely important--regardless of the amount of rainfall.  If the water 
in the soil is evaporating at a relatively greater rate than the rate of 
increased rainfall, there is less water for plants to use for growth, a 
matter of vital importance to farmers depending on rain fed agriculture 
as are virtually all the farmers of the South Sahel region.
        In looking at the temperature data available for the South Sahel 
region which is collected and made available by the National 
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) some interesting, although 
inconclusive, evidence is apparent (see Figures 1-4).  I chose four sites 
at which data is available for at least 50 years prior to the latest year 
of data available (usually 1992), and which correspond to my area of 
study.  The four sites I chose are Natitingou and Kandi in Benin, Fada 
NGourma in Burkina Faso, and Niamey in Niger (see Map near front).  Data 
for some of the sites went back further than what is included but was 
left out because there were periods of several years with no data 
whatsoever.  For those years in which data is available, but in which not 
every month is available at a given site, the year is not included for 
that site only.  
        When the years of complete data are graphed (represented by the 
black diamonds in Figures 1-4), a striking aspect of annual temperature 
is apparent.  Obviously, even without the effects of anthropogenic 
climate change mean annual temperature varies widely at all four 
locations. By fitting a simple linear curve to the data available for 
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each location, a surprising aspect becomes clear:  In all cases except 
for Niamey, the temperature appears to be declining, albeit very slowly,  
over time.  If, however, a linear curve is fit to the data since 1960, in 
all cases except for Natitingou, temperature is rising.  Even in the case 
of Natitingou, temperature since 1960 is falling less quickly than 
temperature for all the years with data available.  Since the early 1960s 
has been identified as the time that global warming may have begun to 
visibly affect global temperature, fitting the curves from 10 years prior 
to that time onwards helps ensure that  natural variation in annual 
climate alone is not causing the trends that appear when a linear curve 
is fitted to the data.  When these graphs are made fitting the curve from 
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Temperature data alone is not proof that global warming is affecting the region.  It is however , an indicator that it 
may be occurring.  But can national policy makers act on a probability?  The answer is not only that they can, but 
that it is extremely important that  they do so.  In order to take action to protect their populations from  the effects 
of global warming, policy makers need not know what the exact  effects will be (Glanz, 1992).  By choosing to 
implement No Regrets  policies, the governments of these countries can benefit their societies  now, and protect 
them against the possible effects of global warming in  the future.  No Regrets policies are those that cause no 
harm and create  benefit without dependence on the future, but developed with a probable  future in mind (Glanz, 
1992).  
     In the case of policies aimed at mitigating the effects of global  warming, the necessity of such No Regrets 
strategies become more clear  when we consider the highly variable nature of annual temperature  throughout 
history (see again Figures 1-4).   Even without global  warming, temperature varies widely year by year as 
illustrated above,  causing variation in the ability of agriculturists to produce crops.   Graphing the temperature 
data for Niamey superimposed upon the  agricultural production data in Niger for the same time period gives a  
clear picture of how important temperature variation may be (Figure 5).   The three  years of least agricultural 
production per capita all  correspond to years with very high mean annual temperatures, a strong  indicator of the 
importance of temperature variation on production, and  through production, survival for the subsistence and near 
subsistence  farmers of the region.  Whether or not climate is changing in the South  Sahel due to human activity, 
governments can act now to protect their  populations against natural climate variation while at the same time  
helping to prepare them for anthropogenic climate change to come. 
Figure 5 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION  
     According to demographic theory (Coale, 1974), the demographic  
transition as seen thus far has four stages.  In the pre-transition  stage, 
birth rates are very high, but are counterbalanced by high death  rates.  
The overall effect is a population with little or no growth.  In  the early 
stage of the transition, death rates fall due to public health  and medical 
improvements in the population.  Birth rates remain high and  a population 
explosion occurs.  In the late stages of the transitions,  births begin to 
fall, and although they still exceed deaths and  population continues to 
rise, the rate of increase is slow.  Finally in  the fourth stage called the 
post-transition period, the birth rate falls  to the point that it is 
roughly equal to the low death rate and the  population reaches a steady 
state of approximately zero population  growth.  This model is based on the 
experience of more developed  countries (Haub et al., 1994) where the  
transition has occurred smoothly  and over a long period of time.  There the 
decrease in death rates  occurred slowly and was of endogenous (interior to 
the region) origin,  caused by a gradual increase in knowledge about health 
and medicine.   There was a lag in the fall of birth rates following the 
fall in death  rates, but not so great as to create a large degree of stress 
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either on  the environment or on the population.  
     The South Sahel region, and indeed much of Africa, is  experiencing a 
population transition much more violently and quickly than  the more 
developed regions did. The South Sahel is currently at the point  of change 
between the early and late stages of the transition.  Changes  to the death 
rate came relatively quickly (the early stage), beginning  around 1950 in 
the form of life-saving vaccinations and medical  technology provided in 
large part by international aid agencies (Haub et  al., 1994).  
      Birth rates, on the other hand, have remained relatively  constant.  
An amalgamation of the population growth for all three  countries in the 
South Sahel region gives a fair idea of what the rates  are, given the 
similarities between Northern Benin, Southern Niger and  Burkina Faso. At 
the present time, the crude birth rate (CBR) per 1000  people in the 
population per year in Benin is 48.09.  In Burkina Faso it  is 48.8, and in 
Niger it is 57.35, while the crude death rates (CDR) per  thousand people in 
the population per year is about one third of the  birth rates at 14.8, 
18.19, and 22.44 respectively (CIA, 1995).  Since  the growth rate percent 
(minus migration) is equal to births minus deaths  divided by ten, the 
region has an overall growth rate percent of  approximately 3 (3.1 in Benin, 
2.8 in Burkina, and 3.4 in Niger (World  Population Council, 1995).  This 
number may not seem very high, but  consider that a growth rate percent of 
three means that if the growth  rate remains unchanged, the number of people 





        By the year 2025, the population in the region will be 
approximately three times its present level.  Perhaps even more striking 
than the level of increase is the irrevocability of the increase.  Due to 
population momentum and the slow speed of decrease in the growth rate, 
population will continue to climb throughout the foreseeable future even 
though growth rates are projected to begin falling in this decade.  In 
the South Sahel region, population momentum rests to a large degree on 
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the age distribution of the population.  Nearly half of the population at 
the present time is under the age of 15.  Thus, a huge majority of the 
population is in, or will be moving into, their reproductive ages within 
the next 15 years.  Even if the number of children born per woman fell 
dramatically, the number of people having children will keep the  
population growth rate high (see Figure 7).
Figure 8
 
        
        The effects of population density increase on the South Sahel 
region will be strongly felt.  Whereas at present the population density 
is about 40 per square kilometer (49 in Benin, 38 in Burkina, and 6 in 
Niger (World Population Council, 1995), under the present UN projections 
for future growth, the population density will increase to about 90 per 
kilometer by the year 2025 even though population growth is falling (see 
Figure 8 below).  Nigers population density is very low in the mostly 
empty upper portion of the country.  The bulk of its population is in the 
South Sahel region where farming is difficult but possible, unlike the 
desertic North.  A population density of 40 per square kilometer is not 
terribly high, but for a subsistence farmer with low crop yields, it may 
be close to what the land can bear and still provide sustenance for its 
inhabitants.  Thus, the population density, while low compared to some 
regions is high for the South Sahel region due to the constrained 
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ecosystem and the modes of agricultural production.  People are not 
acting to limit their fertility general-
ly in the South Sahel Region.   Contraceptive use levels by women are
very low:  approximately 9 percent  of Benins women ever uses contraceptives,
and about 1 percent of Nigers  and Burkinas women are contraceptive users.
     One possible scenario of what will cause population to fall  eventually in the South Sahel is a Malthusian one 
of widespread death due  to starvation when the population gets too high to support itself off the  land, or death 
due to wars for land or rights to production.  Another is  that the population will eventually be artificially 
supported by the  international aid community, and become a sort of welfare exclave of the  western world (Hill, 
1990).  Neither scenario bodes well for the region,  and policy makers need to address the problems of high 
population growth  rates before the region moves any closer to either one.  
     In order to make effective policy, causes behind high population  growth, not just the mechanics of it must be 
understood.  The average  number of children per woman is nearly 7 in the region (World Population  Council, 
1995).  Why do the people of the South Sahel continue to have  large numbers of children?  Paratha Dasgupta 
offers a model which helps  to explain the phenomenon of high population growth in an environmentally  
constrained ecosystem.  Population growth, poverty and environmental  degradation are all tied together in a 
positive feedback loop (Dasgupta,  1995).  As the environment becomes more degraded, people must work harder  
or pay more to obtain the same amounts of food, wood, and clean water  from the environment which increases 
the level of poverty.  As poverty  increases and the environment becomes more degraded, people need to have  
more children both to act as laborers and to ensure that the parents will  be provided for later in life.  An increase 
in population puts even more  strain on the environment, making adequate production or use of the land  again 
more difficult.  Even more children are needed to roam farther  afield in search of wood, to work the fields or in 
the case of some  villages in Northern Benin, to chase wild baboons away that destroy crops  and livestock.  With 
more mouths to feed, each family must farm more land  and leave less land fallow (a traditional practice which 
allows the land to replenish its nutrient cont-  
ent), which leads to lower yields per  hectare and, again, increased poverty.  
     In Tanougou, a commune in northern Benin the likelihood of such a  cycle is apparent in looking at fuel wood 
needs.  As the number of people  in a household increases, so does the need for more wood but at a lower  rate 
than the rate of family size increase.  By increasing a household  from 2 to 6 people (a threefold increase) for 
example, the need for fuel  wood on average only doubles.  Moving from 6 to 12 people in a household  the need 
for fuel wood increases less than two times (Agbo, 1993).  In a  society where people must spend several hours a 
day ranging further and  further afield to collect wood, and where children are able to perform  the task, such as in 
the South Sahel, people can ill afford to limit  their fertility.  
     This ever widening cycle of poverty, environmental degradation,  and population growth is increased by the 
power structure of  the local  communities.  The South Sahel region is marked by control by men over  most 
resources, including the resource of reproduction.  Women cannot  chose to have fewer children, because the 
social structure does not allow  it.  It is the women, however, who bear the majority of the burden of  raising 
children, including maternal morbidity and mortality as well as  the economic burden of raising children through 
early childhood  (Dasgupta, 1995).  As womens education levels and ability to participate  fully in the economic 
sector increases, there is a tendency for fertility  rates to drop.  This may be due to the increase in the cost of a 
woman  bearing child after child.  Such costs include lost opportunities to work  and receive income from work 
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due to childbearing, illness caused by  childbearing, and child rearing (Dasgupta, 1995).  
     In the South Sahel region, literacy rates for women are very low  (exact rates are:  9% in Niger, 6% in Burkina 
Faso, and 16% in Benin  (WHO, 1991).  Both men and women produce crops, and traditionally have  separate 
fields, giving both groups nominal economic power, but generally  women must work in the mens fields as well as 
working  their own.  Women  are responsible for feeding their families from their crops directly or  from the sale 
of them, while mens crops are more often cash crops sold  for export.  
     Until the ultimate cause of high fertility are changed, including  the need for children as labor to survive, as 
well as the lack of  economic and educational opportunities for women, the people of the South  Sahel will not be 
able to lower their fertility rates. 
AGRICULTURAL TRANSITION  
       The agricultural transition has followed a trajectory similar to  the worldwide population transition.  For many 
centuries, agricultural  production kept pace with human population (Drake, 1993).  There were  periods of famine 
due to war, drought or other climatological disasters,  but on a large scale, human populations were able to 
produce enough to  feed themselves.  Increases in agricultural production came through the  increase of the 
amount of land under cultivation, and improved methods of  production.  Drake identifies the shift in increase 
from amount of land  under cultivation to improvements in productivity per hectare as the  beginning of the 
agricultural transition (Drake, 1993).  The transition  includes the period of increasing returns on inputs into fixed 
land  holdings, and eventually reaches a stable point when a given area of land  cannot profitably be made to 
produce more output.  According to Drake,  the shift from size to intensity is especially remarkable at the  
individual farmer or family level at which the amount of land owned or  open to use may be fixed, leaving a 
farmer only one alternative to  increase production:  increased growth intensity.  If increased intensity  does not 
occur, but population continues to increase, rural to urban  migration will occur, giving those who remain on the 
land more area to  cultivate.  
     The South Sahel region is at the early stages of this  transition.  The vast majority of people in the region are 
farmers (over  90% of the labor force in 2 of the 3 countries involved are  agriculturists (CIA, 1995), and almost 
all farmers work on small,  family-run farms.  Some cash crops, mostly cotton, are produced (CIA,  1995).  Food 
crops are varied and include:  sorghum, millet, cassava,  rice, tubers, and others to a lesser degree (UN, 1994, and 
CIA, 1995).   In general, women grow food crops and men grow both food crops and cash  crops.  Agricultural 
production is accomplished using traditional methods  and only the most simple of tools:  short handled hoes, 
shovels, and  machetes.  Agricultural production is highly labor intensive, and yields  are low.  For example, in 
Niger, the profit in terms of food produced per  hectare of arable land is at about $120 in constant US 1985 dollars 
per  year (WRD, 1995).  Considering that a family with 4 people working can  cultivate slightly more than 4 
hectares of land on average (this  statistic is for Tanougou in northern Benin, Agbo, 1993), the amount of  food or 
profits produced is very low.  Most land is broken into small  plots of less than a hectare to one or two hectares, 
with one family  farming several plots.  Little in the way of technological advances have  been brought in.  
Fertilizers and pesticides are used, but due to their  high cost they are not used in the recommended amounts.  
Some livestock  is raised, mostly for family consumption, except for Burkina Faso where a  substantial number of 
cattle and sheep are raised for sale (UN, 1994, and  CIA, 1995).  
          The soils of the region are relatively poor and non-productive.   In the past, this was a manageable problem 
in that the population in any  given area was low enough to allow long periods of fallow between   periods of 
production which gave the land the opportunity to replenish  its nutrient content.  As population increases and 
more pressure is  applied to the already constrained ecosystem-system, periods of fallow  are decreased out of a 
necessity to use the land for food production.   Land that used to be left fallow for a decade or more in between 
each  several year period of use is now only being left fallow for 4 or five  years.  Another common practice which 
decreases the fertility of the soil  is burning off the ground cover which grows up in times of fallow and  between 
harvests.  In a region of no winter to naturally break the insect  and pest cycle, burning the fields helps to 
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accomplish this vital task  for production (Schneider, personal communication), but much of the  organic matter 
on the land is in a sense wasted by being burnt off  instead of being used to enrich the soil.  Fire also destroys any  
unprotected trees which serves to increase the shortage of fuel wood in  the area (Agbo, 1993).  Finally, fire leaves 
the land open to wind and  water erosion until substantial plant cover is replenished.  Some  fertilizers are used in 
an effort to substitute for the loss of soil  fertility, but for the most part these inputs are too expensive for  families 
to afford (Simsik) or unavailable to be used correctly. When  they are used, fertilizers have their own long term 
debilitating effects  on the soil which necessitates ever greater inputs of fertilizer .  
        Shortening fallow periods and field burning is impoverishing the  soil and ever decreasing yields per hectare.  
This creates the need to  try to cultivate even more land to produce enough to survive.  The need  for labor to work 
the increasing landholdings leads to an increased need  for children.  More children serve to increase the pressures 
on the land,  both through need for agricultural production and need for the fuel wood  and other resources that the 
land provides.  This cycle will continue to  reproduce itself and expand until the population can feed itself without  
relying on the practices that serve to keep the cycle in motion. 
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL TRANSITION
The basic epidemiological transition is highly related to both the 
agricultural and demographic transitions described above.  In the early 
stages of the transition, most death is caused by infectious disease and 
malnutrition related disease (Drake, 1993, and Dewey, 1986).  There is a 
high probability that any individual will contract a mortal disease and 
die before they reach old age.  As public health and sanitation measures 
take effect, such as clean water provision and food safety standards, the 
first stage of the transition begins.  Infectious disease and 
malnutrition related disease take fewer young lives, and people begin to 
live longer on average.  As medical technology improves, vaccinations are 
administered against many infectious diseases, and  food becomes more and 
more secure due to agricultural improvements.  Living into old age 
becomes the norm. Death is no longer caused by infection or malnutrition 
for the most part, instead it is due to a whole host of degenerative 
diseases such as heart disease and cancer.  Degenerative diseases existed 
previous to this stage, but since they affect the elderly much more often 
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than the young, they were rarely seen.  This last stage has been reached 
in much of the more developed world, and life expectancies at birth have 
soared into the 70 and 80 year ranges (Population Reference Bureau, Inc., 
1995).  The majority of people in the West live into their retirement 
years and experience one or more of the degenerative diseases from which 
they eventually die (Drake, 1993, and Dewey, 1986).
Figure 9
 
        In the South Sahel region, the transition is underway to some 
extent, but it has come about in a very different manner than it did in 
the West.  Instead of a decrease in illness and death at young ages 
beginning with public health measures as was seen in the West, the 
initial decrease in death rates in the South Sahel came primarily from 
vaccinations and improved medical technology.  For example, in the South 
Sahel region today, only about 35% of the rural population has access to 
safe drinking water (43% in Benin, 31% in Burkina Faso, and 32% in Niger) 
(WRD, 1995).  Sanitation services, such as latrines are in even shorter 
supply with approximately 12% of the population having access to them (5% 
in Burkina Faso, 4% in Niger, and 35% in Benin).  On the other hand, a 
large proportion of infants are immunized now against the childhood 
killers including tuberculosis, diphtheria, polio, and measles (WRD, 
1995).  Thanks to the World Health Organization, small pox has been wiped 
out.  Antibiotics are now available to those who can get to health care 
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facilities.  Access to medical facilities is low however, with overall 
access to a clinic or hospital at less than 50% (WRD, 1995). 
        The effect of the changes in health care and medical services has 
increased the life expectancy dramatically since international aid 
agencies began working in earnest in the 1950s (see Figure 9 above), but 
in all three countries of the South Sahel, life expectancy is still quite 
low by more developed countries standards.  Since life expectancy is a 
measure of the average age at death, it is also an indicator of general 
ages of death across a population.  A low life expectancy such as that 
seen in the South Sahel Region is indicative of deaths due to infectious 
disease and malnutrition related disease because it shows us that a large 
percentage of the population is dying before they reach old age when 
degenerative diseases generally set in.  Infant mortality rates also can 
be used as rough indicators for death rates across all age groups.  In a 
region with high infant mortality, there is likely to be high death rates 
across all age groups, indicating high death rates from infectious and 
malnutritional diseases.  Infant mortality has declined somewhat in the 
South Sahel mostly due to improvements in vaccinations and medical 
technology available, but it remains very high, at 109 per thousand live 
births annually for Benin, 134 per thousand for Niger, and 137 per 
thousand for Burkina Faso (WHO, 1991).
Figure 10
 
        Due to a lack of reporting, morbidity rates (rates of illness) 
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are not well known for most of the world.  A study was carried out in 
Burkina Faso which indicates that the leading causes of visits to health 
clinics and hospitals for children under five in that country are, in 
order of rates, malaria, diarrheal disease, respiratory infection, and 
malnutrition related disease (See figure 10) (Konate et al., 1994).  This 
information roughly corresponds to the World Banks assessment of 
mortality causes for children in demographically developing countries 
(World Bank, 1993).  Children under five bear a large percentage of the 
burden of communicable disease.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, when infectious 
disease occurs, 63.5% of the time it is to a child under five;  32.1% of 
non-communicable disease (including malnutrition) is borne by children 
under five.  The corresponding figures for children in the more developed 
countries of the world are: 29.3% of communicable disease and only 4.3% 
of non-communicable disease (World Bank, 1993).  
        The overall infectious disease rate for people of all ages is 
extremely high in the developing world. The daily adjusted life years 
lost (DALYs) due to any given disease or adverse situation (such as 
malaria or lack of clean water) is a useful measurement of disease 
rates.  It takes into account both loss of life and loss of health while 
alive.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, the rate of DALYs lost to people of all 
age groups due to infectious disease is estimated at 408.7 per 1000 
people.  The corresponding rate due to infectious disease in the more 
developed world is only 11.4 DALYs lost per 1000.  On the other hand, in 
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the more developed world the non-communicable disease rate is closer to 
that of sub-saharan Africa at 92 DALYs lost per thousand people.  
Sub-Saharan Africas non-communicable disease rate is 111.4 DALYs lost per 
1000 people.  This rate is slightly higher than in the more developed 
world, but it is apparent from these figures that proportionally, the 
vast majority of disease burden is caused by infectious disease in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, while the majority in the more developed countries is 
caused by non-communicable, degenerative disease.  
        The epidemiology and agricultural transitions include a change 
from food production for individual use to crop production for sale.  As 
productivity increases, a family can grow more than they themselves 
need.  Selling the excess production, or growing strictly cash crops, is 
a way to save what is produced and create a buffer against times of 
famine or hardship (Dewey, 1986).  Such saving is virtually impossible in 
a purely subsistence farming situation for longer than the year or so 
that excess food can be conserved.  This transition can be enforced by 
the government by the need to pay taxes or the need to have money 
available for other things such as school fees and transportation.  
        Once farmers move from purely subsistence farming to some 
subsistence and some market crops, food consumption is no longer 
equivalent to what is produced.  A movement to cash crops takes control 
of productivity, in terms of profit, out of the families hands and puts 
it into the markets.  For farmers with large and highly productive 
landholdings, this change means more luxury and diversity of diet, but 
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for a marginal farmer the switch can lead to a decrease in nutritional 
intake if the farming family does not make enough money to purchase 
adequate food (Dewey, 1986).  Often the most fertile land is converted to 
cash crop use, leaving the more marginal land on which to produce food 
crops for family consumption.  In periods of low rainfall or other 
climatic catastrophe, those marginal lands produce little to nothing.  
The more fertile lands may still be made to produce crops, although to a 
lesser extent than in high rainfall years, but money has many uses 
besides food purchases.  Income from the sale of these crops may be used 
up before food is gone for other things such as paying taxes and school 
fees.  Over time, if a farming family is successful and the market 
remains high for their cash crops, the savings lead to the ability to 
increase either holdings or intensity of farming.  The increase leads to 
more savings and more increase.  This cycle, where it is possible, can 
lead to smaller farmers being pushed out because they cannot compete with 
the higher technology production of the neighboring farmers who can 
afford to sell their products for less (Dewey, 1986).  Rural to urban 
migration is the result, as we have seen in the United States.
        The South Sahel region is at present in the very early stages of 
this part of the transition.  Some cash crops are grown, mostly cotton, 
but, as are so many developing world producers, the ability to make 
profits is at the mercy of the international market.  Farmers frequently 
turn their best land over to cotton growth, with the idea of including it 
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in their regular crop rotations.  Despite the high nutrient use of cotton 
plants (Simsik, 1993).  The soil becomes impoverished, and when it no 




        Another result of a change to cash cropping is a decrease in the 
variety of what is grown (Dewey, 1986).  Evidence shows that very 
traditional cultures practicing subsistence farming generally have highly 
nutritional diets.  In the South Sahel, it appears that in years without 
drought the area is very close to food self-sufficient in terms of 
calories (see Figure 11).  In terms of nutrition there is a deficiency of 
vitamins and nutrients leading to high rates of malnutrition especially 
in children.  The prevalence of malnutrition for children under five is 
estimated at 46% in Burkina Faso, 49% in Niger, and 35% in Benin (World 
Bank, 1993).
        The epidemiological transition is underway, but due to limited 
access to care, agricultural constraints on good nutrition, and poor 
public health and sanitation, the transition is moving very slowly.
THE EFFECTS OF GLOBAL WARMING
        The demographic, epidemiologic, and agricultural transitions are 
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all in progress in the South Sahel.  The timing and speed of all three 
are influenced by many factors, not least of all each other.  Perhaps 
already, but more likely in the near future, the rate of change in these 
transitions will begin to be influenced by the effects of anthropogenic 
climate change.  Although we are far from understanding all the effects 
global warming may have, when we look through the lens of the transition 
theory, we can predict some of the possible effects of human induced 
climate change.  In general, the most likely changes that global warming 
will bring are to exacerbate the negative effects of transitions already 
in progress.
        Perhaps the most direct change due to global warming will be in 
the agricultural transition.  In the South Sahel, rainfall amount and 
timing are vital to the growth of crops.  If global warming creates 
either more drought in the Sahel or increased volatility in precipitation 
as many predict (Suliman, 1990, Glanz, 1992, IPCC, 1995), the effect will 
be to increase the speed of the present circular trend of  decreasing 
production per hectare leading to the necessity to cultivate more land 
which in turn decreases the revitalizing fallow periods and impoverishes 
the soil further.  Increased drought and failed crops leave the earth 
open to wind and rain erosion when the rain does fall.  Erosion leads to 
increased desertification and impoverishment of soil fertility (WHO, 1990).
        Increased drought or precipitation volatility due to global 
warming may also lead to an increase in out-migration to urban areas due 
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to a decrease in the ability to survive (Doos, 1994) in the South Sahel.  
The migration and urbanization transitions were not discussed in detail 
in this paper, but in brief,  if jobs or other sources of survival are 
not available in the urban centers where people of the South Sahel 
migrate, migration will serve only to swell the already existing problems 
of urban poverty and unemployment.
        Due to a decrease in the ability to produce at the lower 
latitudes, global warming is expected to necessitate a net increase in 
imports of cereals from 20-50% into the developing world (Fischer et al., 
1994).  The average decrease in crop yield of cereals due to global 
warming in the developing world is 10% (Fischer et al., 1994).  There is 
no reason to believe that the South Sahel region will be immune to these 
effects.  Policy options must be considered and implemented soon to try 
to avoid the negative agricultural effects global warming will cause.
        Global warming will indirectly effect the population transition.  
Population, poverty and environmental degradation are intertwined in a 
positive feedback loop (Dasgupta, 1993).  Global warming, through 
increased drought and volatility will add inputs into the loop in the 
form of worsening environmental conditions in the South Sahel.  As the 
environmental conditions worsen, people will need to have even more 
children to do the work necessary to survive.  As cereal production and 
other crop production decreases due to worsening agricultural conditions, 
the already tenuous state of nutrition of the South Sahel may worsen.  
There will be 40-300 million more people at risk for hunger due to 
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climate change worldwide (Patz, 1995).  More malnutrition will lead to a 
higher risk of death, especially for young children.  As childhood 
mortality increases, people may feel that they must have more children to 
replace the children they have lost, to insure that a certain number of 
children survive, or to insure their own futures when they become too old 
to work (Dasgupta, 1995).  This trend is already occurring in the South 
Sahel.  Global warming will serve to increase the problem however and 
cause it to move forward at ever increasing rates.
        On another level, the worsening agricultural conditions due to 
global warming and the already occurring population dynamics will lead to 
increased poverty in the already poor region.  Increased poverty leads to 
fewer economic possibilities, and also less money to pay school fees.  
Parents in the South Sahel are extremely unlikely to send their girls to 
school if they cannot afford to enroll all their children.  Instead, boys 
go to school when the parents can afford to send any children at all.  
Since educational and economic opportunities for women tend to decrease 
fertility (Dasgupta, 1995), the opposite is also true-- where fewer women 
have such opportunities, fertility tends to increase.
        Global warming will not alter the path of the population 
transition as it is occurring now, but it may drastically increase the 
rate at which it is occurring.  Fertility rates are high at present, and 
will get higher still if the effects of global warming are not 
mitigated.  Policy changes cannot stop increases in population, but they 
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can help to slow down the increases to give governments more time to 
provide infrastructure and services to the growing population.  
        The effects of global warming on the epidemiologic transition are 
in many ways tied to the population and agricultural transitions. 
According to the World Health Organization, global warming may directly 
increase health risks, especially for those people who have immature 
regulatory systems, such as  infants and young children, and those with 
failing cardiovascular, respiratory, renal, and other systems (WHO 
1990).  Increasing malnutrition is likely to occur, as described above.  
Malnutrition will also potentially increase due to less diversity in 
diets.  As the climate warms, and drought increases in the South Sahel, 
it is likely that some varieties of edible plants will not be able to 
adapt to the quickly changing climatic conditions.  Since the population 
of the South Sahel relies for the most part on the crops the people 
themselves can grow or gather, a decrease in varieties of crops may lead 
to a decrease in the nutritional value of the local diet.  
        Temperature is a major determinant in disease vector 
infectivity.  It affects replication, maturation, and length of 
infectivity of vectors (Patz, 1995).  Infectious disease rates are very 
likely to change due to changing climatic conditions.  While droughts are 
likely to intensify in the South Sahel, the amount of rainfall is 
expected to increase.  Increased evapotranspiration will remove a greater 
percentage of moisture from the soil, making both the earth drier and the 
humidity higher than at the present time.  Increased temperature and 
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humidity tend to intensify the biting behavior of most insects (Patz, 
1995).  Since many infectious diseases in the South Sahel, most notably 
malaria, are passed through insect bites, it is likely that the rate of 
infection of such diseases will increase.
        Incubation periods for many viruses such as dengue fever, one of 
many arboviruses found in sub-saharan Africa, may decrease.  For example, 
it was found that at 30 degrees Celsius (a temperature experienced in all 
parts of the South Sahel during certain months) the incubation time for 
dengue fever is 12 days.  When the temperature is raised to 32-35 degrees 
Celsius as it may be with global warming, the incubation period is only 7 
days.  This effect alone leads to three times the transmission potential 
of dengue fever (Patz, 1995).
        With global warming, the relative burden of infectious disease on 
the population will probably increase from its already high levels in the 
South Sahel, as will the relative burden of malnutrition and malnutrition 
related disease.
        
POLICY CHANGES TO  MITIGATE THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF GLOBAL WARMING
        Since the exact effects and magnitude of effects of global 
warming on the South Sahel are not known, it is important that any policy 
implemented will also benefit the state and the people if global warming 
does not impact the South Sahel region as is expected.   In the South 
Sahel the most likely effects of global warming are to increase the speed 
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and magnitude of the already occurring negative effects of transitions.   
No Regrets policies are relatively simple to envision in this case:  they 
must be policies which have the power, when implemented, to decrease the 
speed and magnitude of the most likely problems approaching.  They must 
also lead to positive changes for the environment and societies now.  By 
implementing No Regrets policies, the governments involved can provide 
the local population time for the international community and the 
domestic communities to discover effective, long term mitigative 
procedures.  If no policy is taken to mitigate global warming now, a very 
real possibility is that the state of the population and environment will 
deteriorate to such a great degree that long term solutions are 
impossible or are made extremely costly and difficult.  Since pertinent 
policy changes will all have some cost associated with them, it is 
necessary to chose policy changes carefully which could possibly be 
implemented by the governments involved.  The international communitys 
assistance in funding new policy implementation may be of extreme 
importance.  Also, since global warming is itself mostly a result of 
activities in the developing world, ideas such as debt swaps in return 
for policy implementation should not be ruled out.
        One of the gravest dangers that global warming poses to the South 
Sahel region is to decrease the populations ability to produce or 
purchase adequate amounts and types of food to achieve and maintain a 
healthy diet.  There are several fairly low cost policies which could be 
implemented to help alleviate this problem, while improving already low 
file:///C|/545/1995/cunningham.htm (28 of 36) [6/18/2008 10:57:00 AM]
545\cunningham
nutritional standards.  First, the governments involved should enlarge 
the agricultural extension services to the rural regions of the South 
Sahel.  Through these agencies, the states need to encourage the 
maintenance of food crops for local consumption as well as home gardens 
to improve both available calories and available nutrients no matter what 
the state of the international economy for cash crops is.  At the same 
time, extension agents should educate local farmers about the depletive 
effects of cotton production on the soil, not in an effort to cut out 
cash cropping, but instead to ensure that cultivators do not turn their 
most productive lands away from food crops.  Agricultural extension 
workers should train cultivators in methods of composting, interplanting, 
cropping of fallow lands with nitrogen fixing plants, and erosion 
reduction techniques to improve and maintain the fertility of the soil.  
Agriculture extension agents can also play a key role in introducing 
drought resistant varieties to the area.  Reforestation efforts should be 
supported by the extension offices.  Decreasing land cover opens up the 
land to greater degradation and loss of fertility, especially in times of 
drought when new growth is likely to be slow in covering and protecting 
the land.  Reforestation can also directly decrease the work load of the 
population by providing replenishable fuel wood to the population.
        Secondly, the local social centers, health and nutrition centers, 
and clinics should be enlarged and the staffs retrained.  The staff of 
these health related centers should become more actively involved in 
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educating families about nutrition and maintaining a healthy diet using 
locally grown foods.  If possible it would be beneficial to expand both 
the health and agricultural sectors to a village level whereby each 
village had trained members who could both disseminate information to the 
public and receive new information and techniques from the government.  
One low cost alternative would be to train school teachers in health and 
agricultural techniques.  School teachers are respected members of the 
community in the South Sahel, and many people are willing to listen to 
them.  If they were trained well, they could act not only as teachers of 
children, but also leaders in new technology.
        Improving food security may of itself decrease population growth, 
but without more inputs it is doubtful that the effects on population 
would come quickly enough to help avoid the worst problems of 
overpopulation.  The governments of the South Sahel need to ensure that 
the population has access to contraceptive education as well as 
contraceptive methods.  Health clinic staff should be trained to provide 
both at low cost.  Men and women should be targeted for contraceptive 
education since both are of vital importance to decisions of fertility.
        Efforts should be made to improve educational and economic 
opportunities for women also since such opportunities have the effect of 
lowering fertility.  One way that this could be done would be to insist 
that development agencies provide equal opportunities to small business 
projects to both men and women.  Often, development projects target men 
because they are at liberty to take on new projects, while projects that 
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target women must take children and family responsibilities into 
account.  Education for girls can be encouraged by lowering school fees 
and by educating the public, perhaps through school teachers, as to the 
advantages of educated women in terms of improved nutrition and health 
for the whole family and improved earning potentials.  
        The increase in the infectious disease burden that will be borne 
by the people of the South Sahel due to global warming can also be 
mitigated to some extent.  Again, education can play an economical and 
important role.  The local clinics and health centers, if properly 
staffed and trained can provide education and services to the populations 
to avoid and treat malaria and other infectious diseases.  Techniques to 
decrease the number of dengue fever and malaria carrying mosquitoes 
should also be disseminated through the clinics and village health 
centers.  The use of bed nets should be encouraged, especially for 
children, to prevent infection at night, and if possible should be 
provided at low cost.
        The people of the South Sahel must react to the threat of global 
warming.  They cannot do this however without the support of their 
governments through the provision of training, salary for staff, and 
supplying of local outreach offices.  By implementing these policies now, 
the governments involved can mitigate the potential negative effects of 
global warming.  At the same time, they can alleviate some of the 
problems already at play in the region.  If governments do not take 
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action until they know the exact extent and form of damage due to global 
warming, the result will necessitate greater input to reverse the 
negative trends and not alleviate many of the problems of climate change.
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POPULATION DYNAMICS AND URBAN GROWTH PATTERN
Cities are nodes of mans greatest impact on nature, the places where he 
has most altered the essential resources of land, air, organisms, and 
water. The city is the quintessence of mans capacity to inaugurate and 
control changes in his habitat. Through urbanization man has created new 
ecosystems within which the interaction of man, his works, and nature are 
complex. This complexity - and the importance of our understanding it - 
grows as cities burgeon in the modern world.
                                                --Marcus and Detwyler
Introduction
The Urban Age
        In view of societal evolution urbanism is a very recent 
development. Considering that in 1800 only a meager 3% of the worlds 
population lived in cities over 100,000 (Detwyler & Marcus, 1972) - the 
twentieth century may well be called the urban age. In 1969 Davis 
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speculated that in 1990 more than half of the globe's population would be 
living in cities of 100,000 or more (Cities, 1969). This prediction was 
remarkably good. According to World Resources Data Base (WRD), as of 
1995, 45.2% of the worlds population is living in urban centers. The 
portion of urban population in South America (78%), Europe (75%), North 
and Central America (74%) and Oceania (71%) and the former USSR (68.1%) 
lies well above this mark; whereas Africa and Asia still show percentages 
under 40%. Within each continent we find a wide range of urbanization for 
individual countries.
        It can be generalized that countries with a currently low 
percentage of urban population experience the highest annual change 
rates. Urbanization is therefore more significant in those countries than 
in countries with an already high percentage of urban dwellers. For 
example, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, the US or Sweden had a 
percentage of urban population of more than 70% in 1965. This figure did 
increase only marginally over the past 30 years. Countries with less than 
30% urban population in 1965 experienced dramatic changes (Table 1).
Urban Population as a Percentage of Total
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Country 1965    1995    %Increase
United Kingdom  87.1    89.5    2.4
Australia       83.0    85.2    3.2
New Zealand     78.9    84.3    5.4
Sweden  77.1    84.7    7.6
Canada  72.9    78.1    5.2
                        
Turkey  34.1    68.8    34.7
South Korea     32.4    77.6    45.2
Honduras        25.7    47.7    22.0
Kenya   8.6     27.7    19.1
Botswana        3.9     30.9    27.0
Table 1- Country Comparison of Urbanization Rate
        With the earth's growing population the continuation of the 
urbanization trend and of urban growth is more than likely to persist. 
Urban form and development vary a great deal. In view of the complexity 
of the system and the multitude of interacting variables it seems 
presumptuous to think that urban dynamics and growth can be controlled 
and governed. It is however assumed that certain measures and policies 
could help influence changes toward a more favorable and "harmonious" 
development and shape of urban centers. With most of our earth's 
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population living in urban areas, the creation of a livable and 
environmentally sensitive urban habitat is not only a moral but a 
survival need. Increasing the understanding of the 
urban-population-environment dynamics might be a first step towards 
addressing this demand. An improved insight in those dynamics then might 
help to devise policy to manage urban development in a fashion that 
sustains the environment, preserves valuable natural resources and 
biodiversity and mitigates negative effects.
Urbanization: Factors and Problems
        The reasons for urbanization are manifold. One reason for the 
increase of the urban population is total population growth. The rise of 
mercantilism drove the urbanization in 16th century Europe (Hartshorn, 
1992). More recently, urban growth stems from the shift of labor force 
from agriculture to industry and service sectors; the latter two are 
generally located in cities or urbanized areas, thus serving as 
attractors for human migration and agglomeration. Other motivations to 
move from rural to urban settings are job opportunities and education. 
The benefit of the city versus the country can be summarized as the 
maximization of stimulation, exchange and opportunity with a minimization 
of travel time (Register in Aberley, 1994). This is certainly one view. 
During the early stages of European urban history the city represented 
freedom. Still, city life today is associated with a sort of independent 
and anonymous living. 
        The human-imposed order within the city boundaries suggests 
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security and safety from untamed nature or enemy forces. Modern man's 
fear is derived from dangers within the city. In many cases the aspect of 
safety and order of the urban center has lost its validity. The inner 
city often is perceived as unsafe and dangerous. Other benefits, such as 
minimization of travel time, are often offset by the increasing physical 
size of the urban area. In a spread out multi-million person city that 
covers several hundred square miles it can take considerable time to get 
from one destination to another. Automobile travel is slowed down due to 
speed limit and traffic density. With no efficient public transit system 
in place it might take longer to cover the same distance than if one had 
to commute a similar distance between rural villages.
        Continued (rapid) urbanization generally poses a number of 
problems. Housing and infrastructure has to be provided for an increasing 
number of city dwellers. This requires planning and the resolution of 
land use conflicts. If the influx of new urban residents exceeds the city 
planners capabilities to plan lots and streets for new neighborhoods it 
often results in poorly planned and uncoordinated growth development. In 
so-called lesser developed countries (LDCs) with high population growth 
rates, migrants with little and no economic resources often settle 
illegally on vacant areas in, or adjacent to, large cities creating 
pouvre barrios or squatter communities.
        If the city does not meet the expectations for opportunities, 
jobs and wealth, dissatisfaction can lead to criminal or aggressive 
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activities. Stimulation, while good and needed for human development also 
has a flip-side. Life in a dense and crowded environment also can pose 
enormous stress upon the city dweller, possibly leading to various health 
and behavioral disorders such as depression, illness or aggression.
        Cities use large amounts of energy, for industries and to heat 
and light thousands of homes. The energy is often created by burning 
fossil fuels, which leads to air pollution. Pollution of the air and 
water, human and industrial wastes causes negative environmental 
degradation and imposes on the quality of life and well being of urban 
residents. Managing growth in order to mitigate environmental degradation 
will be of utmost importance to ensure a livable urban setting for the 
future (Hartshorn, 1992).
        In summary, problems of urbanization are especially pertinent and 
difficult to address in rapidly changing cities of the third World 
(Cadman & Payne, 1990). These periods of rapid urbanization or 
de-urbanization can be regarded as periods of transition. Transitions are 
times of vulnerability; in the case of urbanization they are a threat to 
the integrity and vitality of a city (Drake, 1992). Rapid urbanization is 
potentially unhealthy and equally harmful to urban residents, the 
functioning of the city and the natural environment.
A Morphological Approach to Population Dynamics, Urban Growth and Urban Form
Development of Urban form
Many studies of urban growth development and form in the past have taken 
a historical or a functional perspective. The historical perspective 
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reveals a cycle of growth and decline, formation and restructuring of the 
city (Cadman & Payne, 1990). Towns and villages have been categorized 
according to physical growth pattern into cluster and linear band types 
or hierarchies of rank-size (Hartshorn, 1992; Christaller et. al.). The 
functional approach perceives cities as an organizing center, serving 
typically a predominant function such as banking, administration, or 
services. We distinguish trade, military, industrial or company towns and 
many more. Geographers also have categorized cities in terms of their 
spatial location as coastal or river cities and so forth (Hartshorn, 
1992). While each of these different perspectives is interesting and 
valid, they fail to address the system dynamics of urban development in a 
more comprehensive manner.
Systems approach and Transition Theory
        Marcus & Detwyler et. al. (1972, 1992) suggest viewing the urban 
agglomeration as a dynamic system or even as an ecosystem. Systems are 
not static, but generally evolve over time. At times, however, systems 
change rapidly due to a changing systems component (i.e. population). In 
terms of urban form other systems components that trigger change are 
transportation modes and technology amongst others. From a systems 
perspective of view, periods of change can be viewed as temporarily 
bounded or transitional (Drake, 1993). Periods of rapid change will be 
followed by periods of relative stability. Transition theory assumes 
interdependence and relationship between transitions of different sectors 
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such as agriculture, education, etc. This means the amplitude and time 
frame of one transition, i.e. urbanization is likely to be influenced by 
others, such as education. Implications for society may be enhanced or 
reduced, if the timing of transitions can be influenced by policy.
Urbanization Transition and Urban Shape
        This study proposes to look at urbanization from a spatial point 
of view investigating the linkage of population growth, urbanization and 
urban shape. It will explore population changes in time and the 
corresponding spatial changes of urban form. The investigation is based 
on the premise that urban form is the physical manifestation of 
urbanization. Urban growth is a result of population growth, rural-urban 
migration and urban expansion. The author believes that the rate and time 
of change in those dynamics and the accompanying fringe conditions 
(landscape, technologies, climate etc.) will determine the urban shape 
(Figure 1). In a generalized way, these factors can be attributed to 
either the natural environment or the human society. Although the 
determinants for urban form of human origin, such as technology, 
transportation systems and culture may dominate, topography and land form 
are especially influential in early spatial patterns (Detwyler & Marcus, 
1972).
Figure 1 - Influences on Urban form
Towards a morphology of urban form
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        The dynamics of urban-population-environment systems are complex. 
Transition theory at the global level and at the local level will be used 
to investigate urbanization trends. In conjunction to the urbanization 
data a number of factors that may influence urbanization, such as 
industrialization, transportation technology etc. will be explored. These 
factors are identified and linked to physical development pattern. It is 
assumed that different values of factor sets will result in different 
physical growth pattern. Furthermore, it is assumed that the timing of 
transitions in other sectors will influence the growth pattern of urban 
agglomerations as well. An attempt is made to develop a morphology of 
urbanization stages based on change and behavioral similarities at a 
national level. The categorization of urbanization stages will become a 
framework from which a morphology of urban development pattern at the 
local level can be devised. This local morphology probably will be 
correlated to behavioral pattern (i.e. traffic) and pattern in the 
environment (i.e. topography) if appropriate [Adams, ref. comment]. The 
author hopes that a general survey of structure and form of urban 
development could be helpful to derive a typology or classification of 
certain trends. In the long run, a morphological study may help to 
indicate development pattern that are preferable in respect to newly 
developed environmental value systems.
        In morphological terms a range of different classes of cities is 
imagined. A morphology could contain simple size distinction (small, 
file:///C|/545/1995/frank.htm (9 of 36) [6/18/2008 10:57:07 AM]
545\frank
medium, large) as well as functional-structural categories (old, new, 
dense, dispersed, high-tech, low-tech, etc.). In terms of development, 
transition theory will help to envision likely future development 
depending on the initial conditions of an urban system. Since technology 
and industrialization are thought of being major shape factors of urban 
growth this study starts developing an initial morphology of urban form 
with respect to the changes in transportation modes and urbanization. In 
particular individual motorized transportation is investigated for its 
impact on urban form. When linking urban growth and transportation 
technology the following scenarios for urban shape development can be 
constructed. A possible test for these morphologies, would be a study of 
urban shapes comparing urbanization and development pattern.
        Three initial morphologies for urban shape and change of 
transportation modes were developed:
1) Introduction of individual automobile transit prior to major urban 
growth >
 
- increase in urban area
- decrease in density
- low overall urban density (except may be historic core) 
- transportation arterial location greatly influence urban form
- depending on the size, satellite-like subcenters might form.
The new urban growth is build for the automobile. 
file:///C|/545/1995/frank.htm (10 of 36) [6/18/2008 10:57:07 AM]
545\frank
2) Introduction of individual automobile transits during the urban growth 
period >
 
- a chaotic state (planners are caught in the dilemma between accommodating
 people or cars)
- dense traffic
- major pollution
- urban area, that is structure in an ad hoc fashion probably with 
decreasing density
- opportunities and dangers depending on economic situation and policy 
decisions
3) Introduction of individual automobile transit post urban growth period
 
- major redesign of the city structure (retrofitting the city for the car)
- relative high density
- traffic congestion
- pollution and noise (if not mitigated by policy)
- can potentially degrade quality of the city structure
        Note: It is very likely that the effect of the transportation 
technology transition varies depending on the size of the city or town. A 
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small town will be less affected by it than a large town. This is a 
matter of geometry and existing density. For these examples growth is 
assumed 
unrestricted by landscape, political borders, or policies. Doxiadis 
organic growth model also predicts distortions along transportation 
routes at advanced stages of urban development (1968).
 
Figure 2 - Morphologies
Urbanization Analysis
        The study uses various analysis techniques to explore the 
feasibility of linking urban transition and urban form to a shape 
development morphology. It looks at many different aspects of the 
problem, trying to understand it without however being exhaustive or 
comprehensive. Hopefully, some different views regarding urbanization can 
be presented.
Methodological Approach and Data
        The methodological approach in this study is twofold. Global and 
local level data will be investigated. This is to emphasize the scale 
dependence of the issue.
        First, a general investigation of urbanization at the global 
level is conducted. This is to establish a general notion of the linkage 
file:///C|/545/1995/frank.htm (12 of 36) [6/18/2008 10:57:07 AM]
545\frank
between population growth and urbanization  While there is a global 
urbanization trend, we probably can observe the urbanization transition 
at different stages, its beginning, in full force or at its conclusion 
for different countries. The global urbanization trends are investigated 
looking at time series data from the World Resource Data for 42 
Countries. Urban, rural and total population development are explored and 
displayed. Urbanization factors that are viewed as influencing 
urbanization and urban form will be investigated in relation to the 
urbanization transition in the hope to discover correlation and linkages. 
One of those factors is the level of technology available in the country.
        Secondly, local level data will be investigated in respect to 
urban development and urban shape. The urban development of 5 major US 
cities over the past four decades serves as starting point for this 
investigation. Then, a more in-depth study of urban shape is conducted 
comparing Boston, MA and El Paso, TX. The study is based on US census 
data. An attempt was made to link the results of the investigation to 
urbanization factors that were thought to be shape-determinants.
Urbanization at the Global Level
National Comparison of Urbanization Levels
        On the basis of availability of desired data, a total of 42 
countries were selected from the WRD (see Table 2). Initially 
urbanization information was mapped on a world projection using ATLAS GIS 
for Windows. Two other factors were mapped in succeeding maps; the 
I_index and a correlation of the urbanization and I_index. The I_index 
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was calculated to provide some sort of measure for industrial 
productivity by dividing Gross domestic Product (GDP) industrial share 
(%) by the workforce in the industrial sector (%). The index is adjusted 
through multiplication by total number of workforce and division by total 
GDP. Supposedly this index will give a indication of the extent of 
industrialization. With at high output of the industrial sector shown by 
a relative large share of the total GDP achieved by a small share of the 
workforce should result in a large index. It is assumed that when few 
people achieve a large proportion of GDP it is a result of automation and 
high technology. This would indicate a high level of technology.
        Map 1 presents a general overview. It displays the 42 selected 
countries according to the proportion of people living in cities. The 
distribution for the four ranges was customized for the purpose of this 
display. The 8 countries at the top of the list in terms of percentage of 
their total population living in cities are in descending order: 
Singapore, Belgium, Venezuela, Uruguay, United Kingdom, Netherlands, 
Denmark and Australia. In terms of land area, except for Australia, these 
countries are fairly small, suggesting that there might be a correlation 
of land area and degree of urbanization. Australia then would be an 
outlier, since despite large areas of land most people live in cities. On 
the other hand, Australia might be right in the ball-park, when using 
hospitable area instead of total land area. Due to the limited data used 
for this study, however, the author opted not to pursue any further 
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investigations in this direction.
        The display of the urbanization transition for the 42 countries 
reveals three distinct pattern. Urban, rural and total population 
development is plotted over time (see Figures 3a, 3b, 3c).
Pattern A
This pattern shows a declining rural population and an increasing urban 
population. Around 1990 to 2000 the total population growth seems to 
level or decline. Pattern A countries are reaching or have reached the 
end of a fairly typical urbanization transition. The urban population 
percentage stabilizes at a fairly high level of 70% of the total 
population or higher. Over the transition period the rural population 
dropped to a fairly low overall level. These countries typically have a 
high I_Index (Figure 3a).
Pattern B
Pattern B countries are at the beginning or in the midst of their 
urbanization transition. A high growth rate for the urban population is 
accompanied by a (soon) declining rural population. The total population 
growth rate is quite high (3%++). The end of the transition in this 
pattern is projected beyond the year 2010 or later (all data and 
projections WRD). These countries typically have a low I_Index (Figures 3b).
Pattern C
Pattern C countries have a very low stable rural population. The urban 
population is however growing in linear fashion. There seems to be no 
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leveling or change in that trend for the next two to three decades (WRD 
prediction). All population increase seems to occur in the cities. The 
countries with this urbanization pattern are Australia, Canada and the 
USA, three major immigration countries (Figures 3c). This suggests that a 
large proportion of the urban growth is due to inmigrating foreigners.
Figure 3a - Pattern A
          
Figure 3b - Pattern B
    
Figure 3c - Pattern C
 
Urbanization and Technology
        Technology and industrialization seemed to be major factors that 
drove urbanization in the past (Hartshorn, 1992). These factors had a 
great influence in changing land use pattern (Sinclair, 1967). A further 
investigation of the link of urbanization to industrial 
production/technology appears promising
        Map 2 displays the calculated I_Index (Industrial GDP/workforce 
industrial share). The high ranking countries are what is often 
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designated as the Industrial Nations. The order is somewhat surprising 
with Norway at the top and the US ranked sixth. The listing might appear 
skewed since strong industrial nations such as Switzerland and Germany 
could not be included due to the lack of comparable data.
        Map 3 shows the correlation between the I_index and the percent 
urbanization for each country. The findings are interesting. There is a 
group of three countries Norway, Finland and Japan with a correlation 
factor of 1.5 or less, meaning that the percentage of urban population 
and the numerical value of the I_index are almost the same. A high 
correlation factor indicates a discrepancy of nominator and denominator. 
This means that despite a low level of technology and industrialization 
there is a high percentage of people living in urban areas. This means 
that urbanization preceded industrial development and must have been 
triggered by different factors. It also means that urbanization will 
occur under different premises than in the countries with a low 
correlation factor. Countries with a high factor are in descending order 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Honduras, Philippines, Romania, Egypt, Panama, El 
Salvador, Costa Rica, Turkey, et. al. Most of those countries are at the 
beginning of their urbanization transition (Figures 3a-c, 4a, 4b, 5a, 5b).
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A complete list of countries with their ranking of urban population, 
I_index etc. is shown below.
Rank #  Country Urban Popin %   I_Index % Urban/I_Index
1       Norway                  77.002525       64.9283         1.1861141 
2       Japan                   77.943899       55.4794         1.4051541 
3       Canada                  78.137155       51.4949         1.517521 
4       Belgium                 96.650384       47.3575         2.0411908 
5       Finland                 60.285375       46.0019         1.3105516 
6       United States           76.237184       45.9387         1.6598559 
7       Sweden                  84.737262       45.6385         1.8570515 
8       France                  72.788174       45.0832         1.6146445 
9       Netherlands             88.915414       44.6254         1.9927255 
10      Denmark                 85.477658       41.7588         2.0473691 
11      Italy                   70.540494       40.9309         1.7247065 
12      Austria                 60.628419       38.8964         1.5589719 
13      Australia               85.167412       37.2962         2.2839209 
14      United Kingdom          89.461725       34.704          2.5781477 
15      Spain                   80.652307       27.9247         2.8886929 
16      New Zealand             84.290541       27.6005         3.0190022 
17      Singapore               100             19.9111         5.0226017 
18      Mexico                  75.298388       18.8261         3.9996807 
19      Venezuela               92.87809        16.3011         5.6980423 
20      Uruguay                 90.301318       13.6092         6.6398028 
21      Trinidad&Tobago         66.50038        13.3537         4.9880179 
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22      Greece                  65.034624       12.9655         5.0181037 
23      Korea, Rep              77.628259       12.3138         6.3061137 
24      Guatemala               41.465022       11.3321         3.6597548 
25      Ecuador                 60.615801       11.316          5.3594873 
26      Colombia                72.721575       10.9699         6.6351802 
27      Ireland                 58.402998       10.6801         5.4684455 
28      Portugal                36.361797       9.92898         3.6655037 
29      Paraguay                50.684652       7.95855         6.3754279 
30      Poland                  63.868236       7.62871         8.3816583 
31      Jamaica                 55.359246       6.92128         7.9998911 
32      Turkey                  68.767733       6.86745         10.024451 
33      Panama                  54.870252       5.02267         10.930329 
34      Costa Rica              49.707944       4.94479         10.144478 
35      Romania                 56.183791       4.44702         12.625571 
36      El Salvador             46.67129        4.41119         10.583059 
37      Egypt                   44.763239       3.81796         11.748882 
38      Indonesia               32.529271       3.63699         8.936613 
39      Philippines             45.677693       3.61282         12.653101 
40      Honduras                47.654155       3.47418         13.733186 
41      Pakistan                34.692607       1.80723         19.273671 
42      Sri Lanka               22.3809         1.58441         14.165127 
Table 2: Industrial GDP/Industrial workforce Index
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Different Urbanization Catalysts
        As a consequence of the map evaluations, the countries with the 
extreme values of the urban - I_index correlation appear to be 
interesting in terms of transitions. The charts below show the 
urbanization transition for Norway, Finland (%Urban/I_Index factor of 
1.18 and 1.31) and Pakistan, Turkey (%Urban/I_index 19.27 and 10.02). The 
most remarkable difference between the two pairs seems to be that the 
energy consumption seemed to raise parallel to the urbanization in Norway 
and Finland. Both countries show a similarly high per person consumption 
of energy of about .2 Terajoules in 1991. For Pakistan and Turkey the per 
person energy consumption in 1990 is about 1/10 of the energy consumption 
observed in the two industrialized nations. Turkeys urbanization level 
(68%) is higher than Finland's (60%). The climatic differences may 
account only for some of the difference.
        It is assumed that this difference in energy consumption will 
lead to a dramatically different urban shape. Since data for city 
density, population and shape is difficult to obtain in the short period 
of time available for this project the impact of technology, i.e. the 
availability of the automobile (expressed also through an increased 
energy consumption per person) will be investigated in a modified way; at 
the local level (for US cities).
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Figure 4 a -  Urbanization and Energy Consumption Trend in Norway
 
Figure 4 b -  Urbanization and Energy Consumption Trend in Finland
 
 
Figure 5 a - Low Energy Urbanization in Turkey
 
Figure 5 b - Low Energy Urbanization in Pakistan
Local Urbanization
        The urbanization at the local level is examined for five US 
cities using census data. The urbanization development of three cities 
with a population of about 1/2 million in 1990 was traced, as well as 
that of two multi-million person cities. As assumed earlier, despite an 
increase of urban population at the national level, some cities decline 
(Figure 6). Some of the cities that had major growth before the advent of 
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individual traffic and others grew in the automobile area. Density seems 
to be one factor that impacts urban form. In comparing the growth rate - 
density correlation of 5 major cities we find a strong correlation of 
rapid growth and high spread. However there are many more factors and 
additional research is needed.
 
Figure 6a - Urban population development
 
 
Figure 6b - Urban population development
  
Figure 7 - Population Density Development
        The generalized data however may be misleading. Therefore a 
comparison of spatial density distribution was conducted for two of the 
five cities investigated.
City Shape: Boston, MA versus El Paso, TX
        The theory, just to recap, is that the time when the urbanization 
transition occurs will have a significant impact on the urban shape that 
is formed. It is in fact the context or conditions under which 
urbanization occurs that will impact the form. Technology is viewed as 
one of the important shape factors.
        With Boston, MA and El Paso, TX we have two cities that have 
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approximately the same size by population; with Boston having a 
population of 551675 in 1992 and El Paso having 543813. Both cities are 
constrained on how freely they can grow in some sense, with Boston having 
the Atlantic Ocean restricting growth to the south and east and El Paso 
having the Mexican border. In these terms the two cities are comparable. 
However, Bostons growth rate over the past 40 years was moderate or even 
declining, while El Paso went through a major post World War II growth 
spur. In 1940 El Paso had a population of about 100,000 (D'Antonio & 
Form, 1965). Boston's population exceeded 100,000 between 1840 and 1850 
(Kennedy, 1992)1. The existing urban shape of the two cities is very 
different.
        The diagrams below map the shape components of population density 
and spatial distribution for Boston and El Paso. They were created using 
1990 US census data for the city proper boundaries. At the block group 
level, population data, area, longitude and latitude for the centroids of 
each block were collected by extracting the appropriate files in 
electronic form and saved as text files. At this level 100% population 
count data is available. Block groups have an absolute population count 
between 700 and 2000 persons. The granularity of this data level ensures 
enough data points to get fairly accurate results for a density mapping. 
700 + data points (blocks) were identified for Boston and 600 + for El 
Paso. However the variation of population within each block was felt to 
be too large to merely map the population. Thus, the delimited text files 
were read into a spreadsheet program (EXCEL) and reformatted for import 
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in a statistics package (SYSTAT). Within the statistics package a number 
of computations were performed to calculate the population density per 
square mile within each block.
        A simple no-frills 2 dimensional plot was chosen to display the 
data spatially. The latitude variable was chosen for the y-Axis and the 
longitude variable was plotted on the x-Axis. The level of density is 
distinguished by color (Figures 8a,b) and size (Figures 9a,b) of the 
symbol plotted on the centroid of the each block within the citys 
jurisdiction. For representation purposes it was necessary to multiply 
the population density per square mile with a factor of 1/1000 to ensure 
the variable was in a suitable range. The data for both cities was forced 
onto the same scale in order to make the graphs more easily comparable.
        Although the plot where density symbols are sized by value evokes 
a more shape like image this might be deceptive. This is not the real 
city shape. The density is so high that the symbols overlap or touch each 
other creating a black seemingly solid city. The colored plot may be more 
honest however it is somewhat hard to translate it into a meaningful 
interpretation.
        The Boston shape plot below shows a very dense, and compact city 
shape with a high population density. Most dense areas are located in the 
older parts of town. Some less dense areas are found in southern parts of 
the town where the city extends into more rolling land.
        In contrast, El Pasos population density on average is 1/5 or 
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less. The urbanized area is spread out along the major arterials. There 
are some areas of higher density, curiously enough one at the eastern 
fringe of the city.
 
Figure 8a - City of Boston Shape in 1990 (Density by Color)
 
Figure 8b - City of Boston Shape in 1990 (Density by size of symbol)
Figure 9a - City of El Paso Shape in 1990 (Density by color)
 
Figure 9b - City of El Paso Shape in 1990 (Density by size of symbol)
Conclusions
        This paper is but one little puzzle piece in gaining insight into 
the urban-population-environment dynamics and especially the linkage of 
urban development and shape. Despite the rudimentary results, some 
thoughts on policy implications are presented. Many more issues became 
obvious for future research.
Discussion of Results
        While globally there is a definitive trend towards urbanization, 
the urbanization transition is already concluded in some of the countries 
investigated, such as Japan, Denmark, the UK. Other countries are at the 
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beginning or in the middle of the urbanization transition, such as 
Pakistan, Indonesia, and many more. The further course of the 
urbanization transition in these countries in terms of amplitude and 
speed will depend on the course of their demographic transition. The 
sooner overall population growth can be slowed the sooner the 
urbanization transition will level. It is likely that the urbanization 
transition will lag behind the demographic transition for a few decades 
while rural to urban migration persists. A general time frame for this 
lag could be derived from looking at industrialized nations which have 
gone through both transitions successfully (Japan, Denmark, Norway).
        At least three countries could be identified that go through a 
somewhat distorted transition, which are Australia, Canada and the US. 
These are major immigration countries. Urban population increases in a 
linear fashion, while the rural population remained constant for the past 
45 years. Besides rural to urban migration of younger members of the 
population, most immigrants seem thus to move to cities. Ports of entry 
and coastal cities are likely to grow more than cities in the interior of 
a country, since these are the places where immigrants naturally arrive 
and mostly settle.
        Depending on the specific characteristics of a country it can be 
assumed that between 80% and 90% of a country's total population will 
live in cities and urbanized areas. Some places with stringent land 
constraints will reach virtually 100% urbanization such as Singapore and 
Hongkong. Country specific characteristics influencing how high exactly 
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the percentage of future urban population will be could possibly be 
derived from a conglomerate of factors such as landscape, level of 
technology, historical patterns of settlement, culture, available land 
area, total population density, policy and others. The author can only 
speculate at this point about the importance of each of those factors, 
but future research might be able to show patterns of development and 
correlation, particularly between land area, density and the total 
urbanization quota.
        In comparing the urbanization of industrialized nations with 
those of lesser developed countries it becomes quickly obvious that the 
urbanization happens under different conditions. The study looked at just 
one factor, which was energy consumption. In Turkey for example, the 
overall urbanization is at a higher level than in Finland - however with 
only a 1/10 of the energy consumption/per person. Urbanization in Turkey 
is based not necessarily on industrialization and improved technology 
(Turkey's relative low I_index also points to that direction). Urban 
shapes and urban living thus will look different in those countries. As 
Sinclair (1967) pointed out J. von Thunens land use model does not apply 
any more for the US or other industrialized nations but may be still 
valid for lesser developed countries. With urban expansion due to rapid 
urbanization it will be interesting to see, if new and what values will 
govern the development. Comparative investigations of city shapes and 
form in countries with high respectively low energy consumption could be 
file:///C|/545/1995/frank.htm (27 of 36) [6/18/2008 10:57:07 AM]
545\frank
an interesting future research topic.
        In terms of all transitions the issue of scale is important. 
While in general, the urban population in the US is increasing, locally 
decline is also observable as can be seen for the development of Chicago 
and Boston. Since both cities are nuclei of larger metropolitan areas the 
decline of center areas also could be viewed as a decentralization and 
dissemination trend. While studies in the past were successful in 
providing empirical data on the "flattening density function" and post 
World War II suburbanisation (Mills, 1969; Newling 1966), the causes for 
the trend are not agreed upon.
        The local level research conducted for US cities and the shape 
investigation for Boston and El Paso in particular suggest that it 
matters when and under what conditions urbanization and urban growth 
occurs. The much older city of Boston experienced major growth and land 
expansion in the past century. Due to the relative limited and slow modes 
of transportation at the time, Boston's density is high, even today. In 
comparison, El Paso's major growth spur occurred post World War II where 
a change in technology brings about cost efficient personal 
transportation. At a comparable population size in 1990 (ca. 500,000) 
urban densities of El Paso are about 1/5 of Boston's densities. Figures 8 
and 9 show the differences clearly. Doxiadis organic urban growth model 
(1968) anticipates a distortion of urban growth away from a compact form 
along radially outbranching transportation arterials, however not to the 
extent observed for El Paso.
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        The shape development analysis conducted for this study has 
several backdrops. While for El Paso the city limits and the urbanized 
area are fairly congruent, it is not for Boston. The area of Boston 
proper did not expand since 1912 (Kennedy, 1990). So, in order to examine 
the shape of urban growth development it probably would be better to look 
at the shape of the metropolitan urbanized area rather than city limits. 
Data availability is a problem, since census tracts and jurisdictional 
boundaries do not necessarily reflect urbanized land and its boundaries. 
Remote sensing and satellite imagery might overcome this problem, however 
since this data has been only recently released to the public time series 
over decades are a problem.
Policy Recommendations
        There are two types of policy recommendations: Country and Local 
Level. The suggested policies are very general at this point. They aim at 
improving the quality of urban agglomerations. This is defined very 
roughly as lowering the negative impact on the environment and decreasing 
the energy/resource exchange flows between the urban ecosystem and the 
surrounding ecosystems, mainly by looking at shape and density of the 
city. The recommendations are based on the broad (and maybe at times 
invalid) assumption that a denser and more compact city is likely to be 
more sustainable (Dantzig & Saaty, 1973)
Country Level Recommendations
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        It seems sensible to categorize the policy recommendations 
according to the stage of urbanization a country or nation is at (Pattern 
A, B, C)
Pattern A (Concluding Urbanization Transition)
=> Stabilize status quo (you do not want to have cities disintegrate 
after booms, marching right into the next  transition)
 Improve efficiency of urban city (lower emission, water use, public transit)
 Mitigate environmental effects in surrounding areas
 prepare for downsizing of the city or industry
 consolidate metropolitan areas and provide for coordinated strategies
        (jurisdictional problems)
Pattern B (Starting Urbanization Transition)
=> slow urbanization down, or at least try to influence development
 Improve opportunities in the country side 
 make vision plans (although there seems to be no time) 
 provide public transit
 promote density and neighborhood clustering, decentralized
 avoid depletion of environment
Pattern C (Immigrant Countries)
=> try to influence urban development
 provide public transit
 promote density and neighborhood clustering, decentralized
 avoid depletion of environment
Local Level Recommendations
file:///C|/545/1995/frank.htm (30 of 36) [6/18/2008 10:57:07 AM]
545\frank
Local recommendations must be much more specific to the individual 
situation of the city.
Future Research
Much more work in terms of developing urban shape morphologies has to be 
done. The author envisions that harmonious correlation can exist between 
urban form and environmental features. These harmonious correlation will 
be perceived as beautiful and particularly pleasant. It also could be 
characterized as being stable and sustainable. Or yet in other words, a 
preferable city shape is achieved by optimizing the urban metabolism2 for 
the surrounding landscape. During rapid changes of either the environment 
or population (characteristics) the harmony of this correlation will be 
disturbed. The author further expects to find different patterns and 
correlation at different scales. So the harmonious urban-environment 
pattern will be different for a population of 10,000 or 100,000.
        A harmonious relationship between urban agglomeration and 
environment can be described as follows:
 the urban form complements or assimilates the landscape, i.e. in color, 
form, character and scale3.
 the size of the city and its energy and resource demands do not cause 
drastic changes in the landscape.
        Beauty, harmony and pleasantness are difficult values to measure. 
It is may be possible to find indicators such as crime rate, rating of 
quality of live, migration rate, traffic congestion to evaluate the level 
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of compatibility of the urban system at its current stage with its 
surrounding environment. For the environment measures of biodiversity, 
decline or increase of renewable resources, fertility of the land, need 
to fertilization in agriculture etc. Since both factors are interrelated 
a depletion of the natural resources in the vicinity of an urban 
agglomeration may as well further decrease the quality of life in a city.
        As described earlier, urban form can be conceived as a result of 
the different factors such as culture, technology etc. (Figure 2). Cities 
in the mountainous countries like Austria or Nepal and Tibet will have a 
different shape than a city in a desert landscape. Growth pattern and 
urbanization pattern will be different as well. It is much easier to 
build a city in a valley on flat ground than on the slope of the hills. 
But flooding of rivers in this valley might be a threat and the valley 
ground must be kept free from development for agricultural usage. Diverse 
and rugged topography might favor many smaller town over one or two very 
large ones.
        In contrast, the desert landscape might favor larger 
agglomerations along a river or at some other water source. It will be 
easier to distribute the water within a large city than build a pipeline 
to supply many smaller towns dispersed in the landscape.
        Technology is an important modulator of urban form. However, it 
tends to exert an increase in energy consumption that might be 
counterproductive in developing sustainable cities.
NOTES
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1. Boston and El Paso are different in age. The settlement of Boston 
began around 1630. Boston reached its peak in terms of spatial extend of 
city limits in 1912. The first permanent settlement on the present site 
of El Paso was in 1827. It was known by its present name by 1859 and 
formally chartered as town in 1873 (Kennedy, 1992; et. al).
2. Urban metabolism views the city as an organism, an open system, with 
inputs and outputs from and to the environment (H. Girardet in Cadman & 
Payne, 1990).
3. The conceptual idea of complementation of man-made world and nature is 
discussed in Norber-Schulz (1984). The structure of the natural place is 
complemented by either adaptation of the same structure in the man-made 
artifacts or contrasted; i.e. diverse landscape with multiple features is 
"harmoniously" complemented by a small scale architecture with lots of 
detailing like we find it in Norwegian wood carvings. The large scale 
desert landscape is complemented with geometrical simple artifacts, 
straight lines, square features, monumental. etc.
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CURRENT ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN INDIA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER TRANSITIONS
Introduction
        Since  winning independence from Great Britain in 1947, India has 
been thrust abruptly into the 20th century. Modern, industrial, medical 
and infrastructural techniques have been grafted onto a society still 
characterized by age old beliefs and class structures, without 
undertaking badly needed reforms and dealing with the issues of 
inequality in distribution of resources and incomes. These policy 
decisions have proved vital for the transitions India has been 
undergoing, one result of  not undertaking badly needed reforms has been 
the limited adaptive capacity of Indian society to change. This has 
consequently influenced the trajectory India is taking through its key 
transition and exacerbated the pressures on Indian policy makers. 
Compared with other countries in Asia such as Korea and Malaysia, India 
has certainly not performed well in the sectors of  alleviation of 
poverty, economic growth, per capita income. In this paper I will briefly 
address some vital transitions affecting India, how these created the 
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need for change and consequently influenced Indias economic policy.
A family of transitions
        The demographic is critically important to Indias long term 
stability. With a population of 900 million in 1994 India is currently 
the second most populous country in the world. As figure 1 below shows 
from 358 million in 1958, Indias population has increased dramatically to 
its present numbers.
Figure 1. Population Growth in India.  Source: World Resources Database 1995
 
The population growth rate in India is currently 1. 9 percent and is not 
expected to decrease further at least until the turn of the century 
(World Resources, 1995). The reason for Indias rapid population expansion 
can be traced to the availability of modern foreign technology from the 
west. These technologies were developed in the west over several hundred 
years during which societal norms concerning the need for large families 
changed. As birth rates decreased, mortality rates due to technological 
improvements, also declined. In India, however, the sudden availability 
of these technologies resulted in death rates declining precipitously 
while birth rates remained constant resulting in a boom in the 
population. 
        Rapid population growth in India creates many pressures. In rural 
areas it  calls for intensified agricultural production to feed the 
growing numbers of people, which raises the risk of environmental 
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degradation. Due to the intensification of agriculture, fallow periods 
needed for soil to regenerate are overlooked and cropland loses fertility 
which in turn, creates pressure to convert forests into cropland. Demands 
upon forests for fuelwood and grazing increase in tandem with population 
pressures. As family sizes increase, agricultural plots get smaller and 
the need for credit to purchase inputs to intensify production methods, 
or avert hunger, increases. The availability of credit from banks is 
inversely related to the size of the plot, which drives poor farmers to 
usurious moneylenders. The resulting need to repay loans or to escape 
from being trapped in such a desperate situations is one of the reasons 
behind rural to urban migration. 
        Indias urban population currently comprises 26 percent of the 
countries population and is expected to keep increasing. Public health 
spending per capita is over 6 times higher in urban areas than in rural 
areas and urban dwellers manage to earn almost twice the amount of their 
rural counterparts (World Resources, 1995). Greater access to social 
services in urban areas acts as a magnet attracting people to cities. 
Most Indian  cities consequently are ringed with slums and squatter 
settlements in which typically half of the cities population resides. 
The  prevalence of diseases rises resulting in increased expenditures by 
the government which also has to provide industrial employment for urban 
dwellers. A large and growing middle class also creates a demand for 
consumer goods and also consumes more resources and energy. Urban 
dwellers also tend to be more aggressive and politically active than 
their rural counterparts and exert political pressure which cannot be 
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ignored Therefore expectations on the government and demands on it have 
risen in tandem with increasing expenditures, driving the need for 
economic performance to alleviate these pressures.
        Confronted by these combined problems Indias government tried to 
expand the countrys industrial base to provide employment, by building a 
monolithic public service sector and by intensifying agriculture. Indian 
policy makers tried to adopt the best characteristics of capitalism and 
socialism and developed a form of economy called the mixed economy.  The 
key facet of this was protectionism. Foreign access to the Indian economy 
was restricted to  49% of equity holdings in Indian firms and even this 
was discouraged. The state took on responsibility for providing the basic 
needs of the people through a large public sector which handled 18 key 
sectors. The industrial infrastructure was comprised mostly of public 
sector companies which were, however, mismanaged, poorly run and 
consequently incurred huge losses, draining the exchequer.
        Import substitution strategy in which trade and industrial 
incentives were biased in favor of production for the domestic market was 
emphasized. However, the inward looking focus on industrialization, and 
the excessive protection offered to industry by licensing and exorbitant 
import tariffs did not put any pressure on industry to reduce costs and 
increase efficiency. The result of this protectionism was that India 
could not produce key raw materials which had to be imported. Exports 
could not keep pace with imports and therefore therefore there was a gap 
in foreign exchange balances which was postponed by foreign borrowing and 
using remittances from Indians living abroad. Indian companies ended up 
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relying more on costly capital than labor and industrial growth failed to 
generate much employment. The pattern of investment  became  highly 
elitist oriented, energy intensive, import guzzling and capital intensive.
        Fiscal deficits created by pumping excess money into the markets 
comprised 11 percent of GDP in 199, 1limiting the governments ability to 
intervene effectively(Ghosh, 1994). The deficit created excess demand 
which couldnt be satisfied by domestic production and therefore increased 
demand for imports and created an inflationary environment. Inflation 
created an upward pressure on interest rates, raising the costs of 
production all around which eroded competitiveness of Indian goods 
abroad. Rising interest costs added to the governments debt burden and 
played a role in adding to the budgetary deficits. Along with the revenue 
and expenditure accounts. See Figure 2 below. The narrow base of the tax 
structure, lack of tax on agricultural income and extortionate taxes 
among the middle to upper class, encouraged evasion. The expenditure 
account was burdened by massive subsidies reaching 2.5 % of the GDP in 
1991, public sector and defence spending, therefore the government had to 
resort  to borrowing. The public debt to GDP ratio approaching 60% in 
1991, limited the governments ability to spend on vital social sectors 
such as infrastructure, education and health(Minocha, 1994).
Figure 2. Central Government Deficit.   Source: World Resources 1995
 
        This structural malady reduced India to a minor player in the 
file:///C|/545/1995/gupta.htm (5 of 35) [6/18/2008 10:57:16 AM]
545\gupta
global economy. The controls on production, licensing restriction along 
with high protective walls fostered monopolistic trends within the 
industry. The lack of competition ensured there was no pressure for 
change and the technological revolution which spread from the industrial 
nations to other Asian neighbors passed India by. Indian companies 
produced inferior goods which could only be sold in the domestic market. 
Since India does not have major reserves of petroleum its reliance on 
imports of petroleum and other bulk products consumed by the industrial 
sector required large amounts of foreign exchange which ensured large 
trade deficits on a regular basis since Indian industries earned 
negligible amounts of exchange through exports.
        All these factors increased Indias vulnerability to shocks, to 
finance these rising deficits India had to increasingly resort to costly 
foreign borrowings. This led to a huge foreign debt and the rise in debt 
service payments further weakened the balance of payments (Singh, 1994). 
This situation came to a head in 1991 when oil prices rose as a result of 
the gulf war and foreign exchange remittances from Indians in the gulf 
dried up. The foreign exchange reserves reached an all time low with the 
government in danger of defaulting on interest payments on foreign loans. 
To escape default the government took out an emergency loan of $2.2 
billion from the IMF(Foreign Trade, 1995). Part of the of the conditions 
attached to the loan were to restructure the economy. The government used 
this opportunity to introduce a comprehensive package of measures aimed 
at reforming the inflationary and wasteful tendencies of the economy. A 
key point which needs to be made is that although the fiscal crisis of 
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1991 precipitated the shift in economic policies, these were long 
overdue. Pressures created by the other transitions were being felt much 
earlier and the government made a tentative attempt at economic reforms 
in 1984 which were subsequently abandoned. By 1991 pressures and 
indicators of crises from the other transitions could not be ignored any 
longer and provided impetus for change. 
New Economic Policy (NEP)
        The Government of India has begun implementing a comprehensive 
package of reforms aimed at correcting the distortions and weaknesses of 
the economy.  The reforms fall broadly in to two categories: 
stabilization procedures and structural adjustment package. Stabilization 
procedures involved a sharp devaluation of the rupee to 50 percent of its 
previous value, drastic cuts in fiscal deficits of the government and 
huge borrowing from the IMF. The accompanying credit squeeze and rise in 
interest rates contained the  inflation drastically from 17 percent in 
1991 to about 6 percent in 1993 (Sinha, 1994).
        The structural adjustment policies are wider ranging and are 
aimed at opening up the Indian economy to foreign competition and 
encouraging foreign investment. Structural adjustment measures attempt to 
unshackle industry from the myriad of administrative and legal controls 
which plague it. Restraints on growth such as industrial licensing have 
been removed for all new units and expansion of industrial units. Most 
public sector undertakings will soon be privatized and only six areas of 
strategic concern have been reserved for the public sector, such as 
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mining, oil and gas exploration and exploitation, defence. Private and 
foreign participation is invited in some specific areas of these 
(Ministry of External Affairs, 1995).
        India is seeking access to foreign capital and technology.With 
this end in mind, direct  foreign investment of upto 100 percent is 
allowed and actively courted. Full repatriation of profits by private 
foreign investors who want to set up  wholly owned power generation units 
in India is also feasible. An area, India is actively courting foreign 
investment in is the power sector. India needs to double its existing 
power generation capacity which would only be possible with foreign 
technology and help. Domestic industries have also been deregulated and 
delicensed and foreign capital and foreign equity participation is 
encouraged in Indian companies. According to Indias Finance minister the 
journey on the road to self reliance has begun. Self  reliance in todays 
world  means the ability to earn foreign exchange to pay for all 
imports(Singh, 1994). With this end in mind  reforms in export and import 
policies have been undertaken and form the cornerstone of the new 
program. Integrating  Indias economy with the world economy is expected 
to increase competition, flow of capital and technology to India and lead 
to more growth and increased employment. From a stage of believing, 
government regulations would ensure social justice, the current 
government  has switched to a belief of market mechanisms ensuring growth 
and eventually poverty alleviation. The planning process and the public 
sector will take a back seat and market forces will be relied upon. Some 
key features of the new policy are discussed below.
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Reliance on Foreign Capital and Debt
        The impetus for adopting reforms was provided by the critically 
low state of foreign exchange reserves in 1991. An emergency loan of  
$2.2 billion was taken out from the  IMF to tide over the crises. Today 
the exchange scenario is looking much better with reserves standing at 
around $27 billion, enough exchange to pay for eight months of 
exports.(Ministry of External Affairs, 1995). However, Indias net 
indebtedness has increased sharply by $18 billion. Adding to the existing 
indebtedness of $ 75 billion, shown in figure 3, Indias external debt is 
expected to rise to  $93 billion making it the second largest debtor 
nation in the third world after Brazil, see figures 3 and 4, below. 
Indias public debt to GDP ratio is approaching 60 percent of GDP. 
Interest payments on servicing foreign debts currently make up 4.5 
percent of GDP  and over 50 percent of current expenditure, as cas be 
seen from figure 4 debt service expenditures are approximately equal to 
current borrowing, which is creating a short sighted, cycle of incurring 
more debt to service interest payments (Sinha, 1994). South Korea and 
Malaysia avoided the debt trap during the 80s even though their debt was 
much higher. They did this by a fast expansion of exports which reduced 
their debt service to exports ratio. On the other hand Brazil and Mexico 
got caught in the debt trap in the early 80s with debt to GDP ratios of 
about 31% because of slow growth of their exports. 
 
Figure 3.  External and Long Term Public Debt.
file:///C|/545/1995/gupta.htm (9 of 35) [6/18/2008 10:57:16 AM]
545\gupta
Figure 4.   Debt Service Expenditures and Current Borrowing.
Source: World Resources Database 1995
     India is trying to attract foreign capital for investment in 
industries and infrastructure. The NEP is promoting joint projects and 
equity participation in India and allowing upto 100% equity 
participation. It is particularly trying to attract investment in power 
generation and utilities. Foreign investors have poured more than $ 1 
billion into the economy and an additional $ 5 billion into the stock 
market. The U.S. is the single largest investor with forty percent of the 
investments approved during the period 1991-1993 (Foreign Trade, 1995). 
The main areas of investment so far are in oil refining, power generation 
and consumer goods. Investment in India however, is still hampered by its 
continuing low credit rating. Standard and Poors, a leading U.S. credit 
rating agency recently decided to keep Indias long term credit rating at 
BB+ which is non investment grade (Prasad 1994). Despite this setback, 
foreign investment is expected to increase dramatically due to the 
incentives provided by the government such as automatic approval of 
projects, profit repatriation and convertibility of the rupee, use of 
foreign brand names. Indias decision to join GATT is also going to be a 
factor in this regard.
Export- Import :
        India plans to achieve a high rate of growth and avoid the debt 
trap which has plagued countries like Mexico, through a policy of 
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aggressively promoting exports and reducing its dependence on imports. 
India wants foreign companies to set up bases for global operations and 
generate exports. India has several characteristics conducive to this. It 
has a vast pool of skilled technical manpower and a developed industrial 
base. It has a history of entrepreneurship and a legal system which 
countries like China lack. Underscoring this, exports soared 20 percent 
in 1993 compared to 1992 however, imports have also increased  by 23.9% 
and as in the past continue to outstrip exports, see figure 5 below.
 
Figure 5.       Exports vs Imports
        Exports are limping because of the higher rate of domestic 
inflation compared to other countries worldwide. This raises production 
costs which prices Indian goods out of foreign markets. The trade deficit 
has therefore continued to increase to 2.2 billion in the first four 
months of 92-93 as opposed to 770 million during the same period in 91-92 
(Prasad, 1994).  Most assumptions of India being able to repay its debt 
and interest payments have been made on the basis of assumptions of 
exports outstripping imports. This seems uncertain given the current 
worldwide recession in developed countries and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union which accounted for 16 percent of Indias export market (Sinha 
1994). Korea and Malaysia avoided the debt trap in the early eighties by 
vigorous expansion of exports when the world economy was more open and 
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booming. In the nineties this achievement may be harder to duplicate. 
According to the 1992 human development report of UNDP, 20 out of 24 
industrial countries are more protective today than they were 10 years 
ago (UN, 1995). Although it is too early to tell, exports are expected to 
increase since profits from exports are exempt from taxes and foreign 
companies will be allowed to repatriate profits, India is specifically 
targeting intra firm trade i.e. companies obtaining components for 
products from different areas for its exports. This is where Indias large 
skilled manpower base and infrastructure and resource base will hopefully 
make a difference.
Government Expenditures and Revenues
The NEP intends to reduce government expenditure in the market and 
redirect it towards social and poverty alleviation programs. Sick public 
sector enterprises will be closed and phased out and foreign equity 
participation invited where ever possible. Public sector monopoly will be 
maintained in six key sectors, some with foreign assistance. The 
government intends to focus most of its expenditures on several key areas 
such as defence, poverty alleviation programs and creating employment. 
The NEP intends to cut all subsidies including those to agricultural and 
to rural industries. No action has however been taken to reduce the 
bloated administrative expenditure. The continuous increase in government 
expenditure particularly in budgetary subsidies together  without 
reforming the tax system and continuing losses in the public sector have 
also contributed to the budgetary gap.  
        Tariffs have been rolled back from nearly 300 percent to peak 
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rates of 50 percent with most duty rates unified at 25 percent (India 
Budget Statement, 1995-96) with further reductions planned. The complex 
and inefficient tax structure which is a cause for concern has been 
reworked to reduce customs and excise taxes and corporate taxes and 
personal tax exemption limits have been increased. However, it is still 
far to narrow with the bulk of the governments revenue coming from excise 
taxes and taxes on interstate commerce. Agricultural income and rural 
industries are not taxed which excludes 70 % of the population from the 
tax net. Although the number of Indians paying taxes is low, for those 
who do pay taxes, rates are high, therefore evasion is rampant. The 
government is attempting to widen its tax base and has proposed 
establishing a tax on agricultural income. Due to political opposition 
this has not been implemented therefore, the governments revenue 
gathering abilities are severely limited.
Fiscal Imbalances, Inflation and growth
        The NEP succeeded in bringing the rate of inflation down from 17 
percent in 1991  to about 6 percent in 93. The fiscal deficit has been 
brought down from 11 percent of GDP in 1991-92 to 5 percent  in 92-93.  
Economic growth has been a modest if unspectacular 5 percent and the 
stock market is trading near its all time high (Sinha, 1994 and Foreign 
Trade, 1995). However, with the population also growing at 2% per annum 
India has to aim at a higher rate of growth to record a improvement in 
the standard of living of its people. According to the eighth five year 
plan, the number of persons requiring employment would be 58 million 
during 92-93 and 94 million during the 10 year period 92-2002. These 
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comprise a 23 million backlog of unemployment in 92, an estimated 
increase of 35 million in the labor force during 92-97 and by another 36 
million during 97-2002. The adjustment measures will also add an 
estimated 11 million to the list of the unemployed. These figures imply 
the real growth in employment generation should be about 4.5 percent per 
annum if full employment is to be reached by the end of the eighth plan 
and 3.5 percent if it is to be attained by the end of the ninth plan 
(Sinha, 1994). 
        There are criticisms that the reductions in deficit have been 
brought about by the soft option of reducing capital expenditure and 
postponing settlement of dues to domestic creditors. The adverse effects 
of this, on investment, growth rate and employment generation are a bomb 
in waiting The governments plans to close large public sector firms will 
also create a large amount of unemployment. The government hopes that 
these will be absorbed by new enterprises which will also provide full 
employment. However, if production trends continue as in the past most of 
the new enterprises and projects will tend to be capital intensive due to 
the availability of large amounts of foreign technology, foreign is 
geared toward employing as little labor as possible.
Implications for other transitions
Demographic Transition
        There are vast demographic differences among  Indias various 
regions. The transition from high to low fertility is nearly complete in 
some states, notably Kerala and Tamil Nadu in the south, with average 
fertility rates of two children. Indias demographic vulnerability is 
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concentrated in a few states in the north, most notably Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh which have fertility rates as high as eight children per woman. 
The impetus for population growth can be traced to the inequalities which 
characterize Indian society. People are not poor because they have large 
families, they tend to have large families because they are poor since in 
this case wealth flows from child to parent. Large families are in the 
economic interests of poor parents, in a situation like this having more 
children is a sensible and rational thing to do. Countries such as Sri 
Lanka and even Kerala a state in India, which have carried out land 
reform, reduced inequalities and made efforts to improve the welfare of 
rural masses have tended to be successful at reducing fertility rates 
(Murdoch, 1988).  Landlessness is high in India, with percentages of 
agricultural landless households estimated to be 15 percent. Even more 
important is the proportion of smallholder households, whose landholdings 
are too small to provide a sustainable livelihood, with the percentage 
being about 40 percent (U.N., 1995). Therefore a necessary step in order 
to slow the impetus for population growth is to undertake social and 
economic reforms to raise the status of the poor and their standard of 
living.
        Indias NEP which will most likely, widen inequality and income 
gaps. The economic reforms could also result in higher prices of 
necessities which will be market determined, instead of controlled by the 
authorities, which will place an additional burden on the poor. The lack 
of emphasis on rural planning and paucity of funds to do so will make it 
harder to arrest the population growth rate, corresponding benefits in 
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employment and income generation, GDP growth rate may be offset to an 
extent by the increased population. Consequently government expenditures 
will also rise in this regard. A larger population will place even 
greater pressure on the natural resource base in India and create demand 
for more cropland, agricultural products and demand more services, 
effecting the agricultural transition and exacerbating rural to urban 
migration.
Agricultural Transition
        About 70% of Indias population is still agricultural and rural 
based.  Over the last four decades India has more than tripled food 
production, due to green revolution inputs of fertilizes, pesticides and 
better seeds. As figure 6 below, illustrates cereal production has 
increased from 85 thousand tons in 1961, to 200,000 tons in 1989, this 
has been accompanied by a greater percentage increase in fertilizer 
consumption.
Figure 6. Cereal Production and Fertilizer Consumption.
Source: World Resources Database 1995
 
        With the increasing intensity of agriculture however, cropland 
has been losing fertility at an increasing pace as fallow periods 
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necessary for soil to regenerate are overlooked. Soil degradation such as 
salinization, loss of nutrients and erosion seriously affect 85 million 
hectares of land(World Resources, 1995). Since the total amount of 
cropland has not declined it can be inferred as cropland has been 
abandoned, new marginal forest areas have been brought into forest 
production, thereby accelerating the loss of forests. As noted earlier, 
population pressures have fragmented family plots and increased 
intensification of agriculture. Therefore if the poor own land it is 
unproductive and they lack the credit to improve it. Large farmers may 
take over small plots, since credit is readily available to them, these 
farmers tend to practice capital and input intensive agriculture which 
displaces marginal farmers. Marginal farmers will be hit hardest by the 
NEPs goal of  removing subsidies and may intensify unsustainable and 
environmentally destructive farming practices. To the extent that land 
fragmentation is not matched by the introduction of intensive and 
environmentally sustainable agricultural techniques, the farmers with 
exceedingly small plots will be forced to mine their land, by shortening 
fallow periods, cutting remaining trees, or by migrating and engaging in 
ecologically destructive practices of land extensification on  marginal 
lands.
        The thrust in the current NEP is to promote application of green 
technologies, therefore there is an implicit thrust towards favoring 
large farmers in the NEP. The focus on promoting exports of farm products 
will also favor large farmers and provide an incentive for large factory 
farms. The government is also removing procurement quotas for grains and 
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staples. An implication of this is the non availability of grains for the 
domestic market. For example, despite 91-92 being a bumper year for wheat 
harvests and  India growing more wheat than the U.S and Canada combined, 
loosening of restrictions led to hoarding by farmers and traders despite 
the high prices offered by the government. The government eventually had 
to import 2.5 million tons of wheat from the U.S. and Canada at high 
cost(Gupta, 1994). Given the NEPs goal of removing all subsidies and 
letting the market determine prices, this does not bode well for the poor 
who cannot afford to pay high prices for necessities. Although the per 
capita availability of food has increased, from 1975 to 1989 the total 
proportion of households with adequate nutrition has remained the same 50 
per cent of agricultural workers are still malnourished. From this it can 
be inferred that food resources are being appropriated by the affluent 
section of society, evidenced in the sharp rise of consumption of meat, 
poultry and dairy products.  
        On the flip side application of better agricultural technologies 
could improve water efficiency, introduce modern soil conservation 
procedures and genetic technology and help raise agricultural outputs, 
which might lead to declining prices. However, intensifying agricultural 
production by applying modern capital intensive farming techniques will  
likely, lead to widespread rural unemployment.
Urbanization Transition
        The urbanization transition is driven in India by the dual forces 
of rural to urban migration and existing population growth in cities. 
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Population pressures in rural areas as well as declining productivity of 
agricultural lands and shrinking plots drive migration. Since the average 
urban citizen manages to earn more than his rural counterpart, migration 
is looked upon as a viable means of escape from a desperate rural 
situation and a way to repay debts. India has the second  highest number 
of urban dwellers in the world at a total of 220 million or 26 % of the 
population. According to projections made by the World Resources 
Institute in figure 7, Indias urban population is going to increase 
steadily with a corresponding decline in the rate of growth of rural 
population reflecting the transformation from a predominantly agrarian to 
a manufacturing industry based economy.
Figure 7. Rural vs Urban Population.                    Source: WRD 1995
         Public health spending per capita is over 6 times higher in 
urban areas than in rural areas (World Resources, 1995). The urban poor 
also have greater access to social services, such as health care, than 
their rural counterparts which acts as a magnet driving urbanization. 
Increased urban pressure could amplify the urban problems of congestion 
and pollution. Most of Indias cities are already near full capacity or 
have exceeded it  and a third to a half of residents live in slums, 
squatter settlements or the pavements. Most urban areas already face 
shortages in drinking water, energy, garbage disposal (World Resources, 
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1995). The spread of the plague in 1994 which was concentrated in large 
cities highlighted the role urban areas play in the spread of diseases. 
        The contribution of Indias urban sector to net domestic product 
rose from 29% in 1950-51 to 60% in 1990-91(World Resources, 1995)  Most 
of the employment in manufacturing, trade, commerce and transport is 
concentrated in urban areas while the rural sector is largely 
agricultural. In India the planning process is heavily biased in favor of 
urban areas to the detriment of rural areas, borne out by the pattern of 
allocation of resources, industries are generally not located in rural 
areas unless they pollute. The availability of employment opportunities 
in urban areas will attract rural populations especially since the goal 
of the NEP is to increase jobs in urban sectors and shift the employment 
pattern from agricultural to industrial. Urban populations also 
increasingly determine the countries political goals and the shape of its 
policies. Not surprisingly the greatest demand for change and continued 
reforms comes from the urban middle class, who stand to benefit most from 
these changes.
 
Forestry and Toxicity 
        The demographic, agricultural and urbanization transitions in 
turn will affect the forestry and toxicity transitions. Forested areas 
which covered 40 percent of the land area in 1947 has declined to 19 
percent. Although forests are currently not shrinking, degradation is a 
serious problem, denuded wastelands cover 130 million hectares(UN, 1995) 
which may have been degraded cropland abandoned in favor of converting 
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forests into farmland. As more land is degraded and abandoned due to the 
increasing intensity of agriculture, more forestland will be brought 
under cultivation.   These lands are vulnerable to erosion and cause 
floods exacerbating problems elsewhere. Population pressures in rural 
areas place demand on forests for fuelwood and grazing. Indias forests 
can sustainable provide an estimated 41 million cubic meters of fuelwood 
per year, yet demand is estimated to be 240 million cubic meters. As 
Figure 8, below shows even exponential  growth in fuelwood production 
cannot produce enough fuelwood, to satisfy demand. 
Figure 8.   Actual Fuelwood & Charcoal Production and Projections Using 
Curve Fits
Source: World Resources Database, 1995
         This demand has increased in the wake of the reforms following 
increased prices of commercial fuels such as kerosene. Studies show heavy 
demand for fuelwood in cities (U.N, 1995) consequently forest cover 
surrounding urban areas is being reduced. Fuelwood is also being diverted 
from the rural areas where was a non commercial product to urban markets. 
Shortages in rural areas induce illegal collection without consequent 
replanting. In addition 25 percent of Indias 400 million livestock graze 
in forests which have a estimated capacity of only 31 million. Urban 
areas also create more demand for timber and paper, As Figure 9, below, 
shows from 1980 to 1990 paper production rose 105 percent accompanied by 
a significant increase in  wood production ( World Resources 1995). 
file:///C|/545/1995/gupta.htm (21 of 35) [6/18/2008 10:57:16 AM]
545\gupta
Population growth increasing  the intensity of agriculture which further 
leads to urbanization will only serve to increase pressures on forests.
Figure 9.     Sawnwood and Paper Production in Thousand Metric Tons.
Source WRD 1995
 
        Urban areas also create a demand for energy which results in 
large hydroelectric projects, intensified coal production and consumption 
which release pollutants. Suspended particular matter and sulphur dioxide 
constitute a major portion of the atmospheric pollutant load in many 
cities in India and cause respiratory problems especially among children, 
for example 3 out of 5 people in Calcutta are estimated to suffer from 
respiratory diseases related to air pollution. Urban and industrial 
growth emit greenhouse gases and other pollutants, emissions of carbon 
dioxide, a greenhouse gas have increased dramatically, in the past two 
decades. Levels of suspended particulates in most cities consistently 
exceed WHO standards.  Most urban settlements in India exist without 
proper sanitation and waste disposal methods other than the nearest 
river. According to a survey conducted by the Central Pollution Control 
Board in 1988, of 212 cities with populations of more than 100,000 only 
71 had sewer systems. of the 6.5 billion liters of sewage generated daily 
in the 12 major metropolitan areas, only 1.5 billion were collected. 
(World Resources, 1995).
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Figure 10.   CO2 Emissions.                             Source: WRD 1995
 
        
        One of the challenges India faces over the next several decades 
is how to speed economic growth without exhausting the resources upon 
which growth relies. Environment health is of importance to Indias 
future. Economic growth may create capital to invest in environmental 
protection, better technology and efficiency can make a positive 
contribution. For example cookstoves can improve fuelwood efficiency, 
thereby alleviating pressures causing forest  degradation and reducing 
demands on womens time which could be spent on being educated and 
learning marketable skills. Health hazards associated with burning 
biomass fuels which expose millions of women to high levels of harmful 
substances will be lowered by adopting cookstoves and other devices like 
solar cookers.  India currently has the largest solar cooking program in 
the world, having sold over 250,000 by 1993(UN, 1995). However, India 
needs modern environmental management techniques and environmental laws 
need to be enforced. A comprehensive Environmental act was promulgated in 
1986, compliance, however has been lax and most state governments have 
not shown much interest in enforcing regulations. Regulatory agencies 
also tend to be understaffed, underfunded and vulnerable to political and 
monetary pressure.
Critical Issues
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        It is only when people can satisfy their needs, have control over 
the resource base and have secure tenure to land that the long term 
requirements of environmental protection can be satisfied. In practice 
environmental values and their associated social costs are often regarded 
as secondary considerations, to be shifted onto other parts of society or 
future generations. In India the opportunity costs of resource saving 
technologies tend to be prohibitively high for the poor, whose production 
and maintenance strategy is shaped, instead to derive short term benefits 
from the available natural resources. The costs of resource depletion and 
degradation are externalized and sacrificed by both industry and the 
poor, alike. Rural families are characterized by high fertility 
preferences, faced with limited access to  capital, improved technology 
and other production inputs, they can often exercise effective control 
over only one input, their own family labor. 
        Because the same factors may be responsible for both high 
fertility and environmentally unsustainable resource use practices, their 
identification is important for the search of policy responses that may 
effectively integrate environmental, economic and demographic concerns. 
Governments can alleviate or exacerbate the stresses farmers experience 
in maintaining their livelihood, through pricing, monetary policies, land 
reforms, access to institutional credit, development of infrastructure 
and provision of health, education and contraceptive services. These 
policies can exert considerable environmental impact by altering the use 
of land based resources. These same policies can influence fertility 
behavior through their effects in the costs of and returns from children. 
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The environmental effects of the different transitions India is 
undergoing have not been experience or have only been dimly perceived in 
the past, a number of their components cannot be fully anticipated until 
they actually occur, at which time it may be too late to counteract them. 
Hence there is a challenging task to choose an appropriate long term 
strategy when standard short term  solutions such as market forces may 
not be able to provide sufficient insurance against the risks associated 
with the various transitions. 
Analysis and Policy Recommendations
        The Indian economy is going through a critical transition at the 
present. How India emerges from this transition will have broad 
implications for its populace and will determine the face of modern 
India. India badly needs modern technology, the efficiency it brings and 
resultant competition to its complacent industries. The infrastructure in 
India is inadequate and demand has far outstripped supply in many sectors 
such as energy generation. With a huge and ever expanding population 
India needs to husband its resources, discourage wastage and promote 
their effective usage, which modern technology has evolved to do.
        Based on Indias past performance and widening income distribution 
gap, increasing inequalities and inflationary tendencies it can be 
inferred, the past economic model was not working well. In this regard 
the NEP is a much needed shot in the arm. Rapid economic growth and 
efficient industrialization is possible through outward oriented policies 
for trade because they encourage efficient firms and discourage 
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inefficient ones. Creating a more competitive environment for both 
private and public sectors promotes higher productivity and growth. 
producing a favorable effect on poverty alleviation.
        Some surface indicators however, do not seem encouraging, India 
is currently caught in a debt trap which is eating up most of its current 
expenditures with the result the government cannot play a role in the 
economy and protect the poor from market fluctuations. Due to exports not 
keeping pace with imports the trade deficit has widened, creating 
problems repaying debt,. How India handles the debt trap will determine 
whether it follows Brazil and Mexicos form of development or Koreas. 
Unfortunately India is going through its transition at a time when most 
world economies are not growing and are in recession and are themselves 
looking for markets. Most of Indias imports since 1991 have tended to be 
of consumer goods, foreign companies seem keen  on exploiting Indias 
large middle class of 300 million who can afford to buy consumer goods. 
Even U.S. trade literature touts Indias huge market not its potential for 
investment (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1995). Therefore a short term 
solution might consist of, not eliminating tariffs completely and 
restricting import of consumer goods for the time being until the foreign 
debt and balance of payments deficit is resolved. Otherwise the burden of 
paying for the consumption of the well off Indian classes will fall on 
the Indian government in the form of increased foreign debt burden. While 
foreign technology and help in needed areas like energy generation, 
infrastructure should be welcome it is premature to throw open the Indian 
market to firms bent on exploiting it.
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        India also needs to be wary of foreign capital. Foreign capital 
can create great social costs if it dominates the countries productive 
resources. By benefitting only the wealthy and foreign investors, it can 
accentuate inequalities and expose poor to market fluctuations beyond 
their control. The poor often end up paying for capital which they never 
wanted, benefitted from and only made their condition worse and 
purchasing power drop. India should not forget that foreign capital does 
not seek to democratize nations but seeks the highest possible returns. 
Therefore a path should be laid out that offers opportunities to direct 
capital investment in socially meaningful ways without jeopardizing 
national sovereignty and public and environmental health (Adapted from 
Cervantes, 1993).
        Structural issues may not also be resolved by a market friendly 
approach. Many countries which have relied on market forces for growth  
including Korea and Japan, implemented radical land reforms before they 
embarked on a high growth path. Privatization of social services came 
after a long period of government operated services, after people were 
able to pay for them(Sinha, 1994). The free market operates efficiently 
within a given structure of the economy. If a given structure is highly 
unequal the market will only reinforce it. Since the market takes care of 
effective demand only, it does not respond to the needs of poor people if 
not backed by purchasing power. So far economic growth in India has 
resulted in increasing concentration of economic power and widening 
inequalities, elitist oriented production structure, declining growth of 
employment, rising prices and growing social tensions. The NEP based on 
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trickle down economics and the purchasing power of the top 30 percent of 
the population does not reverse this trend. It will have an immediate 
impact on 200 million people the other 700 million will see only pain in 
the beginning.
        Therefore the government has to balance liberalizing the economy 
with some measures to protect the poor and employment generation schemes 
which it intends to do. However, due to the resource crunch there has 
been a near stagnation in the governments outlay for social services for 
the past two years. The government therefore has to increase revenues and 
take care of foreign debt. This will be a hard task considering interest 
on debt consists of 50 percent of current expenditures. Other countries 
such as Israel and Malaysia have successfully negotiated debt write-off 
from the IMF and India could try to the same or negotiate more favorable 
terms. Due to political pressure the government has not been able to 
reduce expenditures by closing sick public sector units and increase 
revenues through broadening taxes. Unless these measures are carried out 
they may lead the government to increase borrowing and postpone spending 
on critical items like population planning, poverty alleviation and 
ecological regeneration.
        The large number of unemployed people is also a serious problem 
especially since this number will increase as sick public sector firms 
are closed. It is estimated the stabilization program will  create extra 
unemployment of at least 8-11 million people who may not be absorbed by 
new enterprises(Ghosh, 1994). The NEP is bound to create greater 
inequalities in the short run and greater unemployment problems since new 
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technology tends to be more capital intensive than labor intensive. 
        A focus on employment generation and a feasible strategy for 
devising the same seems to be missing, in the NEP. Generating employment 
for 700 million people is not possible without having a labor intensive 
mix of technology. The NEP is geared to do just the opposite. In a poor 
country the composition of growth may have greater relevance than the 
rate of growth. Since the principal constraint in India is capital, 
investment should be allocated in areas where the amount of capital used 
per unit of output is low, as Table 1 shows, agriculture, therefore 
becomes the primary candidate for a higher share of investable resources. 
(Ghosh, 1994). 
        
Table 1.    Capital Output Ratios Under 5 Year Development Plans
                          
___________________________________________________________________
                 1950-55  1955-60  1960-65  Annual Plans  1965-70  1970-75  1975-
80  1980-85__  
Agriculture      2.48     2.51     4.37     1.96          3.63     
3.35     4.75      6.56
Manufacturing    5.52     7.49     6.67    29.76         11.64     
8.73     6.96      7.63____
Source: Ghosh, 1994
        
        In the field of rural and agricultural development there is 
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hardly any change from the approach of treating them as appendages to the 
main development program. Given that 70 percent of Indias population is 
rural based and that is where the highest incidence of poverty is, this 
is a serious lapse. Spending on rural industries has remained stagnant. 
which has followed the example of earlier plans of treating rural areas 
as incidental to the planning process. The view of the NEP seems to be 
that rural and agricultural jobs are not productive consequently, there 
is a focus on encouraging rural to urban migration. In the words of 
Indias finance minister Manmohan Singh and architect of the NEP  earlier 
industrial growth failed to attract the poor away from rural areas. With 
70 percent of our society still dependent on farm and rural sector jobs, 
India is one of the most stagnant societies in terms of movement of labor 
towards more productive industrial jobs. Therefore the faster pace of job 
creation in the NEP would shift workers from less productive rural jobs 
to more productive urban jobs (Singh, 1994).  
        Inferring from this statement the intention of the NEP seems to 
be shifting rural and agricultural populations to urban areas and 
replacing traditional subsistence agriculture with capital 
intensive agriculture.  The industrial infrastructure would therefore have
to absorb the bulk of India's population which 
might 
not                                                                                                                                
agriculture. The industrial infrastructure would therefore have to absorb the 
bulk of Indias population which might not
be possible. This also has alarming implications for other transitions,
although population growth may decrease as a result of increased access to
health services and contraceptives and greater value of female labor,
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urban squalor would be greatly increased. Epedimiological risks would
certainly increase as squatter settlements boom. The toxicity and forestry
transitions would be impacted as emissions and outflow of sewage and
wastes would increase and become concentrated spatially. The already overburdened
health, sanitation and infrastructural facilities would collapse. Demands for
energy would increase and lead to more pollution. As noted earlier government
expenditures on the average urban resident are much higher than the rural
counterpart, therefore government expenditures would greatly increase.
Since urban populations tend to be more aggressive, pressures on the
government for changes could increase accelerating the rate India takes
through its key transitions. This would further lower the adaptive capacity
of society and determine the trajectory and final outcomes of the transitions.
        So far the government seems to be taking a slow consensus based 
approach to reform. The slow rate of movement through the transition may 
be critical in enhancing Indian societies adaptability to change and may 
ensure negative effects are dealt with. The trajectory India takes 
through its economic transition will be determined by Indian policy 
makers who at the very least are conscious of the need to be re-elected. 
Their response to this factor will determine the outcome of the 
transitions India is facing.
The IPAT Paradox
        Impact (I) on the environment is based on the interaction of 
population (P), affluence (A) and technology used (T).  I = PAT (Ehrlich, 
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1990). The impact on the environment is related to the number of people 
and the amount they consume. Simply put a large number of poor people 
will place pressure on limited resources and have a large impact on the 
environment. This impact, however, is lessened if they are poor and they 
are relatively poor thereby consuming less. Technology plays a role in 
determining impact, traditional labor intensive technologies and advanced 
capital intensive technologies which produce more from a given resource 
with less pollution, have the least impact.  In between are the, 
intermediate cheaptechnologies in vogue throughout the developing world 
which have the most impact and cause wastage.
        Affluence causes a large impact on the environment. Rich people 
consume more per capita than poor people, place more demand upon 
resources and industrial processes. Satisfying demands by the affluent 
classes will drive the industrial system and use more natural resources 
for energy and raw materials emissions of pollutants from industrial 
processes would be expected to increase. As Figure 11 shows there is a 
link between increased GDP and fuel production which causes pollution. In 
India commercial fuel production and consumption have closely mirrored 
increases in GDP.
Figure 11. Energy Trends vs GDP                 Source WRD 1995
        In order to decrease the fertility rate and arrest population 
growth India first needs to increase affluence. In other words income 
inequalities need to be lessened and people need to be made affluent in 
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order to remove the incentive to have children.  Affluent people however 
place more demands upon the environment an have more impact than per 
capita than poor people. Thus India is caught in a catch 22 situation 
solving which needs a multi-pronged approach. Rather than pinning all 
expectations and hopes on market reforms it might be wise to take a 
lesson from the example of Kerala a state in South India which has made 
remarkable strides in areas such as health care, education and population 
control. Over several decades, the state government carried out land 
reform, mandated education through the tenth grade, instituted a minimum 
wage and the right of labor to organize and built the most extensive 
medical facilities in India. The results are impressive: despite a per 
capita income of about $ 300, many indicators such as literacy, infant 
mortality, and life expectancy are close to industrialized countries with 
far higher per capita incomes.  More importantly, it also has the lowest 
fertility rate with an average of just 2 children per woman which is 
replacement level.
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ENERGY RECOVERY FROM LANDFILL GAS
It may be garbage to everyone else, but to us, its gold.
-Mr. Campbell, plant manager for GSF, Allentown, Pennsylvania
Introduction
        Social expectations in current times show a growing support for 
conservation programs such as curbside recycling, conservation education, 
and alternative energy sources including reclamation.  Much of the state 
and federal government is following suit through grants, tax breaks, and 
other such incentives.  One such practice is the recovery of landfill gas 
for energy use.  Methane gas comprises almost half of the gas generated 
from landfills.  Since methane is highly combustible and has qualities 
similar to the common natural gas used in many homes and businesses 
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across the country, the recovered gas may be used as an alternative or 
recycled form of energy.  This project will examine a few of the basic 
facets required to develop such a technology in the United States with 
the intention of creating a general protocol to apply toward any part of 
the world.  There will be four main areas of concern including 
construction and operation, economic analysis, social  impact, and global 
feasibility.
        Construction and operation considerations will include factors 
such as location siting, physical restraints, maintenance, and the 
ability of the landfill to adapt to fluctuating situations such as 
population.  
        More emphasis will be placed upon the two important areas of 
economics and social impact.  The economic analysis will prove to be 
extremely important in that the cost effectiveness may well determine the 
feasibility of such a project.  First, it is necessary to determine 
whether sufficient funding can be met to cover capital costs.  If the 
capital cost can be met, the operational cost will then take precedence.  
        Social impact will play a major role in many decisions.  How will 
it affect the community and their perceptions?  What are the local health 
concerns and how will they be discovered and addressed?  Property value 
will be of great concern to many home and business owners surrounding the 
location.  Politics will enter heavily into the decision of both the 
construction and operation of the landfill.  How will this affect peoples 
attitudes toward other such projects as incineration and hazardous 
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waste?  If government funded or supported, the publics opinion of the 
government in general and all its other projects, related or not will 
probably change.  Whether it is for the better or for the worse will 
depend upon their attitudes toward the landfill project and how it is 
handled.  Thus there will be the question of how to increase public 
awareness, understanding, and communication.  This may prove to be the 
central issue of social impact.
        Finally there will be an attempt to extrapolate the results to 
apply to various situations around the world.  This will be done in order 
to obtain a clearer answer to the ultimate question, is widespread use of 
this growing technology both feasible and acceptable?  This section will 
pull together the issues and results from the other three areas and will 
use the transition theory proposed by William Drake in Towards Building a 
Theory of Population Dynamics: A Family of Transition as an aid to 
policy-makers.  This theory states that a period of upheaval occurs when 
a set of related variables do not switch from being parallel in a 
simultaneous fashion.  The transition occurs as the remaining variables 
catch up with the variable already changed (Drake, 1993).  There will 
also be an attempt to create a loose protocol for deciding whether a 
recovery system can be built and how to begin building it.
The price of black gold and the incentive to find an alternative fuel
        Just last year, for the first time in history, oil imports to the 
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United States accounted for more than half of the nations oil consumption 
with every update in 1995 breaking a new historical record.  The Clinton 
administration has declared rising oil imports a threat to national 
security (Myerson, 1995).  It has been demonstrated that increasing the 
world price of oil from $28 dollars a barrel to $50 dollars a barrel 
would cause a greater loss to the U.S. than to any other country, thus 
implying an embargo against the U.S. would be very successful.  A look 
back through history at the two oil price shocks of the 1970s has proven 
that dependence upon imported oil is costly and that an increase in 
imported oil will also increase the risk of disruption.  This disruption 
can be measured through the price of the energy.  Figure 1 shows the 
price of oil peaking during the oil crisis of the mid 70s then dropping 
down to the approximate level the United States is experiencing today.  
Perhaps the most startling depiction, is the tremendous amount of 
fluctuation of the price of oil compared to that of natural gas, which 
has remained relatively constant throughout the past decades.  High oil 
imports, therefore, put the United States at the mercy of such 
fluctuations.  One way to steady this behavior is to increase domestic 
production of oil in an attempt to decrease the sensitivity to outside 
market disturbances.  
 
figure 1 (Source: World Resource Database, 1995)
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However, domestic production of oil has been on a decline despite the 
fact that 90% of all new exploratory drilling is done by the U.S., and 
with 75% of the estimated total recoverable oil already discovered, a 
breakthrough is not in sight (Folkerts-Landau, 1984).  The data in figure 
2 shows energy consumption out growing energy production.  The deficit, 
so far, has been compensated through increasing the amount of energy 
imported to the U.S. . However, further projections show that, given 
current trends, the U.S. will still fall short of filling the deficit in 
the future, even with the inclusion of imports.  Later data analysis will 
show that, to compound the situation, there may be a transition headed 
towards the reduction of the production of oil as a fuel source.  
 
figure 2 (Source: World Resource Database, 1995)
exponential fit for all data
 
figure 3 (Source: World Resource Database, 1995) exponential fit for all data
The prevalent attitude with the lawmakers is to get away from importing 
energy.  It is a policy based upon this previous data, which effects may 
all be elegantly summed through a simple application of chaos theory 
(figure 4).  Arlinghaus et al. has proposed a chaotic method to view 
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population-environment dynamics, which may also apply to this situation.  
When data is plotted alongside the line y=x (at which input equals 
output), the intersections of these two lines, or fixed points, will 
become either attracting or repelling points, depending upon the area of 
interest on the 
x-axis.  
 
figure 4 (Source: World Resource Database, 1995)
exponential fit for energy import data
Figure 4 depicts such a relationship.  During the mid 60s, the import 
trend passed a benchmark, an attracting point.  At the moment, the United 
States is between two fixed points.  If the stress to increase oil 
imports were removed, the trend would naturally tend to decline towards 
the mid 60s level.  However, there is a threshold of irreversibility at 
which point, the natural trend would be to increase out of control 
towards infinity.  If this point, only twenty years away at the year 
2015, is breached, imports would become extremely difficult to harness.  
Therefore, measures must be taken to bend the import curve away from this 
point in hopes that the future intersection will never occur.  To 
accomplish this, the energy deficit must thus be filled by alternative 
sources.  The administration is currently searching for ways to encourage 
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domestic energy production.  Methane recovery is one such method that may 
be utilized in asserting a little energy independence.  Scott Skill, 
executive director of National Bioindustries Association has forecast, 
landfill gas could supply 5% of U.S. natural gas needs, and thats a 
profoundly large number, and one of the ways this country is going to cut 
its trade deficit (Peterson, 1995).  Figure 5 proves a transition towards 
increased natural gas usage is feasible.  It has happened in the past.  
During a twenty year stretch from 1960 to 1980, United States energy 
consumption underwent a successful natural gas/coal transition.  Coal use 
dropped dramatically, but an equally dramatic increase in natural gas 
usage picked up the slack.
 
figure 5 (Source: Annual Energy Review, 1993)
Examination of the transitions in United States energy production show 
that this phenomenon may already be underway (figure 6).  There have been 
many transitions in the past four decades when, at various times, each of 
the big three energy sources (coal, oil, and natural gas) enjoyed a stay 
at generating the most energy.  However, upon further inspection, it can 
be seen that oil production has followed a very steady overall decline.  
Although coal quite recently experienced an increase in production 
percentage, it, too, is starting to decline.  Natural gas is the lone 
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rising major energy source and will soon rank first in percentage of 
energy production. 
 
figure 6 (Source: Annual Energy Review, 1993)
Energy production from waste, such as methane recovery systems, is 
increasing along with this trend, implying its contribution to natural 
gas production will be significant (figure 7).  Future policy changes, 
such as ones presented later on, may bend this curve into more of an 
exponential shape.
 
figure 7 (Source: Annual Energy Review, 1993)
What is methane gas?
        Methane is the primary component of natural gas and landfill gas 
and can be generated by the anaerobic (oxygenless environment) bacterial 
decomposition of organic waste (figure 8).  This gas is insoluble in 
water and lighter than air so it will tend to rise up and out of a 
landfill into the atmosphere (Lafond, 1992).  Methane is emitted 
primarily by anthropogenic sources which account for about 70% of all 
global emissions.  Landfills are the largest anthropogenic source in the 
United States with the equivalent of 6750 MegaWatts of electricity 
generating capacity escaping to the sky last year; enough to power more 
than four million homes (Hogan ed., 1993).  
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figure 8 (Source: Chestnut, 1991)
Since methane can be produced through the decomposition of organic 
materials only, it is important to characterize a potential sites garbage 
content when determining if a landfill energy recovery project is 
feasible.  Composition varies slightly from site to site within a 
country, and may greatly vary from actual country to country (figure 9).
 
figure 9 (Source: Qian, 1995)
In the United States, approximately three quarters of municipal waste is 
organic.  Due to the advent of widespread recycling, the organic content 
of garbage will continue to rise as glass, metals, and aluminum are 
separated from the waste stream.  Figure 10 depicts this forthcoming 
transition towards a more organic composition with organic content rising 
sharper than the inorganic composition.  
 
figure 10 (Source: Qian, 1995)
file:///C|/545/1995/han.htm (9 of 42) [6/18/2008 10:57:24 AM]
545\han
So why retrieve landfill gas?
        On the mildest and most local level, it is considered a plain 
nuisance, causing the unpleasant odor so much associated with decomposing 
garbage.  There is also a much more serious health issue.  Aside from the 
release of harmful volatile organic carbons (VOCs), the methane which 
comprises the majority of landfill gas is obviously extremely combustible 
and possesses the insidious ability to migrate underground (Lafond, 
1992).  Quite recently, a Madison, Wisconsin, apartment exploded when a 
tenant lit a cigarette, with the most plausible explanation being 
traveling gas from the nearby landfill (Eldred, 1986).  Local vegetation 
may also be affected.  Not too long ago, the ground was bare at the Carne 
Landfill in New Jersey.  The plants would take up the methane in their 
roots and die.  However, ever since the recovery project began, there 
have been definite signs of spring growth all around (Peterson, 1995).  
On a slightly grander scale, smog can be created given the proper 
atmospheric conditions, along with acid rain.  And on the grandest global 
scale, both carbon dioxide and methane are major greenhouse gases.  
Methane is pound for pound more potent than carbon dioxide, responsible 
for roughly 18% of the total contribution to radiative forcing, a measure 
of global warming.  Atmospheric methane concentrations have risen sharply 
at about .6% per year and have more than doubled in the last two 
centuries.  The good news is that much of these effects can be avoided 
through the reclamation and combustion of landfill gas.  Generators used 
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for this purpose are very efficient and are able to combust these 
compounds breaking them down into components having little or no effect 
on the environment (Carolan, 1987).  Aside from producing this 
clean-burning methane, the reclamation displaces the coal or petroleum 
that would generally be used in its place (Hogan, 1993).  Similarly, the 
local community benefits by retaining revenue that would otherwise have 
been used to import the energy from an outside source (Lafond, 1992.  
Naturally, this would also work on a macroscopic level.  The EPA is 
recognizing these benefits and are pushing for future regulation 
requiring the collection and monitoring of landfall gas.  More and more 
landfill owners and operators are realizing that while they may not reap 
royalties, the activity is still positive. (Carolan, 1987).
Part I: Construction and Operation
Siting
        Siting a landfill is perhaps the most complex and certainly the 
most time-consuming step in constructing a landfill.  At present day, 50% 
of all landfills catch their repose in rural areas, while 25% are placed 
on industrial land, and the remaining 25% on other properties.  However, 
while a fill may be located well outside a city, urban growth often 
catches up and overgrows the host community, thus changing its site into 
residential land (Atwater, Dec 1989).  There is such a variety of facets 
to the decisions, it is difficult to find an equitable approach.  One 
method put forth by Swallow et al in his study, Siting Noxious 
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Facilities, seems to give a fair general overview combining approaches 
across several disciplines.  A sound method should address both technical 
and sociological concerns.  The technical side should include expert 
advise regarding engineering, safety, and environmental criteria 
(Swallow, 1992).  It is important to make an attempt to foresee the 
unexpected.  The Seattle Midway Landfill was a model site until toxins 
were illegally dumped into it (Eldred, 1986).  The sauce-political 
approach should emphasize public access to the decision-making process.  
Swallow proposes a three-stage approach.  Stage 1, the first stage, 
examines which sites have the physical requirements for a waste 
facility.  This includes the availability and cost of the land, 
hydrology, topography, and climate.  Care must be taken to balance these 
factors since some of the preferred criteria are contradictory.  Case in 
point, the site should be in close proximity and accessible to the 
primary waste-producing urban center.  However, it is generally best to 
locate far from residential neighborhoods.  This stage produces a long 
list of possible sites that will further be narrowed by stage 2, social 
suitability.  This section involves the education of the public and 
determination of long term effects on the community.  Issues unearthed at 
this stage will be delved into further in the discussion of social 
impact.  This is arguably the most important consideration.  All concerns 
are debated at this point and a short list is created of perhaps two or 
three communities.  It is noteworthy that it is also at this juncture 
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that many solely economically-based selection models break down.  The 
final decision is made at third stage.  The basic concern is finding an 
acceptable compensation package.  It many cases, the compensation to the 
host community is so alluring, the final selectees will auction for the 
right.  An obvious drawback to this system is the ample room available 
for political manipulation.  This can partially be avoided by clearly 
announcing beforehand , the criteria set for both the long and short 
lists (Swallow, 1992).  
How is methane retrieved?
        Methane production begins approximately one or two years after 
waste placement.  The lag time accounts for the amount of time taken to 
deplete the oxygen in the fill so that anaerobic methanogenesis may 
thrive.  A series of blowers and compressors create a vacuum inside the 
landfill.  This pressure funnels the gas into perforated pipes which, in 
turn, head toward the cleanup facility where the gas is filtered and 
heated to remove the moisture (Qian, 1995).
What to do once it is recovered
        Once retrieved, landfill gas can be used  in one of three ways.  
It can be cleaned and compressed to pipeline quality, then sold to a 
natural gas distributor.  The cost to upgrade gas is quite expensive, but 
the landfill is able to sell it directly to a power company without 
having to identify a specific customer.  A second option combusts the gas 
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in an on location generator.  The energy is then generally used for 
maintenance needs on the site itself.  The third, and most profitable 
option, if it is available, is to sell it to an industrial plant as 
medium grade boiler fuel, which contains about half the energy value of 
pipeline natural gas used residentially.  Ideally, the medium grade fuel 
customer would be located no more than five miles away (Hogan, 1993).  
Fluctuations in both demand for energy and seasonal waste generation may 
be handled by mixing in mined natural gas when needed (Lafond, 1992).
Estimating methane output (figure 11)
There are numerous methods used to estimate the generation of landfill 
gas.  A simple equation derived by the EPA in a 1993 report to congress 
on Opportunities to Reduce Anthropogenic Methane Emissions in the U.S. 
offers a quick, handy recipe.
For landfills over 1 Mg:
methane (m3/min) = 8.22 + 5.27 W
        where W = amount of waste measured in Mg (106 grams)
For landfills under 1 Mg:
methane (m3/min) = 7.43 W
        where W = amount of waste measured in Mg (106 grams)
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For each of the above equations, it is standard to assume a 85% 
efficiency (Hogan, 1993).
 
figure 11 (Source: Hogan, 1993)
Note: There is a significant amount of uncertainty in determining the 
exact amount of waste generated in a country, thus a range of estimates 
is often given when depicting trends for large areas, such as the United 
States.
Part 2: Economics
        Ultimately, the profitability of a landfill gas recovery will 
depend largely on the price of energy at which the site is located (John, 
1995).  These recovery systems are highly sensitive to fluctuations of 
market energy prices.  At an expected price of 5"/kilowatt-hour (kWh) in 
the year 2000, it is profitable to recover methane from more than half of 
all U.S. landfills.  A penny less per kWh, and it would feasible to 
recover gas from just 15% of all landfills.  A penny more, however, and 
the figure rises to 75%.  Currently, prices range from 2"/kWh to 10"/kWh, 
with an average of 6"/kWh (Hogan, 1993) (figure 12).  As common sense 
dictates, recovery works best where energy prices are high or where there 
is a population boom requiring power companies to find more power 
(Eldred, 1986).  It may be useful to seek out locations with population 
dynamic transitions showing a simultaneous population boom and energy 
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transition toward natural gas or alternative fuel.
 
figure 12 (Source: Hogan, 1993)
The low, average, and high estimates correspond to the possible charge 
for electricity of 4"/kWh, 5"/kWh, and 6"/kWh, respectively.  As is 
apparent, the sensitivity of these recovery projects is extremely high.  
Currently, the United States is on the path following the high estimate.
        The economic future of landfill gas generation is bright.  New 
federal tax credits are increasing the value of gas for many landfills.  
Specifically, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 extended the Section 29 tax 
credit for non-conventional energy production until the year 2008.  The 
credit is approximately equivalent to 1"/kWh.  
        An additional savings may be redeemed through the cost of 
reducing carbon dioxide (CO2).  Since CO2 is a major greenhouse gas, it 
is advantageous to reduce CO2 emissions.  The estimated cost of doing so 
is approximately $15 per ton.  Since this recovery process not only 
reduces methane emissions, but CO2 emissions also, an additional savings 
of about 2"/kWh may be attached.  Plus, the savings from displacing the 
fossil fuel that would otherwise have been used to create the energy 
totals to approximately .6"/kWh (calculating 1.5 lb CO2 avoided per kWh).
        The overall savings from the Section 29 tax credit and the cost 
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effectiveness of reducing CO2 is about 3.5"/kWh.  This assistance is 
significant noting the sensitivity of the recovery system to energy price 
(Hogan, 1993).
Estimating collection system cost
Again, the 1993 EPA report to congress provides a handy equation for 
estimating cost.
Collection System Capital Cost = W.8 * $470,000
        where W = amount of waste measured in Mg (106 grams)
Operational and maintenance cost = 10% of Capital Cost
        includes 6% for labor-related cost (such as wages and overhead)
        + 4% non-labor-related cost (such as administrative and insurance)
(Hogan, 1993).
Estimating generator cost
MW = methane (m3/min) * .1765
Capital Cost = $1,200,000 per MW
Operational Cost = 13% of Capital Cost
(Hogan, 1993)
Part 3: Social Impact
Property Value
file:///C|/545/1995/han.htm (17 of 42) [6/18/2008 10:57:24 AM]
545\han
        Property value depreciation is often one of the reasons for host 
community opposition to the siting of a new waste facility (Atwater, Dec 
1989)  Landfills affect many environmental and social characteristics, 
all of which are generally reflected in the property value of a home.  
Issues of concern to home owners include the scenic view (or lack 
thereof), quiet, safety, health, risk, nuisances, social impact of a 
stigma on the community, environmental change, government property value, 
the unfairness of one area being impacted while other surrounding 
neighborhoods enjoy benefits, loss of confidence in the government, and 
retardation of residential development (Atwater, Sept 1989).  The 
December follow-up study to the September property value study surveyed 
homeowners with respect to their objections to a landfill (table 1).  The 
shear nuisance of the landfill was the major concern.  However, all the 
impacts are theoretically inherent in the property value.
Facility Impacts on Neighborhood        Proportion of Residents with 
Negative Beliefs
Nuisances       66 %
Health Risks    45 %
Property Values 41 %
Community Image 41 %
table 1 (Source: Atwater, Dec 1989)
One way to compensate homeowners for a perceived loss in property value 
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is to offer property value guarantees.  A property value guarantee 
ensures the homeowners of the hypothetical fair market value of the home 
as if the landfill never existed.  The guarantee is valid even to the 
point where the landfill owner will buy the house if it is not sold 
within nine months.  A study by Atwater and Zeiss on the effect of 
landfills on property values examined 15 case studies covering a variety 
of both rural, urban, and suburban locations.  The results were 
surprising in the sense that they could find no strong correlation 
between the landfill and its host community.  Out of the 15 cases ranging 
equally from rural to suburban to urban communities, 6 cases showed a 
decline in property value, 8 cases showed no effect, and one case 
exhibited an actual increase in property value.  Of the landfills studied 
with recovery systems, they found waste-to-energy plants that use the 
latest technology and are operated cleanly did not impact on residential 
property value or development.  Property value guarantees, although 
unnecessary for monetary compensation, were found useful for the simple 
fact that they acknowledged community concerns (Atwater, Sept 1989)  
However, in a follow-up study and survey, only 50% of the people polled 
found property value guarantees acceptable compensation, therefore, it is 
only a marginally effective public relations tool (Atwater, Dec 1989).
How to Communicate with the Host Community
        Many landowners agree that demonstrating concern for proper 
environmental management is the proper way to position the industry with 
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the public.  Therefore, reclamation projects such as energy recovery in 
its essence, can create good public relations (Carolan, 1989).  The 
education of and communication with the host community is both the major 
and most volatile component of the landfill creation process.  In the 
past, siting was generally dictated through a economical-political 
process.  The public did not have much input into the events that would 
affect them.  This brought about such issues as environmental racism 
which generally targeted poorer communities that were not able to object 
to waste facilities placed in their district.  This process can be 
greatly improved by creating a dialogue between the landfill owners and 
the public.  An excellent case study of such a dialogue is the siting of 
the Maricopa County Landfill in Arizona which incorporated town meetings 
and liaisons as a communication link.  Four hundred angry residents 
attended the first meeting.  The county received the message and 
immediately expanded the site selection using frequent town meetings to 
obtain suggestions from the public for possible locations.  A hierarchy 
was also created through the establishment of advisory and steering 
committees.  The districts elected official, Carole Carpenter, made sure 
the county was given adequate information, the advisory committee was 
alerted to all decisions, and the media was well informed.  This was 
crucial to ensure that facts were always in tact and residents could 
still gather information if they were unable to physically attend the 
meetings.  Carpenter encouraged the airing of all concerns, debates are 
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just part of the process to arrive at a consensus about a landfill site 
that is not only environmentally sound, but socially acceptable (Landfill 
Siting..., 1986).  Twenty-four original sites were narrowed down to 
seven, which the advisory committee carefully analyzed.  When it came 
time to make the final site selection at a town meeting, not one person 
objected.  The meticulous system worked, and the Deputy County Engineer 
noted, we werent getting anywhere until the people got involved in the 
study.  Through public meetings, they learned about landfills, and they 
educated us about what was important to their neighborhoods and them 
(Landfill Siting..., 1986).  The process was time consuming, but as 
Carpenter explained, the public involvement process takes time, but 
people should recognize a year or so is not a long time to go through a 
successful process for siting and starting up a landfill (Landfill 
Siting..., 1986)  This siting method, which closely follows the method 
proposed by Swallow et al, should be widely implemented with careful 
consideration that the town meetings not be used as persuasion by either 
side, rather as an informational session and dialogue.  Any scientific 
experts involved should be careful to simply explain the situation rather 
than justify any proposed decisions (Kaminstein, 1990).
How to compensate a host community
        Every discussion with the host community, particularly during the 
final selection, will include a compensation package unique to the 
concerns of the public.  There are four logical, sequential steps that 
file:///C|/545/1995/han.htm (21 of 42) [6/18/2008 10:57:24 AM]
545\han
may be used to describe this compensation.  Step one is prevention.  This 
includes technical safeguards against accidents or malfunctions.  The use 
of buffer zones between the landfill and the community has also become a 
popular additional prevention technique.  The second step is control.  
This mainly accounts for the construction of the landfill and include 
various liner, filtration, and monitoring systems (Atwater, Sept 1989).  
A resident of the Seattle Midway Landfill community, Denny Clark, was 
worried about his children growing up near the site, but now applauds the 
owners for aggressively installing monitoring probes and measures to vent 
the methane gas (Eldred, 1986).  The third step is mitigation.  If an 
accident should occur, it is important that proper corrective measures be 
quickly implemented (Atwater, Sept 1989).  The three mile island accident 
is an example of successful mitigation.  The property value of the 
surrounding community did not decrease, despite the highly publicized 
mishap.  This has generally been attributed to the expectation of 
government assistance, the absence of visible damage, and the very 
visible influx of troops of cleanup workers (Atwater, Dec 1989).  
Finally, step four is compensation in the form of cash or services 
(Atwater, Sept 1989).  An increasing number of landfills are developing 
public parks on inactive landfill sites.  As part of the deal to accept 
the landfill, the Palm Beach Landfill in Florida has created an enormous 
park to meet the growing needs of adult recreation.  It includes twelve 
miles of cycling paths, a thirty-three acre waterway for canoeing and 
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fishing, along with horse trails, a model airplane field, and even a golf 
course.  The distinguishing characteristic is the ninety-foot lookout 
mound from which pedestrians can spot local landmarks including the 
neighboring active waste-to-energy facility (Palm Beach..., 1995).
Part 4:  Global Feasibility
Barriers and policies to overcome them
1.  Low electricity prices
        In general, methane recovery is only feasible from large, urban 
landfills.  The exact size, however, depends largely on the electricity 
price.  Unfortunately, landfill energy projects are highly sensitive to 
fluctuating prices.  A small dip in cents per kWh translates into a large 
dip in profits.  By the same token, fortunately, landfills are highly 
sensitive to fluctuating prices.  This implies that a mild government tax 
break or incentive program, such as Section 29, can be used to augment 
the profitability and thus neutralize the detrimental effects of low 
market prices.  The current U.S. tax policy is adequate for encouraging 
landfill recovery projects.  The tax structure has already kept the 
average adjusted charge for electricity from energy recovery projects at 
6"/kWh.  Thus, 75% of landfill methane can theoretically be recovered.  
Any increase in the tax break would be a step into diminishing returns.
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2.  Potential liability for financial backers and system operators
        In the United States, under CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act), the owner and operator of a 
landfill may become solely responsible for the costly cleanup if 
hazardous conditions should occur.  This scares away many investors who 
are needed to assemble the high capital cost.  This may be handled in 
three ways.  Governments may fund research for the development of cheaper 
cleanup technologies in order to reduce the amount of the liability.  New 
insurance structures may be looked at to provide better, more affordable 
coverage.  Also, legislative action may be utilized to spread out the 
liability cost among more of the responsible parties.
3.  Siting and Permitting Concerns
        Energy recovery landfills have the best chance of success if they 
are sited close to an urban center experiencing a population boom.  
However, the permitting standards are also stricter around these areas.  
It can be very costly to meet the permitting requirements.  One way this 
may be overcome is to develop more efficient low emission technologies 
such as fuel cells, which chemically convert methane directly into usable 
energy bypassing the reactor, thus making it easier to meet the 
standards.  This can be achieved through governmental funding of both 
public and private research projects.  The opposite approach is to grant 
waivers or provide special permitting for environmentally beneficial 
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projects that can prove a high benefit-to-cost relationship.     
4.  Perception of high risk
        Most alternative energy production technologies are viewed as 
unproven and risky.  This high risk perception may be voided by 
publicizing the reliability and profitability of methane recovery 
projects already in existence.  In the case of the United States, an 
outreach program could be developed to provide information on the over 
one hundred successful U.S. projects already in existence today.
5.  Development cost of technology
        The high cost of technology hinders the development of new, more 
efficient technologies.  Again, the government can fund and develop both 
private and public research programs.
6.  Lack of information
        A landfill may be a prime site for methane recovery, yet the 
owner may simply be unaware of the recovery option.  Or, if aware of the 
option, may not have the know-how to implement it.  For instance, 85% of 
the landfills in the U.S. are owned by local governments whose only 
responsibility is to adequately store municipal solid waste.  Since it is 
not their primary concern, they may be unaware of the ability to take the 
process one or two steps further.  An outreach program can be developed 
by the government to provide publicity and technical information on the 
file:///C|/545/1995/han.htm (25 of 42) [6/18/2008 10:57:24 AM]
545\han
construction and operation of a waste-to-energy landfill (Hogan, 1993).  
This also brings in the issue of public versus private management.  
Smaller plants are particularly sensitive to the performance and 
efficiency of the management.  Many vendors argue that private managers 
are better equipped to handle emergencies.  Public management may become 
too bogged down in bidding contracts which can be slow and political.  
However, advocates of public ownership argue that it is best to keep a 
local landfill under local control.  A publicly owned landfill can also 
theoretically be run at a lower cost since it would be a non-profit 
operation (Carolan, 1987).
By Section of the World
        Waste in developing countries is expected to increase at a much 
faster rate than the industrialized countries.  This trend is attributed 
to projections of higher population growth rather than an increase in per 
capita consumption (Hogan, 1993).  Transition theory may be an incredibly 
powerful tool used to help site energy recovery projects around the 
world.  Through the examination of indicator variables, it can be 
determined which areas are primed for this technology.  General trends 
can be depicted to determine if there is a need for the energy, if enough 
gas can be generated to make it economically feasible, and if the 
physical building blocks exist.  Perhaps the most important contribution 
transition theory can offer to this application, is the ability to time 
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when these variables will occur in the proper combinations.  Knowing when 
sites may be ready to accept this technology is extremely valuable when 
creating policy, and determining how to spend funds and when.  A few 
examples of this technique will be applied to several test countries in 
the following section.  Three transitions will be examined.  The first 
plots energy consumption and production to determine if there is an 
energy deficit to be filled, such as the extreme case of the United 
States.  The second transition checks if the country is in the midst of 
an urban boom.  As has been stated, these projects are best situated 
around areas experiencing rapid urban growth and a natural gas demand.  
The third relationship takes another step past the urban boom to 
determine if the infrastructure is in place to allow recovery projects.  
It is not enough that the project creates energy, the energy must also 
have a path to flow to the consumers.  To determine the state of the 
infrastructure for natural gas, natural gas production is plotted.  If 
there is a boom in natural gas production, the country will most likely 
have the means to distribute the energy,  This underlines another asset 
of the transition theory as a tool.  Transitions with indirect 
relationships can be used to express a variable that may otherwise be 
difficult to obtain.
Africa and the Middle East
        Municipal solid waste (MSW) generation is .7 kg per person per 
day (Hogan, 1993).  There is a need for greater technological development 
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before recovery systems can be installed.  Energy recovery requires the 
control granted by a sanitary landfill as opposed to the smaller, simpler 
dumping landfills which are more frequently found in this geographical 
area.  More effort also must be diverted into creating markets for the 
end product of an energy recovery system, including the infrastructure 
required to provide it.  At this point, resources should be used to 
improve waste handling and landfill design before methane recovery can be 
considered.
Asia
        MSW generation is .6 kg per person per day.  Asia is responsible 
for 16% of the global generation of methane from landfills.  Some 
countries are upgrading their collection methods by using compacting 
trucks and covered containers.  This would decrease the amount of 
scavenging and increase the amount of waste placed in landfills.  In 
addition, the increasing population will also increase the amount of 
waste.  However, economic constraints and a history of slow waste 
management development indicate that the use of sanitary landfills will 
not significantly increase in the near future.  Efforts should be made to 
develop recovery systems for the sanitary landfills that do exist and 
will grow in volume.
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figure 13 (Source: World Resource Database, 1995)
Figure 13 shows Indias energy deficit.  Although relatively small, the 
gap is significant and is showing growth.  Now may be an opportune time 
to begin developing technologies to prevent the gap from exploding.
 
figure 14 (Source: World Resource Database, 1995)
India does not seem to currently be in a rapid urban transition.  
Therefore, areas of densely packed population, which is ideal for energy 
recovery from landfills, may not be increasing at a fast enough rate to 
make this technology feasible.
 
figure 15 (Source: World Resource Database, 1995)
However, India does show an incredible boom in natural gas production, 
along with an exponentially increasing urban population, albeit fairly 
steady compared to the overall population.  Therefore, now may be the 
time to begin planning for widespread recovery.
Europe
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        MSW generation is .6 kg per person per day.  Europe is 
responsible for 20% of the global generation of methane from landfills.  
Some countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, and Germany plan to 
increase recycling and incineration which would decrease the volume 
placed in landfills.  However, the technology is in place to implement 
methane recovery and many of the Western European countries in particular 
have the infrastructure available to distribute the recovered energy.  
Many of these countries such as England are actively researching recovery 
techniques.  Although no Eastern European country currently has a gas 
recovery system, there is tremendous opportunity for widespread 
implementation.  Sanitary landfills or open dumps are the exclusive 
methods used for handling waste in most of these countries (as opposed to 
incineration).  A growing number of these countries, such as Poland, are 
phasing out open dumps in favor of sanitary landfills.  Natural Power, a 
U.S. based company is currently working with Kiev, Ukraine to develop a 
recovery system.  Other such outreach programs to Eastern European 
countries could prove to be successful.
 
figure 16 (Source: World Resource Database, 1995)
The former U.S.S.R. has kept its energy transition fairly steady.  it is 
not in a desperate situation right now, at least as a whole (figure 16).
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figure 17 (Source: World Resource Database, 1995)
However, it is starting to experience a slow urbanization which may 
accelerate in the near future (figure 17).
 
figure 18 (Source: World Resource Database, 1995)
Although the urbanization is relatively slow, the gas fuel production has 
skyrocketed (figure 18).  Therefore, the former U.S.S.R. has the means, 
but not yet the demand.  It should be recommended at this time that work 
is pursued to create markets for landfill energy and that the state of 
sanitary landfills be improved and updated to meet standards required for 
recovery.
The Americas
        MSW generation is 1.8 kg per person per day.  The Americas are 
responsible for half of the global generation of methane from landfills.  
Sanitary land filling is the predominant method for waste disposal.  
There is a great number of growing urban areas with the demand and 
infrastructure necessary to distribute the energy.  Municipal solid waste 
generation is also expected to increase making this section of the world 
best primed for widespread implementation of this technology, 
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particularly in the North American countries.  South America has fewer 
gas to energy systems, but is showing vested interest and a willing for 
commitment to this technology (Hogan, 1993).
 
figure 19 (Source: World Resource Database, 1995)
It has already clearly been shown that the United States desperately 
needs to become energy independent.  There is no urban boom, but there is 
a slight, erratic rise in gas fuel production (figure 20, 21).  
 
figure 20 (Source: World Resource Database, 1995)
This is a good example of the limitations of transition theory for this 
application.  The data show a tremendous need, yet the United States is 
experiencing neither an urban boom nor a steady explosion in natural gas 
production.  Yet, the United States is the prime candidate for this 
technology.  In this case, transition theory gave too vague a trend.  
Further exploration reveals that the rise in organic content of the waste 
and the extremely high per capita waste production will compensate for 
the lack of rapid urbanization.  This is a case in which transition 
theory shows a mild propensity , but more research must follow to 
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determine the exact extent.
Australia
        MSW generation is 1.1 kg per person per day (Hogan, 1993).  There 
are few highly urbanized areas in Australia with landfills large enough 
to make a recovery system profitable.  However, the technology and 
infrastructure are in place for the few landfills which are potential 
candidates.
 
figure 21 (Source: World Resource Database, 1995)
If India is almost primed for an energy recovery system, the former 
U.S.S.R. must wait and prepare, and the United States analysis gives a 
lukewarm result, then Australia is on the other end of the scale.  It is 
actually experiencing increasing exports as its production outruns its 
consumption (figure 21).  There is no urban boom (figure 22).  In fact, 
there is even a slight divergence between total and urban population.
 
figure 22 (Source: World Resource Database, 1995)
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figure 23 (Source: World Resource Database, 1995)
Again, Australia does have the know-how and equipment, there is just very 
little demand (figure 23).
The future of landfills in the U.S. 
        The state of landfills in the Unites States may mirror prospects 
in many of the other highly industrialized countries, and may be an 
indicator of the far future of countries in the later stages of 
industrial development.  As the average landfill size increases, as will 
be the case according to a recent EPA report to congress, energy recovery 
will become more profitable and feasible.  With the Section 29 tax break 
in place for at least another thirteen years, an average rate of 5"/kWh 
is reasonable.  At this rate, about 750 of the current landfills in the 
U.S. can profitably recover methane and produce about 4000 MW of energy.  
To reduce the air pollution, the EPA will soon require all landfills to 
collect and combust the gas produced (Hogan, 1993).   In addition, the 
growth of recycling programs and attitudes change the composition of 
municipal solid waste.  Much of the plastic and metal, which do 
contribute to methane generation, will be removed from the waste stream 
while the organic content, which does contribute to methane generation, 
increases.  This means landfills will become more efficient producers of 





figure 24 (Source: World Resource Database, 1995)
In a time where world population is starting to become a concern for many 
areas of the world if not all areas, more must be done to meet the 
exponentially growing needs of this world community (figure 24).  
Landfill gas recovery is a technology that can actually harness urban 
growth and transform it into a positive force.  
 
figure 25 (Source: World Resource Database, 1995)
As figure 25 indicates, this technology will most likely first impact the 
Americas and Europe.  These two areas have both the highest amount of 
technology and are both major sources of methane emissions, a good 
match.  It is up to these nations to research and refine the system so 
that other sections, such as Asia, may follow suit when the time comes.  
Asia has a high methane emission output, it simply needs the technology 
to make this recovery economically viable.
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        The world can no longer depend on the diminishing oil and coal 
reserves for its future energy needs.  Alternative energy sources are 
available and can be made feasible in the near future.  In all 
likelihood, oil and coal will not be replaced by one single new energy 
source that can be globally transported and used in a similar fashion.  
Rather, they will most likely be replaced by alternative local energy 
sources specific to the unique characteristics of each area.  Landfill 
energy will never be a major global source of energy, but will surely be 
a major local source of energy with more and more communities benefiting 
every year.
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Appendix
Some successful examples
        Landfills remain a largely untapped natural gas reserve capable 
of producing large amounts of energy.  Although a general global approach 
was taken in this paper, methane gas recovery systems are extremely 
sensitive to the surrounding environmental, economical, and 
socio-political conditions.  Therefore, the benefits are harvested 
locally.  Each particular site will have its own set of nuances and the 
feasibility of each site must be determined individually.  Here are some 
examples of locally successful landfills:
Handling fluctuations in supply and demand - Racine Landfill, Wisconsin
The surrounding community of this eight acre site is highly susceptible 
to seasonal fluctuations in energy demand, yet the rate of waste 
generation is fairly steady.  To compensate, the designers incorporated a 
system to simultaneously combust landfill gas and raw natural gas piped 
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in from an outside source.  Therefore, if more energy is needed, more 
natural gas can simply be added.  The system also burns off hazardous 
waste solvents further reducing air pollution.  The design has won the 
Wisconsin Governors Award for Energy Innovation and the National Energy 
Conservation Award from the U.S. Department of Energy (Lafond, 1993). 
The longevity of energy - Burnsville Landfill, Minnesota
The Burnsville Landfill creates 3.2 MW of energy meeting the energy needs 
of the 2000 surrounding community homes.  Although this landfill is 
closed, estimates show that Burnsville can depend on landfill electricity 
for another twenty years (In Minnesota..., 1994).
A growing  resource - Amityville Landfill, Pennsylvania
A recovery system was added to the active Amityville Landfill.  
Originally designed for 1 MW of electricity, it expanded two years later 
to 1.5 MW.  Currently, the landfill produces 2 MW of electricity with 
future plans to add yet another generator (Chestnut, 1991).
Paying for itself - Riverview Landfill, Michigan
Electricity produced at the Riverview Landfill is sold directly to the 
Detroit Edison electric company.  Thus, the landfill operator does not 
need to be concerned with finding a specific customer for the end 
product.  Within two years, the landfill owner recovered the capital cost 
and proceeds are now being added to Riverviews cash flow (Alperovitz, 1994).
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A community improves their local economy - Glendale Landfill, California
Says John Cosulich, supervising engineer, Its a win, win situation all 
the way.  The treated recovered gas from the Glendale is currently being 
sold to the city at a 12% discount from what it used to pay for imported 
natural gas.  Not only does the discount improve Glendales cash flow, the 
locally generated energy as opposed to the imported energy improves the 
economy of the town (Lou Chen, 1994).
Enough energy to spare - Puente Hills Landfill, California
This is the biggest methane gas recovery project in the country.  Despite 
the capital cost of 33 million dollars and an annual operating cost of 
3.6 million dollars, this site generates a revenue of 8.7 million dollars 
every year (John, 1995).
Into the future, Not just for homes anymore
Next year, during the 1996 Summer Olympics, Atlanta has plans to shuttle 
athletes throughout the city in natural gas-powered buses.  EPA 
restrictions will encourage automobiles to have near zero emissions in 
the near future.  Compressed natural gas cars are one of major solutions 
(Peterson, 1995).




MALARIA AND AIDS:  THE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL TRANSITION IN THAILAND
Introduction
        Malaria and the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) do not 
seem to have much in common on the surface. Malaria is transmitted by 
mosquitoes; AIDS through contact with bodily fluids. A parasite causes 
malaria; AIDS results from infection with the Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus (HIV). Malaria is curable; AIDS is not. But it is the similarities 
with which this paper is concerned: namely, both diseases have created 
major epidemiological headaches for health professionals around the 
world, and both diseases are preventable. 
        In terms of the health situation in Thailand, these two diseases 
represent the past and the future. As recently as the 1950s, malaria was 
the number one cause of mortality in Thailand. According to most 
estimates, HIV has spread throughout the country to such an extent that 
AIDS will probably become the top killer by the year 2000. The 
juxtaposition of these two diseases will also be utilized to show that 
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the policy implemented through the control programs for malaria can 
become a groundwork for dealing with a potentially bigger challenge in 
AIDS. 
        In a broader context, this paper will describe the two 
epidemiological transitions seen in Thailand. The first, a shift in the 
major causes of mortality from infectious to degenerative diseases, has 
already been successfully completed. Malaria will be used as a specific 
example to illustrate this change. The second transition has not yet 
occurred, although it has begun. The sole reason for this predicted shift 
-- from degenerative diseases back to infectious -- will be the rampant 
spread of AIDS. However, it must be noted that this is not a foregone 
conclusion, though based on present statistics and actions taken, it is a 
very probable one. 
Transition Theory
        The starting point for this study is the theory of transitions 
put forward by William Drake in his paper Toward Building a Theory of 
Population-Environment Dynamics: A Family of Transitions. The basic 
premise states that changes within societies, or segments of societies, 
can be viewed in terms of transitions in which a certain aspect of the 
group in question begins in a state of relative stability, passes through 
a turbulent stage marked by change and instability, and finishes at a new 
level of relative stability markedly different from the starting point. 
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For this paper on the health situation in Thailand, the epidemiological 
transition from Drakes paper will be used as a framework. 
        The epidemiological transition describes the changing source of 
mortality and morbidity from infectious diseases occurring primarily in 
the younger age groups to degenerative diseases in older age groups.  
This is the traditional way in which this particular transition has been 
viewed. For most countries, passing through this transition marks an 
important step along its developmental road. Within the theory of 
transitions, however, it is important to remember that not all shifts are 
in a positive direction. Every transition has the potential to be 
reversed, or at least to change in a way that negates the previous 
change. This, unfortunately, seems to be what will occur in  Thailand in 
terms of the epidemiological transition. Although the reasons for the two 
transitions are completely different, the result will be the return to 
infectious diseases as the leading causes of mortality, rather than 
degenerative diseases. And again, it will be the young who will be struck 
down as opposed to those who have lived a full life.
The First Transition
        As a nation, Thailand is extremely aware of the state of its 
health. The government has long kept tabs on the various causes of 
mortality and morbidity, and has actively pursued control programs for 
many of the worst offenders. In the case of malaria, it will be shown 
later just how effective such effort can be. In 1987, a commission 
released a report on the health priorities for the country. Within this 
document, the successful passage through the epidemiological transition 
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was noted: 
Since the last decade, Thailand has been faced with a different trend of 
health problem. The acute infectious diseases have been declining in both 
number and severity. On the contrary, most non-infectious diseases have 
been steadily increasing.  
A second report written four years later commented that the health 
transition in Thailand began as early as 1975 when the top ten leading 
causes of death changed from the three top-ranked infectious diseases to 
three non-communicable disorders.  
        But, before providing data on the transition and its success, 
consider some statistics about Thailand itself. Situated in the heart of 
Southeast Asia, Thailand currently has a population of around 57 million 
and a population density of approximately 114 people per sq. km. 
Currently, the population is growing at a rate of around 1.27 percent 
annually.  The country is divided into four distinct regions: 1) Central, 
which includes Bangkok and is the most heavily populated; 2) North, a 
mountainous region that is home to Chiang Mai as well as many indigenous 
hill tribes; 3) Northeast, which borders Cambodia and Laos and is 
relatively dry; and 4) South, which has an abundance of coastline and 
islands popular with tourists. Resting in the tropical zone, Thailand has 
two distinct seasons, rainy and dry, although the temperature variation 
is minimal. Most of the population still engages in agriculture to make a 
living. 
        In showing the success of the epidemiological transition, it is 
useful first to examine another common transition (see Fig. 1). The 
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demographic transition is characterized by a drop in
Fig. 1: Graph of the demographic transition of Thailand (Source: World Resources 
Database)
the crude death rate followed soon after by a drop in the crude birth 
rate.  Looking at the comparison for Thailand of these two variables, it 
appears that this trend has already occurred. There are many possible 
explanations for the success of this transition. Often the drop in crude 
death rate is marked by a combination of a decrease in death rates for 
infants and children under five, and an increase in the life expectancy 
for the general population. In a society that relies heavily on 
agriculture, as is still the case in Thailand, the birth rate corresponds 
to the need for individual families to have surviving children to work in 
the fields or the rice paddies. Thus, when infant mortality is high, the 
birth rate is also high to compensate for the loss of children and 
maintain the ability of the family to produce the crops necessary to 
survive. Conversely, as the infant mortality drops, in some cases so does 
the birth rate. In this way the demographic transition is directly linked 
to the epidemiological one. 
        In Thailand, the demographic transition has indeed coincided with 
a marked decline in the infant mortality rate and an increase in life 
expectancy (see Fig. 2). This, in turn, has occurred at the same time as 
the death rates for many childhood diseases have fallen. From this, it is 
not unreasonable to infer that as families see more of their children 
survive, one of the societal results in Thailand has been a move toward 
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having fewer children. The purpose of this argument is to show that the 
successful demographic transition can be used as a factor in determining 
the success of the epidemiological transition since the variables in each 
play upon the progression of the other.
        Beyond their application to the demographic transition, the 
variables in Fig. 2 illustrate directly the results of the successful 
epidemiological transition, if not the transition itself. Clearly, as the 
shift has been completed away from infectious diseases that mainly kill 
the young, the statistics for infant mortality and deaths for children 
under five years of age have fallen dramatically. At the same time, life 
expectancy has increased as the mortality rates begin to be dominated by 
diseases and conditions that characteristically strike the elderly. 
        This methodology so far may seem indirect. After all, if one 
wants to chart the epidemiological transition, it might seem sufficient 
to put the death rates for infectious diseases on a graph with those for 
degenerative diseases. Unfortunately, the availability of disease 
statistics for Thailand make this straightforward approach nearly 
impossible. For the most part, the statistics for this study were 
obtained from two sources: the World Health Organization and the 
International Medical Foundation of Japan. Although each of these 
organizations received their numbers from the Thai government originally, 
there are still occasional discrepancies between the two. Whenever 
possible, this paper will refer to statistics taken directly from Thai 
government reports. However, since most statistics were gathered from the 
aforementioned secondary sources, discrepancies will be noted when they 
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are deemed important or necessary.
        Fig. 2: Comparison of life expectancy and mortality of children 
under five in Thailand. The left axis corresponds with life expectancy; 
the right axis corresponds with mortality - Under 5 and mortality - 
infant. (Source: World Resources Database).
        One other peripheral set of statistics should be acknowledged 
prior to considering the disease statistics. Health facilities are 
widespread throughout Thailand, and this has been a major factor in the 
successful epidemiological transition. Thailand is divided into 73 
Provinces, which in turn are broken down into 621 districts, which 
further segment into 6283 tumbons. As of 1985, 86% of the districts had a 
major hospital; however, every tumbon had a health center.  This 
extensive coverage will become important when looking specifically at the 
containment of malaria and AIDS. Additionally, the widespread access to 
health care accounts for the percentages of 1-year olds who have had 
certain immunizations (Fig. 3). Of course, this immunization strategy 
influenced the epidemiological transition since these diseases rank among 
the major childhood illnesses.
        Fig. 3: Percentage of children receiving major immunizations in 
Thailand. (Source: World Resources Database). 
Mortality Statistics
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        It is immediately clear (Table 1) that the leading causes of 
death in Thailand have shifted from infectious diseases to degenerative 
diseases over the past forty years. One distinction between infectious 
and degenerative diseases that is often made involves degree of 
preventability. Infectious diseases -- such as malaria, tuberculosis, 
pneumonia, etc. -- are often labeled as more preventable than their 
degenerative counterparts -- heart disease, cancer, cirrhosis. However, 
this is a troublesome distinction since it can be said that many 
degenerative diseases are preventable. To clarify, preventable in this 
case refers mainly to societal and governmental variables, such as access 
to health care, sanitary facilities and clean water. This is still not 
adequate considering that environmental factors that are subject to 
government intervention are often considered causes of many degenerative 
diseases. However, for this study, it will suffice to leave the 
distinction fuzzy, but noted.
Rank 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
No. 1 Malaria   195
Gastroenteritis   
38.7
Accidents   
27.2
Accidents   
35.9
Heart Disease   
49.6
No. 2 Tuberculosis   65.5
Tuberculosis   
34.7
Tuberculosis   
20.8
Heart Disease   
31.4 Other Accidents25.3
No. 3 Gastroenteritis   65.1
Pneumonia   
32.5
Diarrhea   
17.6 
Cancer   
23.6
Cancer   
22
No. 4 Pneumonia   39.4
Malaria   
30.2
Heart Disease   
15.3
Tuberculosis   
14.3
Diseases of the Digestive System   
18.4
No. 5 Dysentery   32.8
Heart Disease   
19
Pneumonia   
14.8
Pneumonia   
10
Transportation Accidents   
15.2
        Table 1: List of the top five causes of mortality in Thailand 
over the years. The number below the cause indicates the number of deaths 
per 100,000 population. A note of further clarification: on this chart 
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the term malignant neoplasms has been changed to cancer. The source 
designated these particular death rates as malignant neoplasms of other 
sites. The reason for this distinction is unclear. In 1990, the death 
rate per 100,000 for all malignant neoplasms, or all types of cancer, was 
39.3, which would move it to second on the list for that year. (Source: 
International Medical Foundation of Japan). 
        Another interesting comment about the leading causes of death 
revolves around the increased prominence of accidents. In fact, by 1987 
injuries as a category -- which includes accidents, homicides and 
suicides -- accounted for more deaths than either infectious diseases or 
degenerative diseases.  However, this is not directly relevant to the 
epidemiological transition.
        The table of leading causes of death shows a marked decline in 
death rates of some of the major infectious diseases. Tuberculosis, for 
instance, fell from 65.5 deaths per 100,000 population in 1950 to 14.3 
deaths per 100,000 in 1980. By 1990, it had dropped out of the top five, 
but Figure 4 illustrates that its mortality rate has continued to 
decline. Similarly, the death rates for pneumonia plummeted over the 
years. Malaria demonstrates the most striking example of the control of 
an infectious disease and will be discussed in detail later. 
        The table also illustrates the increase in degenerative diseases. 
It is unclear whether or not a significantly higher percentage of people 
contract these diseases now or whether the higher rates
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        Fig. 4: Mortality rates for selected causes in Thailand. Data for 
1987 was generated using statistics from other years and trends. (Source: 
International Medical Society of Japan).
are simply a function of an increase in the older population prone to 
such ailments. The important factor to note is the increased prominence 
of degenerative diseases among the leading causes of death. Still, heart 
disease in 1990, which was responsible for 49.6 deaths per 100,000, 
cannot be compared to malaria in 1950 at an incredible 195 deaths per 
100,000. This is another sign of the successful epidemiological 
transition. No longer does a single disease run rampant through the 
society, causing great numbers of deaths. Mortality in post-transition 
Thailand has become widely distributed with no single cause reigning 
supreme, but with degenerative diseases at the forefront.
        However, despite the dramatic improvement in death rates for 
infectious diseases, morbidity rates still remain quite high in Thailand. 
Again, malaria is probably the clearest example of the success of 
controlling mortality, while being unable to conquer morbidity. In the 
tropical climate, it has proven extremely difficult to eradicate 
infectious diseases. It might be more accurate to say that the 
epidemiological transition in Thailand concerns the control of infectious 
diseases as a source of mortality. However, as the following discussion 
of malaria control over the past fifty years will show, infectious 
diseases may never be effectively limited as a source of morbidity. 
file:///C|/545/1995/landweber.htm (10 of 32) [6/18/2008 10:57:32 AM]
545\landweber
Malaria Control in Thailand
        In 1949, malaria accounted for 205.5 deaths per 100,000 
population in Thailand, killing 38,046 people.  By 1992, the death rate 
had fallen to 1.8 per 100,000 population for a total of 1,051 dead.  
These tangible results have been the result of better access to health 
care, which in turn has led to an increased distribution of anti-malarial 
drugs. Before tracing the course of malaria control programs in Thailand 
over the past few decades, it must be noted that the number of cases of 
malaria have not marked the same continual decline as the death rate 
statistics. In fact, morbidity for malaria has fluctuated since the 
mid-seventies (Fig. 6). The reasons for the difficulty in maintaining low 
levels of morbidity will become evident during the recounting of the 
history. However, the morbidity statistics do highlight the difficulty of 
obtaining accurate statistics about malaria. The World Health 
Organization recorded consistently higher numbers of cases than the 
Japanese medical association. There are many reasons why this might 
occur, all of which are factors in the spread and continued prevalence of 
the disease. One organization might be including cases from among the 
large number of workers who enter Thailand from neighboring countries to 
work. Additionally, migration of Thai workers within the country makes it 
difficult to obtain an accurate count, since many of these people end up 
traveling in areas where malaria is highly endemic. One other possibility 
may involve the problems of determining the number of cases within the 
indigenous hill tribes of the Northern region.
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        The ecosystem of malaria consists of three interacting organisms: 
human beings, mosquitoes and the parasite that causes the disease. The 
parasite is carried by the mosquitoes, which in turn infect human beings. 
Mosquitoes can also receive the parasite from infected people, thus 
increasing the diseases chances of spreading. Thailand has 62 species of 
mosquito that are capable of transmitting the disease; however, two 
species are the primary carriers.  Because of its extensive rainy season, 
Thailand has many areas that become ideal breeding grounds for the 
insects. There are three types of parasites that are predominant in 
Thailand. Of these, increasing attention is being paid to P.Falciparum, 
which has shown high levels of resistance to many of the known treatments 
for the disease. Malaria has been eradicated in the major cities of 
Thailand. However, in rural areas throughout the country, malaria remains 
a problem.
        Thailand began a concerted effort to control malaria in 1930 when 
the first Malaria Unit was formed in Chiang Mai to perform surveys, 
distribute medication and educate the general populace. In 1949, the 
first spraying of DDT inside houses occurred in Chiang Mai province in an 
effort to control the mosquito population and thus prevent transmission 
of the disease. At the same time, the distribution of anti-malarial drugs 
increased for use as both prophylactics and treatment. This two-pronged 
approach of attacking both the parasite and the mosquito, which is 
followed in
 
        Fig. 5: Mortality rates for malaria. Data for 1987 was 
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unavailable. (Source: World Health Organization, 1949-1985; International 
Medical Foundation of Japan, 1986-1992).
 
        Fig. 6: Malaria morbidity statistics for Thailand. The vertical 
axis represents the number of cases; the horizontal axis represents the 
year. (Sources: International Medical Foundation of Japan and the World 
Health Organization).
most malaria control programs, yielded positive results almost 
immediately, as noted by the World Health Organization: 
Encouraged by the rapid reduction of malariometric indices in the pilot 
project area with residual insecticidal spray, the Government of Thailand 
decided to launch a nation-wide malaria control programme which was 
extended in a phased manner. Along with spray operations, for purposes of 
evaluation, malariometric surveys were carried out at quarterly 
intervals, and termed as a surveillance system. In addition, malaria 
mortality statistics were also collected.  
This widespread household spraying did in fact have an immediate effect 
on the prevalence of malaria cases. One interesting question that will 
not be covered in this paper is the effect on the Thai population of 
having a toxic insecticide such as DDT sprayed inside homes. However, 
ignoring the possibility that the insecticide might be harming the 
general public, Thailand pressed ahead. In 1965, the government 
implemented a malaria eradication plan for the nation with the goal of 
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conquering the disease altogether. 
        Their optimism proved to be premature. In a single year, between 
1969 and 1970, the number of cases of malaria increased by 42 percent.  
There are many reasons for the increase, but perhaps the two most 
important reflect the adaptability of the mosquito and the parasite. 
Before spraying became widespread, mosquitoes usually fed on people 
inside their homes. Soon after spraying it became evident that the 
mosquito population was avoiding the DDT-sprayed houses, yet continuing 
to bite people outside where there was no concentration of insecticide. 
At the same time, the parasite was displaying an increasing rate of 
resistance to the prevalent treatments. 
        Throughout the seventies, morbidity continued to fluctuate, even 
as the mortality rates continued their downward trend. In 1982, a new 
health plan for the nation included the aim of integrating malaria 
control into primary health services. The result has been a cohesive 
local approach that covers the entire country. 
Spraying was done by the village spraymen. Blood slides were collected by 
the health centre staff, by malaria volunteers and health volunteers. 
There is one malaria volunteer in each village in addition to health 
volunteers. Health education was being done by health communicators. 
There is one health communicator for a group of 10-15 houses.  
Such an organized and pervasive approach holds the key to the second 
transition and eventually control of AIDS. 
Controlling Human Behavior: Prelude to the Second Transition
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        As has been mentioned, reducing morbidity of malaria has posed a 
far greater challenge than reducing mortality. While the adaptability of 
mosquitoes and parasites play a major role in this challenge, the human 
factors are more important to examine for this paper. The government can 
-- and, in Thailand, does -- provide access to health care and 
medication, offer household spraying, and educate the public about the 
disease. But it is the responsibility of the general public to take 
advantage of these services. One factor in the continued morbidity is the 
refusal of many to have their houses sprayed, or to sleep under a 
mosquito net or near a mosquito coil. If the people do not follow the 
advice of the health professionals, it makes controlling the disease more 
difficult. 
        In the case of malaria, other human factors also contribute to 
the spread and perpetuation of the disease. Migrancy is a common 
occurrence in Thailand as a significant segment of the population moves 
around from place to place to work. These people not only lack immunity 
to local strains of parasites, but also introduce new strains into the 
area. Therefore, migrant workers are likely to become infected in the new 
area as well as help to infect the local population. This problem is 
compounded by foreign workers who introduce parasite strains from other 
countries. Another problem occurs with the improvement of the 
infrastructure and what might be called economic progress. Two examples 
are the building of dams and deforestation for timber. The first 
increases the breeding grounds for mosquitoes; the second brings the 
human population into contact with mosquitoes and parasites previously 
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out of range. Both increase morbidity. One final challenge to malaria 
control are refugees, a common phenomenon among the often politically 
unstable countries of the region. For example in the early 1980s, 
Thailand became home to half a million people fleeing Cambodia. Although 
mosquito controls were implemented at the refugee camps, an increase in 
malaria was almost inevitable with the mixing of local and foreign 
parasites. 
        So what are the policy implications of the history of malaria 
control and what path should be followed in the future? It has been shown 
that control of morbidity is a nearly impossible proposition. Mosquitoes 
are a fact of life in Thailand; the only way to get rid of them would be 
to completely destroy their environment. No one is advocating razing the 
forests; at least, not for the purpose of mosquito control. Morbidity 
will fall naturally, and already is, as the economic progress of the 
country begins to reflect itself in higher employment rates, less 
migrancy and better housing. The best policy route, besides continuing 
education on avoiding being bitten by mosquitoes, is to follow the road 
already taken toward better health service nationwide.
        It is the difficulty of controlling human behavior that leads to 
the second epidemiological transition in Thailand and AIDS. Malaria has 
human behavioral factors involved in its spread, but reducing the 
mortality rate does not rely on controlling these. For malaria, the 
government can afford to concentrate on those areas on which it can have 
a definite impact, while allowing behavior control to be a secondary 
concern. The second transition, however, requires that Thailand take 
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exactly the opposite approach:
One cannot compare AIDS to diseases such as cholera and malaria, which 
currently claim the lives of more people. AIDS reaches further into 
society than these diseases because (a) it affects people during their 
most productive years in which they are typically responsible for the 
care and support of both children and elderly parents; (b) transmission 
of the virus generally goes unrecognized; and (c) no cure is available, 
and probably will not be during this century.  
Instead of treating those who have the disease as the first priority, 
AIDS must be prevented from spreading by changing the behaviors of the 
populace that lead to the transmission of HIV. AIDS cannot be cured once 
it is contracted; people with the HIV almost inevitably will develop 
AIDS. It is crucial to stop the transmission at the source.
The Second Transition: AIDS
        One of the most interesting, and terrifying, aspects of AIDS is 
the speed with which it is able to spread through a population, if the 
conditions are favorable. As will be shown, Thailand has proven extremely 
hospitable to the HIV virus. Unlike malaria, health officials know 
exactly when the first AIDS victim appeared in Thailand and are able to 
trace the entire course of the disease to date.
The first case of full-blown AIDS was reported in Thailand in August 
1984. The patient was a 28 (sic), bisexual male and had just returned 
from the United States where he had spent 2 years. He was hospitalized 
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there and then returned home where he received additional care. He died 
by the end of 1984. Due to this alarming event, serological 
investigations of the high risk group were begun that year.
        The second reported case, in December 1984, was a homosexual 
foreigner who returned home after a short period of stay. In 1985, 4 more 
cases were reported. Three are foreigners, who had acquired infections 
abroad. The only Thai patient was a 27 year old bisexual male who had 
contracted the disease from a German who visited Thailand every 2 to 3 
months. The patients female partner was also infected and was classified 
with HIV as ARC (AIDS-related complex).  
As was the case in many countries, the initial appearance of AIDS led to 
stigma. In Thailand, AIDS was viewed as a foreign disease transmitted 
through homosexual contact. However, at the same time, the health 
community in Thailand proved itself less short-sighted than some 
countries, acknowledging that the disease would spread.
Asymptomatic carriers are more likely to spread the disease. Without 
serological examination, they do not differ from the general population. 
The total number of asymptomatic carriers is not known, however, the 
average incidence of seropositives among the high risk population (i.e. 
homosexual/bisexual men, female prostitutes, persons who received blood 
transfusions and intravenous drug abusers) in four seroepidemiological 
surveys conducted in Bangkok and Pattaya ranged from 0.6 to 2.4 percent. 
This nod to the HIV virus showed the willingness to admit that the 
disease was hidden among the population. 
        By 1988, the government had recorded a total of 3,138 carriers of 
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the HIV virus, 38 of whom had developed symptoms of some sort.  Clearly 
there were many more: by 1994, more than triple that number had 
full-blown AIDS (See Fig. 7). The Thai Ministry of Public Health 
estimated that between 500,000 and 600,000 Thais were infected with HIV 
by 1993.  Projections have been done that estimate that, without 
significant changes in behavior among the populace, there will be between 
3.4 and 4.3 million Thais infected by the year 2000.  This is a 
staggering prediction considering that within ten years of being infected 
with the HIV virus more than 67 percent of people are expected to develop 
AIDS and die within the next two years.  Using this framework and the 
Ministry of Public Healths current estimate of HIV carriers, it can be 
inferred that by the year 2003 an additional 335,000 people will develop 
AIDS and probably die by the year 2005. Even dividing this number of 
deaths over 10 years would still mean approximately 33,500 deaths a year 
or a mortality rate of 55.8 per 100,000. Referring back to the leading 
causes of mortality shows that AIDS will clearly take over as the leading 
killer, even without the truly apocalyptic predictions.
        Fig. 7: New cases of AIDS reported in Thailand annually. Cases of 
AIDS-related complexes -- conditions linked to the HIV virus and its 
weakening of the immune system -- have not been included, since 
statistics for these are sketchy and unreliable. (Source: International 
Medical Foundation of Japan and the World Health Organization). 
        Although Thailand currently appears to have the worst AIDS 
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problem within Asia, it must be noted that South and Southeast Asia as a 
whole currently sits on the brink of a major health crisis. Cases 
throughout the region have been increasing at an exponential rate (see 
maps). According to the World Health Organization, as of the middle of 
1993, more than 1.5 million people in the region were infected with HIV.  
Because AIDS strikes those in their prime working years, the epidemic is 
also expected to have a devastating effect on the economic growth that 
has skyrocketed throughout the region in recent years. This topic, 
however, is to large to be handled satisfactorily in this study. 
        As noted, the first cases of AIDS were attributed to homosexuals 
and foreigners. Following the lead of other countries, Thailand first 
focused their efforts on gay men, prostitutes and intravenous drug users. 
The last two groups in particular have been responsible for much of the 
spread of the disease, although it is now clear that the disease is 
spread primarily through heterosexual contact (Fig. 8). However, to 
understand why the heterosexual population became the focus of 
transmission so rapidly, two societal issues must first be addressed: the 





        Drugs, particularly opium, have always been present in Thailand. 
The Golden Triangle area, which encompasses the far northern part of 
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Thailand as well as parts of Burma and Laos, 
currently accounts for a large portion of the heroin trade worldwide. In 
the early 1980s, Thailand saw a sudden increase in heroin addiction, 
particularly among young men living in urban areas. In terms of AIDS, the 
most important factor was the sharing of needles used to inject heroin. 
One study showed that in Bangkok in 1982 between 82 and 92 percent of 
heroin users took the drug intravenously.  In 1988, a seroprevalence 
survey of drug users was taken at clinics in Bangkok. The first survey 
taken between January and March determined a rate of 15.6 percent 
HIV-positive; just six months later that already high rate had risen 
sharply to 42.7 percent. 
        Recognizing the problem, drug clinics, particularly in Bangkok 
where the number of addicts was highest, began to integrate AIDS 
awareness and prevention into their programs. Demonstrations on how to 
properly use condoms and clean needles with bleach became common. The 
clinics now provide a number of treatment options ranging from a 45-day 
detoxification course. . . to promoting safer ways of administering 
heroin (e.g. by smoking), to meditation to reduce the need for a chemical 
high.  
        While the drug problem has posed serious challenges in the 
control of AIDS, by far the most serious obstacle to limiting the spread 
of the disease is Thailands widespread sex industry. Most intravenous 
drug users are found in Bangkok and parts of the north. Prostitutes are 
found virtually everywhere in Thailand. Some estimates on prostitution 
place the number of sex workers in Bangkok between 100,000 and 200,000 
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with as many as 800,000 for the entire country. 
        Fig. 8: Method of transmission in Thailand of  HIV based on the 
category of the person who causes the infection. Abbreviations: 
Het.-Heterosexual; Hom.-Homosexual; Bi-Bisexual; IDU-Intravenous Drug 
User. The term vertical refers to children who have been infected through 
their mothers. (Source: Thai Ministry of Public Health, 1994). 
 
A survey done in June 1991 found that 24 percent of brothel prostitutes 
were HIV-positive. The same survey showed that in northern provinces, 
which do not include Bangkok, this rate was over 40 percent. 
        Attitudes toward sex and prostitution in Thailand pose the 
biggest threat to controlling the AIDS epidemic. Thai men regularly go to 
prostitutes for sex. One survey showed that 44 percent of Thai men lost 
their virginity with a prostitute at an average age of 18.  Another group 
of surveys found that 75 percent of all Thai men have had commercial sex 
at least once in their lives, 16 percent within six months of the 
survey.  Many of these men contract the virus and then go home to their 
wives. This connection between commercial sex and infection between 
spouses illustrates another aspect of prostitution in Thailand:
The circle may be especially vicious because of a peculiarity of Thai 
prostitution. There are many male prostitutes as well as female ones. The 
men who service foreigners tend to be heterosexual by preference, and 
often have wives and girlfriends (some of them prostitutes too) to whom 
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they pass the virus. This creates a frighteningly wide channel of 
transmission between the homosexual and heterosexual pools. 
Two other factors increase the frequency of transmission within families. 
First, homosexuality does not carry the stigma in Thailand that it has in 
Western countries; many married men will have sex with male prostitutes. 
Also, prostitutes who charge lower rates and cater to average Thai men, 
rather than rich locals and foreigners, tend to have a higher incidence 
of the HIV virus. According to a government seroprevalence survey done in 
1991, only five percent of prostitutes charging high rates were 
HIV-positive, as compared to 20 percent of those charging low rates.  
These lower paid prostitutes are also more likely to engage in sexual 
activity with more clients in a single day than higher paid sex workers. 
        All of this leads to one of the more tragic aspects of the AIDS 
situation in Thailand: the infection of children through their mothers. 
One prediction posits that as many as three million children will be born 
to HIV-positive mothers during the onset of the next century; of these, 
one million will probably die of AIDS while the rest will probably end up 
orphans.  This, in turn, will place an incredible economic burden on 
Thailand as a whole.
        Because of the danger involved, the most obvious policy route 
would appear to be a nationwide crackdown on prostitution. Brothels 
operate very openly in Thailand and arrests for prostitution are 
infrequent at best. There are two reasons for this: corruption and 
tourism. The first is seen mostly on a local level. The sex industry 
provides an economic engine for many segments of the country, from which 
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many local officials and businesses profit. Breaking this cycle of 
corruption is a daunting prospect. 
        Policy toward prostitution on the national level does not help 
matters either, since it is intertwined with the booming tourist 
industry. Thailand has become one of the most popular tourist 
destinations in Asia, helped in part by the lure of the sex industry. It 
is a telling coincidence -- or possibly not a coincidence -- that 1987 
was declared Visit Thailand Year, and 1989 officially became the Year to 
Combat AIDS. Patphong Road, one of Bangkoks foci for the sex trade, is 
often visited by busloads of tourists. Two-thirds of the visitors to the 
country as of 1992 were male, and there still are organized sex tours 
from Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Australia, the United States and 
Europe.  The foreigners create two problems: the possibility of bringing 
HIV with them from their home country, and the likelihood that they will 
export it back with them. Though it is not certain how many of these 
tourists actually engage in sexual acts with prostitutes, the surge in 
tourism still initially made the Thai government reluctant to discuss the 
problem of AIDS, for fear of scaring away foreigners and their money. 
        Despite the governments early reticence, the full scope of the 
problem has now been acknowledged, including its connection to tourism. 
The Thai government has initiated a full-scale plan to combat AIDS, 
including public service announcements and condom distribution. The 
government distributed 70 million condoms in 1991 alone.  Another aspect 
of the program has been to increase the scope and availability of testing 
for the HIV virus. However, reports are mixed as to whether or not 
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condoms are used in commercial sex. In the minds of foreigners and Thai 
men, Thai women, especially prostitutes, are expected to be subservient 
and eager to comply with their wishes. Brothel owners propagate such 
thought with the bottom line being that the decision to use a condom 
rests with the client, not the prostitute. 
The Effects of the Second Transition
        It is clear that if drastic changes are not made in behavioral 
patterns that AIDS will become a major cause of mortality in the coming 
years. In fact, based on number of people starting to come down with 
full-blown AIDS, it seems that it is already inevitable that many will 
die: the key now is to keep some control over the situation. In looking 
at AIDS in terms of a second epidemiological transition -- the shift back 
to infectious diseases -- the basic nature of the disease must be 
acknowledged. AIDS weakens the immune system. This, in turn, increases 
the vulnerability to opportunistic infectious diseases. Although the 
death rates for other diseases, such as tuberculosis, have not yet 
increased, it is to be expected that they will as the number of AIDS 
cases goes up. This will lead directly to the second transition. 
        The effects of this transition on the country will be widespread. 
Domestically, a shortage of labor, both in quantity and quality, may 
occur with an increase in AIDS. High rates of absenteeism brought on by 
illness will certainly be disruptive to companies. Finding workers to 
replace those that have died will be difficult and costly.  Health care 
costs will skyrocket as more and more people begin to get sick. There 
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will also be great expense, both sociologically and financially, due to 
the large number of children whose parents will die. Looking at many of 
the variables that this study used to show the successful completion of 
the first transition, the U.S. Department of Commerce made projections 
for the year 2010 with and without AIDS for Thailand. It predicts that, 
if the disease runs the course it is currently on, infant mortality will 
more than double and child mortality will quadruple. Life expectancy at 
birth will fall from around 75 years to closer to 45. Finally, the 
population growth rate will go from being positive to negative. 
        Predicting the number of people who will die of AIDS in the 
coming years is a particularly difficult proposition. There are too many 
factors that affect the spread of the disease and too many unknowns among 
the current population (i.e. the number of HIV-positive Thais). However, 
Figures 9 and 10 show the results of using two basic methods of creating 
projections on the current number of AIDS deaths. As can be seen, the two 
projections differ wildly. The linear projection presents an unrealistic 
picture of the future, with AIDS deaths rising slowly, but steadily, over 
the next two decades. Although it is probably too drastic, the 
exponential projection in Figure 10 is also, unfortunately, more 
accurate. The projection only works until the year 1998, after which the 
number of AIDS deaths for the nation exceeds the total population. It 
should be noted that this dire prediction is based on the number of 
deaths for 1990-92. The curve would undoubtedly be even steeper if data 
from the last two years was available since the number of deaths will 
have gone up. This projection is not useful as a pragmatic tool for 
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dealing with the epidemic logistically. It is nearly unthinkable that 
more than 20 million people, nearly half of Thailands population, will 
die of AIDS in 1998. However, this curve is extremely important to note 
because of the rapid increase that takes place in a very short span of 
time. Up until the projection for this year, the curve is
        Fig. 9: Linear projection of AIDS deaths based on 1990-92 
statistics. Year one corresponds with 1990; year 21 is a prediction for 
the year 2010. (Source: International Medical Foundation of Japan).
        Fig. 10: Exponential projection of AIDS deaths for Thailand based 
on 1990-92 statistics. Year 1 corresponds to 1990; year 9 corresponds to 
1998. The projection for deaths in the year 1999 exceeded the population 
of Thailand, and therefore has not been included. (Source: International 
Medical Foundation of Japan).
relatively flat. Suddenly, in 1996, the number of deaths skyrockets. 
While the reality will not mimic these particular numbers, it is almost 
certain to mirror the trend. As has already been shown through the 
dramatic increases in both the number of cases of HIV and full-blown 
AIDS, within the next two decades the curve seen in the exponential 
projection will become the unfortunate reality.
        However, another type of projection is more useful in terms of 
setting a timetable for policy within Thailand. Using a logistic curve 
fit with an upper limit, it is possible to avoid the pitfalls of the 
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exponential and linear graphs. By setting an upper bound, the projection 
maintains a limit without sacrificing the ability to view the general 
trend, which in the case of AIDS and HIV infection is quite dramatic. In 
order to do these projections, it must be noted that two statistical 
references were needed. For the projection of HIV infections (Fig. 11), 
the two data points used were the Thai government estimate of 500,000 
cases in 1993 and the projection cited of a possible 3.4 million people 
with the virus by the year 2000. The graph of AIDS deaths (Fig. 12) was 
extrapolated from the same numbers, using the 67 percent formula cited 
earlier. Of course, it must be acknowledged that basing a projection on 
numbers acquired, respectively, from an estimate and a projection gleaned 
from  other sources is not the ideal situation. Still, while the actually 
numbers may be debatable, the trend shown can not be ignored. 
        The upper limit for the two graphs provided was set at 7 million, 
a rather arbitrary doubling of the HIV infection statistic for the year 
2000. Although these are the only projections included in this paper, a 
number of other options were calculated using upper bounds ranging from 5 
million to 56 million, the entire population of the country. It is 
important to consider the upper limit set as a worst case scenario, the 
total number of people that might contract the disease. In experimenting 
with the limit, an interesting phenomenon was found. Regardless of the 
worst case scenario envisioned, the HIV projections showed that it would 
come to fruition around the year 2010, give or take a few years. In other 
words, no matter how many people are believed to be at risk from 
contracting HIV, the projection predicts that with the current trend very 
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nearly all of them will have it by the year 2010. Not surprisingly, the 
AIDS graphs with various limits also showed striking similarity in shape 
and end point, predicting that deaths will peak around the year 2020. 
Though it is impossible to say how many people will contract HIV or 
eventually die from AIDS, these projections provide policy makers with a 
framework in which to plan for the epidemic at hand.
        Fig. 11: Logistic projection of HIV infections in Thailand with 
an upper limit set at 7 million. Year 0 (not shown) is 1993. Year 33 is 
2026. 
        Fig. 12: Logistic projection of AIDS deaths in Thailand with an 
upper limit set at 7 million. Year 0 (not shown) is 1993. Year 31 is 2024.
 
Conclusion
        Unfortunately, the outlook for Thailand from a health perspective 
is bleak. As was mentioned earlier, the second transition is not a 
foregone conclusion, but the statistics make it appear very likely. To 
make matters worse, death rates for AIDS in Thailand still barely 
register among the leading causes of mortality -- only 248 people died of 
AIDS in 1992.  Of course, the low number of deaths in itself is not a bad 
thing, but it presents a misleading picture of what is really happening. 
Just as the number of cases has shot up dramatically in the past couple 
of years, so will death rates in the next two or three, as seen in the 
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projections. It is inevitable because AIDS is incurable. There is always 
the hope of a cure, a medical breakthrough. Currently, the World Health 
Organization lists over 150 experimental drugs and at least 13 vaccines 
undergoing testing worldwide.  A cure would almost immediately end the 
epidemic, assuming it was not reserved for those able to pay for it, and 
make the second transition nothing more than a theory. But this type of 
dream -- and currently it is just that -- combined with the low death 
rates in Thailand serve to do nothing except become misleading arguments 
against drastic action. 
        So what are the policy implications for AIDS? For this, the first 
place to look is at the malaria control program. Every tumbon should have 
an AIDS volunteer, just as there is a malaria volunteer. This person, or 
group of people, should be responsible for making sure that all local sex 
workers are educated about AIDS, that condoms are widely distributed and 
that regular testing occurs. Thailand has already proven itself capable 
of providing health services nationwide. Now AIDS education and treatment 
must become part of primary care just as malaria has. 
        The second policy implication will be far more difficult to 
enact, let alone enforce: a change in attitude toward sex and women among 
Thai men. Brothel owners must allow prostitutes to insist on condom 
usage. Thai men must be convinced not to patronize brothels or, at least, 
not to engage in unsafe sex. Changes such as these do not fall easily 
into a government plan of action; it is nearly impossible to legislate 
respect for women. One way to obtain greater control over the spread of 
AIDS within brothels would be to legalize prostitution and then regulate 
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it. This would undoubtedly be a controversial proposition, though there 
are probably fewer societal impediments than in other countries. If the 
government were enabled to license and monitor brothels, it would also be 
able to mandate condom usage and limit the number of prostitutes allowed 
to work. Of course, as is always the case, governmental control would 
bring a whole new set of problems without necessarily solving the 
original ones. 
        There is one guarantee. Attitudes towards sex among the general 
population will change, just as they did in the homosexual and drug user 
communities in Thailand, as people begin to see those around them die. 
Unfortunately, in Thailand that may be the only way that sexual habits 
will change and the AIDS epidemic will be slowed. Sadly, it seems, based 
on this, that the second epidemiological transition will occur with 
devastating consequences. This is what the Thai government must be 
prepared for, the worst case scenario as seen in the logistic 
projections. While it does everything in its power to try and convince 
people to change their behavior, the government must be ready to deal 
with the health crisis that will come if it fails to achieve this 
original goal. The timetable can be seen in the graphs (Fig. 11 and Fig. 
12). The attempts at prevention must be fully implemented immediately 
because it is in the next ten years that the majority of HIV infections 
will occur. Looking ahead, policy makers must plan for a dramatic 
increase in the number of AIDS sufferers between the years of 2010 and 
2020. This is not too far in the future, and all sectors of the 
government must have plans to deal with the problem in the event that the 
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worst case scenario should come to pass.
Notes
References (a) (b)




LESSONS ON IMPROVED COOKSTOVE DIFFUSION: INDIA, KENYA AND CHINA
Introduction
        The diffusion of fuel-efficient biomass stoves throughout the 
developing world began in the early 1980s and was largely justified as a 
"demand side" solution to the fuelwood crisis (Barnes et al., 1994).  
Although limited numbers of improved stoves had been promoted worldwide 
since the 1950s, these were concerned mainly with reducing health 
problems related to wood smoke exposure (Chege, 1993).  By the 1970s, 
however, with annual human population growth rates peaking at over three 
percent in developing countries, and stocks of renewable resources such 
as fresh water and wood rapidly declining, problems related to 
population-environment interactions began gaining the attention of 
policy-makers.  The fuelwood problem was placed on many national 
agendas.  Over half of the world relied on fuelwood for home energy.  
Numerous studies reported that villagers spent greater amounts of time 
searching for firewood and increasingly resorted to the burning of dung 
and crop residues for domestic energy -- tell-tale signs of fuelwood 
shortage (Agarwal, 1986; Barnes et al., 1994; Mellor, 1988). Rural 
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communities such as those in mountainous regions of Nepal and Peru, and 
arid countries in the Sahel, were depleting their surrounding fuelwood 
stocks at alarming rates in order to supply household energy needs 
(Mellor, 1988).  Total fuelwood demand was exacerbated by the oil crisis 
of the 1970s when many poor urban dwellers, previously using kerosene and 
natural gas to cook, reverted to woodfuel (including charcoal) use in 
response to the rising cost of petroleum (Chege, 1993). As the Table 1 
illustrates, by 1980, fuelwood scarcity affected major regions throughout 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America.
        Besides the direct concern that decreased stocks of fuelwood 
would lead to a widespread rural energy shortage, the fuelwood situation 
was regarded as dangerous for other reasons.  Excessive fuelwood 
consumption was believed to be a major cause 
 of local deforestation, leading to a cascade of ecological problems such 
as soil erosion and species extinction.  Furthermore, because fuelwood 
shortage caused an increased
          Table 1:  Fuelwood use by selected ecological regions: 1980 
                         (in cubic meters per cap. per year)
Region                          Need        Availability        Fuelwood status
Sub-Saharan Africa
         -arid                   .5             05 - .01        Acute scarcity
         -mountainous           1.4 - 1.9       .5 - .7         Acute scarcity
         -savanna               1.0 - 1.5       .8 - .9         Deficit
Asia
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         -mountainous           1.3 - 1.8       .2 - .3         Acute scarcity
         -indo-gangetic plains   .2 -  .7       .15 -.25        Deficit
Latin America
         -Andean plateau        .95 - 1.6       .2 - .4 
Acute scarcity
         -semi arid             .7 -  1.2       .6 -1.0         Deficit
         -arid                  .6 -   .9       .1 - .3         Acute scarcity
reliance on crop waste and dung to supply household energy, concern arose 
that farmers were returning less biomass to the earth, thereby lowering 
soil fertility and agricultural output (Barnes et al., 1994).
        Wide-spread rural diffusion of fuel-efficient cooking stoves, 
therefore, was seen as a promising way to reduce overall fuelwood demand 
-- since an average 75 percent of biomass energy is used for cooking -- 
and allow rural communities to restore their fuelwood stocks until they 




With great enthusiasm, programs were launched by national governments, 
international development organizations such as UNICEF, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and CARE, dozens of smaller aid 
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organizations, and private companies. By the mid-1980s, over 100 improved 
cookstove programs were underway in more than 60 developing countries 
(see map entitled Improved Cookstove Projects: Selected Countries). 
        As early as 1983, however, feedback on cookstove projects was not 
encouraging.  After initial introduction of stoves to rural areas, 
dissemination was not spontaneously taking place as predicted.  The 
seeming advantages of fuel-efficiency did not appear to be an adequate 
incentive for the local purchase of new stoves, even with subsidies.  
Moreover, many new stoves did not meet local needs, did not live up to 
their laboratory efficiency rates, and did not hold up to the rigors of 
daily use. Within months, many dissatisfied households abandoned their 
improved stoves and returned to their previous way of cooking -- over a 
three-stone fire, or with other low-efficient traditional stoves.  By 
1986, fewer than 12 of the more than 100 woodstove projects world-wide 
were believed to have distributed or sold over 5000 stoves (Agarwal, 
1986).  A 150-page report by the International Institute for Environment 
and Development (funded by the World Bank, United Nations Development 
Programme, and several other foundations) seemed to seal the cookstove 
coffin by questioning the basic value of most projects worldwide: The 
wrong stoves were promoted for the wrong reasons in the wrong way, 
(Brown, 1985, Foley, 1983).  
Map 1.
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        Nevertheless, in its 1994 review of stove programs throughout the 
world, the World Bank reaffirmed the value of cookstove projects, and the 
capacity for cookstove diffusion to take place: 
        The social, economic, and environmental benefits of promoting 
improved stoves under suitable circumstances are quite large, and the 
existing successes demonstrate the usefulness of well-managed programs. 
(Barnes et al., 1994). 
        In order to explain this attitude transformation toward cookstove 
programs  -- stemming from the failures of many cookstove projects in the 
early 1980s followed by their rebound in the last decade -- I will focus 
on three countries where dissemination of cookstoves has been greatest: 
India, Kenya and China.  Because these countries represent three 
disparate approaches to cookstove program design and implementation -- 
resulting in poor dissemination in India, moderate dissemination in 
Kenya, and overwhelming success in China -- they offer important lessons 
to present and future efforts to spread fuel-efficient cooking technology 
throughout the developing world.  I will not address whether improved 
cookstove diffusion does, in fact, reduce woodfuel demand or improve 
environmental conditions.  Rather, I will focus my discussion narrowly on 
the elements of successful and failed cookstove dissemination efforts by 
presenting case studies of  the aforementioned countries.
India
        Indias fuelwood shortage, serious 20 years ago, has now reached 
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critical heights.  Indian per capita consumption of woodfuel has held 
steady for the past 2O years while its total population has grown by 
nearly two-thirds (see Graph 2).
Graph 2.
 
A sharp increase in the price of commercial fuels (kerosene, coal and 
charcoal) over the last 15 years explains the persistent use of fuelwood 
for cooking among urban poor, while fuelwood scarcity in rural areas has 
caused many families to turn to the burning of dung and straw for 
household energy (see Table 2).
Table 2: Fuelwood Prices in Selected Indian Cities
FUELWOOD PRICE IN RUPEES, PER TON
CITIES          1960    1986    1992
Ahmedabad       90      740     1191
Bangalore       47      657     1135
Bombay          84      1232    1812
Calcutta        93      1040    1585
Hyderabad       66      667     917
Today, India still relies on woodfuel to satisfy 24 percent of its total 
energy consumption. The World Resources Institute report for 1994-95 
indicated that Indias forests can sustainably provide 41 million cubic 
file:///C|/545/1995/lombard.htm (6 of 24) [6/18/2008 10:57:37 AM]
545\lombard
meters of fuelwood per year, although current annual demand for wood 
stands at 241 million cubic meters (World Resources Institute, 1994). In 
the village of Gujarat, India, it takes an average of 3 hours per day to 
collect wood for a family of 5; one family member --usually a child -- 
often spends all of her time outside the home completing this chore 
(World Resources Institute, 1994).
        Hoping to abate this national thirst for woodfuel, the Indian 
National Programme on Improved Chulhas (stoves) was launched in 1983 
(Barnes et al., 1994).  Administered by the central bureaucracy, as well 
as in six regional offices (and in numerous state and district offices), 
the program aimed to disseminate hand-made clay and mud stoves (equipped 
with chimneys) in order to double the fuel-efficiency of traditional 
three-stone fires and reduce indoor air pollution (Barnes et al., 1994).  
The government took a campaign approach to dissemination, implementing an 
aggressive country wide effort, with special emphasis on rural India.  
Ten-day demonstration camps were held to motivate and involve villagers, 
local government functionaries and students in the rapid diffusion effort 
(Agarwal, 1988).  Local women, especially,  were targeted for the 
building and marketing of chulhas (Chege, 1993).  A major component of 
the diffusion strategy was the provision of a government subsidy to all 
households purchasing an improved stove.  A minimum 50 percent subsidy 
was available, reducing the cost of new stoves from $10 to $4.30 (Kammen, 
1995; Barnes et al., 1994).    
        As a result of this massive campaign, India quickly disseminated 
improved stoves to about 8 million households.  However, fundamental 
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weaknesses in this approach gradually became apparent.  Because it 
involved multiple levels of government bureaucracy, program 
administration was cumbersome and fractured (Kammen, 1995).  Furthermore, 
the program lacked an adequate budget for consistent monitoring and 
evaluation so that problems were not detected and corrected early on.  
Lastly, the program was quickly diluted, being only one of several 
national campaigns occurring at the time.  
        Presence of a large government subsidy also presented its share 
of problems. Because the government automatically paid builders for half 
the cost of stoves, producers incentive for construction was directed 
more toward the government than toward the needs of the consumer (Barnes 
et al., 1994).  Producers took a less aggressive role in marketing than 
would private entrepreneurs, and were cued to follow overly-general 
government specifications for stove construction, rather than tailor 
stoves to meet the particular needs of the community.  Consequently, 
local stove construction was often hasty and technically faulty. Many 
stoves did not accommodate the household cooking pot or crumbled under 
excess heat. In two Indian villages, inadequate training of students (of 
urban background) resulted in the construction of numerous chimneys that 
expelled smoke within the house (Sarin and Winblad, 1983).
        Moreover, many of the stoves simply did not provide the promised 
savings in household woodfuel consumption. Its very hard to get the 
critical dimensions for efficiency without highly-trained craftspeople, 
explained John Lippert of Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA), a 
US-based development organization involved in stove dissemination until 
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1987 (Brown, 1985).   Similar cookstove projects in areas such as Central 
America and Nepal, where stoves were constructed from mud, sand and clay 
by poorly-trained individuals, also attained efficiency and continuation 
rates much lower than predicted (Barnes et al., 1994).
        The heavy government subsidy for cookstoves also squelched 
efforts by private entrepreneurs to disseminate their own improved stoves 
as they could not compete with the government price.  As will be 
illustrated in the cases of Kenya and China, commercialization of 
improved stoves is key for long-term, self-sustained cookstove dissemination.
        Another flaw in the Indian program was its failure to target 
regions where fuel shortages were especially acute, or where woodfuel was 
an expensive commodity, such as in urban settings.  Many rural households 
could not afford or were not willing to make even the modest $4 
investment, especially if they could gather fuelwood for free; the 
purchase of a new stove, especially in the eyes of men, did not seem to 
provide adequate return.  Attempting diffusion in impoverished, 
non-critical zones wasted precious financial resources for Indias 
cookstove program, and discouraged program implementers (Barnes et al., 
1994).
        In sum, the Indian effort at cookstove diffusion progressed 
rapidly at first, but, riddled with administrative, technical and 
marketing mishaps, resulted in poor wide-spread dissemination. By 1990, 
the average discontinuation rate for improved cookstove use in India was 
50 percent -- among the worst globally.  Today, approximately one in 40 
Indian homes is equipped with an improved woodfuel stove (see Figure C).
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        Nevertheless, faced with worsening population pressures and fuel 
shortages,  India remains determined today that improved chulhas can play 
an important role in mitigating woodfuel demand. The government has 
modified its top-down strategy, and has begun to integrate some of the 
successful aspects of cookstove programs that will be enumerated in the 
remaining discussions on Kenya and China.
Kenya
        With few domestic sources of energy such as coal or petroleum, 
approximately 80 percent of Kenyas total energy consumption is in the 
form of traditional woodfuel (WRD, 1994). With higher rates of total 
fertility and per capita consumption of traditional woodfuels than either 
China or India, Kenyas woodfuel crisis risks progressing at a much more 
rapid pace (see inset of map entitled Total Fertility Rate: Cookstove 




(representing 80 percent of Kenyas total land area) the fuelwood gap in 
neighboring Sudan illustrates the grave woodfuel situation in arid East 
Africa (see Table 3):
Table 3: Woodfuel Gap Forecasts for Sudan (million cubic meters of tree stock)
                        1980    1985    1990    1995    2000
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1. Forest stock         1994    1810    1539    1145    607
2. Forest growth        44      40      34      25      14
3. Woodfuel consumption 76      88      102     121     141
4. Woodfuel gap (3-2)   32      48      68      96      127
By 1983, rural women in Kenya were traveling on average 3.5 hours per day 
to collect wood.  Facing high woodfuel prices, but having no cheaper fuel 
alternative, urban Kenyans spent an estimated 20 percent of their average 
annual income on household fuel (Kammen, 1995).
        In the early 1980s, the Kenya Renewable Energy Development 
Project, a collaborative effort between the U.S. Agency for International 
Development and the Kenyan government, was created.  Over the next 15 
years, the project used a cyclical refinement process to design and 
disseminate appropriate cookstoves for Kenya.  Their first fuel-efficient 
stove -- capable of burning both wood and charcoal -- was modeled after 
an improved metal stove developed in Thailand (Kammen, 1995).  Since many 
Kenyans had traditionally employed metal cookstoves for years (made from 
scrap metal by local artisans), it was assumed that the switch to the 
modified Thai Bucket would be a smooth one.  After minimal field testing, 
therefore, this first generation stove was disseminated to villages 
throughout rural Kenya. 
        Consumer response to this new stove was equivocal.  First, the 
stove had a narrow base, making it unstable for heavy pots, especially 
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with rigorous stirring.  Second, the laboratory-designed stove did not 
match the size of Kenyan pots and pans fitted for the traditional metal 
stove.  Third, the stoves ceramic and vermiculite liner proved too 
efficient: it retained so much heat that the metal exterior fatigued and 
structural segments cracked easily (Barnes et al., 1994, Kammen, 1995).  
Map 2.
        Furthermore, like India, efforts to diffuse new cookstoves in 
Kenya were focused in rural areas, where people could ill-afford the 
initial cash outlay for a stove, and had little monetary incentive to 
save wood.
        Early monitoring and evaluation of cookstove projects, however, 
picked up on the poor diffusion rates much more quickly than in India.  
Consequently,  the Kenya Renewable Energy Development Project began to 
develop a second generation of cookstoves.  Enlisting feedback from 
womens organizations involved in community health and environmental 
protection, as well as  focus groups from several regions, a new stove, 
the jiko, was recast in the mid-1980s.  The jikos hourglass shape 
provided greater stability at the base of the stove. Its insulative liner 
-- extending only within the upper portion of the stove --prevented the 
overheating and cracking typical of the previous version.  Finally, its 
mouth accommodated a greater variety of pots (Kammen, 1995).
        Next, the Kenyan cookstove program began working with private 
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craftspeople to ensure on-going, mass production of the jiko.  As one 
analyst described, Project managers debated whether to give the job to 
the formal or informal sector -- and ultimately decided to involve both, 
(Chege, 1995).  A loose consortium of artisans engaged in traditional 
stove production was selected to manufacture the metal cladding of the 
new jiko, and existing pottery companies began producing the more 
complicated ceramic linings (Chege, 1993; Kammen, 1995).  Mass production 
and competition brought down the price of the jiko, making it affordable 
to more Kenyans.
        Finally, surveys were conducted to determine the strongest 
potential markets for the jiko (Barnes et al., 1995).  The stove was 
targeted specifically for urban dwellers who faced unavoidably high fuel 
costs and who did not rely on fire for uses other than cooking. The new 
stove, while costing between $2 and $5 (approximately two to three times 
as much as the traditional metal stove), provided a total yearly savings 
of about $64.70, paying for itself in two months (Chege, 1993; Kammen, 
1995; Barnes et al., 1994). Moreover, purchase of jikos by highly visible 
organizations such as schools, businesses and churches helped to spark 
interest within the general population (Kammen, 1995).  Additionally, 
possession of a new jiko became a symbol of status among lower-income 
Kenyans, increasing cultural diffusion of this technology throughout and 
beyond the city.
        The design changes of Kenyan cookstoves, coupled with new 
marketing strategies as well as training programs on production, use and 
maintenance, have made huge strides in the stoves acceptance. Diffusion 
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of the jiko currently stands at approximately 20,000 per month (Chege, 
1993).  Because of its success, moreover, the jiko has been disseminated 
in several other East African countries -- Sudan (28,000), Tanzania 
(54,000), Uganda (25,000) as well as Zambia and Burundi (Kammen, 1995).
        The diffusion of a third generation of improved cooking device 
tailored for rural Kenya is currently underway.  With the assistance of 
numerous womens groups in the rural regions (forming an alliance called 
Maendeleo ya Wanawake --  womens development), government and aid 
organizations have designed a cheap and simplified version of the jiko -- 
the Maendeleo (Kammen, 1995)., This innovation is essentially the ceramic 
portion of the jiko without the metal frame.  It is placed directly over 
an open fire, and accommodates large pieces of wood.  (This is a major 
advantage to rural women, many of whom do not have the tools or 
inclination to chop wood into fine pieces for small, portable stoves). 
While less efficient than the jiko (attaining 15 to 35 percent efficiency 
versus the jikos 20 to 40 percent efficiency), the Maendeleo still 
requires 25 percent less wood than a three-stone fire, and costs the 
consumer between $.80 and $1.20 (Kammen, 1995).
        To be expected, diffusion of improved cookstoves in rural Kenya, 
as well as in rural India, will progress slowly as long as fuelwood is a 
free commodity and womens time is not monetized (see Figure B).  With 
increased womens education and entrance into the labor market, however, 
rural husbands may be more willing to invest in time-saving technology 
for their wives, knowing that the time they save will be used to earn 
family income (see map entitled Education of Women...Cookstove Countries).
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China
        Chinas motivation for initiating a national cookstove program was 
rooted less in a concern over fuelwood shortage, and more in a desire to 
reverse households rapid conversion to coal as their fuel of choice 
(Smith et al, 1993).  With the liberalization of the rural economy in the 
early 1980s, average family income steadily increased in the countryside, 
bringing with it a general desire to climb the energy ladder.  Mass 
ascension from woodfuel to coal use caused nation-wide supply shortages 
of coal, especially to large industry .
 
graph
        As part of its strategy to mitigate coal demand, the government 
devised a plan to disseminate highly-efficient biomass stoves so that 
woodfuel consumption would become cheaper than coal use. The Chinese 
National Improved Stoves Program was initiated in 1982.  In the following 
10 years, over 125 million improved cookstoves and parts reached homes in 
China; today 7 out of 10 rural households possess stoves that are at 
least 30% more fuel-efficient than older stoves (World Resources, 1994) 
making the Chinese program the most successful worldwide (see Chart below).
chart 
        The Chinese government played an important but limited role in 
cookstove dissemination.  First, the central government restricted itself 
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to providing up-to-date research on cookstove technology and identifying 
areas of greatest potential for stove adoption.  Local rural energy 
offices took charge of technical training, implementation, standards for 
manufacturing production, and program monitoring (Kammen, 1995; Barnes et 
al., 1994).  Second, with direct contracts between the central and county 
governments, the program bureaucratic entanglement (Barnes et al., 
1994).  Third, government subsidy of improved stoves was extremely 
limited ($.84 for every stove costing $9) and was directed toward stove 
producers -- to provide assistance with construction training,  
administration, and promotion support -- rather than toward consumers 
(Barnes et al., 1994).  Most rural Chinese, considerably wealthier than 
their counterparts in Kenya or India, were able to lay down the initial 
funds for this investment in fuel-efficiency.
        With design, production and sale of the improved stoves occurring 
at the ground level, stoves were created to suit the local community. 
Improved brick and mortar stoves (with accompanying chimney) replaced 
older models.  For those families unable to purchase completely new 
stoves, insulative parts (such as mortar and ash) were sold as packing 
around the stoves circular opening where the wok sits (Kammen, 1995).  
Stoves in the cold Northern States were designed for the dual purpose of 
cooking and heating.  Stove design also took into consideration 
attractiveness and convenience (Barnes, 1994).  
        Although it began with a custom-built approach, the Chinese 
cookstove program is gradually moving to mass-production of stove parts, 
in order to increase profit margins for private manufacturers, as well as 
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reduce the cost to the consumer.  This approach, it is hoped, will assist 
in the long-term sustainability of Chinas cookstove program and allow the 
improved technology reach the poorer and more remote populations (See 
Figure A).
Conclusion
        The experiences of India, Kenya and China offer valuable lessons 
to other countries engaged in cookstove dissemination. First the 
overwhelming success of Chinas cookstove program, and eventual 
improvement of the Kenyan effort attest to the fact that fuel-efficient 
stoves are indeed popular among select populations.   Such populations -- 
usually urban -- already purchase fuel, and thereby stand to benefit 
directly from fuel-efficiency.  In some of the most successful cookstove 
programs, such as in Kenya and Rwanda,  consumer payback for the stove 
investment has occurred within only a few months (Barnes et al., 1994).  
Figures A, B, and C.
        Market surveys should be undertaken before improved stoves are 
disseminated; as India learned, precious funds should not be wasted on 
attempting diffusion in regions where it is likely to fail.  
Low-potential markets typically include impoverished rural areas where 
fuelwood is still free or accessible, and where fire is used for many 
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purposes other than cooking (such as lighting, heating, smoking meat, and 
as insect repellent) (Munslow et al., 1988; Barnes et al., 1994).  For 
these populations, separate fuelwood/energy approaches may be necessary, 
including tree nursery programs, agricultural interventions, and other 
indirect methods to improve overall economic prospects, to monetize 
womens labor, and to address land-use management practices (Munslow et 
al., 1988). 
        Second, to the greatest extent possible, stoves should be 
modified versions of traditional stoves and should be durable, 
attractive, and user friendly. Extensive pilot testing, involving the 
input of actual consumers and local artisans, should precede stove diffusion.
        Third, as illustrated in China, the government should play an 
important but narrow role in cookstove dissemination.  The national 
government may provide technical research on cooking technology, and 
spread knowledge about improved cookstoves (information, education and 
communication), while local governments see to production quality, and 
local monitoring and evaluation (Barnes et al., 1994; Munslow, 1988).  
Government subsidies, as India discovered, usually cause stove producers 
to neglect consumer needs, resulting in inferior stove quality and less 
aggressive marketing. Hence they should be avoided, or replaced with 
opportunities to attain credit for the purchase of a stove.  Donor 
agencies may also assist in the above-mentioned roles, but only if their 
support is sustained (at lease 5 years) and coordinated with other public 
and private cookstove diffusion efforts (Barnes et al., 1994).  
        Finally, for long-term success, commercial enterprises involving 
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local experts should become the primary producers and disseminators of 
cookstoves.  As with the Kenyan program, mass producing stoves and their 
parts, as well as using local scrap material, helps to lower costs.  
Conversely, mass campaigns and folk construction to disseminate 
cookstoves, as Indias program illustrated, are not conducive to the 
sustained production of high-quality stoves.  Applied to similar projects 
in other countries, these lessons may further the rebound of cookstove 




Improved cookstoves in Kenya, Chaina and India
Improved Stoves          Efficiency (%)         Cost ($US)          Dissemination
Jiko                     25-40                  $2 to $5            1 million plus
Maendeleo                15 -35                 $.80 to $1.20       100,000
Chinese brick and mortar 20-40                  $8 to $9            125 million
Indian mud & clay chulha 10-40                  $8 to $10           8 million
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NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRIORITIES: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF URBANIZATION IN 
UGANDA AND TANZANIA
Background:
        This paper seeks to examine the urbanization transition and its 
relation to population and environment dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
The study will focus on two countries that  have had similar experiences 
in many respects but also offer important differences in their 
ideological approach to  development.  Uganda and Tanzania had very 
similar experiences particularly prior to their independence in early 
1960s.  They were both under British colonialism (Tanzania having become 
a British colony in 1916), had predominantly agricultural economies and 
inherited a common market (The East African Community of which Kenya was 
also a member).  
        Interestingly, after independence, the two countries that had 
experienced a similar past, each took on a very different approach to 
economic development.  In both cases, the focus was on nation building,  
social change and economic independence for the good of the general 
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population.  Uganda initially pursued market-based economic policies that 
placed a premium on individual incentives and basically promoted the 
colonial approach to economic development.  In the late 1960s, the state 
adopted mixed economic policies that promoted import and export 
protectionist measures but still with a capitalist approach.
        Tanzania, on the other hand took a different direction of 
intent.  After five years into independence, Julius Nyerere, Tanzania's 
leader, lost faith in the development institutions inherited from 
colonialism.  In 1967, Tanzania adopted the Arusha Declaration on 
Socialism and Self-Reliance, marking a clear retreat from previous 
aid-driven politics characteristic of the other East African nations.   
The declaration entailed the abolition of private enterprise, the 
nationalization of private agricultural and industrial enterprise, and 
the reduction of the countrys dependence on external financing.  
        Development according to Nyerere meant that people and not money 
were the motor force of social transformation.  Development in this case 
meant initiating communal village settlements (Ujamaa Villages) in rural 
areas using local materials and simple technology.  Government support to 
meet basic human needs, notably food, education, water and transportation 
would then be provided within these confines.  This new socialist program 
had no industrialization agenda to speak of, and it was invariably 
anti-urban.  In Nyerere's opinion, it would be unfair to focus 
development programs on urban centers since peasant production was the 
sole genuine source of marketable surpluses and thus national wealth.
        Nyerere's program is the most notable national spatial 
restructuring system in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Originally a voluntary 
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resettlement effort, by 1970, financial and technical assistance had been 
added as rewards for moving into the Ujamaa villages.  By this time, only 
9 percent of the population lived in the communal villages , thus by 
1973, the government of Tanzania initiated a policy of forced 
resettlement --namely "Operation Tanzania".  Becker, Hamer and Morrison, 
1994,  have commented that this operation was remarkably successful in 
redistributing population within and between territories.  D. Oluwu 
(1990) adds that the program succeeded to the extent that it brought 
together scattered families into village settlements and enabled the 
government to reach the largest possible number of people.    However, 
the consensus among others that have studied the program is that it was a 
failure from the point of view of agricultural productivity, 
infrastructure allocation and administrative management.  It was also a 
very costly program.  Thus one of  its intended objectives--controlling 
growth of urban areas--was not achieved.
        Uganda, on the other hand, saw urbanization as a fundamental 
prerequisite to modernization and thus national development.  In all the 
country's five year development plans following independence,  there was 
considerable discussion on the costs of urbanization.  The planning 
position was that investing in the rural areas where the population was 
highly dispersed brought with it special costs, particularly in the 
provision of social amenities (educational and health services).   Yet a 
high concentration of population such as in urban areas would permit 
economies of scale in transportation, communication and provision of 
other social services.  To the Uganda government, the debate over 
allocation of resources for urban or rural programs was a budgetary 
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concern rather than one of  humanistic reasoning.
        In addition, Uganda envisioned market oriented economic policies 
as the means of facilitating Africans to enter the urban business sector 
(that had been previously dominated by Asians and Europeans), and a means 
to redistribute income and wealth.  Tanzania saw equitable income 
distribution, particularly in favor of the rural peasantry as more 
important than economic growth within the inherited colonial economic 
structures.  Tanzania focused on rural based development to counter 
urbanization.  With this same socialist agenda, Tanzania introduced 
another difference among her East African counterparts (Kenya and 
Uganda).  Tanzania moved fast and far ahead of them in terms of arresting 
potentially volatile ethnic tensions that would otherwise result from 
regional inequalities.  The Ujamaa village program allowed interaction 
among the various ethnic groupings from various regions.  In addition, 
the introduction of Swahili as the national language,  helped to down 
play all previous ethnic and language differences.  Yet Ugandas failure 
to develop a program geared toward regional development to encompass 
regional differences triggered ethnic tensions of the magnitude we saw in 
the country throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
        These comparisons are important because they provide a starting 
point for understanding the urbanization transition, which for the 
purposes of this discussion can be traced back to the time of 
independence (1960s).   Since the 1960s, a significant amount of 
literature has been generated on urbanization trends in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Many authors have attributed the problems related to 
urbanization to Africa's obsession with "urban bias" policies.  Michael 
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Lipton (1977) in Why Poor People Stay Poor,  critiques development 
theories and practice, by  charging that their authors are responsible 
for problems related to urban biased development in many Third World 
countries.   What Lipton really meant was that those that are informed by 
these theories in their practice, for instance international advisors on 
national planning, have stressed the importance of investment and 
production in export-oriented sectors (that are urban based for the most 
part) and industrialization and have encouraged heavy capital 
expenditures for urban infrastructure, such as ports and airport 
facilities, highways, communication systems, urban hospitals and 
educational institutions.  
        Nevertheless, the debate on the implications of urbanization 
continues.  There those that believe, especially amongst political 
economists that urbanization in and of itself is a positive sign of 
economic growth.  There are also political consequences in that it has 
been proven to create a middle class in societies such as Uganda and 
Tanzania where there was none prior to independence.  Perhaps what is 
still not clear is the causal  correlation between levels of urbanization 
and economic development.  In other words, does increased urbanization 
lead to high per capita incomes or does increased economic growth lead to 
urbanization?  It would seem from Lipton's argument that economic growth 
particularly if national government policies are targeted for urban 
areas, occurs first and once the conditions in the urban areas become 
attractive, they then encourage rural-urban migration.  In the meantime, 
because national budgets particularly in Africa can only be stretched so 
far,  rural areas are neglected.  Indeed, proposals for rural development 
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by national advisors have focused on a limited number of projects such as 
large scale irrigation and other land questions which in some instances 
have rendered large populations landless.  The focus on export-oriented 
sectors invariably implies that the emphasis in many countries is on 
national economic performance with no consideration for the human capital 
that is responsible for economic growth.  This urban focus translates 
into rural underdevelopment.  Again, because the chances of survival seem 
some how better in the city, mass emigration from rural areas becomes 
everywhere the norm.
Demographic Transition:
        Now that we have established the background to the factors that 
influenced modern urbanization transition in Uganda and Tanzania, we need 
to put the concept in the context of population and environment 
dynamics.  In addition to tracing the urbanization transition in these 
two countries, it is also the intent of this paper to identify symptoms 
of a deteriorating urban environment and to see if there is a direct link 
between these problems and the process of urbanization.  In order to 
completely grasp these phenomena, there is need to look at urbanization 
in Uganda and Tanzania in the context of the larger demographic framework 
of the two countries.  
        E. Kalipeni, 1994,  informs us that the high population growth 
rates currently witnessed in Africa are primarily due to Africa's 
position in the second stage of the demographic transition.  In this 
stage,  crude death rates have suddenly decreased while birth rates have 
stubbornly remained high and sometimes experience an increase. 
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Technological advancement in the medical area as well as economic growth 
are the reasons for this shift.  We can safely say that both Uganda and 
Tanzania have experienced a dramatic decline in crude death rates 
including infant mortality rates particularly since the turn of the 20th 
century.  These changes have had significant influence on population 
growth in both rural and urban areas in Tanzania and Uganda as well as 
other Sub-Saharan African states. (see fig 1 and appendix I).   For many 
countries, the population has more than tripled in the last forty years 
and in a few cases, it has quadrupled.
FIGURE 1
             
Source of Data: World Resource Database, 1994/95, New York, NY, 1994.
        
        There have been two schools of thought on the subject of high 
population growth rates both of which have had some impact on public 
policy in Uganda and Tanzania.  The neo-Malthusian tradition,  deeply 
rooted in the Western development thinking argues that population growth 
is detrimental to development, in that it will outrun world resources and 
finally lead to misery.  The Worldwatch Institute under the directorship 
of Lester Brown have notably paid significant attention to hunger in 
Africa.  In their series On the State of the World (1990-95), they point 
out that the food shortages so prevalent in Africa are an indication of 
the consequences  that the world will be faced with unless nation states 
take immediate action in terms of regulating population growth.     This 
argument also implies that population growth rate is currently far 
greater than the potential increases in food production.  
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        The second school of thought comes from a contrary tradition, 
largely anti-Malthusian.  The debate in this case has been led by Third 
World structuralists who argue that population growth can in fact make 
positive contribution to economic growth and development.  Population 
growth, they contend, can have beneficial  effects on stimulating demand 
and encouraging technological innovation to accommodate the new growth.  
It is this tradition that has greatly influenced African leadership in 
the recent past.  For many decades, African leaders generally encouraged 
population growth.  The reasons have ranged from population and people 
being a development asset to a way of replacing populations lost during 
the various catastrophes experienced in the late 19th century and early 
20th century.  The anti-Malthusian tradition thus explains why neither 
Uganda or Tanzania has had a population control program until recently.  
Uganda :
        Up until 1992, the Uganda government did not have an explicit 
population policy and as such lags behind many Sub-Saharan African 
countries in national debate on issues of population growth.  In fact in 
the 1966-1971 second five year development plan, the nation was less 
concerned with population pressure as a potential problem .  Apart from 
the mountain regions of the eastern part of the country, elsewhere, 
population density was low.  But the 1980 population census and the Atlas 
of African Affairs, 1980, both indicated an uneven pattern of population 
growth and concentration around the Lake Victoria region.  The Lake 
Victoria region occupies the three largest urban conglomerations of the 
country (Kampala, Jinja and Masaka--see map 1) including the most 
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productive agricultural region of the country.  Today, however, there 
seems to be heightened concern in many African nations about the region's 
growing food deficits,  increased external dependency (apparent in the 
size of Africa's foreign debt),   growing poverty, low GNP per capita 
incomes and growing urban problems.  These concerns are all directly 
related to the population question thus require a systematic  program to 
deal with them.
        According to the World Bank country study, 1993,  Uganda's 
population growth rate was estimated at 3.10% between 1990-1995 and if 
the current total fertility rate of 7.3 children per woman were held 
constant, then the country would experience an increased growth rate of  
up to 3.8% annually between 2010 -2015.  A United Nations projection for 
1988 places it at 3.58 percent while the World Resource Database - 
1994/95 (WRD) places it at 3.00%  in the same period (see fig. 2). 
FIGURE 2
 
Source of Data: World Bank, 1988, United Nations, 1989, World Resource 
Database, 1994.
The UN and WRD data sources, however, also predict a slight drop in the 
growth rate between 1995-2000 or after 2000 to 3.51% and 2.68% 
respectively, and a relatively higher drop after 2015 indicating that 
Uganda is entering the last demographic transition state.  The estimated 
fertility rate of 7.3 per woman, places Uganda among countries with the 
highest fertility rates in both Sub-Saharan Africa and among Third World 
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nations in general.  Increasing crude birth rate between 1970 and 1995 is 
equally worrisome. (see Fig 4)  
FIGURE 3
Source of Data: World Resource Database, 1994/95: New York, NY, 1994
FIGURE 4
                 
Source of Data: World Resource Database, 1994/95, New York, NY, 1994.
Tanzania:   
        Tanzania, like Uganda has had no official population policy.  
However, the countrys second five year plan which initiated the Ujamaa 
program had implicit demographic and redistribution effects. By 1979, 
"Operation Tanzania" had successfully redistributed 79 percent of 
Tanzania's mainland population into Ujamaa villages.   Other aspects of 
the development programs that had specific population content are those 
that related to health (including maternal and child health), education , 
rural development and spatial redistribution because at independence, the 
main obstacles to national development were seen as poverty, ignorance 
and disease.   
        However, the Ujamaa program, failed as a rural development policy 
and in 1977, it was officially ended.  The program failed partly because 
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it became apparent after a few  years that the economy  could not support 
the plan objectives.  In addition, the program failed to redistribute 
population evenly countrywide.  Most of the resettlement  took place in 
the northern and western (lake regions) and in the central (mountain 
region).  Secondly, the  program failed to control population movement 
between rural and urban areas as was intended.  Prior to 1967, Tanzania's 
annual rural-urban migration rate stood at 7.05 percent.  During the 
"operation Tanzania" program,--1970-1978, the rate dropped only slightly 
to 7.01 percent indicating that the program did not significantly improve 
rural conditions nor did it have a major impact on urbanization trends.  
During the same period, there is evidence of only 1 percent annual rate 
of out migration from urban areas to  the countryside. 
Urbanization Trends: 
        Although Uganda and Tanzania embarked on deliberate policies that 
initially affected urbanization trends, both countries are still highly 
rural societies (see Fig. 5).  This fact would seem to indicate that 
there were other variables that accounted for urbanization trends that we 
are witnessing in both countries besides the specific programs each 
adopted.  In Tanzania, as previously noted, the Ujamaa program failed as 
a rural development policy and invariably led to an increase in movement 
of population from rural to urban areas.  In Uganda on the other hand, 
urbanization did not occur as quickly as the government intended.  By 
1995, less than 20% of Uganda's population resided in urban areas while 
close to 30% of Tanzania's lived in cities.  Nevertheless, the 
urbanization transition in Africa as a whole is only recently emerging 
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from its early stages.
FIGURE 5
.                
Source of Data: World Resource Database, 1994/95, New York, NY, 1994
It has been suggested that the region is experiencing runaway 
urbanization.  But there is no indication that the urbanization trend is 
any different from what other regions experienced during their 
urbanization transitions.  The forces driving urbanization are 
identical.  The difference, is that these forces are stronger in Africa 
than in most other places.  In particular these forces (that can be 
traced back to the time of independence) include increased fertility 
rates, population movements, deteriorating agricultural productivity and 
growth in government labor force.  In addition, urban growth in Uganda 
and Tanzania has disproportionately concentrated in capital cities and 
the principle industrial centers.  
        In Tanzania, based on the 1978 population census, a significant 
proportion of net-migration into the country's urban centers is recorded 
in Dar-es-Salaam, the national capital.  Like in most other African 
states, growth in Dar-es-Salaam is five times greater than in the next 
largest city and 50 percent of Tanzanias urban population is concentrated 
here.  There is even evidence of negative growth in some of the smaller 
towns perhaps due to  migration to larger cities such as Dar-es-Salaam or 
back to rural areas (during the Ujamaa program).  
        Natural population growth in Tanzania's urban centers is also an 
intriguing phenomenon.  The general assumption that fertility rates are 
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lower in urban areas and generally higher in rural areas has been proven 
otherwise in Tanzania, particularly in Dar-es-Salaam.  Data provided by 
the 1989 United Nations case study on population policy for Tanzania 
suggests that fertility increased between 1967 and 1978, with the total 
fertility rate rising from 6.6 percent to 6.9 percent and that crude 
birth rates rose from 47 per 1000 to 49 per 1000 in the same period.  In 
urban areas such as Dar-es-Salaam, fertility rate increased from 4.3 
percent in 1967 to 5.7 percent in 1978.  This is also true for other 
towns such as Dodoma and Arusha (see table 1) 
TABLE 1
Urban Growth in Tanzania:
Estimated Total Fertility Rates (TFR)and Crude Birth Rates (CBR)/1000
 for selected towns: 
based on National censuses of 1967 and 1978.
City/Town                               1967                                    1978
                                TFR             CBR                     
TFR             CBR
Dodoma                          6.9             48                      
7.4             52
Arusha                          7.1             51                      
7.6             48
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Tanga                           6.9             46                      
7.1             47
Dar-es-Salaam                   4.9             33                      
5.7             48
Tabora                          5.5             40                      
6.2             45
Kigoma                          5.9             43                      
7.1             52
   Mwanza                          6.9             49                      
7.4             51              
Source of Data: United Nations: Population Policy Paper Number 22, New York, NY, 1989
an indication that perhaps rural norms had been transferred to urban 
areas as rural-urban migration occured.  Life expectancy in urban areas 
was also much higher than in rural areas during the same period 
        In Uganda, prior to 1971, the country's social indicators were 
comparable, if not better than, most countries in Africa.  The country's 
economy was 90% agricultural based.  The various regimes that governed 
the country between 1971-1985 radically reversed the economic and social 
progress the country had attained since independence.  The civil strife 
that ensued following the first military take over in 1971,  and the 
civil war that broke out following the elections of 1980, were largely 
based in the most productive part of the countryside--the region 
surrounding the country's capital (see map 1).  This led to a decline in 
agricultural contribution to national Gross Domestic Product.  Industrial 
productivity did not increase eitherand the country increasingly depended 
more on foreign assistance .  
        With the deteriorated agricultural productivity, particularly in 
the 1970s and 1980s Uganda's urban population growth rate began to surge 
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resulting primarily from rural-urban migration but also from population 
natural increase in urban areas.  In addition, the military regimes of 
the 1970s and 1980s were characterized by large armies, which could be 
seen in the size of military barracks many of which were built during 
this period around the capital.  Every regime recruited large numbers of 
military cadets from the countryside (particularly northern Uganda) who 
made the city their permanent home.  These regimes were also 
characterised by large civil service bureacracies all in an attempt to 
legitimize the regimes.  Inevitably, these policies are directly 
responsible for the rapid increase in urban population particularly in 
the Lake Victoria region.  The growth, however, concentrated in the 
country's capital, Kampala as was the case in Dar-es-Salaam.  Kampala's 
share of national urban population increased from 38% to 52 percent 
during this period.  At the same time, as the countrys economic fabric 
deteriorated due to mismanagement, there was a decline in urban social 
services leading to a destruction of the urban infrastructure.  It is 
estimated that during this period, GDP declined by 25 percent, exports 
(primarily agricultural products) declined by 60 percent, and imports 
except for military hardware declined by 50 percent.  The large increases 
in defense expenditures led to further increase in foreign capital 
borrowing.  Priorities of the 1960s decade that focused on providing for 
urban growth became insignificant as expenditures on important sectors 
such as education, healthcare, urban services were being reduced in favor 
of defence expenditures to maintain the 1970s and 1980s military regimes. 
Impact of Population Growth on the Urban Environment:
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        The impact of population growth on the urban environment is still 
debatable in some circles.  For instance the Ugandan government initially 
perceived population growth in urban centers as a prerequisite to 
modernization and eventually national development.  Some economists have 
argued that urbanization in and of itself is not a negative indicator.  
It is in fact a positive sign on economic growth.  Recently, however, 
there is growing indication that too much urbanization may not 
necessarily produce desired results of economic growth.  In fact the 
situation in Uganda and Tanzania as will be seen later,  indicates that 
economies of these two countries are incapable of supporting large 
numbers of urban population, let alone rural populations.  The rate of 
urbanization assumes an equivalent level of job creation, housing supply, 
health care, educational and transportation facilities.  Many African 
governments have not been able to reproduce economies with these 
qualities as was the case in the industrialized and industrializing 
nations.  Thus the question of the role of population growth on urban 
environmental degradation has to be seen in light of state ability to 
provide the necessary infrastructure to support its urban populations.  
Uganda:
        The World Resource Database (1994/95) as well as the 1993 World 
Bank study on Ugandas  social sectors provide a very dismal picture of 
the changing urban environment.  The problems are two fold--increased 
urban population growth that is concentrated in the largest city, 
Kampala, and structural neglect.  Ugandas urban population nearly doubled 
in the past thirty years,  yet growth in the national economy has not 
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kept the same pace.   As previously noted, the countrys economic 
performance took a downward spiral during the 1970s and 1980s.  
Government resources to support population growth shrank as export 
earnings declined.  National budgetary figures show that fewer resources 
have been devoted to providing and improving existing social or physical 
infrastructure in the last 20 years.   The most visibly affected areas 
are access to clean water, garbage collection, sanitary and sewage 
facilities, and housing shortages (see table 2).  These are very serious 
problems that can no longer be ignored as they have come to define urban 
centers of Uganda. 
TABLE 2
Access to Safe Water and Sanitary Facilities in Urban Areas
                         Safe Water                 Sanitary Facilities
                        1980    1990                    1980    1990
Uganda                  45%     60%                     40%     32%
Tanzania                X       75%                     X       76%
Source of Data: World Resource Database, 1994/95: New York, NY.
 
        The problems are more pronounced in the countrys capital, Kampala 
where 52 percent of the urban population resides, and the industrial hub 
of Jinja, where no major infrastructure improvement has taken place in 
the recent past. (see figure 6)  The authors of the 1993 World Bank 
country report write that although the country is well endowed with fresh 
water and its resources, increased human activities both in city and 
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countryside --deforestation, poor farming practices, industrial pollution 
and demographic pressures--have disturbed the equilibrium of the water 
cycle through increased run-off with minimal recharge to the underground 
and surface water reserves, thus impairing water quality.  As a result it 
is estimated that only 60% of the countrys urban population has access to 
safe water supply, a situation made worse during the civil upheaval 
period.  In the rural areas the percentage of population that has access  
to clean water within reasonable distance is even lower (because there 
are no water treatment plants).  The World Resource Database (1994/95) 
also indicates that access to sanitary services has declined in Ugandas 
urban centers from an estimated 40 percent in 1980 to 32 percent in 1990. 
(see table 1)  These numbers indicate an alarming condition of urban 
areas in Uganda, particularly in the larger cities.
FIGURE 6
                        
Source of Data: United Nations, 1988, New York, New York
Tanzania:
        As the case in Uganda, the declining urban environment in 
Tanzania is a combination of rapid population growth rate as well as 
government declining expenditures on new infrastructure and or 
maintenance of  existing ones.  The pervasive deterioration of urban 
infrastructure rose out of national policies that had been paved with the 
best intentions: the goal was to create a conflict free society (with 
equitable income distribution, avoiding exploitation of the rural sector 
by investing heavily in urban centers, and by avoiding the big city 
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phenomenon).  Even when the 1970s rural policies failed, and it was clear 
that urbanization was inevitable and on the rise, the government did not 
invest in new infrastructure beyond that the colonial government left 
behind.  In 1980s, Tanzanias urban centers were characterized by 
shortages of basic necessities, rising poverty, and massive inflation.   
The WRD 1994/95 report does not provide data on access to safe water and 
sanitation facilities for 1980, but the figures for 1990 indicate that 
there is still a serious problem in many of Tanzanias urban centers.  In 
the last two decades, Tanzania has become increasingly dependent on 
foreign financing for its development projects implying poor economic 
performance.  The country's priorities are now being made based on the 
overall needs of the country as opposed to specific needs of a city or 
region.  In other words, resources are spread thinly across the various 
national social sectors.  One indicator of Tanzania's dismal economic 
situation is that once a net exporter of food in the 1960s, the country 
now spends a significant amount of its resources importing food items.  
        Perhaps the most alarming problem in Tanzania is the growing 
concentration of the population in very few areas.  According to the 
United Nations Population policy study of 1989,  60 percent of Tanzanias 
population is concentrated on 20 percent of the land. 
Conclusion:
        Unfortunately, in most African states, the urban environment is 
in a state of crisis.  The problems are clearly related to infrastructure 
deficiencies as noted in Uganda and Tanzania but most importantly to 
population growth that cannot be absorbed by national economies.  These 
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problems are noticeably high outside the core areas of the cities 
(Central Business District) and are not only affecting the urban 
environment, but also productivity of urban areas.  It is estimated that 
by 1980, at least 50 percent of Africas urban population lived in slums 
with no basic services (water, sanitation, healthcare, etc.)    The city 
size inherited at the time of independence has grown many fold as new 
immigrants arrive and natural population growth expands, and yet, no 
accompanying infrastructure investments have been made in the same 
proportions for most countries. 
        This paper has attempted to explain  these problems in relation 
to the urbanization transition in two countries--Uganda and Tanzania.  We 
began with a background of national policies that both countries adopted 
immediately after independence and their impact on population growth and 
urbanization trends.  We discussed the theories that influenced national 
leadership in their effort to formulate population programs.  We have 
also discussed urban population growth in the two countries as well as 
the impact of urbanization on the urban environment.
        The paper has tried to show that there is a relationship between 
population growth and environmental degradation.  In both Uganda and 
Tanzania, the data indicated that there is a causal relationship between 
concentration of population densities in a few urban areas and the 
environment.  Yet the two countries have made no major attempts to 
integrate a population policy in national economic planning.  Today,  all 
demographic indicators point to a continued high population growth rate 
with prospects of rise in urban areas and certain other regions of both 
countries.  The possibility of decline in population growth as well as 
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the improvement of the urban environment will occur only if there is a 
deliberate government commitment to reducing population growth.  
Likewise,  urbanization growth will have to be dealt with in terms of the 
overall national population structure.  
Policy Implications:
Local Programs:
        In 1992,  the Uganda government in its rehabilitation and 
development plan stated that a national population policy would be 
formulated.  The document states that:
        ....Government is keenly aware of the importance of population factors in 
        socio-economic development.  Of particularly concern is the effect 
        of population increases on the health status and welfare of the people, 
        especially amongst the most vulnerable groups such as mothers 
        and children.  In this regard, Governments long term objective 
        is to promote the health and welfare of the population by reducing 
        the prevailing high levels of morbidity, mortality, and fertility 
        to ensure a balance between population growth, socio-economic 
        development and the quality of life of the people. 
        However, the discussion of a national population policy has been 
made in very broad terms with no specificity.  At the present time, the 
country lacks an organized family planning program along the lines of 
some leading African countries such as Zimbabwe.  In view of the urgency 
to reduce the countrys high birth rates which are directly responsible 
for the high population growth rate, there would be need to address the 
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crisis with a strategy with a long term effect that targets the 
reproductive sector of society.  With this  strategy  the country will be 
able to deal with several  other problems  including poverty at both 
individual and household level,  reproductive choice,  reduction in the 
number of children born to HIV infected parents (who would die and leave 
behind orphans), maternal and child health,  and rapid population 
growth.  Attempts do deal with population problems with economic measures 
have only partially been successful and they have been very short term 
strategies.
        In Tanzania, we have seen that coercive measures to control 
growth in urban areas were not successful.  There were no counter 
measures to control growth in rural areas.  Several years later, the 
Tanzanian government attempted to relocate the capital--Dar es Salaam to 
Dodoma (in the center of the country) in the hope of diversifying 
development and relocating business and therefore people.  Strategies 
such as this, however, are very expensive for countries that have many 
other pressing priorities.  In addition, they only resolve the high urban 
density question, but not the root cause of the problem--natural 
population increase.
External Programs:
        It is expected that urban growth rate will begin to stabilize 
around the year 2000 in both countries. (see Fig. 8) 
 
FIGURE 7
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FIGURE 8
                                 
Source of Data: World Resource Database, 1994/95, New York, NY, 1994 and 
United Nations, 1988, New York.
Several reasons can be identified as contributing to the decline in the 
urbanization trend.  First, WRD and UN data indicate that as we move into 
the Twenty-first century, overall population growth rate for Tanzania and 
Uganda will begin to decline (see Fig 1, 2, 7).  This will have an impact 
on urban population growth resulting from natural increase.  Secondly 
national economies of both countries are shifting into directions that 
are beginning to have an impact on the urban population.  Since the early 
1980s, upon the advisement of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund both Uganda and Tanzania governments  adopted Structural 
Adjustment economic programs (SAPs) that were designed to restore 
economic structures of countries that were experiencing poor micro and 
macro economic performance (depictable in their large external debts as 
well as large deficits).   The SAPs have had several effects.  They have 
forced governments to shrink their large bureaucracies, encouraged 
decentralization of government and other business functions from capital 
cities to secondary centers and have resulted in reduced government role 
in parastatal bodies (state owned corporations).  Besides the large 
bureacracies, parastals were another major strain on national governments 
in terms of their large resource consumption in form of surplus 
workforce, marketing and distribution expenditures. 
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        The SAPs were also designed to resucitate Africa's declining 
agricultural sector in order to absorb those populations that the public 
sector would have eliminated.  It is expected that as a result of the 
decentralization effort, more jobs will open up in other towns thereby 
attracting unemployed populations from capital cities. While migration 
behavior cannot be precisely predicted, the long term expectation 
resulting from the SAPs is a reduction in rural-urban migration as people 
find more remunerative activities in the agricultural and rural sectors.  
Monitoring and Evaluation: Towards Comprehensive Planning:
        In order to reduce birth and fertility rates, there are several 
areas that must be tackled at the same time.  For instance, developing 
literacy programs that would  target women and at the same time increase 
their employability in productive sectors could be a starting point.  
When women are employed in market productive sectors, it is expected that 
they will begin to view reliance on their off springs as sources of 
household labor in a different vein.  The people of Uganda and Tanzania 
have long been  aware of the increasing cost of maintaining a large 
family, but the economy has not been able to provide an alternative.  
        National programs that promote equal opportunity to education 
need to be developed.  The Uganda government has been working on such a 
program for the last five years and it is expected that by 2005, all 
children in Uganda will have access to primary school education.  Not 
only does society need basic education, there is also need to target 
those areas that have a direct link to peoples lives, such as 
environmental education.  Even in this area, a national policy needs to 
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include women at the forefront.  African women are in direct contact with 
the natural environment on a daily basis,  such that understanding the 
causes of degradation is very important to safe guarding it.  In many 
communities, they find themselves with the responsibility of passing on 
new knowledge to their children and to society as a whole.  Thus farming 
techniques and other ways of reproducing life in ways that would sustain 
the ecosystem would have to be introduced to women.   
        There are no easy solutions to population and environmental 
questions.  Local and external intervention programs discussed above are 
merely experiments for which concrete effects may never be realized.  
Many domestic and foreign entities would have to be involved in 
determining long lasting solutions to the problems created by the 
interaction of population and the environment.  At the same time, the 
various entities would have to integrate their  determinations  in order 
to develop comprehensive plans that would have sustainable effects.  In 
addition, the programs developed need to have the capacity to be 
monitored on a regular basis so that ideas can be sythensized, failed 
ideas rejected and new ones added.  The national economies of both Uganda 
and Tanzania are incapable of managing the complex nature of population 
and environment dynamics, thus the international community needs to 
intervene from time to time.  Intervention needs to be constructive and 
not coersive as has been the case in many places.  Constructive 
intervention would, for instance, constitute technological expertise to 
monitor progress of and improve specific population and environmental 
programs. 
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 APPENDIX I
                                                        
                                                        
                    Population in                   Average Annual          
                    Millions                        Population Change               
                                                        
                    1950    1990    1995            1980-85 1990-95 2000-05
                                                        
Angola              4.13    9.19    11.07           2.63    3.72    3.05
Benin               2.05    4.62    5.40            2.82    3.11    2.91
Botswana            0.39    1.24    1.43            3.40    2.92    2.69
Burkina Faso        3.65    8.99    10.35           2.50    2.81    2.69
Burundi             2.46    5.49    6.34            2.80    2.88    2.53
Cameroon            4.47    11.52   13.28           2.83    2.83    2.84
Central Afr. Rep.   1.31    3.01    3.43            2.58    2.62    2.31
Chad                2.66    5.55    6.36            2.28    2.72    2.47
Congo               0.81    2.23    2.59            2.82    3.00    2.67
Cote d'Ivoire       2.78    11.98   14.4            3.86    3.68    3.28
Djibouti            0.06    0.44    0.51            4.46    3.01    2.88
Equatorial Guinea   0.23    0.35    0.40            7.22    2.55    2.41
Ethiopia            19.57   49.83   58.04           2.12    3.05    2.84
Gabon               0.47    1.16    1.37            4.01    3.31    2.64
Gambia, The         0.29    0.86    0.98            3.01    2.60    2.34
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Ghana               4.90    15.02   17.45           3.58    3.00    2.81
Guinea              2.55    5.76    6.70            2.23    3.04    2.86
Guinea-Bissau       0.51    0.96    1.07            1.87    2.14    2.12
Kenya               6.27    23.59   27.89           3.56    3.35    3.12
Lesotho             0.73    1.75    1.98            2.78    2.47    2.39
Liberia             0.82    2.58    3.04            3.17    3.32    3.08
Madagascar          4.23    12.01   14.16           3.06    3.29    3.06
Malawi              2.88    9.58    11.3            3.42    3.31    2.42
Mali                3.52    9.21    10.8            2.85    3.17    2.91
Mauritius           0.49    1.08    2.34            1.09    1.00    2.68
Mozambique          6.20    14.20   16.36           2.27    2.83    2.87
Namibia             0.51    1.44    1.69            2.94    3.18    2.91
Niger               2.40    7.73    9.10            3.36    3.26    3.02
Nigeria             32.94   108.54  126.9           3.20    3.13    2.95
Rwanda              2.12    7.03    8.33            2.87    3.40    3.09
Senegal             2.50    7.33    8.39            2.81    2.70    2.59
Sierra Leone        1.94    4.15    4.73            2.32    2.66    2.54
Somalia             3.07    8.68    10.17           3.2     3.18    2.99
South Africa        13.68   37.96   42.74           2.58    2.37    2.07
Sudan               9.19    25.2    28.96           3.11    2.78    2.65
Swaziland           0.26    0.75    0.86            3.07    2.68    2.64
Tanzania            7.89    25.99   30.74           3.28    3.36    2.99
Togo                1.33    3.53    4.14            2.93    3.18    2.93
Uganda              4.76    17.56   20.41           2.72    3.00    2.68
Zaire               12.18   37.39   43.81           3.18    3.17    2.98
Zambia              2.44    8.14    9.38            3.58    2.84    2.56
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Zimbabwe            2.73    9.95    11.54           3.22    2.97    2.48
                                                        
Source of Data: World Resource Database, 1994/95, New York, NY, 1994
APPENDIX II
Map 1:  Urbanization in Uganda:  Major Cities
Map 2:  Urbanization in Tanzania:  Major Cities
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COSTA RICA AND THE FORESTRY TRANSITION:  
A MODEL FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Introduction
        Tropical forests are disappearing at alarming rates.  During  the 
1980's, approximately 4.6 million hectares of tropical rainforest and 
6.1  million hectares of moist deciduous forest annually were converted 
to other land uses (Sizer, 1995).  The loss of tropical forests is 
greatest in Asia  (2.2 million hectares per year), followed closely by 
Latin America (1.9 million hectares per year).   The reasons for tropical 
deforestation are very complex, and are linked to local needs of the 
community, national policy, and international markets.  Solutions to 
tropical deforestation will require a complete analysis of all of the 
reasons for loss of this habitat.  Government policies may be a part of 
the solution to reducing the loss of tropical forests.  
        Costa Rica has experienced rapid rates of deforestation during  
the 1960's and 1970's.  The national government responded to this 
environmental crisis by creating a widely-praised system of national 
parks, biological preserves, and other protected lands to slow down the 
deforestation rate.  As a result of government policies, Costa Rica's 
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deforestation rate has stabilized, and today there is little net loss of 
forests.  Costa Rica is viewed as an international leader in conservation 
efforts and biodiversity preservation.  However, Costa Rica still suffers 
from deforestation outside of the protected areas, threatening the edges 
of the protected areas and creating biogeographical islands of protected 
forests.  In addition, the rapidly growing population may pose another 
threat to the remaining forests.   The challenge for the national 
government of Costa Rica is to direct policy measures to the current 
deforestation outside of protected areas.   If this challenge is not met, 
Costa Rica may one day  be completely deforested outside of pockets of 
protected forests.
Physical Geography of Costa Rica
        Costa Rica is a small country (19,730 square miles [51,032 square 
kilometers]), slightly  larger that the state of West Virginia, and is 
located approximately 10 degrees north of the equator.  The physical 
geography results from the complex relationship of many variables, 
including the tropical location, topography, and prevailing wind 
direction.  The topography consists of two parallel mountain ranges which 
are tectonically active.  The highly urbanized Central Valley or Meseta 
Central located between these mountain ranges is actually a tectonic 
depression (Dorn, 1989).  Costa Rica is geologically young, and the 
volcanic soils are more fertile than the expected leached tropical 
soils.  Prevailing winds come from the east, which bring large amounts of 
precipitation to the Caribbean coast (up to 200 inches per year), and 
lower amounts of precipitation to the northern and central part of the 
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Pacific coast.   The tropical location and the varied topography result 
in an amazing biological wealth; some estimates indicate that Costa Rica 
contains approximately 5 percent of all of the world's species of plants 
and animals (Baker, 1995).  This biological wealth is closely linked to 
the variety of forests found in Costa Rica, including tropical 
rainforests, tropical wet and dry forests, and montane forests.  
Forestry Transition
        All societies are dynamic, and experience change in all or some 
of the following sectors: demographic, energy, urbanization, 
technological, educational, agricultural, and forestry.   Transition 
theory provides a model to describe changes in sectors over time to 
understand the relationship between human population and the environment 
(Drake, 1993).  When analyzing a sector longitudinally, there is a 
critical period where the rate of change is particularly fast, and the 
society must accommodate this change.   The society may be  vulnerable at 
this point, and have difficulty adapting to the change (Drake, 1993).   A 
further complication occurs when societies experience rapid change in 
multiple sectors at the same time.   Then, the potentially harmful 
impacts of one transition can be exaggerated by the presence of other 
transitions, and the society must cope with multiple changes 
simultaneously.    Public policy can intervene to mitigate the negative 
impacts of rapid change in multiple sectors, if the society can identify 
these critical areas.   A period of stability often follows this rapid 
change.   The equilibrium that is achieved is dependent upon the way the 
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society manages the period of rapid growth (Drake, 1993). 
        Transition theory is particularly applicable to countries 
experiencing rapid population growth. Often, changes in many sectors are 
related to either human population growth or changes in settlement 
patterns.  Rapid population growth often directly affects the 
educational, agricultural, forestry, energy and urbanization sectors.  
Besides affecting many sectors in the society, rapid population growth 
has a major impact on the environment.   For purposes of analysis, it may 
be desirable to examine one transition; however,  transitions from 
different sectors are intimately linked, and it is difficult to 
completely separate one from the others.   
          The forestry transition describes changes in forest cover over 
time.  At the beginning of the forestry transition, a large percentage of 
a region is forested.  During the critical period of the transition, 
deforestation rates are exceptionally high.  Forest cover eventually 
stabilizes at a lower total area of forest cover than at the beginning of 
the transition.  The rate of deforestation is determined by many 
variables, including local demand for forest products and land, and 
international demand for forest products.  Forests are a renewable 
resource, and the forestry transition is complicated because regeneration 
of forests often occurs simultaneously with deforestation.  However, 
regenerated forests frequently do not contain the rich biodiversity of 
the original forests because non- native or mono-species  often replace 
the native species.    The forestry transition is further complicated 
because of the difficulty of obtaining longitudinal data on forest cover  
and the lack of universal agreement on definitions for forest cover and 
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deforestation.        
          The forestry transition for Costa Rica is illustrated in Figure 
1.  Forest declined rapidly from 1961 to the early 1980's, while the land 
in permanent pasture increased dramatically.  The country was in a very 
vulnerable stage during this period of extremely high rates of 
deforestation. Deforestation rates were 7 percent per year during this 
period of rapid change, versus 2 percent for the other time periods 
(Sader, 1988).   This  high deforestation rate between 1977 and 1983 
indicates a significant loss  of primary forest.   
          Continuation of this rate of deforestation would have 
eventually resulted in complete deforestation of the country. However, 
stability is reached by the early 1980's, and there appears to be little 
change of forest cover since that time.   The amount of land in cropland 
has remained almost constant.    Costa Rica has completed the forestry 
transition, and has reached a stable point where total deforestation 
rates are relatively low.    However, deforestation does occur, and the 
following section explore the reasons for historical and current 
deforestation in Costa Rica.
Causes of Deforestation in Costa Rica  
           Deforestation results from both direct and indirect factors.  
Direct factors emanate from the local area, while indirect ones can be 
attributed to global factors (Honadle, 1995, p. 90).   Direct factors 
include social variables, such as population growth and change in 
migration patters; economic variables, such as growth of transportation 
corridors and employment opportunities;  and political variables, such as 
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national land policies and government subsidies.  In addition, physical 
variables, such as type and accessibility of forests, play an important 
role in the rate of deforestation.   Indirect causes for tropical 
deforestation result from international market needs (Honadle, 1995, p. 
92).   Indirect factors include world demand for tropical products, such 
as hardwoods, fruit, and palm oil, and the world demand for beef.   The 
indirect factors are frequently linked to direct factors; for example, 
global consumer demand for bananas increases the amount of land cleared 
for banana plantations and the local community sees the potential for  
both employment and revenue from the banana plantations (direct 
factors).   Tropical deforestation is a complex  problem that is affected 
both by other  sectors in the society, and by international markets.      
        Historical analysis of forest cover is often restricted by lack 
of both the necessary data and longitudinal maps of land use/land cover.  
Sader and Joyce (1988) used satellite images to complete a longitudinal 
study of the loss of primary forests in Costa Rica during five time 
periods: 1940, 1950, 1961, 1977, 1983 (Figure 2).  The study focuses on 
physical variables related to deforestation, including type of forest, 
humidity, and slope.  
 
Figure 2:  The Forestry Transition in Costa Rica. 
Source:  World Resources Institute, 1994.  
        Prior to 1940, most deforestation occurred in the tropical wet 
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and dry forests in the northwestern part of the country.  These 
ecosystems have a distinctly dry season, and were cleared for crops and 
pasture land in the early history of the country  (Sader, 1988).  Primary 
forest occupied only 11 percent of the entire tropical dry region as of 
1940.  Between 1940 and 1950, the highest average annual rates of forest 
clearing occurred in the tropical dry and montane moist forests (Sader, 
1988).  During the time period of 1961 to 1977, the highest annual rates 
of clearing occurred in the montane wet forests, followed by the tropical 
wet forest.  By 1977, the primary tropical dry region was totally 
deforested.  As a result of the loss of the tropical dry forests,  the 
tropical moist forests are now cleared for cattle ranching.  
        Annual deforestation rates between the years 1940 to 1983 were 
lowest for relatively dry forested areas, such as montane forests.   The 
more humid  areas are less accessible and less desirable for agriculture 
and pasture use because of high rainfall, rugged topography and rocky 
soils (Sader, 1988).
        Much of Costa Rica is in relief; the majority of the low lying 
areas are located inn tropical rainy locations.   Prior to 1940 and for 
the period 1940 to 1950, the largest amount of forest cleared occurred in 
the 31 to 45 percent slope category.  Between the years 1961 and 1977, 
the forest clearing rate increased on the shallow slopes (4.4 percent per 
year).  Prior to 1977, the 0 to 5 percent slope areas were inaccessible 
Atlantic coastal plains.  However,  the rate of deforestation has 
increased in the tropical rainforests adjacent to the  San Jose-Guapiles 
Highway in the 1977 to 1983 period (Baker, 1995).   
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Social  Variables Related to Deforestation
        Deforestation is closely associated with a growing population 
because of the need for additional land for both settlement and 
agriculture.  Costa Rica has  a population of 3.3 million people.  The 
birth rate is 26 per thousand, and death rate is 4 per thousand, which 
results in a 2.2 percent natural increase and a doubling time of 32 years 
(Figure 3).  Costa Rica is in Stage 2 of the Demographic Transition 
Model, the fastest growing stage of the model.  Population growth rate 
has been dramatic, as illustrated in Figure 4, which shows an exponential 
curve fit to the population growth for the time period of 1950 to 1995.   
In 1990, approximately one-third of the population was under 15 years of 
age, indicating that population growth will probably continue for several 
decades (World Resources Institute [WRI], 1994).  The population may 
double to 6 million before stabilizing.  This growing population places a 
stress on the country's national resources, including the forests.  
 
Figure 3:  The Demographic Transition for Costa Rica. 
Source:  World Resources Institute, 1994.  
 
Figure 4:  Actual and Projected Population of Costa Rica. 
Source:  World Resources Institute, 1994.
        Approximately half of the population resides in the San Jose 
metropolitan area and the Central Valley.  During the 1970's,   migration 
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increased to the San Jose metropolitan area in response to a depressed 
agricultural sector and the promise of employment in urban areas.   
However, the global recession triggered by the 1979 oil price increase, 
1980 increase in world interest rates, and reduced foreign loans,  
altered  migration patterns.  In the time period of 1981 to 1982, 
citizens left the San Jose metropolitan area and moved to rural 
districts.    Between the years 1973 to 1984,  population increased 51 
percent in rural areas with arable land (WRI, 1994).  Population 
increased on marginal land, also; the population increased  27 percent on 
land classified as poor and 16 percent on land classified as very poor 
(WRI, 1994).  This migration to rural districts has increased 
deforestation rates. Since 1984, the population in the urban areas, 
primarily San Jose and Alajeula,  has been steadily increasing (WRI, 
1994).  
Economic Variables Related to Deforestation
        Economic variables that contribute to deforestation include the 
growth of the transportation network, increased production of crops and 
beef for export, and the loss of employment on plantations.  The 
development of transportation corridors increase accessibility to 
previously remote areas, and hasten deforestation.  Costa Rica's 
transportation network grew dramatically  during the time period 1977 to 
1983.  The cumulative distance of primary, secondary and unimproved roads 
and railroads was approximately 2088 kilometers in 1967 and 5582 
kilometers in 1977 (Sader, 1988).  In 1977, the mean distance from the 
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nearest road or railroad to a forest was 14.2 kilometers.  The greatest 
distance of any forest location (63.5 kilometers) to the nearest road or 
railroad is located in the northeast near the Nicaraguan border (Sader, 
1988).  However, the San Jose - Guapiles highway, which links the capital 
San Jose to the Atlantic lowlands has opened up this previously 
inaccessible area (Baker, 1995).   
        During the 1970's, much of the forest clearing is directly 
related to the expansion of the cattle industry (Figure 2).   The 
tropical wet and dry forests of the Pacific lowlands are largely 
deforested today, and the land is in permanent pasture.
           Today, it is the expansion of banana plantations, rather than 
the cattle industry, that is a reason for much of the deforestation.    
Bananas are a  major sources of revenue for Costa Rica, and  banana 
plantations bring the promise of local employment opportunities and 
increased capital for both the local and national economy.   However, 
these plantations have also caused social and environmental problems,  
as  illustrated by the following example in the Sarapiqui  region.   The 
Sarapiqui  region is located near the San Juan River close to the 
Nicaraguan border.   The Sarapiqui  contains approximately 250,000 
hectares, of which 50,000 are protected in biological preserves, 100,000 
are in peasant agricultural communities, and 100,000 consists of 
secondary growth forest, cattle pasture, ornamental-plant or fruit 
plantation (Vandermeer, 1995).   At least five banana companies are 
planning expansion in this region because of perceived market 
opportunities in the European Community and Eastern Europe (Vandermeer, 
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1995).  Both the local and national governments encourage the expansion 
of banana plantations.  Costa Rica is a poor country with a large 
external debt, so companies that promise revenue and employment are 
welcomed regardless of the problems that may result.  
        The banana industry brings complex chemical pesticides and 
fertilizers to the region, reduces the amount of forests, and contributes 
to local social problems.  Pesticides pollute local water bodies and 
poison plantation workers.  Standard Fruit Company used the fungicide 
DBCP in the region, and approximately 2,000 workers on the plantation 
became sterile (Vandermeer, 1995).  Forests must be cleared for the 
banana industry.   The area in the Sarapiqui  dedicated to banana 
plantations  increased from 20,000 hectares in 1985 to 32,000 hectares in 
1991, and it is projected to be 45,000 hectares by the end of 1995 
(Vandermeer, 1995).  Banana plantations may eventually include all of the 
arable land in the region that is not either protected in a biological 
preserve or owned by agricultural communities. Frequently, the local work 
force does not provide enough laborers, and workers are imported from 
other parts of Costa Rica or from other countries, including Nicaragua 
and Panama.   
        When banana prices fluctuate in the world market, or the land 
becomes unproductive through overuse,  banana companies reduce their work 
force.   The unemployed workers can either migrate to the metropolitan 
areas or try to settle in the region.  Unemployed workers that remain in 
the region need land to grow subsistence crops or harvest products from 
the forests.  However,  the local community  in the Sarapiqui may have 
little land to offer the workers, and the only land that is not devoted 
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to agriculture is located within the four biological reserves in the 
region.  One future scenario projects that  the landless peasants may be 
forced to clear the forests in the biological preserves (Vandermeer, 
1995).
     Protected lands have been threatened by unemployed  
plantation workers before.   After several banana plantations had been  
abandoned, approximately 800 unemployed laborers and their families moved  
into the Corcovado National Park, and began prospecting for gold  
(Bequette, 1994).  The rivers of the Corcovado National Park became  
polluted with sediment and mercury.  A court order gave the police powers  
to evict the workers, but soon other prospectors arrived, setting off  
armed conflicts between the police and the prospectors.   The expansion  
of industries dedicated to production of cash crops can have a  
detrimental impact on forests in two ways.  First, the land must be  
cleared for the production of the cash crops.  Second, workers imported  
into the area may clear marginal lands for their own use when work is no  
longer available on the plantation. 
Political Variables Related to Deforestation  
         Federal policies contributed to the rapid rate of deforestation  
in the 1960's and 1970's. The 1961 Land Reform law allowed landless  
migrants to apply to the Agrarian Development Institute (IDA) to obtain a  
title for unused private land (WRI, 1995).  Unfortunately, much  of the  
IDA land was marginal land, and was prone to high rates of soil erosion  
if deforested.  In the 1970's, ownership rights were given to anyone who  
cleared the land and lived on it for one year (WRI, 1994).  Squatters  
could either claim land after a 10 year period, or sell the cleared or  
improved land after only one year to cattle ranchers, who immediately  
took title to the land.  Poor and landless individuals could profit by  
clearing  land and  selling the land to cattle ranchers.  
        Much of the deforestation on the Pacific Coast is a result of  
expansion of the cattle industry.  Government policies promoted the beef  
export  industry by allowing subsidized credit to ranchers, and  
tolerating high delinquency rates (WRI, 1995).  People were motivated by  
these subsidies to enter the cattle industry whether or not the industry  
was profitable. 
Current Rate of Deforestation  
        The annual rate of deforestation for the time period of 1981 to  
1990 is approximately 50 hectares or a 2.6 percent annual rate (WRI,  
1994).  Costa Rica has the largest annual rate of deforestation in  
Central America (Sizer, 1995).  The annual logging of closed broadleaf  
forest (1981 to 1990) is approximately 34 hectares per year; 27 percent  
of which is primary forest (WRI, 1994).  A chart showing current land  
cover is in Figure 4. 
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Figure 5:  Land Use/Land Cover in Costa Rica.  
Source:  World Resources Institute, 1994. 
Government Response to Deforestation  
        The Costa Rican government responded to the rapid deforestation  
rates in the 1970's by banning the export of more than 60 tree species  
and prohibiting deforestation without permits (Baker, 1995).  However,  
efforts by the federal government have not ended deforestation; landless  
peasants continue to move onto marginal land, and land is cleared for  
coffee and banana plantations.  
        In 1970, Costa Rica formed a national park system to protect  
valuable forests and preserve biodiversity. Approximately 10.27 percent  
of the total land area is protected and an additional 17 percent is aside  
as forest reserves, buffer zones, wildlife refuges and Indian reserves  
(Baker, 1995).   The National Park System is in charge of managing 21  
national parks, 9 biological reserves, and a national monument (Table  
1).  The national parks and reserves protect soil and watersheds, and  
preserve the habitat for approximately 75 percent of all Costa Rican  
species of flora and fauna (Baker, 1995). 
Table 1:  Costa Rica's National Parks, Refuges, and Reserves  
Arenal National Park                                    Hitoy Cerere Biological Reserve  
Barra Honda National Park                           Irazu Volcano National Park  
Braulio Carrillo National Park                        Isla Guayabo Biological Reserve  
Cabo Blanco Natural Reserve                       Juan Castro Blanco National Park  
Cahuita National Park                                   La Amistad International Park  
Cano Island Biological Reserve                     Las Baulas de Guanacaste Park  
Cano Negro National Wildlife Refuge           Lomas Barbudal Biological Reserve  
Carara Biological Reserve                            Manuel Antonio National Park  
Chirripo National Park                                 Marino Belleno National Park  
Cocos Island National Park                         Palo Verde National Park  
Corcovado National Park                            Poas Volcano National Park  
Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge  
Guanacaste National Park  
Guayabo National Monument  
Tortuguero National Park  
Barra del Colorado  
Rincon de la Vieja  
Santa Rosa National Park  
Tapanti National ParkOstional  
National Wildlife Refuge 
Source:  Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, 1995. 
        In 1989, the country began to reorganize the National Park System 
in an attempt to  increase the protection of the forests.   The national 
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parks, reserves, and national forests are being combined into larger 
regional conservation units (RCUs) so that wildlife can easily migrate 
from one preserve to another. The Guanacaste Regional Conservation Unit 
serves as a model for these megaparks (United National Environment 
Programme).  The other RCUs are:  Arenal, Cordillera Volcanica Central, 
Isla del Coco, Osa, Pacifico Central, Tempisque, and Tortuguero.   Costa 
Rica is widely praised for its system of protected areas.   Only five 
percent of the forests in Costa Rica are not under some kind of protected 
status.  The National System of Conservation Areas will hopefully ensure 
the long term preservation of one-fourth of the country, and the current 
administration plans to expand the conservation areas to cover one-third 
of the total area of the country (Figueres, 1994)
          The national  government also promotes reforestation by using 
tax breaks, but the reforestation often results in the development of 
tree farms that contain non-native species, such as teak.  The government 
grants legal residency status to persons participating in reforestation 
programs; however, these efforts frequently do not replicate the once 
complex ecosystems (Baker, 1995).  
Costa Rica's Model of Sustainable Development
        Sustainable development is not a clearly defined concept; many 
interpretations can  be found  to  describe sustainable development. The 
Brundtland Commission summed up the spirit of sustainable development as 
"development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (in Hale, 1993).  
The Jose Maria Figueres Olsen administration views sustainable 
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development as an alternative development paradigm to ensure both 
economic growth and environmental protection in Costa Rica (Figueres, 
1994).  Costa Rica is currently experiencing difficulty in many sectors, 
including the forestry, demographic, energy and urban sectors.  Forests 
outside of protected areas are cleared, the human population is rapidly 
growing, energy consumption increases 9 percent annually, and the 
migration to the Central Valley increases (Castro, 1994). The possibility 
of a reduced standard of living for Costa Ricans has convinced the 
government to pursue a model of development that differs significantly 
from the current industrialized model.   The national government is using 
Agenda 21 from the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro in June,  1992 as a guide for implementing 
sustainable development policies, and hopes to export this sustainable 
development model to the rest of the tropical developing world 
(Figueres,1995; Keating, 1995).   
        A key motivation for the construction of this new model of 
development is the desire for preservation of the forests which host the 
vast biological wealth; as stated by the Minister of Natural Resources, 
Energy, and Mines:  "Biodiversity is a pillar of Costa Rica's sustainable 
development initiative" (Castro, 1994).  The Costa Rican model for 
sustainable development is impressive in its extent, and attempts to 
integrate international (extra-regional), regional, national, and local 
components  (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5:  Major Components of the Costa Rican Model for Sustainable Development:
International Component
Ratified Convention on Climate Change (1994)
Statement of Intent for Bilateral Sustainable Development, Cooperation 
and Joint Implementation of Measures to Reduce Emissions of Greenhouse 
Gases - United States and Costa Rica (September 30, 1994)
Convention on Biological Diversity
Conservation Units can Procure international funding
INBio - Merck Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
INBio - Intergraph
Regional Component
Central American Commission of Environment and Development
protect region's biological diversity (1989)
coordinate preservation of tropical forests
Central American Convention on Biodiversity (1992)
Central American Alliance for Sustainable Development (1993)
Convention for the Management and Conservation of Natural Forest 
Ecosystems and the Development of Forest Plantation (1994)
Megaparks (Path of the Panther )
Si a Paz and La Amistad
National Component
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Constitutional Reform
Reforms to articles 18 and 15 of the Constitution
"right to a healthy and ecologically sound environment"
Institutional Reforms







Source:  Figueres, 1994 and 1995; Keating, 1995; World Resources 
Institute, 1995, Castro, 1994. 
International Component of the Model
        An integral part of the sustainable development model is for 
Costa Rica to forge alliances and agreements with other nations. 
Opportunities for sustainable development investments and projects, such 
as the Global Environmental Facility wind power project, are created by 
international agreements (Castro, 1994).   Costa Rica has  also adopted 
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the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change.  Costa Rica is welcoming joint implementation projects, 
cooperative projects between developed and developing countries to reduce 
greenhouse emissions (Castro, 1994).  On September 30, 1994, United 
States Vice-President Gore and President Figueres signed a letter of 
intent for a Bilateral Sustainable Development, Cooperation, and Joint 
Implementation (United States, 1994).  A pilot project will institute 
sustainable forest management in a national park and buffer zone in 
central Costa Rica.  The project includes funding to police illegal 
deforestation and purchase privately held land inside the park (United 
States, 1994).   
        International non-governmental organizations are welcomed   to 
Costa Rica to help develop conservation programs  and provide funding to 
implement these  programs.   Costa Rica contains numerous private 
reserves and a children's reforestation project in Monteverde.  Some of 
these organizations participate in a debt-for-nature swap program that is 
designed to both protect forests and reduce the country's external debt 
(Table 2).  One example of a debt-for-nature swap follows.  The Nature 
Conservancy bought a portion of Costa Ricas debt from a United States 
bank  at a discounted rate.  Costa Rica then paid off the National Parks 
Foundation with bonds in the local currency, and agreed that the money 
would be used on conservation projects. 
Table 2:  Debt-for-Nature Swaps in Costa Rica. 
Purchaser                       Date    Face Value of debt      Millions of 
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dollars     Cost($) Funds Generated(million $) 
FPN                             2/88    Total   5.4             
918,000                 4.05
Netherlands                     7/88    Total   33              
5,000,000               9,9
TNC                             1/89    Total   5.6             
784,000                 1.68
Sweden                          3/90    Total   24.5            
3,500,000               17.1
Sweden/WWF/TNC                  3/90    Total   10.753          
1,953,473               9.602
Rainforest Alliance/MCL/TNC     1/91    Total   0.6             
360,000                 0.54
Source:  World Resources Institute, 1992.  
        Costa Rican conservation units can procure international funding, 
and manage their budgets separately from the national budget.  Costa 
Rica's National Biodiversity Institute (INBio) recently signed a contract 
with Merck Co., Ltd, one of the world's largest pharmaceutical 
companies.  INBio will provide Merck with samples of plant and insect 
species in exchange for royalties from any marketable products (Langreth, 
1994).  The objective of the agreement is to finance the conservation of 
biodiversity, and to ensure that Costa Rica receives a small percentage 
of profits derived from pharmaceutical extracts.  Some of the proceeds 
will help fund the "All Taxa Biodiversity Inventory," a detailed survey 
that will eventually include all of the species found in the Guanacaste 
Conservation Area (INBITTA, 1995)
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Regional Component of the Model
        Central America has a unique political geography; seven small 
countries share  an isthmus that connects two much larger regions.   
Because of the physical proximity, environmental problems frequently 
become transboundary problems.  These issues require a regional solution, 
and the governments of the Central American countries have made  several 
efforts to unify the region.  During the 1989 Summit at Costa del Sol, 
the Central American presidents agreed to create the Central American 
Commission of Environment and Development (CCAD) to protect the region's 
biological diversity, and coordinate preservation of tropical forests  
(WRI, 1995).  CCAD consists of representatives from each of the seven 
Central American countries. The charter states that the goal of the 
organization is to promote "coordinated actions by governmental, 
non-governmental, and international organizations" (Weed, 1993).   The 
CCAD created a forestry unit that designed a regional Tropical Forestry 
Action Program (TFAP), to develop guidelines for forest policy (Figueres, 
1995).   In 1992, CCAD representatives signed an agreement with the 
United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration to receive 
regular satellite images to provide information to use to advise member 
governments on deforestation (Weed, 1993).
        As a result of the Convention for the Management and Conservation 
of Natural Forest Ecosystems and the Development of Forest Plantation, 
the Central American countries propose to consolidate the management  of 
protected areas, reforest lands, and manage forest growth in secondary 
forests (Figueres, 1995).  The region's national forest service directors 
and TFAP coordinators met with farmer's unions, forestry industry 
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representatives, and women's groups during the convention to discuss any 
concerns related to the management of the regions forests.  
        Transboundary protected zones are being established throughout 
Central America to protect international forests from squatters and 
prospectors.  These international reserves, often called "Peace Parks," 
include La Amistad Conservation and Development Initiative,  located 
along the border  between Panama and Costa Rica,  and the 500,000 hectare 
"Sistema de Areas Protegidas para la Paz (System of Protected Areas for 
Peace), also called the Si-a-Paz, reserve along the Costa 
Rican-Nicaraguan border (Weed, 1990).  An eventual goal is to create a 
Central American biogeographical corridor called the "Path of the 
Panther."     These transboundary parks are rich in biodiversity, and 
unfortunately are under intense pressure for development (Weed, 1990). 
        A regional plan called the Central American Alliance for 
Sustainable Development (alianza para el Dessarrollo Sostenible de Centro 
America) was launched in December, 1993 by United States Vice-President 
Albert Gore and the presidents of the Central American countries 
(Figueres, 1995).  The objectives are listed below:  
Table 3: General Objectives of the Central American Alliance for 
Sustainable Development
1.  To make Central America a region where peace, freedom, democracy, and 
development will thrive by promoting a change in personal and social 
attitudes in support of sustainable development in the political, 
economic, social, cultural, and environmental domains. 
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2.  To ensure sustainable practices for preserving regional biodiversity.
3.  To communicate the Alliances achievements to the international 
community so that Central American efforts will serve as an example to 
others.
4.  To permanently strengthen societys capacity and increase 
participation in the process of improving the present and future quality 
of life. 
Source:  World Resources Institute, March, 1995. 
National Component of the Model
        The Costa Rican government is taking steps towards sustainability 
by implementing constitutional, institutional, and policy reforms.  In 
1994,  articles 18 and 50 of the Political Constitution were revised to 
confer the "right to a healthy and ecologically sound environment"  
(Castro, 1994).  The Parks Service, Fish and Wildlife Service and Forest 
Reserves and Protected merged into a new institution:  the Directorate of 
Conservation Units under the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and 
Mines (United Nations Environment Programme).  Costa Rica is currently 
experiencing a nine percent increase per year in electricity demand, and  
an electricity tax was implemented to internalize the full environmental 
costs of generating electricity (Castro, 1994).   
        A national  government - non-governmental organization (NGO) 
commission developed a project to convert up to 2 million hectares of 
pasture back to woody crops and forest (WRI, 1995).  In November, 1994,  
the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy, and Mines and the Ministry of 
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Rural Development inaugurated the 7,000 hectare Horizantes Forest 
Experiment Station in the Guanacaste Conservation Area (ATBI for 
Terrestrial Organizations of the Guanacaste Conservation Area).  
Government and private extension agents provide educational support to 
help citizens switch from grass to woody crops.  
Local Component 
        The national government plans to integrate local community groups 
into the sustainable development model.  Costa Rica has  numerous 
community organizations, including 2,000 rural development boards, two 
thousand water control boards, and 100 nongovernmental organizations 
(Figueres, 1995).  These organizations will be informed and hopefully 
involved in the national government's effort to pursue sustainable 
development.  
Exportability of the Model
        Costa Rica is planning to become a pilot project for sustainable 
development, and create a model that can be exported to the rest of the 
developing world.  But, can the Costa Rican Model be applied to other 
tropical developing countries?  Even though Costa Rica is a poor country 
and is classified economically as a developing or a Third World nation, 
Costa Rica has undergone a social and political transformation in the 
past four decades that differentiates it from the rest of the Third 
World.  Many social indicators place Costa Rica in a developed nation 
category  rather than with developing nations.  Table 4 compares relative 
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characteristics of wealth and social indicators for Costa Rica, its Third 
World neighbors in Central America, and the more developed United 
States.  Advances in education, health care, and urban and rural 
infrastructure have resulted in a dramatic improvement in the lives of 
both rural and urban Costa Ricans.  Costa Rica has had a strong 
democratic tradition since its independence in 1821.  Costa Rica was the 
first Latin American country to base its government on free elections and 
a multi-party system (Wearing, 1993).  In 1948, Costa Rica abolished its 
military, and the government still pursues a philosophy of social and 
economic improvements for all Costa Ricans.  The nation continues to 
develop democratic institutions, and search for ways to both improve the 
lives of the people and the quality of the environment.  Costa Ricas 
political system contrasts dramatically with the political systems of its 
neighbors.  
        The Costa Rican Model of Sustainable Development has evolved from 
this history of social transformations and democratic principles. In 
addition, the country actively seeks international experts to help design 
programs and restructure governmental agencies.  The well educated and 
healthy Costa Rican population is an asset to the implementation of 
conservation projects.  The country already has a strong environmental 
educational program.  The traditions of dedication to the quality of all 
citizens and democracy are very different from the experience in much of 
the developing world.  An important question is whether the Costa Rican 
model can be applied to nations that have not undergone social and 
political transformations.   Because of the unique circumstances in Costa 
Rica, some of the programs initiated in Costa Rica may be difficult to 
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implement elsewhere in the developing world.  
        Another potential problem with the model is that it may not stop 
the high deforestation rates outside of protected areas.  The Costa Rican 
Model of Sustainable Development ultimately relies on a national system 
of protected lands to save forests; indeed the current administration 
plans to increase the amount of protected land to approximately 30 
percent, and today only 32 percent of the total area is forested.  
Therefore, almost all of the forests in the country would be under some 
kind of government protection.  Placing land under protected status does 
not  address all of the critical variables related to deforestation.  In 
addition, there can be no guarantee that the sanctity of national parks 
will not be violated if the local population needs land or forest 
products.  The model needs to incorporate the reasons for deforestation, 
and attempt a solution to this problem.  Deforestation outside of 
protected areas is caused by many linked variables, and is a difficult 
problem to solve.
Table 2:  Comparison of Costa Rica, Central America, and the United 
States Characteristics of Wealth.
Characteristic                      Costa Rica      Central America (1)     United 
States
GNP per capita                      $1,841          $1,201                  $22,356
Agricultural Labor Force                24%         36% (2)                 2%
Birth Rate (per thousand)               26.3        34.9 (2)                15.9
Total Fertility Rate                    3.1         4.4 (2)                 2.1
Life Expectancy                         76.3        67.28 (2)               75.9
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Death Rate (per thousand)               4           6.8                     9
Infant Mortality                        14          45.4                    8
Assess to Clean Water                   
Rural (%)                               84          41                      not 
available
Urban (%)                               100         89                      not 
available
Assess to Sanitation Service                    
Rural(%)                                93          44.4 (3)                not 
available
Urban (%)                               100         75.6                    not 
available
Government Expenditure for Health (%)   26.3        11.8 (4)                13.5
Adult Female Literacy                   93          69 (5)                  99
Adult Male Literacy                     93          75 (5)                  99
Couples using Contraceptives            70          40 (1)                  74
Per Capita Energy Consump (gigajoules)  16          12.1                    320
Percent change(since 1971)              30          7                       -4
Per capita carbon dioxide emissions (%) 1.06        0.53                    19.53
                        
(1) Central America calculations exclude Costa Rica
(2) Excluding Belize
(3) Excluding Nicaragua
(4) Excluding Honduras, Nicaragua, and Belize
(5) Excluding Belize and Nicaragua
Source:  World Resources Institute, 1994.
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Policy Recommendations - For the Donor International Community
        Costa Rica is experimenting with a form of economic development 
that does not sacrifice environmental quality.  The international 
community should pay close attention to this experiment because all 
nations in the future may have to link economic growth and environmental 
protection.  Therefore, the donor international community should support  
Costa Rica's efforts with financial, technical and scientific support.  
Financial institutions should forgive the massive external debt that has 
accumulated in Costa Rica (Figure 6).  This external debt may pose the 
greatest obstacle to the Costa Rican efforts of sustainable development.  
The country is so pressed for revenue that polluting industries are 
actually welcomed in this conservation-conscious nation. The country is 
forced to cannibalize its own economy and natural resources to service 
the debt.  Debt-for-nature swaps may not adequately address the current 
$4 billion external debt. International financial support is also 
important for the institutional management of the protected areas.  This 
aid can help ensure stability for the protected zone.
 
Figure 6:  External Debt of Costa Rica. 
        This concept of additionality has been incorporated in several 
international agreements, such as the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, the Convention on Biodiversity, and Agenda  (Jordan, 
1994).  Additionality refers to financial aid on top of or in addition to 
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the aid that is currently received by the developing world to finance 
sustainable projects.  
Policy Recommendations - for Costa Rica
        The International Monetary Funds structural adjustment program 
requires Costa Rican government departments to reduce their staffs and 
budgets (Baker, 1995).  This reduction of government is designed to 
improve both the macro- and micro- economic performance of the country.  
However, this reduction of government may adversely affect both 
conservation projects and social programs.  The Costa Rican government 
should strive to maintain these programs, and not cut funding for the 
conservation areas, health care, and family planning during this period 
of structural adjustment.  The social improvements of the last forty 
years should not be reversed.  The government should look to other 
programs to eliminate.  
        Costa Rica, like the rest of the Latin American countries, cannot 
sustain economic growth, improve the standard of living for the 
population and protect the environmental with the heavy weight of the 
countrys external debt.  Therefore, the Costa Rican government should 
default on the external debt.           
        Deforestation experienced today in Costa Rica results from a 
variety of local decisions.  A strong regional planning system should be 
implemented to address local needs, economic growth, and environmental 
protection.  This type of institution is absent in the sustainable 
development model.  One type of planning agency that may work to reduce 
deforestation and improve the local economic situation is a watershed 
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management planning unit.  Watershed management uses the boundaries of 
hydrologic units to create the political boundaries of a planning 
institution.  The watershed is managed as a holistic entity; land use 
decisions are made in the best interest of the entire drainage area.  The 
drainage map of the country will serve as the basis for the construction 
of watershed management units.  Each planning unit should have adequate 
funding, political authority, and local participation to ensure that 
development choices will not adversely affect the watershed.  The 
ultimate success of any development scheme will depend upon the choices 
made at the local level.   Finally, the creation of a Ministry of Forests 
or a Ministry of Natural Resources may help avoid potential conflict of 
interests within the Ministry of Natural Resources, Mines, and Energy. 
Conclusion
        The problem of tropical deforestation is a complicated one, so it 
must be anticipated that the solution will be equally complicated. One 
important key to reduction of deforestation is understanding all of the 
variables that contribute to the deforestation rate, and attempting to 
integrate these variables into the solution.  Costa Rica is a poor 
country with a rich environment.  The national government is pursuing 
economic growth that does not adversely affect the environment by 
creating a model for sustainable development,  and should be applauded 
for these efforts.  The model has many positive attributes, but, at this 
time, does not appear to adequately address the reasons for deforestation 
outside of the protected areas.  Perhaps support from the donor 
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CHAPTER TWELVE
ERIN N. PERRY
URBAN GROWTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN KENYA
Introduction
        Humans are a plague upon the planet.  This is the philosophy that 
many environmentalists and zero-growth advocates live by.  Regardless of 
whether or not one agrees with this statement, it is clear that 
exponential growth of the human population will affect the natural 
environment.  As our human numbers increase, the finite supply of natural 
resources needs to support more and more people.  Further, as Third World 
countries develop and levels of affluence increase, the citizens there 
will demand more goods per person.  Pollution is bound to increase, as it 
has been for decades, and resources are bound to become more scarce, but 
for how long?  How much can the Earth supply before our rates of growth 
level off?
        These are questions that the establishment of a 
population-environment dynamic hopes to answer.  Specifically, this paper 
will examine the urbanization transition (along with the demographic 
transition) and the corresponding effects on the environment.  Kenya will 
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serve as the study area, as a country in the midst of both of the above 
transitions.  Continued high rates of population growth strain many 
sectors of Kenyan society, including agriculture, education, urban 
infrastructure, sanitation, water supply, energy, and employment. 
        Growth of the urban environment appears to coincide with overall 
population growth.  Urban growth has intense and often specific effects 
on the environment because of its high population densities.  For 
example, the need for employment brings industry to cities, and along 
with it air and water pollution and increased need for energy.  Citizens 
of large Third World Cities such as Nairobi demand improved roads and 
sewers;  this requires more energy, construction materials, and a steady 
water supply (often entailing more hydroelectric projects in the 
country).  Demand for food in the cities must also be supplied by rural 
areas, and with fewer people per hectare of arable land because of 
rural-urban migration.  This necessitates more capital-intensive 
agricultural practices, such as herbicide and pesticide use (with obvious 
negative effects on soil and water supply).  As more and more rural 
people migrate to cities in search of better employment and educational 
opportunities, poverty-stricken shantytowns flourish around the outskirts 
of major cities.  The basic needs of residents of these areas, including 
health services, often remain unmet.  In the wake of urbanization and the 
resulting inequities (or perceived inequities) between urban and rural 
residents  the potential for social unrest increases.
        Despite all the problems that proliferate in cities such as 
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Nairobi, I will assert that cities can exert positive forces on the 
population environment dynamic as well.  In areas such as education and 
sanitation, urban areas can exert the power of economies of scale that 
rural areas cannot.  Better education and better access to health 
services, as more often found in urban areas, can lead to reductions in 
fertility, which relieves pressure on the environment.  This reduction in 
fertility is crucial to the survival of the Kenyan people, in that 
agricultural limits are approaching, environmental stresses are 
increasing, and food shortages may be in Kenyas future.
Africa in general
        According to the United Nations Environment Programme, most of 
Africa is actually under-populated (UNEP 1).  The problem, however, is 
whether or not the increasing numbers of people will "be gainfully 
employed or whether, on the contrary, they will swell the ranks of the 
under-employed and the jobless" (UNEP 1).  Their fear is based on the 
prediction that the growth of urban areas will continue at a rapid rate 
without a complementary increase in activities  or the creation of an 
adequate number of jobs (UNEP 4).   
Background
        Kenya is largely an agricultural nation, despite recent trends in 
rural-urban migration.  In fact, the Kenya Highlands is one of the most 
productive agricultural regions in Africa (CIA 160).  The labor force 
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consists of 15% agriculture, 50% public sector, 20% services, and 14% 
industry and commerce.  Climate in Kenya is quite variable, from tropical 
at the coast to arid in the interior.  As of July 1989, the population of 
Kenya was 24,346,250 with an annual growth rate of 4.2% (CIA 160).  As 
shown in Figure 1, Kenya has one of the highest growth rates in Africa.  
The United States Central Intelligence Agency estimated literacy at 47% 
of the total population in 1989 (CIA 160).  
        The population of Kenya in the 1979 census was 15,327,061, and 
had risen to over 24 million by 1989 (CIA 160).  Of the total figure, 
827,775 live in the capital of Nairobi and 341, 148 in the coast city of 
Mombassa (Central Bureau of Statistics 13).  From Figure 2 below, we can 
see the trends in birth and death rates in Kenya.  In 1989, according to 
CIA figures, total fertility in Kenya was at 7.8 children born per woman 
(160).  The 1989 birth rate was 51 births per 1000 population while the 
death rate was only 9 per 1000 population.  The birth rate has been slow 
to "catch up" with the steady decline in the death rate, although it is 
declining and projections by the World Resources Institute indicate that 
it will continue to do so.   This pattern is typical of countries such as 
Kenya in the early stages of economic development (Ominde 1984, 41).  
Despite movement towards the urban areas, Kenya remains a largely 
agricultural nation, with some 80 percent of the population working on 17 
percent of the land.    The vast majority of Kenyans are small scale 
farmers;  however, large scale farms dominate coffee, tea, cereals, and 
livestock products-the export oriented sector of agriculture (Brass & 
Jolly 11). The potential impacts of urban-rural migration on agriculture 
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and land-pressures will be discussed later.
Figure 1.  Thematic Map of Africa by Population Growth Rate.
What stage of the demographic transition is Kenya in?
        The demographic transition involves moving from a state of high 
birth and death rates to one of low birth and death rates.  According to 
William Drake, at the beginning of the transition when birth and death 
rates are high they are "in relative equilibrium with each other" (304).  
By some event the death rate then dramatically drops,  starting the 
transition.  The widespread availability of western style health care 
such as immunizations in the Third World has recently caused this drop in 
death rates.  By definition of the transition, after a time lag, the 
birth rates slowly drop to catch up to the death rates until another 
equilibrium is reached (Drake 304).  Because of this time lag, some 
growth in population is inherent in the transition.  How drastic/sudden 
is the drop in the death rate determines  largely the manageability of 
the population growth.  If a very sudden drop in the death rate occurs, 
such as in many Third World countries including Kenya, a population 
explosion occurs "and society experiences all the stress and human misery 
created by this condition" (Drake 304).  This combination of high 
fertility and low mortality is characteristic of the contemporary 
demographic situation in northern Africa.  However, countries in eastern 
and western Africa have generally experienced both high mortality and 
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high fertility (typical of a country that hasn't gone through the 
demographic transition).  Kenya was one of these countries, until it 
experienced substantial mortality declines in the 1970's.  This resulted 
in considerably increased growth rates for Kenya (Ominde 1984, 27).  In 
the mid-'70s, Kenya's growth rate was estimated at 3.7 percent, the 
highest in Africa (Ominde 1984, 28).  In 1989, the growth rate had risen 
to 4.2% (CIA 160).  Kenya has long been considered one of Africa's 
success stories because of its relative political stability and social 
tranquillity.  However, this success has been tempered in per capita 
terms by its rapid population growth (Brass & Jolly 8).
 
Figure 2.  Birth rates and death rates superimposed on total population.  
Date source:  World Resources Data Base 1994-95.
        As seen in Figure 3 below,  population growth appears to have 
been the highest in semi-arid parts of Kenya, due in large part to 
reductions in infant mortality among pastoralists (Livingstone 6).  In 
contrast, low rates of growth in areas such as the Victoria basin reflect 
reductions in the natural rate of growth by migration to other areas 
because this area has run out of capacity to absorb population 
(Livingstone 9).   
        According to Brass and Jolly, "Kenya has undergone the first 
stage of a classic demographic transition, declining mortality coupled 
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with relatively constant fertility.  This phase would now appear to be 
complete, because future mortality declines will be more modest and 
therefore not affect the overall growth rate as much.  Fertility is now 
the crucial process governing growth (21).  According to Ominde, the 
demographic trend parallels that of many of the countries in similar 
stages of development.  The difference, he asserts, is that in Kenya the 
combination of high fertility and rapidly declining mortality is 
"virtually unprecedented in demographic history" (Ominde 1984, 53).  
Fertility
        As shown in Figure 4 below, the risk of dying at a young age has 
dropped dramatically since 1940, life expectancy has risen, but total 
fertility has continued to rise.  
Figure 4.  Fertility Rate, Probability of Dying and Life Expectancy.  
From:  Brass and Jolly.
Fertility is highly related to mortality, as Ominde discusses.  
"Expectations of life have a direct bearing on the extent to which 
population is just replacing itself or exceeding the replacement level" 
(Ominde 1984, 30).  Mortality conditions were such in Africa that a woman 
needed 3.5 births to replace the parent generation, whereas in the United 
States only 2.1 births were needed (Ominde 1984, 30).  Where female death 
rates are high, a higher level of fertility is required to maintain the 
population at the same level.  By 1972 the total fertility rate was 
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estimated at an astonishing 8.1 births per woman (Ominde 1984, 43).  Some 
reasons for this rise in fertility include better health conditions in 
Kenya, which created a tendency for miscarriage rates to decline.  As an 
indicator, the percentage of childless women declined noticeably between 
1969 and 1977, from 7.9 percent of women 45-49 to only 4.5 percent in the 
same age group in 1977 (Ominde 1984, 43).  Researchers have also found 
that fertility declines drastically with secondary-school education for 
women.  This may be because increasing education is generally associated 
with a tendency for women to delay marriage and childbearing.  As Micah 
Cheatham points out in the chapter on fertility reduction in India, 
education is negatively correlated with fertility when looking at data on 
primary school education and fertility rates of females aged twenty-five 
and over from countries in all stages of the demographic transition.  
Also, increased education for women leads to increased chance of modern 
sector employment, which can entail changing values about family size 
(Ominde 1984, 44).  Urban women are much more likely to be of the group 
of women with higher levels of education, which tends to reduce 
fertility.  However, they also have better access to health care and 
nutrition, which are factors which tend to reflect a more fertile 
(physically healthy) population.  
        As can be seen in Figure 3, urban fertility is systematically 
lower than rural fertility in every province in Kenya, the highest 
fertility rates being found in the Western Province and the lowest in the 
East.
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        In urban environments, patterns of fertility differ from those in 
rural areas.  In a rural setting, children are viewed as a form of 
consumer durable yielding a flow of services over time.  The labor of 
children adds to family income and it provides economic and social 
security for the parents in the future.  Of course, there are costs to 
having children as well, such as the opportunity cost of parents not 
working while raising children.  Families tend to balance the utility of 
children against the costs of bearing them and raising them.  In rural 
areas, the utility of the childrens labor and income generating potential 
clearly outweighs the costs, since few women have significant employment 
opportunities.  However, as wage/income earning opportunities increase, 
alternative uses of time increase the price of children relative to other 
goods, mostly through increasing the opportunity cost of the mothers 
time.  Also, increased income leads parents to spend more on better 
clothing, housing, nutritious food, and high quality education.  Thus the 
cost of raising each child increases.  These characteristics of increased 
income generating opportunities, better wages, and better opportunities 
for purchasing the above amenities are prevalent in urban areas.  Thus, 
the logical conclusion is that family size and fertility will decrease in 
urban areas (Oberai 155).
        This set of circumstances may indicate that increased 
urbanization is a good way to reduce fertility and therefore reduce 
population pressures.  However, many migrants to urban areas are not 
affluent enough to afford the amenities which increase the costs of 
having children.  More common is that in-migrants live in slums on the 
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outskirts of the city.  Surveys indicate that in poor urban areas such as 
the slums outside of Nairobi, only 20.5% of households have flush 
toilets, 46.7% have regular garbage disposal services, and 55.45 have 
access to public water standpipes (Oberai 157).  This lack of facilities 
in slum areas reflects the lower probability that these residents will 
spend more on relative luxury goods such as education and better clothing 
for their children.  Women will also have fewer opportunities to earn 
higher wages while living in these shantytowns.  Thus, slum dwellers have 
higher fertility levels than the general population in many Third World 
cities like Bombay (Oberai 159).  According to Oberai, The results of 
studies reviewed...suggest that in general urban poor have larger 
families than the urban non-poor, both because of their desire to have 
more children for reasons of economic security and because of their 
limited access to education, health facilities, family planning and other 
social services (Oberai 160).
Population momentum and the future
        The concept of momentum is an important one in analyzing 
population dynamics.  The effects of reductions in fertility, say, as the 
result of family planning programs, will not be felt for many years due 
to the youthful character of the population.  As shown in Figure 5 below, 
the age structure of Kenya is heavily weighted toward the bottom, 
younger, segment of the pyramid.  Because the young people still have to 
grow up and reproduce, the "population momentum" will carry population 
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levels up until the next generation is born and the effects of the family 
planning programs can be felt.  So even if this generation of young 
people entering child bearing age has only 2 children per couple 
(replacement level fertility), the 
Figure 5.  Age Structure.
population will still increase greatly before reaching a stable level.  
As Ominde explains this concept of population momentum: "The imbalances 
in the birth-rates and death-rates and the fact that more than half the 
people in these regions are under the age of 15 mean that the demographic 
upsurge will not relent until well into the twenty-first century"  (1984, 
32).   Where this population pyramid is broad based, with high 
proportions of younger ages, dependency ratios are high;  many young 
people are dependent on relatively few adults.  This results in  
resources being diverted to more consumption and thus less savings and 
investment (Ominde 1984, 40).   Urban poverty often exacerbates this 
dependency problem.  A poor urban household is characterized by low, 
irregular earnings by one principal worker and a large number of people:  
hence the high ratio between household size and the number of earners 
(Oberai 145).  
History of Urbanization in Kenya
         The population in Kenya has been largely distributed around 
environmental factors and productive agricultural areas.  Sparse 
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populations in vast parts of the country is due to rainfall patterns;  
the Kenyans have tended to settle more densely around areas which receive 
high rainfall and therefore have a high potential for development 
(Alikhan 65).  
Figure 6.  Monthly rainfall data by district.  From Odingo.
        Another major factor contributing to the uneven distribution of 
population was the alienation of large amounts of productive areas for 
the occupation of white settlers during the period of colonial rule.  
Prior to colonial administration, land was largely owned on a tribal 
basis (Ominde 1984, 6).  During colonial rule, the African population was 
confined to Native Reserves;  the areas that once were these reserves 
continue to be the areas with the highest densities (Kisii, Kakamaga, and 
Kiambu for example).  Lands occupied by pastoral tribes such as the 
Masaii tend to have the lowest densities, districts such as the Tana 
River, Lamu, Narok, and Samburu (see Figure 7 for locations).  While 
urbanization has increased in most all of Kenya from 1969-1979, the Coast 
province has remained relatively unaltered;  curiously, this is the only 
province with an indigenous urban tradition (Alikhan 66-67).
Figure 7.  Map of Kenya
        Areas with the highest levels of urbanization are located in the 
former White Highlands, where towns grew in response to economic 
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development during colonial times, and in the Coast Province where the 
urban tradition dates back to a period of Arab influence (Alikhan 67).  
Urban agglomerations in the Arab Coast province arose in the form of 
trading centers from the ninth century onward (Ominde 1984, 59).  The 
arid and semi-arid regions of Kenya are more urbanized than their more 
environmentally favorable counterparts in the southwestern part of the 
country (see Figure 8).
 
Urban-Rural Migration.
        Environmental problems associated with population growth often 
manifest themselves in the urban areas.  Thus, it is important to examine 
the phenomenon of urban-rural migration along with population growth to 
establish a population-environment dynamic.  First, we must determine 
whether or not there is a link between population growth and 
urbanization.  If we examine Figure 9 below, it appears that there is a 
positive correlation between population growth and growth in the urban 
population.  Both are growing at an exponential rate, a characteristic 
that becomes unmanageable very quickly. 
        According to Livingstone, rural-urban migration tends to have a 
bias toward young people with some education (10).  Those with more 
education seem to be less content in rural areas and seek out the cities 
in search of employment.  Whether or not cities can actually provide this 
employment and whether or not existing services can absorb these new 
immigrants is debatable.  Overall, 37.8 percent of all male migrants in 
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Kenya move from rural to urban areas, and 31.1 percent of all female 
migrants do the same (Ominde 1984, 76).  This gap between male and female 
percentages can possible be explained by the above assertion that 
migration to urban areas has a bias toward those with some education, a 
group that is predominantly male. The next largest category of migration within 
Kenya 
is rural to rural, which accounts for 35 to 36 percent of all migration 
(Ominde 1984, 76).  
        Some general characteristics of migrants to Nairobi will help in 
analyzing the reasons for this movement and may lead us to policies to 
make the flow more manageable.  Over forty percent of migrants to Nairobi 
are Kikuyu, the major ethnic group in Kenya (composing 20.8 percent of 
the total population) and 35.9 percent come from the central district 
(Alikhan 168-169).  A large majority of migrants come directly from their 
place of usual residence (76 percent).  The vast majority of migrants to 
Nairobi are between 20 and 34 years of age and are Christian.  
Sixty-seven percent of migrants to the city have more than a primary 
education.  Respondents of Alikhan's field study indicated that the major 
reasons for migrating to Nairobi were for job availability, better paid 
jobs, and better educational facilities (Alikhan 181).  These statements 
are a testament to the inequalities between urban and rural areas in 
terms of services, and suggest that if job opportunities were increased, 
wage differentials between cities and rural areas were diminished, and 
educational facilities were improved in rural areas, the pulls of the 
city would be lessened, along with the pace of migration.  Indeed, we 
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must not forget the role of women in major cities of the Third World, as 
they often carry an exceptional burden, providing economic support and 
performing housekeeping and child-rearing as well.
        Migration occurs because of certain "pushes" urging people out of 
their area of residence and "pulls" toward the cities.  Some of these 
pushes include relief of population pressure in the rural areas 
(especially when the move to the city is permanent), the need for a 
supplementary source of income (which can be accomplished through 
remittances to the family at home from the migrant), and the need for 
capital for the development of farms or other activities in the rural 
home areas (Livingstone 12).  In rural areas, certain "pushes" operate to 
encourage people to move to the cities.  Often, education is seen as 
giving access to employment outside the farming sector, which has great 
value to families during years of crop failure (offering a measure of 
security).  "Households used income diversification both to secure 
themselves against risk and to build up savings for investment in the 
farm" (Mortimore, Tiffen and Gichuki 142).  It is important to note that 
persistent rural-urban migration has increased the incidence of 
female-headed households in rural areas, especially in areas where male 
out-migration has been substantial.  This has implications for income, 
welfare, and agricultural extension and production (Livingstone 15). 
        
Figure 9.  Growth in Urban Population versus Total Population Growth.  
Data source:  World Resources Data base 1994-95.
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        Why is urbanization such a concern in the Third World while First 
World countries went through the transition without much discussion?  
Granted, there have been great problems with urbanization in 
industrialized countries, including pollution, traffic congestion, 
shortage of housing, insufficient sanitation, social friction, 
delinquency, and aesthetic environmental deterioration.  However, in less 
developed countries, such as Kenya in the wake of the end of the colonial 
system, "cities now grow with even greater speed, despite the meager 
resources available for coping with the adverse consequences" (Ominde 
1984, 30).  This rapid growth magnifies the problems experienced by 
developed countries in lesser developed nations.  In these developing 
countries, "the rate of increase in absolute numbers of urban population 
and the associated growth in rural population has no parallel" (Ominde 
1984, 30).  Natural rates of population growth in developing countries 
like Kenya are much higher than any ever experienced in currently 
industrialized nations.  In unplanned slums of major cities like Nairobi, 
population growth rates approach 7-8 percent while the general urban 
population is growing at approximately 5 percent per year (Ominde 1984, 
30).   
        In now-developed countries, urbanization occurred because of 
increases in agricultural productivity which provided capital 
accumulation and less need for labor; thus creating a rural labor 
surplus.  Capital inputs were available as a result, and so industry 
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could expand and offer more opportunities for labor.  Thus, "Urbanization 
in the experience of now-developed countries was thus both a cause and a 
consequence of higher standards of living" (Oberai 24).  In countries 
such as Kenya, the rapid increase of rural populations led to an increase 
in the rural labor force which could not be absorbed by the agricultural 
sector.  Therefore, in Kenya and other Third World nations, urban growth 
has resulted from pressures of rural poverty, and so its consequences 
have been negative (unemployment, slums, and poverty-Oberai 25).  
Figure 10.  Demographic trends worldwide.  From Ominde 1984 (Population 
and Development in Kenya)
From Figure 10 above, urban population growth in Africa occurred at a 
rate of 4.8 percent per year, while rural areas grew less than half as 
fast (1.8 percent).  This is partially due to the phenomenon of 
rural-urban migration, which now constitutes the largest volume of 
migration in the world (Ominde 1984, 31).  Many problems are associated 
with this rapid urban growth.  A few major concerns in Kenya include:  
the squalor of rapidly growing slums, deterioration in public services, 
shortage of housing, congestion in the streets, growth in unemployment, 
and worsening imbalance in income distribution (Ominde 1984, 32).   In 
1985, industrial workers earned three times as much as agricultural 
workers in developing countries (Oberai 31).  All of these problems lead 
to less direct effects on the environment, which will be discussed in the 
next section.
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Urban Growth and the Environment
        Growth in urban areas has ramifications on the environment that 
stretch well beyond the boundaries of the city.  Increased numbers of 
people must be supported by the same amount of land in rural areas and 
relatively fewer people to manage it (as greater proportions of people 
migrate to the cities).  In 1969 approximately two-thirds of the total 
area of Kenya supported only 8 percent of the population: the urban 
population (Ominde 1984, 54).  This spatial inequality in the 
distribution of population leads to many problems in resource 
development.  Agriculture must be intensified or expanded to feed the 
urban dwellers.  Hydroelectric projects must be used more frequently to 
supply water and energy to the cities.  Industry blossoms in the city, 
increasing pollution and taking resources from rural areas.  
        Industrial growth seems an inevitable consequence of 
urbanization, for industry exploits the economies of scale found in large 
cities such as Nairobi.  Whether or not growth in industry can occur 
rapidly enough to accommodate immigrants from rural areas who seek formal 
sector employment is questionable, however some burgeoning of industry is 
almost certain.  As we can see from the graphs below (Figures 12-15), 
increases in urban population in Kenya have produced corresponding 
increases in fuel and charcoal production and carbon dioxide emissions 
(although CO2 emissions are more erratic).  Using best fit curves to 
project this data set into the future, we can see that if current trends 
continue pollution will increase and pressures for coal and fuel 
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resources from rural areas will increase. 
        From Figure 11 below, it appears that agricultural 
intensification is the wave of the future, because agricultural land has 
not expanded much in recent decades.  All the land area suitable for 
rainfed agriculture is already being cultivated and there has been a 
shift in the agricultural boundary into some semi-arid areas in the east 
and north (Darkoh 1991, 61).  This expansion of agriculture could mean 
increased desertification if current farming techniques are used (which 
tend to promote erosion).  Erosion ravages prime agricultural areas and 
leaves little potential for production.
        Some 483,830 square kilometers of Kenyas total area of 569,137 
square kilometers is already experiencing some form of desertification, 
or 85% of the total land area (Darkoh 1991, 61).   This desertification, 
caused in large part by agricultural expansion, has repercussions on 
agriculture, creating a sort of negative feedback loop.  About 30% of 
land in Kenya has been moderately to seriously affected by 
desertification with about 55% in imminent danger of declining in 
productivity, leaving only 15% of the land in good condition for farming 
(Darkoh 1991, 61).   Estimates suggest that by the year 2000 Kenya will 
only be able to feed 17% of its population from its own land, using low 
inputs such as fertilizer and pesticides, and will not be able to produce 
adequate food for its entire population even at intermediate levels of 
inputs (Darkoh 1991, 66).
        Intensification of agriculture to produce needed food for urban 
areas could also have effects on the income distribution of Kenya.  The 
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demand for  inputs, many of which are urban-based, will likely increase 
with agricultural intensification.  Therefore rising rural incomes will 
also increase the demand for goods and services produced in the city, 
thus stimulating urban incomes and expenditures disproportionately (Anker 
and Knowles 45).   Despite this inequality, the experience of the 
Machakos area in Kenya supports the hypothesis that increasing population 
density leads to intensification through changing labor-to-land ratios 
(Mortimore, Tiffen and Gichuki 141).
Figure 11.  Land use changes in the Kenya Highlands between 1920 and 
1960.  From Odingo.
 
Figure 12.  Curve fit and actual data for Charcoal and Fuel Production in 
Kenya.  Data source:  World Resources Data Base 1994-95.
 
Figure 13.  Commercial Fuel Production and Urban Population in Kenya.  
Data Source:  World Resources Data Base.  [A logistic curve might also be 
fit.]
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Figure 14.  Traditional Fuel Consumption in Kenya.  Data Source: World 
Resources Data Base 1994-95. [A logistic curve might also be fit.]
Figure 15.  Industrial CO2 Emissions and Urban Population in Kenya.  Data 
source:  World Resources Data Base 1994-95.  [Compare this curve to the 
graphs of the rainfall data, Figure 6.]
        Water supply for the growing urban populations is also a major 
concern.  In Nairobi, the mean annual water use per capita was 154 liters 
in 1968, compared with 556 liters in U.S. cities (White, Bradley and 
White 115). Water deficiencies are common from January to March and July 
through September in Nairobi.  Per capita water use is dependent on many 
factors, including size of family, income level, education, cultural 
heritage, and the cost of obtaining water (White, Bradley and White 
117).  Low-density urban areas tend to use the most water per capita (252 
liters) compared to medium high density areas using 167 liters per person 
(White, Bradley and White 118).  Therefore, it seems that as urban 
densities increase, per capita water use decreases.   This may be 
interpreted as a positive consequence of urbanization in Kenya.  However, 
the increasing numbers of urban dwellers may dampen the positive effects 
of lower per capita use, resulting in still higher demands on water 
supplies that are currently in shortage many times during the year.     
        In most of the highland area of Kenya, where Nairobi is located, 
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rainfall is variable and uncertain (Odingo 150).  Farmers in the area are 
facing increased pressures for livestock development because of the 
demands of a more modern urban population.  This in turn requires more 
water, and so more boreholes and dams.  Large scale dams and other water 
projects have been shown to have large negative effects on surrounding 
land and populations.  Large areas of land are submerged by dam retention 
areas, including areas along the Tana River where past water projects 
were located.  Disease also increases around water retention areas as 
water-borne viruses flourish.  Therefore the demand for water and 
agricultural products in urban areas often degrades the environment in 
rural areas.
        Increased energy demand from urban areas is having a large 
negative effect on the environment of Kenya.  Urban demand for charcoal, 
largely in Mombassa and Malindi, leads to the wholesale cutting of 
forests in the Kilifi district (Darkoh 1991, 69).  Forests have been cut 
to the point of encroachment onto traditionally reserved areas such as 
the Kaya forests (Darkoh 1991, 69).
Urbanization, the Environment, and the Future.
        Some have attributed environmental degradation in Africa to the 
absence of environmental awareness among the poor.  It is, of course, 
unreasonable to expect people living on the edge of existence, worrying 
about their next meal, to be concerned with the larger environment.  
Darkoh contends that environmental degradation is largely caused by 
"human population pressure and outside influences (e.g..-modernization) 
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leading to over-exploitation and poor management of resources (forests, 
soil, water, atmosphere, etc.) through over-cultivation, overgrazing, 
deforestation, poor irrigation practices, pollution, etc." (Darkoh 1993 
60).  Disproportionate growth of urban areas plays a large role in this 
phenomenon as pressures for goods and services increase.  As Darkoh 
points out, "demand for household fuel poses a clear threat to economic 
development in several countries.  It has led to denuded forests near 
rural villages and round towns and cities.  With the loss of tree cover 
comes increased erosion and lower crop yields.  The resulting loss of 
soil fertility reduces harvests which in turn means poverty for the 
dependent population" (2, 60).
        This environmental degradation in rural areas, caused in large 
part by the demands of cities, can in fact cause even more people to go 
to cities in search of better conditions.  The case of the Ethiopian 
Highlands illustrates this experience:  starvation and death forced the 
exodus of millions of environmental refugees to urban areas or less 
degraded lands elsewhere (Darkoh 1993 61).  Could this happen to the 
currently productive Kenyan Highlands?  Those who are poor and hungry 
will often cut forests, overgraze grasslands, overuse marginal land, and 
crowd into already congested cities.  This cycle must be interrupted for 
any policy to be effective.
        Predictions for the future are varied.  Some, including Peter 
Kimm, assert that within 10 years most of the poor will live in urban 
areas (3).  The predicament of cities such as Nairobi cannot be 
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overlooked.  An easy solution to the problem of population growth and 
environmental problems would be to heavily regulate industry in cities, 
and generally make living in cities more difficult so that people will 
remain in rural areas.  However, cities currently contribute over half of 
the gross domestic product of developing countries and by the year 2000 
it is predicted that they will contribute over two-thirds (Kimm 4).  
Without the economic development provided by cities, countries such as 
Kenya have little hope of developing, which is usually the precursor to 
lower population growth rates.
        Growth of economically productive employment must be stimulated 
so that cities may absorb an expanding labor force.  The agricultural 
sector does not provide a solution to the employment problem, as the 
agricultural land in Kenya is already being subdivided into plots too 
small to support a family adequately (Lewis 142).  Employment must be 
increased, however, such that industry does not over-exploit natural 
resources and create intolerable amounts of pollution.  A process called 
"technological leap-frogging" may be a means to accomplish this.  
Leap-frogging involves  transfers of cleaner, more efficient technology 
from developed nations to countries like Kenya trying to grow 
economically.  
        Some suggest, however, that it is prohibitively expensive to 
create a significant number of new jobs in the capital intensive 
industrial sector (Lewis 142).  They assert that the basic need is to 
encourage growth of smaller secondary urban areas.  Smaller urban areas 
may address the need to foster backwards and forwards linkages with 
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agriculture, and would provide readily accessible marketplaces for 
farmers (Lewis 143).   If this strategy is pursued, the need for sanitary 
water supplies, sanitation systems, control of rain-water run-off, 
streets, and other infrastructure issues become critical (Lewis 146).  
However, the major difficulty with this strategy is that to decentralize, 
the central government must be willing to decentralize, and hence give up 
some of their power, which may be unlikely.
        Kenya's government is moving in the right direction in terms of 
its philosophy for development.  Its policies with respect to the 
preservation of the environment are based on the premise that prevention 
of harmful effects is less costly than their subsequent correction.  The 
policies emphasize that environmental considerations must be incorporated 
at the planning stage of development projects.  However, either through 
lack of political clout or necessary machinery for monitoring and 
surveillance, there is often no follow-up observation of the impact of 
rural development schemes (Darkoh 1993, 71).  Improving monitoring and 
enforcement of existing policies can not only improve environmental 
conditions, but also provide formal sector employment for so many urban 
dwellers that are in need of income.
        It seems that, from examining all the evidence presented here, 
that there are two ways of looking at urban growth and the environment in 
Kenya.  One school of thought asserts that increased urbanization is a 
good thing for environmental quality in Kenya.  In this scenario, 
urban-rural migration has a dampening effect on total population growth, 
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therefore reducing pressures on the environment.  As population grows, 
rural poverty pushes people to urban areas.  During this migration, 
people tend to acquire more education (either before migrating or after 
they reach the city).  This higher education level leads to a desire for 
smaller families, thus reducing the rate of population growth.
        The other theory is that urban migration is a positive feedback 
to population growth, and therefore increases pressure on the 
environment.  Once again, as population increases people migrate to urban 
areas,  Because of the increased proportion of people in urban areas, 
greater pressure is placed on the rural environment to provide goods and 
services for these new urban dwellers.  The new demand for production in 
rural areas will thus reinforce the need for large families there. The  
cycle of unmanageable population growth is thus perpetuated.
        This author tends to agree with the former theory of urban 
growth, in that the rate of growth of cities is occurring too quickly, 
without the jobs for migrants and the agricultural surplus to support 
it.  Of course, some policies are in order to improve conditions in urban 
areas, but not to the point of increasing the pushes to these areas from 
the rural lands.  For example, efforts to reduce urban poverty, including 
increasing formal sector and industrial employment, will increase incomes 
for urban families and encourage the view of children as an economic 
liability.  Technological leap-frogging is a viable option for Kenya, 
soliciting help from nations such as the U.S. in adopting more advanced 
technologies for production that are less polluting than those that would 
normally be adopted in the course of development.
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        These policies will not reduce environmental degradation alone.  
Rural areas must also be targeted for increased income generating 
opportunities and improved services so that people won't have such a 
strong incentive to flee to the cities.  Better education and access to 
health care are essential in rural areas.  Opportunities for women to 
earn income are also crucial to not only improving conditions in rural 
areas but to reducing the desire for large families (i.e.-increasing the 
opportunity cost of women's time).  These activities could include 
working in health care, teaching, and selling hand-made goods.  The 
establishment of smaller urban centers will help in this endeavor, 
allowing more agricultural distribution areas (also a place where women 
could work) and places to sell wares.  By keeping activities 
decentralized, pushes from rural areas can be decreased, influx to large 
urban centers like Nairobi can be slowed, and population pressures can be 
reduced.
        As we can see, population growth, urban growth and the condition 
of the natural environment are intricately entwined.  As countries such 
as Kenya develop, urban populations are bound to increase.  Our job as 
policy makers is to see that the pace of this urban growth is manageable, 
that migrants can earn a living and that both urban and rural 
environments can be sustained.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
LYNELLE   PRESTON
DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS OF DEFORESTATION:  
A MISSING LINK IN DEVELOPING FOREST POLICY IN  SIKKIM   
                                                                
Introduction
        Deforestation is increasingly becoming recognized as the number 
one threat to mountain ecosystems and mountain cultures.  The Himalayas 
are no exception.  During the last 20 years studies have focused on the 
relationship between deforestation and the corresponding increase in 
population.  Although extensive numerical statistics are lacking, the 
trends and indicators blatantly illustrate this causal relationship.  
This study examines Sikkim as a specific example of the larger trends 
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that are occurring in the greater Himalayan region.  Although Sikkim has 
not yet suffered as extreme deforestation as its neighbors, its rate of 
deforestation is much more dramatic.  Because Sikkim is only in the early 
stages of deforestation, there is a greater chance that this destruction 
is reversible. This study examines different demographic factors which  
contribute to the amount and rate of deforestation and then outlines 
policy recommendations  which could be used to slow or reverse these trends.
        Sikkim, the newest state of India, is located in the northeast 
corner of the country bordering Tibet on the north, Nepal on the west and 
Bhutan on the east.  (Appendix 1, Map 1)  Compared to the rest of the 
Himalayas, the state has been visited by few outsiders and therefore has 
been less disturbed by western influences and consumptive tendencies.  As 
in other areas, resources are becoming more scarce as population 
increases and consumption patterns continue at present levels.  
        According to Dr. William Drakes theory of transitions, Sikkim 
appears to be in the midst of a forestry transition -- a period of rapid 
change, relative instability and volatile conditions.  Sikkim is at this 
vulnerable state because it is in the beginning stages of dramatic change 
rather than being near the end of the transition, a period returning to 
relative equilibrium and stability.  While this transitional stage makes 
Sikkim especially vulnerable, the transition period also provides policy 
makers in Sikkim with unique opportunities to direct change in positive 
rather than negative directions.  Typically, when such periods of 
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transition and crisis are recognized, people tend to act aggressively and 
develop creative solutions.  Since deforestation is a relatively recent 
phenomenon in Sikkim and it is in its early stages, there are great 
opportunities now to implement changes which will direct and shape future 
forestry trends. 
A Model  Simulation to Assess Deforestation
        While the majority of research on deforestation explores the 
causal relationships between the many different factors, it rarely gives 
an indication of the magnitude or time frame involved.  In a paper 
entitled  Man versus Mountain:  The Destruction of the Himalayan 
Ecosystem (Rieger in Lai, 1981),  Hans  Christopher Rieger has devised a 
model simulation which graphically illustrates the magnitude and severity 
of current population and deforestation transitions in the Himalayan 
region as a whole, rather than simply stating that these problems exist.  
Rieger uses an ecological model of the deforestation processes based on a 
set of assumptions describing the Himalayan region to illustrate current 
forestry trends and to predict future ones.  The assumptions include a 
population growth rate of 2 per cent per annum,  an  extraction rate of 
1400 kg per capita per year, a natural forest density of 360 tons per 
hectare of timber, and a natural forest growth of 5 per cent per decade.  
Using these initial conditions, the model was first set in motion for a 
period of 100 years.   The results are depicted in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1:
Source:  Reiger, 1988.
        As is expected the extraction curve has a close similarity to the 
population curve.  Since the natural growth of forests curve lies well 
above the extraction curve, the ecological system appears to be in 
balance.  A policy-maker in year 100 looking back  on past developments 
would have no cause for alarm if he assumes -- as most politicians do -- 
that the future is most likely to be like the past.  However, an 
examination of Figure 2, in which the same curves have been projected for 
a further century, shows that this complacency is ill-founded (Rieger, 1981)
Figure 2:
        Because of the exponential growth of population, the extraction 
rate increases so rapidly that before the year 120 is reached, extraction 
exceeds the natural regeneration of the forests.  Within a few decades, 
the remaining forests are depleted to the point of complete 
destruction.   The result is not only the complete destruction of the 
forests,  but also the destruction of all the people who depend on 
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forests for their survival.  This model does not, however, necessarily 
predict what will happen in the future because other variables are not 
considered in the equation.  But it does illustrate the current trends 
and projects one possible future scenario (Lal, 1981).
        Sikkim is no exception to this model.  In fact, the available 
data indicates that the rate of deforestation in Sikkim may be occurring 
at an even greater speed than that described in Riegers model.   When 
running the model using initial conditions which are more representative 
of Sikkim, the simulation yields much more dramatic results.  The rate of 
destruction appears to be occurring at a much faster rate.   The 
population growth rate is faster and thus the population and extraction 
curves are steeper; the population density, exacerbated by urbanization 
trends, is higher in Sikkim than that depicted in Riegers model; the 
changing ethnic composition and the booming tourism industry is affecting 




        One of the most apparent indicators that Sikkims extraction rates 
will exceed natural forest growth and total forest stock is the extreme 
population growth rate. While Rieger used a population growth rate of 2 
percent per year, the population of Sikkim has grown at a much faster 
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rate.  (Figure 3)  During the last 30 years, the growth rate has 





The dotted line on the graph shows the actual population during the last 
100 years while the solid line shows the exponential projection of 
population growth over the next fifty years.  This projection indicates 
that the population will continue to grow at an increasingly rapid rate.  
This projection assumes stable conditions and does not consider other 
factors.  A closer examination of different demographic characteristics 
of Sikkim, however, allows one to assess whether in fact the population 
will continue to grow at the exponential rate depicted in the graph.  
        The demographic information provides conflicting indicators of 
the future population growth.  During the past 100 years, on of the main 
factors which has caused the growth rate to approach  a  5.07 per cent 
per annum growth rate in 1981 has been the migration of Nepalese settling 
in Sikkim.  The population growth rate of Nepalese living in Sikkim has 
averaged around 7 per cent between 1931 and 1981 and between 1978 and 
1981, the population growth rate was 8.81 per cent per year.  Figure 4 
illustrates this:








        Thus, much of Sikkims population explosion is due to migration 
rather than to high fertility and other  demographic characteristics.   
Migration however is not necessarily a positive feedback loop, where an 
increase in immigrants triggers a greater increase.   In fact the 
opposite occurs; when a significant amount has migrated, there is less 
room and therefore less desire for others to migrate.  A high migration 
rate in one decade does not guarantee a high migration rate the next 
decade.  In fact, at some point the migration rate will start to level 
off and eventually decline as an area becomes exceedingly crowded and 
less appealing.   The data indicates that Sikkim appears to be nearing 
the end of its migration transition. (Figure 5)  Assuming the ratio of 
Nepalese to Sikkimese has remained constant between 1981 and 1991, the 
decline in total population growth of Sikkim indicates a corresponding 
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decline in the population of Nepalese immigrants. 
        However,  other demographic indicators show that while migration 
trends may be slowing, the total population growth rate of Sikkim will 
continue to increase dramatically, although perhaps not to the same  
degree as in the past due to high migration rates.  One such indicator 
that the population growth rate will continue to increase is the age 
structure of the current population in Sikkim.  Figure 6 indicates that 
almost 70% of the population is under the age of 29 (Desai, 1988).   
Thus, a majority of the population is either at child-bearing age or will 
be there soon.  According to present patterns, the fertility rate will 
either continue at the same rate or increase.  The fact that only 10% of 
the population is over 50 years old indicates that the death rate will 




Source:  Desai , 1988.  
        
        Literacy levels can also be used as an indicator of population 
growth rate since a low literacy rate often corresponds to a high 
population growth rate.  In Sikkim, only 34.05% of the population were 
literate in 1981.  In general, the urban population is more literate than 
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the rural population; the literacy rate in urban areas is 54.86% and in 
rural areas is 30.05%.  Similarly, the literacy rate for males is almost 
twice as high that of females, 44% and 22% respectively (Balaraman, 
1987).  Although this study does not directly examine the relationship 
between literacy and population growth, this causal relationship is 
generally accepted among demographers.  While there are exceptions, a low 
literacy rate often suggests a high population growth rate.
        Sikkims population is currently growing at a rapid rate, a 
majority of the people are in the young age groups, and literacy rates 
are low.  Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the population will grow 
exponentially even if migration is slowed.  Thus, assuming that the 
consumption rates in Sikkim are similar to those in the simulation and 
that there is a similar causal relationship between population and 
consumption as there is in other parts of thee Himalayas, these 
demographic indicators suggest that both the population and the 
corresponding extraction rates are more severe than what is shown in the 
simulation.  
Population Density
        Another assumption Rieger makes in the simulation is population 
density.  Rieger assumes a population of 1,000 people living in a 100 
sq.km. area,  yeilding a density of 10 people per sq.km.  After 100 years 
the density in the simulation was 72.5.  In contrast, the East district 
of Sikkim had a much higher population density with 187 people per sq.km. 
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in 1991 (Lama, 1994).   As a whole, Sikkim currently has an area of 7,096 
sq.km., a population of 406,452, and a corresponding density of 57 people 
per sq. km.  Thus, Sikkim does not have a significantly higher population 
density than that depicted in the simulation.  However, since the 4,226 
sq.km. in the North district are largely uninhabitable due to rock and 
snow cover, extreme altitudes and harsh weather, the majority of the 
population lives in the other three districts.  Consequently, 92% of the 
population lives in 40% of the geographic area ( Map 1, Appendix 1; 
Figure 7, 8).  Thus, while the density of the country as a whole is only 
57, the density of certain districts is significantly greater than the 
density assumed in the model both under the initial conditions and after 








        Current urbanization trends in Sikkim further indicate how much 
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more densely populated these southern three districts will become.  For 
example, not only is the East district already more densely populated 
than the North, but the population growth rate is also much higher than 
the growth rate of the North district.  This difference in rates is at 
least partially a consequence of the fact that population growth, as 
mentioned earlier, is a positive feedback loop: a chain of 
cause-and-effect relationships that closes in on itself so that a change 
in any one element in the loop will change the original element even more 
in that same direction.  Hence, an increase will cause a further increase 
(Meadows, 1992).  Therefore, since the East district has more people than 
the North now, the positive feedback loop suggests that the East district 
naturally will increase at a faster rate, even though the resources are 
more scarce.  
        Another reason that the East district is becoming more densely 
populated is because of the recent urbanization trends.  Figure 9 
illustrates the urbanization transition which has been occurring over the 
past fifty years.  In 1941, the census revealed no urban population at 
all.  By 1981, however, almost 20% of the population was considered 
urban.  This indicates that much of the population is concentrated in 
pockets, thus placing even more constraints on the resources in these 
urban centers.  While in some countries, urbanization trends have had 
beneficial impacts on deforestation   because large amounts of people 
with not enough forests are forced to find alternative sources of energy, 
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in Sikkim it is the urban centers which have suffered from the most 
deforestation as evidenced by land slides (Desai, 1988).    Nevertheless, 
the unevenly distributed population and the increasing urbanization 
trends mean that certain areas of Sikkim are becoming much more densely 
populated than that depicted in Riegers simulation.
Figure 9:
 Source:  Desai, 1988.
        Just as the number of people per geographic area is significantly 
higher in parts of Sikkim than in the simulation, so too is the 
corresponding number of people per forest area.  The simulation begins 
with an assumption of 1,000 people and 9,800 hectares of forest; this 
yields 9.8 hectares of forest per person.  After 100 years, the 
simulation indicates 1.18 hectares of forest per person.  According to 
many estimates of deforestation in Sikkim, the remaining forest area in 
the 1980s was 265,210 hectares while the population was 316,385.  This 
indicates a ratio of .84 hectares of forest per person.  Since .84 is 
already well below the simulations 1.18, this may indicate that the lines 
on the graph are actually closer together than those in Riegers 
simulation.   
        By using a different population growth rate and a higher density, 
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and assuming that extraction rates per person is similar to that used in 
the simulation, it is clear that the population and extraction curves 
will both be steeper than those in the simulation.  No data could be 
found on the natural forest growth rate or the rate at which forest stock 
is declining.  Therefore, by using the forestry rates depicted in the 
simulation, combined with higher population and extraction rates, it 
becomes clear that the point where these lines cross may occur sooner in 
Sikkim than in other Himalayan regions.   Consequently, Sikkim is 
currently at a point along the transition more similar to that projected 
for the second hundred years where the lines are closer together.   
Perhaps today is most accurately represented by the 100th year of the 
simulation rather than the 10th year.  Such information is critical for 
policy-makers and forest managers.  The immediacy of the situation needs 
to be considered in adopting and implementing new forest policies.
Changing Ethnic Compositions
        There are other demographic characteristics, not accounted for in 
Riegers simulation, which significantly affect resource use and 
consequently affect the forestry transition.  Numbers and statistics are 
often the most commonly used indicator of change in a society although 
other factors may have a more significant impact on resource use in a 
particular region.  For example, the different ethnic groups in Sikkim 
utilize forest resources very differently and consequently have very 
different impacts on the environment.  An increase in the population of 
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Nepalese people in Sikkim has caused corresponding changes in forest 
use.  Historically, Sikkim was inhabited by two major ethnic groups -- 
Lepchas and Bhotias.  The Lepchas are believed to be the original 
inhabitants of this area while the Bhotias are the Tibetan immigrants who 
took refuge in Sikkim in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.  These 
two groups intermarried and became assimilated.
        Before the 1900s, the Nepalese began to migrate to Sikkim because 
their lands were deforested, over-cultivated, and over-populated (Kazi, 
1993). In 1904, however, when Sikkim became a British protectorate, The 
Nepalese began to migrate in large numbers.  The Indian government 
encouraged Nepalese people to settle in Sikkim, help bring the land under 
cultivation, and build roads.  The Indian government also brought 
Nepalese people to Sikkim in an effort to outnumber the Tibetan-minded 
Sikkimese peoples so that the state as a whole would be more closely 
aligned with India than with Tibet.  As a government official said, an 
influx of hereditary enemies of Tibet (Nepalese) is the surest guarantee 
against revival of Tibetan influence. (Desai, 1988)  As a result, 
Nepalese people have moved in and now comprise approximately 80% of the 
population as shown in figure 10.  Not only has it changed the culture of 
Sikkim, but it has also impacted the forest base.
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Figure 10:
 Source:  Desai, 1988.
        In addition to the actual speed of immigration, the cultural 
differences between the Nepalese and the other ethnic groups has had a 
significant impact on forest destruction.  The traditional Bhotias and 
Lepchas practiced a shifting cultivation called jhuming in which they 
moved to a new location every time the soil began to erode and became 
less productive.  New land was cleared while old land was given time to 
rejuvenate.  Given the low population of Bhotias and Lepchas before the 
Nepalese arrived, there was always plenty of land to practice this type 
of agriculture sustainably.  However, when the Nepalese came, they 
brought with them knowledge of terrace farming in which they settled in 
one location and farmed the land.  Terrace farming has definite 
advantages over jhuming in terms of soil erosion; however, since the 
Nepalese came in such large numbers, most of the available land was 
cleared for these permanent settlements.  Additionally, with all the land 
in agriculture and a decreasing amount of forests, the amount of rainfall 
is reduced.
        The Nepalese were also brought to Sikkim to help build roads.  
This meant that not only were forests cleared for roads, but they were 
also cleared for new agricultural lands which became accessible by the 
new roads.  
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        The influx of Nepalese people also has an impact on the total 
population growth rate because as a group the Nepalese have a much higher 
fertility rate than the Bhotias and Lepchas.  While the Lepchas and 
Bhotias are poorer and therefore marry later because of the high bride 
price , the Nepalese have typically married at an early age and have 
traditionally practiced polygamy.  Since the Nepalese have a higher 
fertility rate, an increase in Nepalese residents means an increase in 
the overall fertility rate and consequently a higher growth rate for 
Sikkim.  While the arrival of Nepalese has caused Bhotias and Lepchas to 
assimilate, the Nepalese have maintained their traditional culture and 
fertility patterns rather than adapting to those of the host cultures.  
        While on some levels the Nepalese seem to contribute more to 
deforestation, there are other situations in which the Bhotias and 
Lepchas use more resources than the Nepalese.  While the Nepalese 
typically build concrete or mud thatched houses, the Lepcha and Bhotias 
have traditionally built their houses out of valuable timber even when 
other materials are available.  A house for 5 people requires one tree 
trunk annually for construction purposes.  Consequently, about seventy 
cubic meters of valuable wood is logged per house although less than 
twenty cubic meters would suffice if properly and efficiently utilized 
(Karan, 1984). 
        The Lepchas and Bhotias also have more livestock than the 
Nepalese.  These animals utilize the forests for grazing and deplete the 
forest density.   While tracts of forests are not necessarily cut down 
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for the livestock, the animals feed on the undergrowth and on young 
plants which affects the forest health and productivity.  
        Understanding these cultural differences in resource use enables 
policy-makers to design programs which target some of the fundamental 
causes of high extraction rates.  For example, by limiting the flow of 
immigration, less forests will need to be cleared for agriculture.  
Similarly, by providing education and incentives for Lepchas and Bhotias 
to utilize less valuable timber or other building materials for their 
houses, timber resources would be utilized more wisely.  
Tourism
        Another significant change which has affected resource use in 
Sikkim is the increasing number of tourists.  As other popular Himalayan 
tourist destinations become over crowded and deforested, tourists are 
flocking to Sikkim in search of unexplored and undisturbed environments.  
Relative to its neighbors, tourism is a recent phenomenon in Sikkim.  
While tourism in Nepal and Darjeeling began in the 60s and 70s,  tourism 
in Sikkim only recently began to accelerate in the 80s.  Although  
numbers and hard data describing the tourist trend in Sikkim are not 
available, a look at the trends in Nepal and Darjeeling, two places with 
similar natural resources and similar pressures, provides an indication 
of what may be currently occurring in Sikkim and also what is likely to 
occur.  Tourism in Nepal increased from 12,000 tourists in 1966 to 
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110,321 in 1975, an increase of 8.2%.  The number of foreign tourists in 
Darjeeling increased from 3,299 in 1974 to 10,977 in 1983 (Lama, 1994).  
Based on a survey done in 1976, over 90% of the tourists visiting 
Darjeeling are Indian nationals.  Therefore, it is estimated that between 
1974 and 1983 the number of tourists rose from 32,990 to 109,770.  While 
this is only a 3-fold increase in Darjeeling, tourists comprised 
one-tenth of the total population of Darjeeling at that time.  In both 
Darjeeling and Nepal tourists represent a significant percentage of the 
population although they are not typically accounted for in census data.  
Thus the actual population in these areas and their corresponding use of 
resources is significantly greater than what is depicted in the figures.
        Not only are the number of tourists significant, but also the 
type of tourists are important in that different types utilize resources 
differently.  The tourists in Nepal and Darjeeling can be divided into 
two major types, domestic and foreign.  In Darjeeling 90% of the tourists 
are Indian nationals who are coming to the hills for a long weekend or 
short stay.  These people are among the wealthier and are looking for 
somewhat luxurious tourist facilities.  Consequently, Darjeeling has 67 
hotels in the 4.4 square miles of the state.
        Nepal, on the other hand, caters to a different kind of 
tourist--trekkers who have come from places outside of India to hike in 
the Himalayas.  The resource needs of these tourists are very different 
from those of Darjeeling visitors.  Relatively speaking there are not 
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many hotels in Nepal because the majority of tourists are hiking, staying 
in modest accommodations, and theoretically eating more locally grown 
foods.  Thus, these tourists consume less of the forests.  However, the 
situation is not that simple since many of the trekkers in Nepal hike and 
stay at higher elevations near tree line, where the forests regenerate at 
a much slower rate than in the moist hill regions.  Thus, the location of 
these tourists has more destructive impacts on the environment.  
        Sikkim has a mixture of these two types of tourists with an 
estimate of 80% domestic tourists and 20% foreign tourists (Lama, 1994).  
Using the information from Nepal and Darjeeling, Sikkim has the 
opportunity to develop a tourism industry which caters specifically to 
the types of tourists who will have the least impact on the environment.  
Environmental  Impacts of Population Pressures
        The actual relationship of human activity and forest destruction 
has recently become more heavily studied and understood.  Although the 
exact rate of deforestation is unknown, the fact that it is occurring at 
fast speeds is suggested by the increasing number of landslides, one of 
the most common visible effects of deforestation in mountain 
environments.  While exact statistics on landslides are not available, 
experts agree that landslides are occurring more frequently than in the 
past (Blaraman, 1987).  The fact that they are reported to be most common 
around places with the highest density of people is an indication of the 
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interrelationship between people and landslides even though no specific 
data is available.  
        However, landslides have historically been a part of life in this 
area.  The physical geography, steep slopes, high amount of rainfall, 
drastic altitudinal changes and variety in soil types, as well as the 
geologically unstable, young nature of the Himalayan region, located on a 
fault line between two tectonic plates make Sikkim extremely susceptible 
to landslides.  Although there are many natural causes of landslides in 
Sikkim, there are also human factors which contribute to landslides. 
        The most obvious connection between human activity and landslides 
is deforestation.  As land is deforested, there are no longer root 
systems to keep the soil in place on the steeper slopes.  Thus, in a 
heavy rain, the soil is washed downhill resulting in huge landslides.  
Deforestation is probably the leading cause of soil erosion and hence 




        The chart illustrates that deforestation is caused by a 
combination of the number of people and the behavior of people.  Some of 
the boxes on the top level of the flow chart are areas that have been 
emphasized in this study -- differing demands for shelter among ethnic 
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groups and tourist types, food demand, construction techniques, 
agricultural techniques, and grazing.  Each of these uses trigger other 
processes leading directly to deforestation and landslides.  For Example, 
Cardamom is one of the largest commercial crops and is grown along steep 
river banks.  When the crops are harvested the soil is loosened and 
washed down stream after a heavy rain fall.  A use that is not depicted 
on the chart is the unscientific construction of roads and buildings on 
these steep slopes.  This is one of the biggest factors that can destroy 
natural ecosystems and trigger landslides (Desai, 1988).   Such 
construction prevents the free lateral movement of moisture.  Once this 
equilibrium is broken, progressive erosion occurs (Desai, 1988).
        The steep slopes and heavy rainfall mean a high velocity of water 
flow and therefore the transport of large quantities of silt, sand, 
boulders and timber.  This erodes the river valleys and decreases the 
lateral support to hill sides, causing cracks in the upper level due to 
mass stress.  As the cracks fill up with water, the resistance of the 
hillside decreases and major landslides occur.  Such landslides can 
extend uphill and lead to the collapse of steep faces causing dangerous 
damming of big rivers (Desai, 1988).
Policy Implications and Recommendations
        The consensus among experts that there is an increasing number of 
land slides and that these landslides are at least partially caused by 
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deforestation has been enough to trigger forestry policies and programs 
in Sikkim.  While the existence of government programs suggest progress 
and action, the approach used to arrive at such programs is often flawed; 
the policies are not based on scientific data or carefully designed and 
therefore fall short of achieving their objectives.  It has been a trend 
throughout history that policy makers prefer to make new policies rather 
than to successfully implement or monitor polices which have already been 
adopted.  Consequently, many policies are adopted haphazardly, do not 
address all the aspects of the problem they intend to solve, and are not 
monitored to see whether they are in fact effective.  
        In Sikkim, as in other areas and countries, the solutions to a 
problem as large as deforestation have been piece meal; each government 
department, development worker, or scientist has a different perception 
of the problem and a different solution.  The typical response to a 
problem such as deforestation is to sound the alarm and then take the 
driver seat, without analyzing the full scope of the problem and all its 
components.  In Sikkim for example, there are more than ten different 
government-sponsored developmental programs working on fixing 
deforestation -- the department of education, forest, land use, soil 
conservation, agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry, rural 
development, public works, power, health, and the Sikkim Trading 
Corporation and Spices Board.  While each department is working on an 
important component, there is no unified comprehensive overall natural 
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resource management strategy.  There has been little collaboration among 
the different departments to collectively try to understand the 
complexity of the problem.  The issue of deforestation spans many 
disciplines.  Consequently, solutions lie in an integrated 
cross-disciplinary approach where physical scientists, social scientists 
and demographers, local residents, and policy makers work together as a 
team.  
        The first and most obvious gap in Sikkims forestry policies is 
the dearth of numerical data and the uncertainty of the data which does 
exist.  Measuring forest cover has always been more of a challenge in 
mountainous regions, however the need for data here is as important if 
not more important than obtaining forestry data in other parts of the 
world.  The data that is available is largely qualitative.  For example, 
one scientist writing about deforestation (Moddie, 1981) describes the 
road heading north from Gangtok.  In 1947, 15 km up the track from 
Gangtok was one of the worlds finest rhododendron forests, dripping with 
500 cm of rainfall a year.  It was a shock to discover ten years later, 
that not one tree stood there.  Such data is typical of what is available 
on the deforestation situation in Sikkim.  Many of the reports discuss 
the fact that there are only 265,210 hectares of forest area left.  This 
figure is from the early 1980s and is the only figure found in all the 
different sources of information.  Thus, it is probable that one 
scientist came up with the figure and all the others have relied on that 
information as the commonly accepted amount of forest cover left.




        Among the various reports I found only one map illustrating the 
land use patterns (Figure 12).  While this map is better than nothing, it 
does not have enough detail upon which forestry policies and 
reforestation schemes can be based.  There is a real need in Sikkim for 
GIS and remote sensing technologies in order to understand the situation 
accurately enough to design strategies that will be effective.  Obtaining 
accurate and sufficient data should be the first step in developing 
policy recommendations.  Such information will serve as base line data 
against which success can be measured.  Having base line data is an 
essential tool needed to monitor the success of policies, and to know 
when certain policies need to be altered to better achieve their goal.  
Depending on the level of local expertise in this area, training programs 
may be needed in order to develop a skilled people who are able to gather 
such data.
        Another set of information which will be critical to designing 
effective policy is socio-cultural data.  It is becoming increasingly 
recognized that policies which do not examine and understand the social 
components and the needs of the local residents are often short-sighted 
and unsuccessful.  Consequently, a comprehensive study of the 
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socio-cultural aspects is desperately needed before any regional forestry 
policy can be designed.  There are many different approaches to use, 
including participatory rural appraisal or a social impact analysis, 
however the most essential element is to go to the villages, speak with 
the resource users themselves and become familiar with their specific 
needs.  This study has outlined some of the social aspects of the 
deforestation dilemma, yet the source of information has been largely 
outside experts or government leaders living in the capitol of Gangtok.  
It is typical for development work to rely on such information without 
actually going to the communities, having community meetings, and hearing 
from those groups of people whos voices are rarely heard.  
        The most important group to target in obtaining socio-cultural 
information is the village women.  These are the people who make the 
household resource decisions.  They gather the fuel for cooking and the 
fodder for livestock.  They are the ones playing the most vital role in 
the village economies.  They are also the ones most underrepresented in 
government departments or government decisions.  Culturally, they do not 
interact much with men and therefore they do not participate in 
decisions, nor do they have access to information about natural resource 
issues.  Consequently, it will be essential to spend time with these 
groups of women to understand their resource needs.  Given the cultural 
norms, the most valuable data would probably be obtained from a female 
researcher rather than a male one.  Such details are often overlooked yet 
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are critical to obtaining accurate data which will lead to effective 
policy strategies.  
        The final set of information needed is data regarding 
deforestation patterns and forestry polices in other parts of the 
Himalayas.  Such information can be used to assess which strategies have 
previously been used and which ones have been effective.  This will 
assist the government in implementing policies and programs which have a 
greater likelihood of effectively reversing the current deforestation 
trends rather than implementing programs which have already failed in 
other areas. 
        The most obvious intervention strategy is to improve the 
regeneration rate of forests using afforestation schemes and 
erosion/landslide control.  However, these two solutions deal with the 
immediacy of a particular situation yet do not address or alter the 
fundamental causes of the problem.  Looking back to figure 11, soil 
erosion and deforestation are in the lower half of the flow chart.  While 
schemes to reverse these trends are important and do address the most 
visible aspect of the problem, the underlying causes of the problem 
remain unchanged.  Consequently, while more trees may be planted, the 
consumption rate and overall deforestation rate, affected by population 
numbers and behaviors, will continue to increase.  Thus afforestation 
programs and erosion control measures will not be effective when 
implemented in isolation.
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        Solutions need to focus on the causes of deforestation, those 
boxes that are at the top of the flow chart -- the number of people and 
the behavior of people.  This first part of this study has illustrated 
how these two factors, number and behavior, affect resource use 
differently.  Utilizing the information outlined previously, policy 
makers can begin to design solutions which deal directly with the causes 
of the problem.  Consequently, rather than investing money in 
reforestation and scientific remedies, it is important to address the 
human components which are at the heart of deforestation.
        The foremost social intervention involves reducing the population 
growth rate.  Based on the first part of the paper, it is apparent that 
handing out birth control may not be the most direct approach to limiting 
population numbers.  In fact, the most important strategy does not 
involve fertility rates at all, but rather, involves the migration rates 
of Nepalese residents since this has been the driving force behind rising 
population growth rates.  The second area to target is fertility rates.  
However, these programs need to specifically target the Nepalese 
residents rather than the Bhotias and Lepchas; the Nepalese are the ones 
with high fertility rates.  Such details, based on a sound analysis of 
the situation, are absolutely critical to the success of the various 
policies.  A typical policy maker, government bureaucrat, or development 
worker may not realize these subtleties and may invest significant 
amounts of money on birth control in an area dominated by Bhotias and 
Lepchas who have an extremely low fertility rate anyway.  Reducing 
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migration and curbing the fertility rate of Nepalese are two initial 
strategies to reduce the number of people.  After a comprehensive 
analysis of socio-cultural factors has been conducted and more base line 
data has been gathered about the specific regions of Sikkim and the 
different ethnic groups, other strategies can be devised which 
specifically address the needs of these people.
        The second social intervention that can be used to reverse 
deforestation is to change population behaviors and therefore consumption 
rates.  This study has outlined the various ways in which differing 
behaviors affect resource use differently in Sikkim.  Based on this 
study, specific behavior patterns can be targeted in an effort to 
decrease the rate of deforestation.  
        The first and perhaps most effective strategy in changing anyones 
behavior is through education.  In addition to targeting those people who 
currently go to school, education programs need to address those 
populations who do not attend school and instead are at home managing the 
natural resource needs and decisions.  These are primarily the women.  
Women are the ones who make the majority of natural resource decisions 
yet they have the least access to information on conservation and 
resource management techniques.  Targeting this female population through 
village workshops, adult education programs, and dissemination of 
educational materials would be an important first step. There needs to be 
a mixture of formal technical programs and informal non-technical ones 
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which cater to the different learning styles.  Once a group of women are 
educated, these women can then work as a team to educate other women in 
rural communities about natural resource management techniques.  More 
broad educational programs should follow after these initial female 
education programs have been implemented.   
        Some of the most obvious behaviors to change are those at the top 
of the flow chart in Figure 11.  For example, housing construction and 
agricultural  techniques are two aspects discussed earlier which 
contribute to high consumption levels.  By providing education to the 
Bhotias and Lepchas about the wood they are using to construct their 
houses, these people may be willing to change their practices if they 
understand the environmental impacts and consequences of their current 
construction methods.  Showing them alternative housing styles which use 
different types of wood or different building materials altogether could 
be enough to encourage them to change their current practices.  The 
initial socio-economic studies will be helpful in assessing their current 
housing needs and in finding suitable solutions.  
        A second behavior change which could be encouraged is a shift in 
the agricultural techniques which are currently being used.  For example, 
by having the Bhotias and Lepchas practice less jhuming (shifting 
cultivation) and switch to terrace farming, the land that was 
traditionally left fallow can be used for tree nurseries and 
reforestation programs.  In addition, a closer examination of the 
file:///C|/545/1995/preston.htm (29 of 38) [6/18/2008 10:58:06 AM]
545\preston
different agricultural techniques that are being used in the Himalayan 
region is needed in order to determine the most effective agricultural 
techniques with the least destructive impacts.  Agroforestry programs, 
which have been started in Sikkim, have been fairly successful although 
they are not widespread.  By planting certain species, farmers can reduce 
soil erosion while also earning economic profits from exported products 
such as cardamom and mandarin oranges.  By capitalizing on specific 
agricultural approaches such as these, farmers will be able to maximize 
production while minimizing environmental degradation.
        Another potential behavioral change which would require further 
study is the impacts of urbanization.  In some parts of the world, 
urbanization has had a positive effect on rates of deforestation.  In 
such situations urbanization trends have been paralleled with a rise in 
alternate energy sources.  This arose out of necessity because the amount 
and location of forests were inadequate for the large numbers of urban 
residents.  If Sikkim adopted alternate cooking fuels like kerosene or 
solar power, the urbanization phenomenon may not have a negative impact 
on forest resources from an energy perspective.  
        However, unless there is an increase in construction technology, 
urbanization will still be destructive from a soil erosion perspective.  
Currently, the poor technology used to build roads and buildings has led 
to an increasing number of landslides.  A study of similar urban areas 
located in mountainous terrain would help determine how, if at all, to 
file:///C|/545/1995/preston.htm (30 of 38) [6/18/2008 10:58:06 AM]
545\preston
develop urban areas in Sikkim.  A study could show that given the extreme 
vertical topography, it is not feasible to have large urban centers.  In 
this case, there needs to be policies which provide adequate services to 
the villages so that there are few incentives to migrate to urban areas.  
The issue of urbanization is a good example of an aspect of deforestation 
which may be overlooked by those developing forestry policies, yet is 
clearly interrelated. 
        A final aspect of deforestation which addresses both numbers of 
people and behaviors of people is the growing tourism industry.  As 
mentioned previously, the tourism industry is just recently beginning to 
grow and expand.  The government needs to understand the dynamics of 
tourism and the potential environmental and social impacts before it can 
develop an effective strategic plan for the area.  In recent years, 
Sikkim has responded to tourism by developing  facilities as needed.  For 
example, they have upgraded the accommodations with modern amenities, 
improved the transportation system with a fleet of comfortable vehicles; 
increased the opportunities for adventure tourists by providing trekking 
equipment, new trekking routes, and even hang gliding and river rafting; 
and finally, they have improved the publicity and availability of tourist 
information through private and governmental media.  While all these 
approaches are appropriate, the country lacks an overall tourism 
management plan.  The country needs to be proactive in determining what 
kinds of tourism are best for Sikkim and then devising strategies that 
are in their best interest rather being reactive to the tourist demands.
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        The government again, needs to examine successes and failures of 
other Himalayan tourist destinations, especially those areas that have 
failed.  This will help Sikkim to create a tourist destination that not 
only provides the best services for tourists, but also has the least 
environmental and social impacts on the area as a whole.  As mentioned in 
the analysis above, Sikkim now caters largely to domestic tourists rather 
than foreign ones.  There needs to be a formal study on the difference 
between these two types of tourists to determine which type of tourist 
will be more beneficial for Sikkim.  Through a careful analysis of all 
the components of tourism, one can arrive at specific innovations which 
will determine the success and sustainability of Sikkims tourism industry 
in the future.  
        For example, if a study indicates that trekker tourists in 
general uses fewer resources than wealthy weekend tourists, yet has a 
significant negative impact on the fragile alpine environment, strategies 
can be devised which reduce such impact.  For example, trekking routes 
can be designed through the lowland areas where the vegetation is more 
sturdy.  In addition to having less impact, these new routes could make 
trekking more appealing to those populations who traditionally prefer to 
avoid extreme altitudes or cold temperatures.  
        Another solution would be to devise a way for trekking at high 
altitudes to have less negative environmental impacts.  Since almost a 
third of Sikkim is uninhabitable because it is under rock and snow, 
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perhaps trekker tourism would be a good way to put this land to use.  
This would require designing specific trails and encouraging tourists to 
stay on them, providing for increased litter and trash, having kerosene 
imported for cooking, and possibly even having solar outhouses to take 
care of human waste.  Opening up such a high altitude trekking industry 
would provide many jobs, especially for those people who live in these 
extreme conditions of the North District and are well-suited to fill 
these roles.  There would be a need for some outside technological help, 
yet this could be the perfect avenue for development agencies eager to 
fund useful projects. 
        If the results of a tourism study show that trekkers overall have 
less impact than domestic weekend visitors, then publicity strategies are 
needed which attract foreign trekker tourists and discourage domestic 
ones.  The simplest approach to limiting domestic tourists is to limit 
the number of luxury accommodations. 
        In sum, Sikkim needs to take an active role in shaping the future 
of their tourism industry  rather than simply responding to the tourism 
demands as they arise.  This will enable Sikkim to plan for the future 
and to develop an industry that will be effective and sustainable when 
other Himalayan destinations are deforested and overpopulated.  
        This policy section has outlined a number of possible steps which 
could be taken to reverse the deforestation trends.  Underlying all of 
them is the need for a rigorous monitoring and evaluation system.  As 
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mentioned previously, in many parts of the world, policies are 
implemented but there effects are rarely monitored and therefore it is 
difficult to determine if the policies have been effective.  Given that 
there will be baseline data from the initial studies, the Sikkimese 
government will be able to monitor the different components of the 
overall strategy in order to terminate programs that are not working, 
alter ones that could be working better, and to also determine which 
programs are effective and should be replicated in other areas.  By 
monitoring programs and sharing the information about successful and 
unsuccessful programs, effective deforestation programs will emerge.
Conclusion
        This study has used other Himalayan regions in an effort to first 
predict deforestation trends in Sikkim and then examine the population 
and environmental factors specific to Sikkim which have influenced the 
rate of deforestation.  This has provided a more accurate picture of the 
deforestation transition in Sikkim despite the absence of numerical 
forestry data.  Hopefully the study has illustrated for policy makers and 
others, the complexity of issues surrounding the deforestation 
phenomenon.  The final policy section has provided a map of issues for 
policy makers to consider before adopting any one specific policy or 
strategy.  Deforestation needs to be addressed in its entirety, 
incorporating all the interrelated aspects of the problem.  Strategic 
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planning must be a joint effort of multi-disciplinary experts combined 
with the local people who utilize the resources.  Plans must be focused 
on long-term visions and goals and not just on solving immediate problems 
and disasters.  By addressing these needs, Sikkim has the potential to be 
a model Himalayan ecosystem which has maintained its biodiversity of 
species, unique and pristine mountain environment, enclaves of 
traditional cultures, and a sustainable economy.
APPENDIX 1
Map 1:  Sikkim
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN  
KAREN ROWE  
HYDROPOWER IN NEPAL
Introduction  
        Nepal is a mountainous region with a number of Himalayan rivers flowing 
throughout the country, and there is no doubt that harnessing some of these waters will 
assist in improving the socio-economic well-being of Nepals people (see map). By 
investing in hydropower projects Nepal will be exploiting a clean, renewable energy 
source. However, it becomes Nepals task to recognize the trade-offs that exist in 
implementing different types of dams, to truly ensure that the country is working towards 
improving the socio-economic well-being of its people.  
         There is an ongoing debate over small and large dam projects. In this paper evidence 
of the merits and drawbacks of each of will be considered and this evidence will lead to a 
rationale which supports the notion that Nepal is not ready for large scale dam projects. 
Therefore, Nepal should focus its efforts on creating policies directed to smaller projects. 
A general overview of both the positive and negative effects of dams is discussed, 
followed by a more specific look at the benefits and threats to implementing dam projects 
in Nepal.  
        This position will be supported by using the Transition Theory. Investigation of 
population-environment dynamics is complicated and can involve a number of intricate 
analyses. Transition theory is an effort to break down this complex dynamic. It views the 
population-environment relationship as a family of transitions. Drake (1992) has defined 
transition to describe a specific period of time which spans the shift from slow to rapid 
change in the sector and then usually a return to relative stability (p. 302). Transitions 
have similarities and differences and the timing of them is very important because the 
timing affects societal vulnerability and is frequently influenced by public policy (p.303). 
It is also important to recognize that various sectors can experience transitions 
simultaneously and this reference serves to maximize or minimize the effects on the 
societys ability to cope with the transition. Which stages of transition a country may be in 
should be examined to determine whether it is in its critical period when society is 
vulnerable to damage. Also, transition theory explains that the completion of a transition, 
meaning returning to a steady state, does not necessarily lead to improved conditions, but 
may be more detrimental to a society. Intervention and action is therefore needed to assure 
the smooth progression of sectors through their various transitions (Drake, 1992).  
        The case of Nepal illustrates that the timing of transition is crucial, and that lack of 
positive interventions may result in deleterious consequences. An examination of the 
agriculture, forestry, energy and demographic transitions will be presented in order to 
understand how these transitions interact and serve to impede or enhance Nepals overall 
development and growth, with particular attention to the energy sector and its role in 
Nepals future. 
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General Dam Information  
        Modern dam construction was initiated in the 1920s, advanced after 1950 up until 
today, and today globally there are more than 38,000 dams (Gardner and Perry, 1995). 
Although there was a decline in dam construction in the 1980s, both the number of dams 
being built and the average dam size have been increasing in the 1990s.  
        Industrialized nations were the first to construct dams, yet more recently three 
quarters of dam projects undertaken are in developing countries. It has been recognized 
that dams have generally been regarded as a symbol of modernity and a source of national 
prestige, partly because they are seen as a multipurpose tool of development (Gardner and 
Perry, 1995, p.201). The potential uses and benefits from dams are well known. Dams are 
a source of electric power, a means of flood control, a source of supply for water irrigation 
projects and a possible recreation outlet. In 1992 more than 18% of the worlds electricity 
came from hydroelectric power created by dams. Dams have also provided assurance in 
areas where drought occurs by holding water in reservoirs that can be used when there is 
no rainfall. Dams can also control the flow of rivers and thus alleviate flooding problems. 
More recently the impetus for building dams has come from the apparent need for more 
sophisticated irrigation projects due to countries growing need for food and water.  
        Within a broadly focused dam project there are a number of possible negative side 
effects. Reservoirs can produce decomposing plant life at the bottom which may release 
greenhouse gases (CO2 and Methane) into the air, at rates comparable to coal production 
plants (Gardner and Perry, 1995). In addition, the nutrient rich sediment used for soil may 
get caught in a dams reservoir and this sediment may shorten the expected life of the 
reservoir. Finally there is a degree of uncertainty as to the long-term usefulness of a 
reservoir which is determined by its level of siltation and sedimentation.  
        Dams have potential negative effects on the human population as well. Large scale 
water projects were a major contributor to the 75% global increase in cases of 
schistosomaisis. In addition, to create reservoirs or even build roads to facilitate the 
construction of dams, it becomes necessary to displace certain individuals and 
communities. In the past, most resettlement or relocation of individuals has not been well 
thought out and has left these people in worse conditions than before. Often these 
individuals attempt to move back near their original homes and people who live near dams 
face increased health risks. Another negative effect on people is the loss of arable land. 
Dams are intended to increase irrigation, and improve the productivity of the land, yet 
reservoirs eat up the arable land. The larger the project, the bigger the land loss, and 
consequently the more people ousted from their farm land. Finally, dams in seismic 
regions can cause severe suffering to a country.  
        With dam projects, the positive and negative effects are influenced by and vary 
greatly depending on the environmental, social and political context within the country or 
region. A look at Nepals geography, environmental condition, and social and political 
status illustrates the importance of examining these relevant aspects within the context of 
the country. Potential dam construction will have a strong impact in many of the sectors in 
Nepal, most directly affecting the agriculture, forestry and energy sectors. 
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Nepal: General Review  
        Nepal is a small landlocked country about 500 miles long and 100 miles wide. It is 
located in the Himalaya mountains and bordered by China to the north and India to the 
south, east and west. It is a mountainous country with approximately 77% of its total area 
occupied by hills and mountains (Poudel, 1991). It is a country of physical extremes from 
the arctic high Himalaya in the north to the subtropical hot flatlands in the south. It has a 
population of approximately 20 million, made up of many different ethnic, cultural and 
linguistic backgrounds. In Nepal there is a hierarchical society with a strong caste system 
still dictating ones place in society.  
        Nepal is one of the least developed nations in the world, and has one of the lowest 
per capita incomes. In addition, there continues to be an increase in the population and an 
increase in misuse of the land. Infant mortality rates are among the highest in the world 
and life expectancy at birth among the lowest. Half the population lives at or just above 
the starvation level; this fact has a significant impact on the environmental degradation. 
The extreme poverty is both a cause and effect of environmental degradation. The 
impoverished farmers lack access to economic assets and are forced to exploit whatever 
resources are available, without consideration of the environmental consequences. Dahal 
and Guru-Gharana (1993) in their paper Environment and Sustainable Development in 
Nepal assert that: 
Poverty, population growth and lack of education and awareness (including 
personal and environmental hygiene), coupled with institutional problems 
including inefficiency and poor technology of public utilities are causing 
this process of environmental degradation (p. 171).
        Additionally, the countrys lack of infrastructure, such as transport and 
communication, has severely limited its economic opportunities. Such conditions lead to 
heavy reliance on its natural resources. There is an over exploitation of some its natural 
resources such as forests, yet there is an under exploitation of other resources such as 
water (i.e. hydroelectric energy source) (Dahal and Guru-Gharana, 1993). Historically 
Nepal has relied heavily on foreign aid for development and the majority of the 
development projects are conceptually born in the aid negotiation arena rather than on the 
planning desk (Bhadra, 1982, p.6).  
        Finally, as Nepal is a landlocked nation with a small domestic market, and limited 
natural resources, it must rely on its neighbor, India, for any international market 
opportunities. Since Indo-Nepal relations have been rather tenuous, Nepals manufacturing 
sector has remained small, representing a mere 1% of the Nepalese workforce. 
Hydropower Development in Nepal  
Water Resources in Nepal  
        Nepal has over 6,000 rivers and streams. Its water resources constitute about 2.27% 
of the world stock for about .35% of the world population (Dahal and Guru-Gharana, 
1993). It is drained by 3 major river systems: the Kosi in the east, the Gandaki in the 
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central region, and the Karnaki in the west. Most major river basins originate in the 
Himalaya and are snow or ice glacier fed and maintain relatively high flow. Thus with 
such steep topography and such immense river resources (see Map 1) the potential for 
hydroelectric power is great. Based on annual run-off of rivers the theoretical potential 
hydropower of Nepal is estimated to be about 83,000MW. Of that 83,000MW the amount 
that can be economically exploited ranges from conservative estimates of 30% to just over 
50% (UNCED, 1990, Shresta, 1991). Yet the actual installed hydropower capacity by the 




Hydro facts  
1000 watts = 1 kilowatt (kW)   
1000 kW = 1 megawatt (MW)   
When 1kW of electricity is used for 1 hour, 1 
electrical unit is consumed (1kWh) Hydro-electric 
power plants are generally classified into two 
types as storage and run of river systems. A 
storage system involves a dam which holds water 
back to form a reservoir having sufficient 
capacity. Run of river plant is built on a river 
which has a sustained dry season flow that can be 
diverted for electricity generation (Dixit, 1991). 
Energy and Hydropower  
        Figure 1 below reveals that Nepal is not energy independent, rather it relies on 
energy imports of coal and oil to meet most of its commercial energy needs. Meanwhile, it 
is evident that the amount of hydropower exploited thus far is too minimal to help the 
country meet its commercial energy needs. 
Figure 1. 
Source: World Resources Data Base, 1995. 
However, if Nepal were to further exploit its hydro-electric energy source, the country 
could achieve energy independence, as well as bring in revenue to help economic 
development. But at what cost to its people and their environment? Is energy 
independence something Nepal is in a position to be striving for, and more importantly 
what are the trade-offs of achieving this independence? In order to become an energy 
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independent country Nepal would have to implement large, expensive dam projects. This 
cannot be done without outside financial assistance and regional cooperation from its 
neighbor, India. However, smaller dam projects aimed at rural development and rural 
electrification may prove to be less risky financially, environmentally and socially, and 
thus more suitable to a country that is already financially strained, environmentally 
threatened, and politically weak. Table 1 shows the major potential benefits and 
detriments to both large and small dam projects in Nepal. 
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        Nepals energy needs are increasing, as seen in Figure 1, and hydropower 
development seems beneficial. Nepal can exploit this resource not only as a clean energy 
source for domestic needs but also as a resource to sell electricity to India to benefit 
economically. Water resource development can provide great opportunities for regional 
cooperation. Both India and Bangladesh could benefit if dam construction led to flood 
reduction and improved irrigation; Nepal could benefit economically from the sale of 
electricity. Yet there are a number of potential negative side effects that need to be 
considered carefully before a decision to embark on some sort of sharing a river project.  
        Nepal, historically and currently, overuses its forest for energy, resulting in severe 
deforestation. Dams in Nepal could provide a renewable, clean source of energy to take 
the pressure off the much overused forestry sector. Dams would also prove highly 
beneficial in assisting the agriculture sector by improving irrigation with a consequent 
increase in production. An increase in food production has a direct effect on the quality of 
life of the people. Finally, large, regional dam projects would allow for electricity sales 
and hydro-dollars that could contribute significantly to Nepals economic growth.  
        The need to exploit water resources seems apparent and appears to be needed to 
improve the socio-economic well-being of Nepals people. However, careful consideration 
of the type of dam project most suited for Nepal is also needed to prevent negative 
consequences which would be harmful to the people. Therefore a closer look at Nepals 
demographic situation, as well as the environmental conditions in the forestry, agriculture 
and energy sectors is provided. 
Transitions in Nepal  
Demographic Transition  
        In the demographic transition it is important to consider the crude birth and death 
rates and the overall timing of these two rates. Generally in the demographic transition the 
death rates start to decline earlier than the birth rates. How this process occurs is 
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influenced by a number of factors, some of which can inhibit a country from lowering its 
population growth rate in order to complete a successful demographic transition.  
        Continued high population growth rates is evident in many developing countries. 
This translates to increased demand for goods and services and puts direct pressure on the 
environment. Public policy and positive interventions are often implemented to help a 
country reduce its population growth rate and thus begin to improve its management of 
impacts caused by severe population pressure. The timing of when a country begins the 
demographic transition, and of how fast fertility declines once the transition begins are 
critical factors which have significant impact on many other sectors.  
        Figures 2 and 3 illustrate that Nepal is in the beginning stage of its demographic 
transition. The birth rate has begun to decrease, and the population growth rate has also 
begun to decline. 
Figure 2. 
Figure 3. 
        However, it is important to remember that while the population growth rate has 
peaked at 2.8%, it is still quite high and therefore the total population growth will continue 
to increase at possibly an unmanageable level. Some estimates project that current efforts 
to slow population growth will not make a significant impact until 2030 (UNCED, 1990). 
The World Bank reports conclude that Nepals demographic situation is among the worst 
in the world (Seddon, 1994). Also, one should be aware that different sources indicate 
rather different projection estimates, and data from many developing countries is at best 
questionable. Yet for Nepal, all generally conclude that their population will continue to 
increase and that crude birth rates are still high despite concerted population control 
efforts.*  
        The population distribution in Nepal has also been experiencing changes since the 
late 1960s. Increased migration to the Terai (flatlands) began when forests were cleared 
through a malaria eradication project in the 1950s. Environmental stress in the hills caused 
by deforestation, a shortage of wood fuel and soil erosion, and an increasing population 
pressure on the land was recognized. Thus with the clearance of the forests in the Terai, 
more agricultural lands opened up and hill farmers suffering from the poor conditions in 
the hills began to head south to obtain land or to farm others land (Sill and Kirkby, 1991). 
In addition to males migrating for agricultural opportunities, females too began to migrate 
for marriage opportunities. As families recognized the severity of the situation in the hills, 
and the opportunities in the Terai, they began sending their daughters to the Terai to find 
husbands who had obtained land and presumably, a better life.  
        Table 2 reveals the change in the make up of the hills and Terai from 1970 to 1980. 
In the 1970s towns in the Terai started to emerge along with industrial and commercial 
development. This occurrence caused additional increase in the internal migration pattern. 
If migration to the Terai continues, Nepal will slowly evolve from being a hill and 
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mountain society to a plains and urban country (Sill and Kirkby, 1991). 
Table 2 Internal Migration in Nepal  




Hill 52.5% 47.7% 
Terai 37.6% 43.6%
Source: Atlas of Nepal in the Modern World, 1991  
  
However, counter-beliefs as well as empirical evidence indicate that this is unlikely. Rural 
to urban migration does not yet appear to be very significant in absolute numbers.  
        Another important factor inhibiting the structural change from the hills to plains 
society is the impact that tourism is having on the mountain areas. Nepal has become a 
paradise of sorts to many tourists who visit Nepal for the trekking, mountaineering and 
sight seeing. Tourism has become a major foreign exchange earner (23% of the total 
foreign exchange earnings) and plays a role in enhancing the economic development of 
the country. The number of tourists continues to grow and has increased exponentially 
since the 1950s when Nepal first opened its doors to foreigners. In 1966 the number of 
tourists was 12,000 while in 1988 more than 300,000 tourists visited Nepal (Bista, 1991). 
The impact of mountain tourism on the economy seems to have slowed the trend of 
migration to the Terai.  
  
Mountain people like the Sherpa have shown great tenacity in holding on to 
their subsistence lifestyle and the development of mountain tourism has 
enhanced the resource value of otherwise negative environments (Sill and 
Kirkby, 1991, p.25)
Mountain tourism can also have profound negative environmental effects and policies 
should be made to minimize the negative environmental, social and cultural costs 
associated with tourism, and to maximize the positive effects of providing foreign 
exchange and becoming a positive means of economic development.  
        The demographic factors in Nepal reveal high but decreasing infant mortality and 
crude birth rates, yet the total fertility rates remain quite high, 5.47 in 1995 (WRD, 1995) 
and have changed minimally in the past decade. The resulting continued increase in the 
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population has led to population pressure on the land that can not be solved by internal 
migration. Nepals population dynamic has severe implications for the environment. As 
environmental conditions worsen it becomes more difficult for other sectors to complete a 
smooth transition to a steady positive state. 
Forestry Transition  
        In Nepal the present rate of deforestation exceeds the rate of plantation and natural 
regeneration (UNCED, 1990). Forest degradation has been recognized in Nepal for a 
number of years and direct attempts have been made to address this hazardous 
environmental problem. Nepal is currently in the midst of the forest transition, 
experiencing rapid deforestation. It is in the critical period when rates of change are high, 
limited societal adaptive capacity and an imbalance among key variables exists 
(Drake,1992). Over 75% of energy needs and over 40% of fodder needs are met by forests 
(Bajracharya, 1993).  
        The rate of deforestation is often driven by the general demand for forest products 
and in Nepal the demand is extremely high. Forests alone are the source of almost 96% of 
rural household energy needs (Dahal and Guru-Gharana, 1993). Forest use in Nepal is 
primarily of three kinds: cutting of branches for fuelwood, cutting whole trees for paper, 
construction and commercial use and the clearing of forest area for agricultural land use.  
        Nepals local condition impedes a successful movement through the transition. It is 
believed that if there is a heavy local demand for fuelwood, steep slopes, infertile soils and 
limited water availability, the forest transition can take a different form (Drake, 1992, p. 
316). Nepal certainly is represented by all of these characteristics since more than two 
thirds of the countrys land is steep slopes, fuelwood remains the countrys main energy 
source, population pressure on the land is causing the soil to be overused and become 
increasingly infertile. Finally, limited ability for sophisticated irrigation schemes on such 
steep slopes has at times resulted in insufficient water.  
        Additionally, Nepals forests are not evenly distributed in relation to the population, 
thus intensifying the overuse of forests in many densely populated areas. This uneven 
distribution pattern of forest and population causes problems for people collecting fire 
wood and fodder. Estimates show in some hill areas the demand supply ratio of forest 
produce ranges from 2.3:1 to 4.1:1 (UNCED, 1990). Fuelwood is the major source of 
energy for cooking and heating in the rural areas, and urban consumption of woodfuel is 
shown to increase with income despite the availability of alternative sources such as 
kerosene and electricity. (Sill and Kirkby, 1991) This phenomenon is an important 
indicator of the Nepalese peoples reliance on the more traditional methods to which they 
are accustomed. It may indicate a lack of intervention in education and/or policy aimed at 
helping individuals to make necessary changes. While it seems that discoveries of 
alternate energy sources would help to alleviate this high pressure on the forest, this 
example illustrates that the discovery of alternatives alone is not enough.  
        Deforestation can be directly attributed to human activity. Examples are loss of soil 
productivity by overuse and increased erosion due to extension of agriculture and roads 
into the steep fragile slopes throughout the hills. The need for more agricultural land is 
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also drastically affecting the rate of deforestation. It is clear that this continued rate of 
woodfuel consumption has led to supply problems and environmental damage. Yet if 
more agricultural land for food is needed, because of an increasing population and thus a 
higher rate of energy and food consumption, deforestation will undoubtedly continue at 
high rates. 
Agricultural Transition  
        Agriculture is the defining element in Nepals economy with more than 90% of the 
population depending on subsistence farming. Agriculture is approximately 57% (data 
varies depending on the source from 54% - 65%) of the GDP and over 90% of the 
working population are engaged in agriculture (UNCED, 1990).  
        Drakes Transition Theory explains that worldwide agricultural production has been 
rising in relative harmony with population and this is due primarily to two main factors: 
the extension of land under cultivation and improvements in land productivity. However, 
in Nepal evidence reveals that while cultivated land has increased in the past in some 
areas of Nepal due to population growth, this expansion has been to marginal lands and 
thus minimized the improvements in land productivity. In other areas, the Eastern Hills for 
example, the amount of cultivated land has remained constant for the past fifty years (Sill 
and Kirkby, 1991). This expansion of cultivation to marginal lands leads to negative 
results including a decrease in average crop yields, an increase in soil erosion, and further 
loss of forest land, which is already being depleted at a high rate to meet the energy needs 
of the country. From 1965-1985, the amount of cultivated land in Nepal increased by 30% 
and the cropping intensity increased by 54% (Khatry, 1992). Yet data in tables 1 and 2 
indicate that in the future cultivated land will not increase, yet cropping intensity will.  
  
Table 3.  
  
1985 2005
Cropping   
Intensity 
%





Cropping   
Intensity 
%





Mountain 135 1.07 140 1.62
Hills 170 1.30 175 2.33
Terai 163 2.00 190 3.02 
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Table 4.  
  
1985 2005 
Cultivated   
(ha/capita)
Cropped   
(ha/
capita)
Cultivated   
(ha/capita)
Cropped   
(ha/
capita)
Mountain 0.15 0.25 0.08 0.11
Hills 0.12 0.20 0.06 0.11
Terai 0.17 0.28 0.11 0.22
Source: Khatry, 1992  
  
However, despite such high cropping intensity in the hills, yields are still much lower than 
in the Terai. This reinforces the observation that much of the land in the hills is not 
suitable for cultivation, and farmers are forced to continue to farm marginal lands that fail 
to yield high outputs.  
        In order, to increase agricultural land productivity both fertilization and irrigation are 
needed, both of which are severally limited in the hills. Fertilizers need to be imported and 
transported to the hills, which is costly and unaffordable for the majority of the 
subsistence farmers. More sophisticated irrigation schemes are too expensive and beyond 
the technological capability of Nepal. However improvement and enhancement of 
irrigation schemes is needed to improve agricultural productivity by allowing for more use 
of fertilizer and the introduction of new kinds of crops.  
        Figure 4 illustrates that while the amount of arable land seems to have peaked, the 
irrigated land has been generally increasing, indicating improved techniques. There are a 
variety of techniques used in Nepal, including some small hydroelectric power projects. 
However, as indicated by data (see tables 3 and 4) revealing the troubles in both the hills 
and Terai, it seems more effort is needed to improve irrigation schemes to allow for 
maximum agricultural productivity on limited land availability. 
Figure 4. 
Major causes for the downward trend in crop yields is the soil erosion, decline in soil 
fertility, high soil erosion in the Terai (flatlands) and lack of irrigation facilities. The high 
soil erosion rate leads to other negative consequences such as landslides. Landslides 
coupled with high sedimentation levels resulting from sediment loads carried by the major 
rivers in Nepal increase the dangers of flooding. Even though Nepalese farmers are 
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apparently taking measures to prevent such occurrences, it is certainly not within the 
capability of subsistence level farmers to tackle such overwhelming problems by 
themselves. The impoverished farmer is forced to exploit natural resources, because he 
has no other viable option. Such actions inevitably leads to further destruction of the land 
and eventually an overall decline in agricultural production. There is a clear need for 
interventions aimed at improving the land quality to benefit the struggling farmers who 
make up the bulk of the population.  
        As is common in other South and Southeast Asian countries, Nepali farmers too, 
suffer from unequal distribution of land. Two-thirds of all farmers have small plots of land 
which relegates them to constant poverty. Farms are particularly small in the hills, and the 
average hill farmer has enough land to feed his family for less than 6 months. Food 
shortages, loss of land in the hills from landslides and poor soil quality have profound 
effects on the lives of many hill farmers. This situation has lead to agricultural 
intensification, the farming of marginal lands and internal migration.  
        Nepal is aware of its agricultural problems and limitations and they have been a 
priority in development projects since the 1970s, yet despite such efforts there continues 
to be a decline in crop yields. That is not to say that Nepali farmers are ignorant and 
simply continue to promote land degradation. Nepali farmers, are responding to such 
degradation, with as much innovation as within their power. Many of Nepals hillsides are 
comprised of terraced land plots in an effort to maximize utilization of the land while 
preventing the land erosion caused by both landslides and the monsoon rains. 
Energy Transition  
        There are two different energy sources in the developing world: (1) traditional 
biomass fuels usually found in rural areas including wood, crop waste, and animal dung 
and (2) modern commercial fuels such as coal, petroleum products, natural gas, and 
electricity. 
Energy Consumption in Nepal
        Nepal presently still relies very heavily on traditional biomass fuels for energy 
consumption. These traditional fuels, especially wood, account for more than 90% of its 
energy consumption. Such high rates of traditional biomass consumption are evident in 
both the forestry and agricultural sectors which suffer supply problems and environmental 
damage. Furthermore, Nepal has the lowest commercial energy consumption per capita of 
any developing country (World Bank, 1989). There are many possible explanations for 
this given the present economic and social conditions in Nepal: 
* It is still far cheaper for Nepalese to continue to use traditional fuels by 
stripping the forests  
* Since most of the population lives in poverty, they have low purchasing 
power to buy more modern forms of fuels.  
* Traditional attitudes prevail due to a lack of education and policy 
implementation aimed at change in energy use. (World Bank, 1989))
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Finally, their commercial energy consumption levels are far lower than other developing 
countries because of their slow urbanization and industrialization rates. As a country shifts 
from an agrarian to an industrial economy, there is a natural increase in commercial 
energy consumption. However Nepal is still an agricultural society. Map 1 and table 3 
reveal Nepals strong reliance on traditional fuels, dependence on agriculture, and very low 















1970 1990 1971 1991
Nepal  94%  92% 97% 93%
Pakistan 59% 50% --- 22%
India 72%  66% 31% 26% 
Energy consumption can be a major contributor to environmental degradation. Even 
though Nepal is still primarily an agricultural society and industrial growth is presently 
slow, Nepal needs to make a shift in its energy consumption patterns and move toward 
more commercial energy practices. If this needed shift is made in a timely and careful 
manner, a positive change in the energy sector can benefit Nepal by lessening the 
environmental degradation and improving agricultural capacity. 
Figure 5. 
        Since Nepal is still experiencing relatively little urban and industrial growth, they 
have the opportunity to explore resource exploitation options and can make the needed 
shift at a reasonable pace. There is not such a dire need to focus on increasing the energy 
supply as fast as possible, which is the general paradigm for energy planning adopted by 
most developing countries (WRD Resource Book, 1995). Unfortunately, when countries 
push for such quick increase in supplies to meet their rapidly changing energy needs, they 
are often not effective in managing supplies to maximize the services. Thus, increased 
energy supply is often not very efficient.  
        Nepal cannot continue to rely on its biomass fuels because not only will conventional 
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means not be able to meet Nepals growing commercial energy needs, but it is detrimental 
to the population-environment dynamic in Nepal. The challenge for Nepal to make the 
shift to commercial energy sources is probably one of the most complex and expensive 
aspects of the countrys development. The consequences are dramatic to just about all 
sectors in Nepal. 
Energy Production in Nepal
        Nepals energy demand is expected to grow at least 8% per year as electricity service 
is extended. Commercial energy consumption in Nepal includes coal, petroleum, and 
hydropower. Since Nepal is not rich in coal or oil it seeks to utilize the one abundant 
renewable source of energy - hydropower. It makes sense that Nepal would want to 
exploit this abundant renewable resource since importing coal and oil is expensive, limited 
and not very environmentally sound. However the big question, and one which will have a 
severe impact on Nepals economic, social and political future is what is the best way to 
exploit this energy source? This has been an ongoing debate in Nepal.  
        Globally, there has been recognition that large dam projects are environmentally and 
socially damaging, however the trends show that average dam sizes are increasing and 
currently large scale dam projects in countries such as Brazil, Turkey and Japan are being 
built (Gardner and Perry, 1995). Nepal too, is considering such projects, even though the 
risks are extremely high.  
        There are benefits and problems to implementing any dam project, however, the 
amount of consumption and degree of degradation are factors that must be weighed in 
comparing overall effects of different technologies and cultural perceptions of resources 
may alter with time (Biomedical Environmental Assessment Group, 1974). While 
uncertainty is an inherent part of any environmental problem, decision makers need to be 
better informed about the environmental processes and social preferences. In weighing the 
benefits and detriments of the dam possibilities in Nepal, there is a need to consider and 
understand the countrys environmental, economic, and political status. Given its relative 
poor environmental and economic state, as well as the political instability due to a 
relatively new and struggling democracy, it seems that large dam projects in Nepal are a 
very high risk. 
Large Dams = High Risk  
Environmental Conditions  
        In Nepal the existing environmental status described in the forestry, agriculture and 
energy transitions, makes large dam projects problematic. The forestry and agriculture 
have a symbiotic relationship, as is evident by the interdependence of the two sectors. 
First, the deforested mountainside erodes the topsoil which negatively effects the 
agricultural productivity of the soil. Also, rain on a deforested mountainside cause this 
topsoil to be flushed down the hillside and it ends up in the rivers, lakes and hydroelectric 
reservoirs. This in turn causes the reservoir to fill with sedimentation and hence shortens 
its life span. Second, such large projects would inundate valuable limited agricultural land. 
With an increasing population, the cultivated land has already peaked and there are food 
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shortages in the hills. Creating large reservoirs in the hills, where the land is already 
limited, would certainly impact many farmers lives.  
        Another option that Nepal has considered is avoiding storage type dams and building 
run-of -river dams which do not require a reservoir and therefore do not flood as much 
valuable land. However, these dams need to be built fairly high in the mountains and 
therefore need road access (anywhere in Nepal), would require building roads or tunnels 
through the mountainside in order to access the river to construct the dam. In both cases, 
building roads and tunnels or creating reservoirs will cause many people to be displaced. 
Nepal does not have large urban centers to absorb these people or a large industrial and/or 
manufacturing sector for these people to become trained. Moreover, relocating these 
individuals to the Terai is not a preferred option. There was heavy internal migration to 
the Terai in the 1960s and 70s, and it is now densely populated and therefore no extra 
farm land is available.  
        Large scale projects are designed primarily to sell electricity and to initiate large 
scheme irrigation projects in the Terai; neither of which are intended to benefit the hill 
farmer. Given the inequality of the land ownership, whereby the vast majority of farmers 
are subsistence level farmers, it seems likely that such large irrigation projects would not 
prove beneficial or even needed by the majority of hill farmers. In the hills the farmers do 
not have enough land to produce a market surplus, so large irrigation projects would assist 
a few large landowners who already possess better quality land, yet not realistically 
addresss the needs of the majority of the farmers. Large dam projects do not make it easier 
for the hill farmers to improve their land productivity because they do not focus on 
providing the kinds of irrigation the majority of the farmers need, nor do they put them in 
a better position to enhance their fertilizer use.  
        The energy transition is also severely impacted by large dam projects. These large 
dams are designed to generate energy for export. The high voltage needed to convert this 
type of energy to be used for domestic energy at the local level is costly, technologically 
difficult, and therefore unlikely to be figured into the overall budget of this type of project. 
Moreover, these projects are so costly and have such long gestation periods that they do 
not provide any means for slowing the heavy reliance on traditional fuels - the forests. 
There is an immediate need to alleviate forest pressure by generating energy for cooking 
and heating in the villages but these projects are not designed with this intention in mind. 
The large-scale projects look at the macro-level impact, yet ignore the village level, where 
the main forest degradation occurs.  
        In addition, the larger the project the greater the potential hazards. The Himalaya are 
considered to be a relatively young mountain range and because of this they are still being 
actively uplifted and continue to rise each year about 1cm (Shrestha, 1991). This tectonic 
activity makes Nepal highly susceptible to earthquakes. Given the terrain of Nepal, mostly 
steep slopes, even minor tremors result in landslides which potentially block rivers to 
form lakes. Furthermore, given these conditions it is possible for the effects of an 
earthquake to extend east to west and pose great threat to any large structure; like a large 
dam ready to burst and wipe out a significant portion of the country.  
        The powerful run-off from the Himalayan rivers also carry some of the heaviest 
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sediment loads in the world (Terrell, 1991). These sediment loads get deposited in 
reservoirs and have significant impact on shortening the life of the reservoir. Heavy 
rainfalls, during the monsoons on deforested land also contributes to landslides and heavy 
sedimentation. If the reservoirs are taking away precious agricultural lands, then a trade 
off of receiving increased land productivity is expected, however the people directly 
effected by the reservoirs do not see these results. 
Foreign Aid Dependent  
        In addition to the environmental risks, Nepal is at high risk socio-economically when 
considering the implementation of large dam projects. They need to depend heavily on 
foreign aid development to construct such projects which far exceed their national 
economy. Nepal already is highly dependent on foreign aid.  
        During the Rana period before 1950, Nepal was not interested in foreign aid, as it 
was viewed as an intrusion. However, since the 1950s Nepal has opened up to foreigners 
and recognized the possible benefits of modern technology. They began to accept foreign 
aid, and since then they have continued to become increasingly more and more dependent 
on it. Foreign aid inflow into the country has steadily increased and aid in the form of 
loans is much larger than grants. In 1988, 69.40% of the total aid was in the form of loans. 
(NFFAS, 1992). Foreign debt is rapidly accumulating and in 1990-1 Nepals outstanding 
external debt reached 46% of the estimated GDP (Seddon, 1994). It has been argued by 
many that while Nepal has been receiving foreign aid for more than 40 years, they have 
not succeeded in alleviating poverty as is indicated by their economic indicators. If aid is 
supposed to help a country to overcome the development bottlenecks so that the country 
can move rapidly from an initial heavy dependence on foreign aid toward self-reliance 
then Nepal has thus far failed (NFFAS, 1992).  
        In the past two decades large amounts of money has been invested in the agriculture 
and energy sectors. Aid aimed at serving large irrigation and hydroelectric projects 
accounts for a great deal of the aid money in these two sectors. It was estimated in 1987 
that a hydroelectric project, Arun III was to receive more than $600 million (World Bank, 
1989). Such incredible amounts of money being loaned for these risky projects only 
enhances Nepals dependence on foreign donors.  
        Unfortunately, this foreign aid does not appear to be enhancing Nepali productivity. 
It has certainly been speculated that when projects are planned by experts outside of 
Nepal, with minimal Nepali institutional support there is widespread economic abuse and 
corruption (Bista, 1991). Hence, not only is Nepal heavily dependent on foreign aid but it 
has also become passive in the planning of these foreign initiated donor projects. A large 
dam project is a perfect example where mega-donors do the macro-planning. It seems 
logical then, that the Nepali government cannot refuse this kind of project that brings large 
amounts of money to the country and possibly to their own pockets. 
Nepal-Indo Relations  
        Nepal also needs to consider its relations with India since any large dam project 
would require Indias cooperation. Currently and historically relations with India have not 
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been great and there still exists a deep rooted lack of trust between the two countries. A 
most recent example of the general difficulties experienced by the neighboring countries 
is the trade embargo which India imposed on Nepal in 1989. The trade and transit treaty 
between the two countries expired and major differences between the two government 
prevented the signing of a new one and Nepal was deprived of some 80% of goods 
normally imported from India (Seddon, 1994). This caused economic hardship in Nepal as 
prices rose and tension mounted. Such conditions provided impetus for the revolution in 
Nepal in 1990.  
        Another example specifically related to dams, further illustrates the tenuous relations 
between Nepal and India. The one completed joint dam project was initiated by India in 
1954. The Kosi Barrage, located in Nepal on the southern border, was developed because 
of a flood in Northern India in 1954. This project has been viewed as disastrous by both 
Nepal and India. The government of Nepal feels they allowed the dam to be built and only 
suffered environmentally with losses of arable land, while India benefited from flood and 
irrigation control. The Nepalese also believe that India has done nothing to repay Nepal 
for its efforts. Yet the Indian government feels that the prosperity they were to gain has 
been nonexistent, as the barrage failed to produce the estimated irrigation potential and a 
Kosi river flood in 1991 reconfirmed Indias suspicion that the barrage in its present state 
is not an effective means of flood control.  
        Nepal and India continue to disagree on issues regarding this project, each blaming 
the other for problems and hazards. Even the new government in Nepal today has not 
forgotten this project that they felt cheated and included in the new Constitution of 1990 is 
a statement that treaties dealing with water sharing have to be ratified by a two-thirds 
majority in the parliament if they are of a comprehensive, serious, long term nature 
(Aryal, 1995). This deep rooted lack of trust seems to be even more influential in 
preventing large dam construction than anti-dam activists complaining about the 
environmental degradation incurred by dams.  
        Despite such problems, Nepal continues to explore large dam options and since 1987 
has been preoccupied with developing a large project in Eastern Nepal, known as the Arun 
III project. This large scale project, to be funded by the World Bank, was designed to 
generate revenue by not only for providing electricity to meet the national demand, but 
also by selling electricity to India. Even with recent changes in the government the project 
was supported as unrealistic visions of hydro-dollars still permeated the government. The 
elected Prime Minister in 1990, stated that the problems of trade deficit with India will be 
overcome with Arun III hydroelectric project (Gyawali, 1991 p. 6).  
        While the newly developed constitution in 1990 gave people the right to 
development, it also gave them the right to information (Aryal, 1995). The Arun project 
became the first controversy about a major development project in Nepal. Also, World 
Bank, receiving pressure from various projects, established a commission in 1994 to hear 
complaints from parties affected by proposed dam projects. Arun III opponents in Nepal 
were the first to address this commission with their concerns (Gardner and Perry, 1995). 
The project has been opposed for years by many private environmental groups who felt 
that such a large World Bank project could have more harmful than beneficial effects. 
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After years of debate the project was finally rejected in August of this year. It was decided 
by the new World Bank president to cancel the project because Nepal was too poor for the 
project to succeed (New York Times, August 1995). 
Political Instability  
        In addition to Nepals poor environmental and economic conditions, it also lacks the 
institutional and infrastructure support to successfully complete such projects. This is 
mainly due to the political instability found in Nepal. Political stability is an underlying 
assumption in the transition theory, for without positive government intervention, it is 
difficult to make it through a transition to a steady state.  
        Prior to 1990 Nepal had an absolute monarchy. It was a partyless Panchayat (village 
council) system in which power was exercised from the palace. In 1990 there was a 
democracy movement, which was not directed at the king, but against the Panchayat 
system which institutionalized the kings power. The aim was to lift the constitutional ban 
on political parties. The struggle was painful for Nepal as demonstrations and violence 
caused casualties, but it was minimal compared to other countries experiencing 
democratic revolutions. Within less than three months the king dissolved the Panchayat 
system and a new interim government was formed under a new multiparty parliamentary 
democracy system.  
        However, any country struggling to adhere to a new democratic system of 
government is bound to suffer difficulties and go through a period of instability and thus 
have difficulty managing its resources. In 1990 the new government inherited a country 
characterized by extreme poverty, high population growth, and an aid-dependent 
economy. These conditions are not easy to change in a short period of time.  
        Moreover, as in any state recently freed from autocratic rule, the society is in a state 
of confusion as modernity approaches. This is especially true in Nepal because since 1990 
the government has changed hands over four times. There continues to be mistrust among 
people and dissatisfaction with government decisions and the two main parties, the 
Congress and Communist, continue to fight to control and set the general course for the 
government. These government decisions effect development activities. Development 
activities need to be more political, but they need a stronger more stable political 
framework to rely on for support. In addition, a stable government is needed to ensure that 
a more broadly defined strategy for the countrys development is achieved. 
Small Dams = Low Risk?  
        Small dam projects are aimed more specifically at assisting the rural farmers and 
since 94% of the people live in over 30,000 villages and over 90% are farmers, a 
development project seems meaningless unless it improves their lives. In addition a World 
Development Report published by World Bank in 1990 stated that several factors were 
impeding development. Among these was an inadequate participation: inadequate 
attention was given to sociocultural and political factors in the design and implementation 
of projects resulting in ineffective projects and a greater reliance in foreign aid. However, 
it is ironic that World Bank made this statement since it is the main organization that 
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Nepal has become so heavily dependent on for loans in large dam projects which ignore 
any local participation. Similarly, in 1992 World Bank report recognized that many of the 
water projects built in developing countries over the past 25 years have been failures, lack 
of technical expertise and inability to operate and maintain water systems once they were 
in place(Brookshire and Whittington, 1993). It was suggested that lack of community 
participation or local involvement in design and management is a major cause of project 
failure; a typical example is large dam projects being imposed on the local people who 
have no decision making power and often only suffer the negative consequences.  
        Large dam projects ignore rural farmers, while small dam projects specifically aim to 
improve rural development. The socio-economic benefits are extensive. First, small 
hydropower plants can be run of river types which means no reservoir or storage space is 
needed. This important aspect certainly minimizes the potential environmental 
degradation and loss of arable land by not flooding the lands to create a reservoir. 
Secondly, small dams are designed to provide the villages with electrical energy. And 
with this electrical energy comes numerous opportunities for rural development. There is 
the possibility for local farmers to begin to participate in income generating activities such 
as small cottage industries. Electricity will also help to improve education standards by 
making it easier to study and also making radio (and eventually television) available to 
people who have been fairly isolated and distant from country and world information. 
Also, electricity available in villages where health clinic exist will enhance the capability 
of the clinics by allowing for the use of modern facilities such as X-ray equipment and 
small operating rooms, and refrigeration for storage of medicine.  
        Electricity in rural areas, provided by hydropower, will definitely help to increase the 
earning potential of the population and possibly slow migration to the Terai, urban areas, 
and out migration (primarily to India). Small dam projects are also sufficient to provide 
irrigation opportunities. Electrical energy can pump the water for lift irrigation. Since the 
majority of farmers own minimal land, such irrigation schemes would be beneficial to 
them.  
        Finally, small dams will definitely have a direct and immediate impact on saving the 
countrys forest resources. Small dams designed to generate electricity to provide for 
cooking purposes, will drastically cut back the amount of fuel wood used by rural people. 
However, simply providing the electricity is not enough to cause farmers to change their 
behavior and immediately adopt a system of utilizing electrical equipment. Education is 
needed to instruct farmers of the importance and benefits of changing from their 
traditional system of exploiting the forest resources. An integrated system of providing 
education and employment opportunities is essential to make rural electrification 
beneficial in enhancing the development of the country. 
Policy Recommendations  
        Nepals apparent environmental, economic, and political conditions prevent it from 
implementing such large scale dam projects, yet it is apparent that something must be 
done to meet the increasing energy demands of the country. If policies were implemented 
to restrict immediate focus on small (projects not requiring international cooperation, and 
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not financially exceeding the national economy) Nepal would benefit by improving its 
economic and environmental conditions. Such focus would give Nepal time for its newly 
democratic government to stabilize, to work on improving relations with India, and to 
begin to rely less on foreign aid.  
        The Nepali government should not focus on becoming an energy independent 
country, rather it needs to focus on feeding its people, educating its people, slowing the 
population growth, and protecting its resources. The following are policies for 
consideration based on evidence presented in this paper: 
Population Policy  
        Nepals population has increased at about 2.1% annually over the last decade 
(Gurugharana, 1993). In a country with a very limited resource base, this kind of 
population pressure has severe consequences. It has resulted in increased poverty and 
environmental degradation, and therefore, curbing the population is necessary to begin to 
alleviate poverty and improve environmental conditions. The Government has established 
targets in its population policy which include reducing the total fertility, infant mortality, 
child mortality and maternal mortality rates but what interventions and specific policies 
will enable this to become a reality need to be further explored and articulated.  
        Nepals continued high fertility rates are indicative of the need to incorporate not only 
a more extensive family planning program, but to improve education and employment 
opportunities for people, especially for women who remain at the bottom of the economic 
and social scale. Nepals government is aware of its rising population and recognizes that a 
fair amount of the poverty found in the country can be attributed to this fact. However, 
they have not yet been able to devise an extensive program that addresses all the factors 
involved in controlling population growth. Efforts are being made to improve the 
education status of women and a number of non governmental organizations have 
provided financial support as well as training and materials for literacy classes and income 
generating schemes for rural and urban women. These actions need to be continued, but 
more importantly they need to be better monitored by the Nepali government in order to 
maximize the productivity of these programs. 
Agriculture policy  
        Nepals need for a more effective agricultural policy is also apparent by the worsening 
conditions in the agriculture sector. Nepali government and people, like many countries in 
the world, maintain a more is better mentality. They believe the answer to improving their 
lives or developing their country is done by producing bigger and better things. However, 
it would be more practical and beneficial to focus on better management instead of more 
facilities. This would include initiating policies aimed at educating farmers, as well as 
providing assistance such as seedlings and fertilizers, in ways to allow them to maximize 
their agricultural production.  
        In addition, often smaller more manageable products are overlooked as viable 
options. An example of wanting to improve things on a larger scale than necessary can be 
seen in the irrigation schemes targeted. The majority of farmers own very small plots of 
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land and therefore do not need large costly irrigation schemes. They continue to devise 
their own small irrigation systems, however these generally are not long lasting. The 
projects are labor intensive because they are temporary and need to be remade each year. 
However, if a policy was made to assist farmers in improving their indigenous irrigation 
schemes, it would prove beneficial to all. As noted by Gurugharana (1993) in his paper 
Poverty Alleviation and Human Development: The Nepalese Case, The country has water 
resources for substantial improvement in irrigation which should, however, be of 
reasonable size under farmers management (p. 96). He emphasizes the need for 
technologies to be suitable to local conditions and small-scale production. The 
Government needs to further research and investigate the feasibility of providing 
assistance with these types of projects, rather than waiting for a more sophisticated system 
which may not appeal to the local farmer, and not be affordable or easy to maintain. 
Water Resource Policy  
        Nepal is in desperate need of a national water policy that will allow the government 
and people to decide for themselves how to best utilize their water resources. Currently, 
Nepal relies heavily on outsiders to come in and decide how to exploit its water resources. 
A national water policy would cause those in authority to investigate for themselves what 
exactly needs to be done to meet the national energy requirements, what is economically 
feasible, and what options are the least environmentally damaging. Again, like the 
agricultural policy, there is a need to focus on better management instead of more 
facilities. Nepal needs to thoroughly investigate its existing water projects, including dams 
already constructed. Such research and action can be used to improve the technology that 
is available at reasonable costs. It will also serve to avoid local difficulties and excessive 
costs that have resulted in the past due to lack of investigations done by Nepalese. 
Furthermore, policies could be designed to provide incentives for better management and 
better performance.  
        Finally, if a policy to implement small dam projects, designed to provide rural 
electrification, was implemented, it would be important to focus on training and working 
directly with rural farmers to maximize the potential benefits from locally implemented 
projects that could develop if villages are supplied with electricity. It is not enough to 
simply provide electricity to the villages. There needs to be direct efforts to bring skilled 
people to villages to assist in the development of locally designed projects. Proper 
monitoring and continuous feedback would be essential to avoid replication of mistakes, 
waste of important resources, and to ensure further progress and development. 
Conclusion  
        All projects seem to be problem-ridden but it appears to be between those that are 
more or less successful in overcoming their troubles and those that are not (Hirschman, 
1991, p.3). This assertion holds true in Nepal. The future direction of the exploitation of 
its water resources needs to be decided in order to improve the lives of all Nepalese. 
Nepalese are faced with a situation in which they need to understand the trade-offs 
involved in potential projects, and then make a well informed decision to implement 
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policies designed to help them achieve a solution that is suitable to their country.  
        On a micro level small dams seem very beneficial, however, it is uncertain if such 
projects will allow Nepal to become an energy independent country. The trade-off, 
however, is to implement large dams that pose such a high risk for the county. Large dams 
cause arable land reduction when there are already food shortages. They are also much 
more expensive and would put the country, already more foreign aid dependent than any 
other developing country, into further debt. These facts coupled with the environmental 
and social risks posed by such projects indicate that large dams are not the answer for 
Nepal. Given all the conditions, Nepal may never be ready for large dam projects, but it is 
clear that the current conditions should direct Nepal away from considering such projects. 
There are certainly trade offs for both, but given the evidence it seems evident that Nepal 
needs to exploit its water resource in a manageable way aimed at developing the country 
at a pace from which they can benefit, and this is not capable by initiating large dam 
projects. 
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A VILLAGE IN TRANSITION : THE CASE OF GANVIE
        This paper seeks to examine the state of transitions taking place 
in the Lake Nekoue region of southeastern Benin.  With the majority of 
the population concentrated in this region, increasing population growth 
continues to put pressures on an already strained environment.  The 
lagoon system running along the coastline serves as a resource for the 
artisanal fisherman to find his catch and also provides him with a place 
to live.  His catch has historically provided a major source of protein 
to the people of southern Benin.  To this point, nothing but exploitation 
of the waters has taken place, but it is becoming increasingly difficult 
to maintain such a careless view.  Changes must be made if the resources 
of the lagoon are to be maintained.
        The transitions that I will be looking at are the demographic, 
tourism, and fishing transitions.  These form the base of the problems 
that are currently being experienced.  Other transitions, such as 
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forestry and urbanization, do not apply to this water-based setting, and 
others such as the technological transition, are not yet an issue.  
GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY
        The Republic of Benin runs due north from the West African coast, 
extending nearly 700 kilometers inland from the Gulf of Guinea.  Benin is 
bordered on the northeast by Niger and the Niger River, on the northwest 
by the Pendjari River that runs along the border with Burkina Faso, by 
Nigeria to the east, and Togo to the West.  The country is fairly small, 
with an area roughly equal to the size of the state of Pennsylvania.  
        The coastal region consists of a series of small lagoons which 
connect Benin's major rivers to the sea, the largest and most important 
of these is Lake Nekoue. Within this lagoon, as well as others, there 
exists a population that lives on the water, and derives their nutrition 
and livelihood from it.  In the southeast region, the major ethnic group 
is Toffinu.  They have lived on Lake Nekoue for several hundred years.  
These people were originally mainland inhabitants, living in the central 
region of Benin, but fearing their more powerful neighbors who had dealt 
in the slave trade with the arriving Europeans, they fled south.  When 
they were still pursued, they moved into the middle of Lake Nekoue, 
because the lagoon was too shallow for slave ships to enter, and the 
customs of their African pursuers did not allow them to cross the water.  
Thus, they escaped and their life on the water began.  Indeed the name of 
the largest village on the lagoon, Ganvie reflects this history.  In the 
Toffinu laguage, gan neans "we are" and vie means "saved".
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THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION 
        As with other developing countries, Benin is still in an active 
period of its population transition.  Birth rates within the rural areas 
continue to rise, while for the entire country, they have begun to level 
off in recent years and with increased access to health care and safe 
drinking water, death rates continue to fall.  Figure 1 illustrates this 
process at work.  Additionally, Figure 2 shows the dramatic increased 




Source: World Resource Database, 1994.
Figure 2
 
Source: World Resource Database, 1994.
        Given these factors, Figure 3 illustrates the projected 
population increase through the year 2025.  There is a public 
contraception policy in place, although it has a lot to do with 
preventing the spread of the HIV virus, and not as much with family 
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planning.  However, most family planning efforts are focused in the 
cities, and neither information or supplies are readily disseminated in 
the rural areas.  Given the importance of children within the family, as 




Source: World Resource Database, 1994.
        Each of these statistical realities is being aided by a number of 
factors at work within the country.  For the village of Ganvie, and the 
rest of the Lake Nekoue region, the major factors are:
        Increased access to health care
        Availability of potable drinking water
        Imposition of Western religion
        Since 1985, the inhabitants of Lake Nekoue have had access to a 
hospital in the lagoon village of So-Tchanhoue.  This hospital is one of 
the major reasons for the explosion of population within the lagoon.  It 
has given the population much greater access to medicines and treatments 
than before.  (Previously, the nearest hospital was on the mainland.)  
The hospital has been instrumental in controlling the diseases that have 
traditionally been self-limiting to the population, such as cholera and 
malaria.  AIDS has not yet made an impact.  As of June 1995, only two 
cases had been diagnosed by the hospital.  Additionally, within the last 
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ten years, the government has installed a series of wells to provide 
fresh, safe drinking water to almost every village on the lagoon.  This 
also has helped stem the historical cholera problem.  Both of these 
factors have helped to cause a rise in the population and put further 
strain on the ecosystem to provide for the inhabitants that depend on 
it.  As previously stated, family planning projects exist in Benin but 
have not yet been disseminated to the rural population.
        The imposition of western religion has also made an impact on 
this transition.  The traditional belief system in the village instilled 
a strong sense of morals and values among its inhabitants.  It provided 
rewards for those who abided by it, and penalties for those that did 
not.  Through an elaborate system of deities, rituals, and 
responsibilities, it helped regulate the villager's lives.  For example, 
polygamy is an accepted practice in the village.  It is not uncommon for 
a man to have more than one wife.  Although there is no formal limit to 
the number of wives, under the traditional system, the number of wives 
that a man may have has been limited by the number of wives (and 
children) that a man can provide for.  If a man did not provide for one 
of his wives, she could cast a spell on him, or demand that the deities 
punish him, and misfortune would befall him.  
        As missionary activity in the village increased, and Christianity 
was introduced, the villagers saw that as people left the traditional 
ways, nothing happened to them, there was no punishment.  For many, it 
took away the incentive to exist by a difficult, and at times expensive, 
but practical, system.  As such, there are currently three types of 
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belief systems at work in the village: those that follow the traditional 
belief system, those that follow western/non-indigenous belief systems 
(Christianity, Islam), and those that follow neither of the two systems.  
This population, who experience no ramification to their actions and have 
lost faith in the traditional values, but do not believe in the 
missionary message have made a powerful impact on the population 
transition.  Men of thirty and forty years of age, having grown up in the 
traditional society usually have one or two wives, and practice some form 
of religion, traditional or not.  However, this is not so with the 
younger men.  Presently, it is not uncommon for a man of twenty years of 
age to have in excess of ten wives, each with several children.  The men 
do not take care of their families, and as such, the woman is left to 
provide for her own family unit, thus enabling the man to procreate 
further.  There is no limit to the number of wives that he may have, 
since he does not provide for his offspring, thus his resources are not 
limited by his responsibilities.  The women seek to have more children, 
as the children help provide for the family where the husband does not, 
and the population grows. (See Figures 1 and 3)
        This impact is evident by examining age distributions within 
Ganvie. (Table 1 and Figure 4)  In 1979, the majority of the population 
was under the age of fifteen.  It is this group, presently aged 15-30, 
that is now of childbearing age and is producing significantly more than 
their replacement amount of offspring that is pressuring the population 
picture.
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Table 1
Age Distribution in Ganvie (1979)
0-5 years       6-14 years      15-49 years     50 and up       Unknown Total





        Table 2 also shows these factors at work.  Between 1962 and 1995, 
Ganvie has more than tripled its population, and thus its demands on the 
lagoon and the ecosystem.  More importantly, Table 3 shows the total 
population of the entire district of which Ganvie is a part, to provide a 
frame of reference for the magnitude of population growth that the area 
has experienced.  By projecting the increase in the population, using the 
same level of growth that Ganvie has experienced, the strains on the 
ecosystem become immediately apparent.  If the rate of growth in the 
district parallels that of Ganvie, the district population has almost 
tripled within the past fifteen years, and the strain on the ecosystem 
has risen similarly.
file:///C|/545/1995/sifontes.htm (7 of 26) [6/18/2008 10:58:20 AM]
545\sifontes
Table 2:
Population Growth in the Village of Ganvie
Year (Source)                   Total Population
1962 (Demographic Study)        9,300
1979 (Census)                   10,807
1989 (Census)                   20,000
1995 (Estimate)                 30,000
Source: Radji, 1991  and Sifontes, 1995.
Table 3:
Population of Sous-prefecture (District) of St-Awa in 1979
Administrative Division     Total Population        % Men per 100 Women     1995 
Projected Population
So-Awa District (total)     37,818                      94.38               104,818
So-Awa                      4,913                       100.12              13,609
Ahomh-Lokpo                 5,297                       94.39               14,672
Dekamey                     2,350                       105.42              6509
Ganvie I                    6,449                       94.54               30,000
Ganvie II                   4,358                       86.24               (see 
above)
Houedo-Aguekon              5,096                       98.60               14,115
Vekky                       9,355                       92.25               25,913
[Note:  Figures for Ganvie I and Ganvie II should be combined]
Source: Radji, 1991.
        Part of the reason for the slow population growth during the late 
1960s and early 1970s that is not evident in the tables is the impact of 
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the rural exodus that took place during that time period.  Due to the 
strength of the Nigerian economy and their currency, the naira, many of 
the Toffinu migrated to Nigerian in search of opportunity.  The recent 
devaluation of the CFA (the monetary unit for a significant portion of 
West Africa) coupled with the decline of the natural fishery could have a 
similar effect in the future.  However, in speaking with people about 
such opportunities, most were reluctant to change their current lifestyles.
THE IMPACT OF TOURISM
        Another part of the changing picture in all of the lagoon 
villages, but in particular Ganvie, is the role that tourism has played 
in the development of the villages.  Ganvie is singled out due to its 
position, as the first lagoon village one reaches when leaving the 
mainland.  It is the closest to Cotonou, Benin's largest city, and other 
villages are further apart.  Because of its novelty, it is described as 
the Venice of the Africa, tourists come from all over the world to see 
Ganvie.  This has helped lead to the decline in the traditional mores of 
the Toffinu society.  It also has other undesired impacts on the 
village.  People have begun to expect money from the tourists.  Children 
beg and pester until they are appeased.  Tourism has also provided a 
market for prostitution in the village.
        Due to the marketing efforts of the Benin government during the 
Marxist period, Benin saw a large number of tourists during the 1980s.  
Since the political shift, however, there has not been emphasis on 
continuing advertising, and the number of visitors has been decreased.  
file:///C|/545/1995/sifontes.htm (9 of 26) [6/18/2008 10:58:20 AM]
545\sifontes




        It is estimated that 90% of the tourists visiting Benin, make the 
trip to Ganvie during their stay. (Radji, 1991)  Until recently, the 
national government has had a monopoly on the exploitation of the tourist 
trade.  The price for the trip to Ganvie was strictly controlled by 
them.  Since the liquidation of ONATHO, the national tourism and hotels 
office, the private tour operators have taken over this facet of the 
tourist trade.  Under both systems, this has meant the exploitation of 
the Toffinu.  They are shown off and paraded n front of tourists, while 
only a few villagers (the restaurant and shop owners) derive any benefit 
at all.  The current mayor has worked to change this system, however, and 
now, for every tourist that comes to the village, a portion of their 
passage goes to a village fund, to be used as the people of Ganvie see 
fit.  Currently, a trip to Ganvie costs 5,000 CFA (~$10 USD) and of this 
sum, the village is given 250 CFA (~$0.50 USD). The inequities still 
abound, but the villagers are able to derive some benefit from the 
tourist incursions on their lives and thus, continue to tolerate them.  
This idea of compensation has spread, though, and people will not allow 
picture taking or even polite conversation without some type of 
compensation.  "Cadeau, cadeau" (gift, gift) is the common cry.  The 
villagers have begun to expect such "gifts" from the tourists, and for 
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the most part, the tourists have been quite happy to oblige.  The 
situation is becoming intolerable, however, as every tourist is inundated 
by begging villagers.  The village excursion is becoming increasingly 
unpleasant, as the so-called traditional lifestyle that one is traveling 
to see is being marred by crass commercialism.
        Tourism provides money for village infrastructure and 
improvements, but the number of tourists has decreased without the 
continued government outlay for international advertising.  The villagers 
still do not receive an equitable share of the proceeds gained from their 
exploitation.  However, I do not know how this system could easily be 
changed, as it is currently controlled by private industries who already 
have the resources to perform this service.
        The continued degradation of the lagoon can have a further impact 
on tourism.  As the lagoon ecosystem becomes increasingly constrained, 
accumulated waste and garbage in the water will serve to dissuade visits 
to the sight.
THE DECLINING FISHERY
Evolution of Lake Nekoue
        At 160 km2, Lake Nekoue is the largest lake in Benin.  Its depth 
is between 0.5 and 1.5 m during the dry season.  This figure increases 
dramatically during the rains, to approximately 2 to 3.5 m.  The lake has 
two exits, through the Totchi canal which connects the Porto-Novo lagoon 
with the sea near Lagos, Nigeria, and the canal at Cotonou.
        The outlet at Cotonou is not a natural phenomenon, it is an 
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attempt for man to control the works of nature around him.  Its evolution 
can be explained in a series of steps.
        First, in 1885, with the repeated flooding of the rapidly 
expanding Cotonou by the Ouimi and St rivers, an artificial opening was 
created to relieve this that let the land-locked flood waters in this 
area escape.  The creation of the Cotonou channel allowed the salt and 
fresh waters to mix in the lake at a much higher concentration than 
before.  The salinity of Lake Nekoue shifted to reflect the additional 
contact with the marine environment.  The ecosystem was dramatically 
changed by this "first contact".  Shrimp, mollusks, and other marine fish 
were able to exist within the channel and also within the lake.  New 
fishing opportunities were created for certain populations.  Fresh water 
fish sought refuge in the north of the lake where the salinity was still 
low, and where the phytoplankton from which they derived their 
nourishment could still be found.
        Eventually, due to sediment, a gradual closing of the channel 
would occur without regular dredging.  This gave rise to a cycle of 
opening and closing, where during the dry season, the closing of the 
channel allowed the freshening of the water and an environment where 
phytoplankton could flourish, and provided a substantial source of food 
for the fish population.  Once the flood waters had migrated into the 
lagoon, the channel would be opened by the movement, and the marine and 
lagoon environments had the opportunity to mix once again. 
        With creation of the commercial port at Cotonou (est. 1960), sand 
from the channel was removed to make cement for the project.  This ended 
the ability for channel to periodically close.  The exchange between sea 
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and lake waters became permanent.  This has had repercussions on both 
flora and fauna of lake
        The primary flora of the lagoon used to be mangrove.  
Unfortunately, due to the change in environment and the human devastation 
of the natural environment (cutting down trees for houses and acadjas), 
the flora now consists mostly of sea grasses on the small masses of land 
around as well as within the lagoon which are used to feed animals, and 
water lilies that dominate the lake during the fresh water period and 
make travel on the water very difficult.
        A barrage was built in the late 1970s, in an attempt to return 
the lagoon to its pre-port state, by enabling the periodic closing of the 
channel by artificial means.  However, this effort was short-lived and 
unsuccessful, as groups that had begun to use the channel for their 
shrimp operations favored the continual mix of fresh and marine water 
environments.  Once the barrage was completed, they destroyed it.  After 
a second attempt, and a second sabotage, the barrage idea was abandoned.
        As would be expected in a water-based society, the main 
occupation is fishing.  The people are integrally connected to the 
water.  They derive their livelihood and nutrition from it, and have so 
since the establishment of the village.  Indeed, approximately 88% of 
males within the lagoon villages are fisherman, as their primary 
occupation. With the decline in the natural fishery, there are those that 
have turned to other professions to make a living.  Women purchase the 
fish that the men catch and sell it to the market or retain it for their 
own use, women also have small shops and sell other commodities as well.
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Methods of Fishing
        There are a number of different fishing practices within the 
villages, the ones currently used are:
-LINE (manned)
        This is  the conventional image of fishing, one line and one hook 
under the fisherman's control.
-CAST NET (manned)
        This is a large net that is cast over the water in areas that are 
public domain, the fisherman rapidly casts and recalls them, removing 
anything that has been caught in the net, and casts it again.
-DJOHOUN (unmanned)
        This is a method where a number of hooks are hung off of a single 
line supported on each end by two poles at different lengths.  These 
hooks catch passing fish, which remain caught on the line until the 
fisherman comes back to remove them.
-BASKETS (unmanned)
        There are several types of baskets and/or traps used.  They are 
primarily used for catching crabs and shrimp.  The fisherman places the 
traps in the water, primarily at the end of the day, and returns to claim 
his catch the next morning.
-ACADJA (unmanned)
        Created in 19th century, this system consists of an ensemble of 
branches usually circular or in the shape of a rectangle anchored in the 
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bottom of the lagoon, covering top to bottom of lagoon, filled with 
smaller branches and leaves.  The area serves as refuge for number of 
fish, especially tilapia, which feed on the plankton which develop on the 
decaying branches and leaves.  It also serves as refuge for the fry of 
reproducing fish.
        Fishing the acadjas takes a lot of manpower, which favors a 
communal lifestyle.  While only well off members of the community can 
afford to have them, almost everyone helps fish them.
The number of acadjas is now fixed.  Previously the acadjas were taking 
up a significant surface area in the lake, and the decay of all the extra 
plant material from branches was causing the lake to fill.  The state has 
now imposed a tax which helps to limit the size and number of acadjas on 
the lake.  The economic pressures facing the people are evident here as 
well, where the acadjas used to fished twice a year, in order to allow 
for significant growth of the crop, and allow time for reproduction, they 
are now harvested after a period of only 3 to 4 months.
-MEDOKPOKONOU (unmanned)
        By far, this is the most devastating practice.  Only very 
recently invented, medokpokonou consists of raising a net across a given 
area in the lake, and placing a large pouch at each end.  Given the 
current condition of the fishery, only nets with very small openings are 
used.  Net size is described by the number of fingers that can fit 
through one of the holes, thus a fisherman knows how big the smallest of 
the fish that he will catch will be.  The nets for this practice are 
described as one finger nets.  When used, they will effectively remove 
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all the fish from a given area.
        The impact of this is clear.  By using such small nets, even the 
fingerlings and non-mature members of many species are being removed from 
the lake.  The species do not have a chance to reproduce and thus, the 
number of potential as well as actual fish in the lake is reduced.
Figure 6
 
Source: World Resource Database, 1994.
        Figure 6 shows the dramatic drop in freshwater fish production in 
Benin in recent years.  This can be partially attributed to the decline 
in the Lake Nekoue fishery, as it is the primary source of fish for the 
metropolitan Cotonou and Porto Novo regions.  The specific amount of fish 
that comes from the Lake Nekoue fishery is not known, however, it has 
been estimated at over 50% of the total fish catch. (Falana, 1990)  
Conversations with the local fishermen tell even more about the state of 
the fishery, however.  In listing the approximately twenty different 
species that have historically flourished during the flood and non-flood 
periods (see Appendices B and C), only two or three are currently present 
in any abundance, and for those, the size of the fish caught as well as 
the total catch weight has been dramatically reduced.
Regulations
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        There are regulations put in place by the government to protect 
the natural fishery, such as the regulations concerning acadjas.  
However, because of the remoteness of the locations, as well as the lack 
of manpower, they go practically unenforced.  Among these regulations is 
a prohibition on using fishing nets smaller than "two fingers", which if 
followed would help reduce the damage caused by medokpokonou.  People in 
the village are fully aware of these rules, but knowing that enforcement 
is non-existent, most choose not to follow them.  
        The future of the natural fishery is bleak, and the population is 
very slowly becoming aware of it.  But knowledge is not automatically 
leading to action, as the popularity of medokpokonou suggests.  Inherent 
in the Toffinu culture is an "I've got mine" attitude, which impedes 
resource preservation efforts.  As long as there is enough for today, 
there is no concern for tomorrow.  With the rapidly decreasing fish 
catches, the tide has begun changing, however, and reality has begun to 
reach them.  Already, families are not able to support themselves from 
their traditional lifestyle, and must seek other nutritional sources.  
However, due to the decline in the natural fishery, there is not 
sufficient money to buy supplementary provisions.  
RECOMMENDATIONS
        It is a daunting task to change the path that this area is 
already headed on.  There are multiple factors: social, political and 
economic at work that complicate this process.  First, the preservation 
and protection of the natural fishery needs to be addressed.  A primary 
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component of this would entail educating the population of the current 
situation and its consequences.  The people have experienced the 
dwindling fish catches and have begun to adapt to the decreased 
productivity.  However, their solution is to permanently open the channel 
to sea, in order to maintain contact with the marine environment, and 
thus providing a passage for marine fish into the lagoon.  This action 
would serve to devastate the already stressed ecosystem.  Instead, we 
need to look for other ways to allow the Toffinu to continue their 
historical lifestyle in a way that will preserve the environment for 
generations to come.  
        There are several recommendations that can be made to address the 
issues confronting the Toffinu.  The first would involve a strict 
regulation of the exploitation of the lagoon.  Fishing practices and net 
sizes need to be strictly regulated and monitored.  While the current 
government infrastructure does contain a fisheries ministry, its 
regulations have not kept pace with the current realities of the 
ecosystem or economy.  As has been explained, the population is desperate 
to feed and support itself from a resource that is unable to adequately 
provide for those who depend on it.  Medokpokonou is just one adaptation 
to this reality.  It is relatively easy for the government to enact 
regulations.  The more difficult task is their enforcement.
        There is an existing government agency that has greater contact 
with the village leadership, as well as the population on a more frequent 
basis.  The Ministry for Rural Development already maintains close ties 
with the lagoon  villages to aid in their progress.  Already, the local 
representative acts as a quasi-extension worker providing the villagers 
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with information and services, and hearing and addressing their 
grievances.  Aside from the internal village and familial structures, 
this is the closest contact that many have with the national government.  
To extend the duties of this office to encompass some of the duties of a 
fisheries officer, to monitor local fishing practices, would take 
advantage of the already existing framework to provide a more watchful eye.
        Another recommendation involves providing the Toffinu with other 
activities to support themselves, aside from fishing.  This would be a 
government supported/self-selected effort of retraining.  A few people in 
the villages have already seen the merit of finding non-fisheries based 
occupations.  Others need to be encouraged to do the same and the state 
can help provide the opportunities for them.  Cooperatives can be 
established along interest lines to promote crafts and trades.  Groups to 
teach such skills as basket making or metal working can be created, and 
also used to market the goods.  These groups can also be used to begin to 
educate those who have not previously had access to formal education.  
Public health issues and contraception can be addressed.  Such groups 
would provide greater organization to the population than is currently 
present.  Additionally, to increase village access to food supplies, and 
to redirect nutritional efforts away from the fishery, the government 
would be well served to provide land for a "land-based" Ganvie, where 
agriculture could be practiced.
        These recommendations are not entirely new.  This type of 
redirection has already happened in an area of the Zou Province.  Faced 
with a declining natural fishery, residents enacted and enforced a 
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program to save their natural resource.  To replace the dwindling fish 
supply, they imported a species of carp from a nearby river, and to 
ensure its survival, a ban was enacted to prohibit all fishing in the 
lake for a period of six months, every year.  This regulation was 
enforced by the village chiefs who would enact a hefty fine from anyone 
who disobeyed the prohibition.  This seems to have worked in this area, 
partially because the villages were land-based, and thus there were 
agricultural opportunities present to occupy and sustain the population 
during periods that the ban on fishing was in place.  However, it was not 
an easy transition for a population who had had continuous access to a 
fishery.  In order for the population to be open to such a drastic 
change, they had to become aware of the consequences of continuing down 
the current path.  They had to become accountable for the future of their 
resource, learn how to maintain it and police it when the state did not 
have the resources to help. 
        This would be an even bigger step for the lagoon-based villages 
of Lake Nekoue, where there is no land, to sustain agricultural 
activities.  This is why a comprehensive retraining plan including the 
help of the Benin government is necessary to complete the transition from 
reliance on the fishery.  However daunting, such broad steps are crucial 
to preserve the future of the Toffinu and Lake Nekoue.
        Tourism has the potential to provide funding for village 
infrastructure and improvements, as well as economic benefits to the 
entire country, but the number of tourists has decreased without the 
continued government outlay for international advertising.  If tourism is 
indeed a priority, money needs to be spent if Benin expects to attract 
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the level of tourists that it has in the past.  
Additionally, the villagers still do not receive an equitable share of 
the proceeds gained from their exploitation, but so far have been 
unsuccessful at increasing their share of the profits.  Perhaps a second 
fee could be charged that the villagers could directly assess and benefit 
from, one that is more in line with the amount that is currently being 
charged.   
        The amelioration if the lagoon environment needs to be addressed 
for the benefit of the tourist trade as well.  The continued degradation 
of the lagoon can only have a further negative impact on tourism.  As the 
lagoon ecosystem becomes increasingly constrained, accumulated waste and 
garbage in the water will serve to dissuade visits to the sight.
        A final recommendation would be to greatly increase the amount of 
aquaculture that is currently being practiced.  Figure 7 shows the amount 
of aquaculture production harvested between 1984 and 1991.  In 1984, 
aquaculture consisted of less than one tenth of one percent of the total 
fish production.  In 1991, it had risen only slightly, the increase in 
1987 being due to a funded aquaculture program, which has since bee 
completed .  This level needs to be dramatically increased o a permanent 
basis, as it has the potential to provide supplemental sources of fish 
protein in the Benin population diet as well as an income source for the 
Toffinu (by ensuring their involvement in the project).  Aquaculture has 
already been shown to be a viable part of replacing the nutrition gained 
from the natural fishery.  During the late 1980s, an aquaculture project 
was held outside of Lake Nekoue.  It involved raising a non-native 
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species of tilapia.  It was successful for study, but when funding ended, 
it was not continued, and none of its recommendations have been 
implemented.  The infrastructure still exists, however, and if it were 
used to raise native species of tilapia that can be raised either for 
market or for village use, it could take some of the pressure off of the 
natural system.  
Figure 7
 
Source: World Resource Database, 1994.
Appendix A
Number of Tourists visiting Ganvie, by Nationality, between 1983 and 1988
Nationality     Total Number of Visitors        Annual Average          Rank
France          26,170                          4,361                   1st
Germany         9,320                           1,553                   2nd
Benin           8,430                           1,405                   3rd
Switzerland     4,984                           830                     4th
Italy           3,991                           665                     5th
Holland         2,050                           341                     6th
Canada          1,950                           325                     7th
Belgium         1,862                           310                     8th
United States   1,829                           304                     9th
Austria         1,789                           298                     10th
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Togo            1,744                           290                     11th
England         1,429                           238                     12th
Russia          1,216                           202                     13th
China           812                             135                     14th
Ctte d'Ivoire   655                             109                     15th
Spain           638                             106                     16th
Nigeria         605                             100                     17th
Senegal         405                             67                      18th
Japan           366                             61                      19th
Niger           350                             58                      20th
Mali            325                             54                      21st
Ghana           299                             49                      22nd
Denmark         293                             48                      23rd
Sweden          244                             40                      24th
Cuba            123                             20                      25th
Source: Radji, 1991.
Appendix B
Species of fish found during non-flood period and relative abundance:
Toffinu Name        Scientific Name                             Observation
Ewh                 Tilapia melanotherm                         +++++
Djan zavoun         Chrysichthys nigrodigitatus     
Digon               Penaeus duorarum        
Asson               Callinectes latimarus   
Atcha loki              
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Tchiki              Ethmalosa fimbriata                         ++++
Wlhtin applo        Megalops atlanticus     
Agossou fofo        Tiilapa guineensis      
Ogban               Elops lacerta   
Tchhmidi            Eucinostomus gerres     
Assui               Pellonula afseliusu     
Ogoun               Sphyraena guachancho    
Oussa               Trachinotus teraiia     
Adjago              Caranx senegalus        
Ossan               Gimnura micrura 
Adowi           
Appendix C
Species of fish found during flood period and relative abundance:
Toffinu Name        Scientific Name                         Observation
Ewh                 Tilapia melanotherm                     +++++
Djan zavoun         Chrysichthys nigrodigitatus     
Digon               Penaeus duorarum        
Hwa                 Heterotis niloticus                     ++++
Aboli               Clarias gariepimus                      +++++
Tonvi               Clarias agboyiensis     
Tchiki              Ethmalosa fimbriata                     ++++
Allidjo             Kribia nana     
Agbogui         
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Adovi               Hemichromis faciatus    
Bhbhvou         
Sovoun              Synodontis gambiensis   
Ekin                Chromidotilapia guntheri        
Agbadja         
Sannoumadou             
Agoutchi                
Ahotoun             Parachanna obscura      
Ohouin          
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A SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE INTERSTATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM'S 
EFFECTS ON SUBURBANIZATION
Introduction
        The role of transportation systems in fostering growth and 
affecting land use structures has been of great interest to academics, 
planners, investors, and politicians.  Peter O. Muller formulated his 
explanation of urban form in his article, "Transportation and Urban Form: 
Stages in the Spatial Evolution of the American Metropolis", by 
identifying four transportation eras (Figure 1).  Figure 1 clearly 
illustrates the concept of dependency of land use on transportation 
system changes.  Indeed, innovations in transportation technologies in 
the past have greatly influenced people's travel attitudes, travel 
behaviors, and then extended the boundaries of socio-economic activities, 
such as workplaces, residential areas, and shopping.  While examining 
Figure 1, it is important to distinguish the growth effects from the 
distribution effects.  In Figure 1, the distribution effects can be 
interpreted as the changing shapes of urban forms, while the growth 
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effects are the net change of total areas within the urban boundaries.
Figure 1, Intraurban Transport Eras and Metropolitan Growth Patterns: (I) 
Walking-Horsecar Era, (II) Electric Streetcar Era, (III) Recreational 
Auto Era, (IV) Freeway Era.
Source: Peter O. Muller, Transportation and Urban Form: Stages in the 
Spatial Evolution of the American Metropolis.
        The effects of transportation infrastructure on shaping urbanized 
areas have drawn significant attention in the past.  The relationship 
between transportation and land use is interactive.  Empirical urban 
development research reveals that land use patterns influence 
transportation investment decisions, which may later affect further land 
use changes.  In this research, only the effects of highway/expressway 
systems on urbanized area growth will be explored.
        The primary intention in building interstate highways was for 
"interstate" transportation purposes, e.g., national defense and 
interstate commerce.  Nevertheless, several major metropolitan 
transportation studies, e.g., a study done by the Chicago Area 
Transportation Study (CATS) in 1955, suggested that one purpose in 
developing the transportation networks was to serve travel generated by 
projected land-use expansions (Teaford, 1986).  Demand-driven 
transportation planning schemes were very much a part of the thinking.  
Indeed, more than 30 years' experience tells us that those limited-access 
highways have very significant impacts at the local level, in addition to 
their impact on land use at the regional or even broader geographical 
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scale.  Rapid urban sprawl in the past several decades is perceived to be 
directly or indirectly induced by the emergence of highway systems.  
Because interstate highways are relatively "lineal" featured (one 
dimensional) with respect to overall urban areas, their effects should be 
considered in terms of directions as well as densities.
        This research examines the land use impact of interstate highway 
investments from a geographical perspective.  It begins with a brief 
literature review which summarizes the objectives, motivation, 
methodology, and results of previous research on similar issues.  In the 
second section, major research questions are illustrated.  Next, the 
methodologies applied in this research, e.g., grid-cell based raster 
spatial analysis, are introduced followed by the development of models 
and discussions of modeling results.  Then, the transition of spatial 
effects is analyzed based on the derived modeling results.  In the final 
section, conclusions drawn from research findings are summarized and some 
policy implications derived from this study are discussed. 
Literature Review
        Muller (1986) pointed out that Americans were not urban dwellers 
by design.  Many people live for a dream of owning a private, single 
family home, near-to-nature, rural, with huge front and back yards.  As 
described by Schaeffer and Sclar (1975), "people have found a way to 
isolate themselves;... a way to privacy among their peer group;... They 
see nothing except what they are determined to see."  For a majority of 
urban dwellers, living within large cities was actually not a personal 
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preference but a personal choice given no other viable choices.  Starting 
from 1945, after a long period of economic depression and war, the U.S. 
showed a great potential for economic revitalization.  The automobile was 
no longer a luxury good but a necessity for commuting, shopping, 
socializing, and running personal errands.  Meanwhile, America's birth 
rate rose, many young couples left crowded central city neighborhoods and 
moved to spacious suburbs where their kids could play in their own front 
or back yards. Two-car families became commonplace.  In many aspects, the 
suburbanization appeared to be an inevitable tendency (Teaford, 1986).  
The passage of the Interstate Highway Act of 1956 signaled the arrival of 
the suburbanization era.  The booming highway systems acted as catalyst 
which turned the historic metropolitan cities inside out and reshaped the 
traditional urbanized areas .  This suburbanization phenomenon can be 
well explained by the increase in people's mobility.  People can afford 
to live outside the central cities by traveling at a much higher travel 
speed on the newly constructed highways while not increasing travel 
time.  Figure 2 illustrates the concept of the dynamic relationships 
between population density and urban area expansion from a spatial 
perspective.  The resulting increase in mobility indeed reduced the 
relative attractiveness of old and crowded central cities.
Figure 2, Type of Urban Area Expansion: (I) Pure Growth (increased 
population are even distributed), (II) No Growth, Redistribution (no 
change in total population), and (III) Growth + Redistribution (net gain 
in population and population redistribution)
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        Meanwhile, the gasoline cost in the U.S. was low enough to 
support the highway commute choice.  Anthony Down (1992) pointed out that 
the inflation adjusted price of unleaded gasoline actually went down by 
27.4 percent from 1975 to 1987.  The gasoline prices in other industrial 
countries in 1991 were at least 50 percent higher than those in the 
United States.  In some areas, like Italy and Japan, the gasoline prices 
were three times or higher compared to the prices in the U.S.  The 
relatively lower gasoline cost reduces the auto operating cost and thus 
indirectly encourages the urban decentralization.
        Nevertheless, it is not appropriate to attribute the only cause 
of suburbanization to the transportation systems.  Bradbury, et al. 
(1982) concluded that several possible causes of urban decentralization 
exist.  The results suggested that national economic conditions, 
technological change, and  federal policies were also responsible for the 
urban decline in the past decades.  
        There are some studies concerning highway impacts on land use 
changes.  In the early interstate highway era, the majority of research, 
such as Adkins (1959), and Mohring (1961), tended to justify the positive 
effects of interstate highways through economic reasons, such as increase 
of land value.  However, these studies failed to address the difference 
between growth and distribution effects.  That is, whether the land value 
increases near the highway were simply a distributional shift or a net 
gain within the region as a whole was an issue.  Both researches used the 
highway length as a indicator rather than using the accessibility 
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measures of the highway interchange.  It was recognized later that the 
highway interchange is a more meaningful and appropriate research unit 
when exploring  highway systems' impact on land use.  Finally, both 
researches were conducted in the late 1950s and early 1960s which might 
be too early to capture "time lag" effects of the highway investment.  
Thus an objective evaluation of the effects of these newly constructed 
highways was virtually impossible.
        A more recent and comprehensive highway impact studies was 
conducted by Payne-Maxie Consultants for U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT) and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) in 1980.  This study was designed specifically to explore the 
impact of beltways (circumferential limited-access highways) instead of 
overall interstate highways.  It considered influential factors, such as 
city ages and highway location.  In addition, this study applied the 
concept of interchange density using it as a measurement of highway 
accessibility.  Most importantly, an effort was made to distinguish the 
distributional impact from the growth impact by controlling regional 
growth related variables.  In other words, the study attempted to control 
for the regional changes and then identify the "pure" distributional 
impact.  The results unveiled the fact that neither the existence of 
beltway itself nor the interchange density has consistently significant 
impact on population growth in SMSA during the study period (1960-1977).  
        Regarding the spatial analysis of land use change literature, a 
recent work, BART AT 20: A Preliminary Look at the Economic, Property 
Market, and Land Use Impact of the Bay Area Rapid Transit System, by John 
D. Landis (1994), studied the impact of Bay Area Rapid Transit stations 
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on surrounding area land use conditions and evolution.  This study 
analyzed 1965-1990 land use changes at nine suburban BART stations.  
Grid-cell based analytical methods were used and probability models were 
developed in the study.  The results suggest that the distance to the 
existing BART stations have significant influences on land use change. 
The farther a grid-cell is away from BART stations, the less likely this 
grid-cell would change its land use.  In addition, adjacent land use type 
also stood out as a highly significant and consistently important 
variable, especially during the 1975-90 period.  The positive coefficient 
for this adjacent land use variable indicates that land use of each 
individual grid-cell is strongly affected by the land use pattern of its 
neighboring, or adjacent grid-cells (the existence of the spatial 
neighboring effect).    
Research Questions
        As mentioned before, the main purpose of this study is to 
demonstrate the impact of interstate highway systems on population 
decentralization since the 1960s.  In order to achieve this goal, the 
following three major research questions are proposed.
1. Spatial correlation: Are the expansions of urbanized areas spatially 
correlated with the development of interstate highway systems?  That is, 
do the directions of population decentralization match the directions of 
highway system development?  Figure 3 illustrates the spatial correlation 
effects.  The inner shaded circle stands for the existing urbanized area 
before the highway systems were constructed.  The thick black line 
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represents a radial highway system which goes right through center city 
area.  It is assumed that the net expansion of urbanized area are equal 
for both types of growth (A and B).  Should there be no spatial 
correlation effect, type A expansion is expected.  Otherwise, the new 
urbanized area would look like type B.
2. Spatial neighboring effects: Do spatial neighboring effects play a 
significant role in the expansions of urbanized areas?  That is, all else 
being equal, do lands which are closer to the existing urbanized land 
have a higher chance of changing their urbanization status?
3. Time lag effects: Do time lag effects of highway systems on population 
suburbanization exist?  With other conditions controlled, would a 
non-urbanized land cell which is closer to a younger highway interchange 
have a higher probability of turning into an urbanized land cell than 
that one whose closest highway interchange is older?
Figure 3, The concept of Spatial Correlation Effects
4. Beltway effects: Do beltway systems have any effect on encouraging 
in-fill type of urbanized area expansion (type A in figure 3) rather than 
radial expansion along the highway corridors like type B in figure 2? 
5. Transitions of spatial effects on suburbanization: Whether two major 
spatial effects, spatial correlation and spatial neighboring effects, are 
experiencing transitions in terms of their impacts on suburbanization.
Methodology
Case Study Area Selection: Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
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        In this study, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, is selected for 
longitudinal analysis over three decades (1960-1990) of interstate 
highway evolution and urbanized area growth.  The following information, 
including some digital map files, about the case study area are collected 
for research purposes.
1. Urbanized area boundaries of case study area for year 1960, 1970, 
1980, and 1990
2. Street center line maps for the case study area (digital format)
3. Interstate highway system evolution from 1960 through 1990
4. Interchange locations and their years of completion
5. Locations of undevelopable lands, e.g., rivers (digital format)
6. Other arbitrarily defined boundaries, e.g., city boundary and county 
boundary (digital format)
7. Classification of highway types, i.e., beltway vs. radial systems.
        Figure 4 provides an overview of the evolution process of 
urbanized area of Oklahoma City from 1960 through 1990.  In this study, 
spatial models are developed to distinguish the directional effects of 
the interstate highway system from its density effects on urban 
decentralization.
GIS Analysis
        By using a GIS software (ARC/INFO for UNIX running on IBM RS6000 
platform), this research develops several grid-cell based spatial 
analysis models to explore the spatial evolution process of Oklahoma City 
urbanized area and its relationships with interstate highway 
constructions between every observation time period (every 10 years) or 
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every other observation time period (every 20 years) .  In the following 
multivariate logit models, change of urbanization status (dichotomous 
variable) will be used as the dependent variable throughout all models.  
Each cell is treated as a research unit and each non-urbanized cell's 
probability of changing its urbanization status in the next decade is 
represented as a nonlinear function of its distance to the closest 
existing urbanized cell, its distance to the closest highway interchange, 
year of completion of the closest highway interchange, and type 
(beltway/radial) of the closest highway interchange.
Cell size selection
        The urbanized area boundary coverages for Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 
are determined from census data issued every 10 years by the Census 
Bureau.  Due to lack of precision of the hard copy maps in the census 
books, the source of the urbanized area data, cell size is set to equal 
one half square mile per cell (about 3734 feet on each side).  In other 
words, this study employs neighborhood-scaled observations in the models.
The definition of study areas
        Empirical evidence shows that the absolute magnitude of urbanized 
area growth is actually a function of existing urbanized area's size.  
Larger urbanized areas tend to have larger expansion.  Thus, a study area 
should be defined in a way which is sensitive to the area's size.  It is 
clear that traditional methods for defining study areas, such as using 
politically defined boundaries, are not appropriate.   Besides, the 
numbers of changed cells and non-changed cells should not be heavily 
weighted to either side in order to make the forecast model more 
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meaningful.   Therefore, only those cells which are perceived by authors 
to have a reasonable chance of changing their urbanization status are 
included in the study area.  In this case study city, Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, the study area is defined as a 3-mile buffer of 1960 urbanized 
areas for 1960-1970 model, 3.5-mile buffer of 1970 urbanized area for 
1970-1980 model and 1960-1980 model, and 4-mile buffer of 1980 urbanized 
area for 1980-1990 model as well as 1970-1990 model .  Within each study 
area boundary, areas covered by water body, e.g., lakes and rivers, are 
regarded as undevelopable areas and thus are taken out of the sample 
set.
Logit Model Development
        Among others, there are three commonly used probability models: 
Linear Probability Model (LPM), Logit Model, and Probit Model.  The 
difficulty with LPM is its linear assumption which may result in 
observations with probability greater than 1 or less than 0, a 
meaningless result in a probability model.  Both logit model and probit 
model belong to the nonlinear probability model family with values always 
bounded by zero and one.  Usually, both models have similar performance 
in terms of their prediction power and accuracy rate.  However, the logit 
model is relatively easier to be interpreted.  In this study, the logit 
model with dichotomous dependent variable (change of urbanization status 
during the study period, 0 = no changed, 1 = changed) is used with each 
grid-cell in the defined study area acting as a unique observation.  The 
basic format for dichotomous logit model is as follows:
        P(Y = 1 | X) = exp( sum(bx))/[1 + exp( sum(bx))]
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        where X are observed variables and the remaining unknowns are the 
parameters b.
Spatial correlation phenomenon
        It is commonly believed that the massive interstate highway 
system construction since the mid 1950s' is one of the major causes for 
the rapid growth of urbanized lands.  The Euclidean distance of each 
cell's centroid to its closest highway interchange is measured to 
represent the actual distance between the two.  This independent variable 
(DIST_INT) is expected to have significant negative coefficients 
throughout all multivariate logit models.
Spatial neighboring phenomenon
        By definition, the urbanized area is a cluster of land cells with 
their population density reaching a certain threshold.  It is assumed 
that the presence of an urbanized area cell can enhance the chance of 
urbanization of its neighboring cells.  Authors assume that the evolution 
of urbanized areas was affected by interstate highway systems but also by 
the spatial neighboring effect.  The rationale for expecting the 
neighboring effect is land developers' avoidance of costly extension of 
urban infrastructure.  Using the census definition of urbanized area as 
places with population densities greater than 1000 persons per square 
mile implies the need for water and sewer line infrastructures in the 
newly developed lands.  Land developers are inclined to develop land near 
existing systems to avoid costly mainline extensions.   
In order to distinguish the interstate highway spatial correlation effect 
from spatial neighboring effect, the latter is controlled by adding an 
independent variable, DIST_UA which measures the Euclidean distance from 
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each observed cell to its closest urbanized area cell during the previous 
decade.  Consequently, significant and negative coefficients for this 
predictor (DIST_UA) are expected throughout all logit models.  That means 
the farther a cell is away from existing urbanized cells, the less likely 
this cell will turn into an urbanized cell.
Time lag effects
        There remains an unknown issue regarding whether a time lag 
effect exists in terms of encouraging non-urbanized areas growing along 
highway corridors.  Urbanized area's growth directions may not reflect 
the influences of nearby highway interchanges until much later than the 
interchange's completion year.  In order to explore this issue, this 
research includes the closest highway interchange years of completion as 
another independent variables (INT_60, INT_70, and INT_80).  These time 
lag variables appear as dummy variable formats on cell by cell base.
Beltway effects
        As mentioned, beltway systems are believed to play important 
roles in forming urbanized area boundaries.  If a non-urbanized cell's 
nearest highway interchange is a beltway interchange, it is expected to 
have higher probability of changing its urbanization status (positive 
effect).  In the following logit models, dummy variable (INT_BELT) is 
used to explore the beltway effect on urbanization.
Spatial Effects Transitional Analysis
        Based on logit modeling results, several curve fitting 
techniques, such as logistic curve fitting, are used to depict the 
historical trend and predict the future trend of spatial effects on 
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suburbanization.  The probability of changing urbanization status during 
different time periods are then discussed.  The aggregate trend of 
urbanization area growth (without directional concerns) is used to adjust 
for the predicted results.  
Modeling Results
Logit Modeling
        In this study, a framework of the binomial logit model for 
predicting the probabilities of changing urbanization status among 
non-urbanized lands is specified as follows:
P(UA_CHANGE=1 / DIST_INT, DIST_UA, INT_60, INT70, INT_80, INT_BELT) =  
exp(b0+b1*DIST_INT+b2*DIST_UA+b3*INT_60+b4*INT_70+b5*INT_80+b6*INT_BELT) 
/ [ 1 + 
exp(b0+b1*DIST_INT+b2*DIST_UA+b3*INT_60+b4*INT_70+b5*INT_80+b6*INT_BELT)]
where
UA_CHANGE: dichotomous dependent variable, 1 = from non-urbanized area to 
urbanized area during study period, 0 = otherwise
DIST_INT: distance to the closest highway interchange.
DIST_UA: distance to the closest urbanized cell
The following three dummy variables are used if applicable.
INT_60: dummy variable for testing time lag effect.  INT_60 = 1 if the 
nearest interchange was completed before 1960, otherwise INT_60 = 0
INT_70: 1 if the nearest interchange was completed between 1961-1970, 0 
otherwise
INT_80: similarly, 1 if the nearest interchange was completed between 
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1971-1980, 0 otherwise
INT_BELT: 1 if the nearest interchange is part of the beltway system, 0 
otherwise
Three logit models by each decade within the study period 
(1960-1990) are established and summarized in table 1.
1960-1970 Model
        Figure 5 shows the urbanization area expansion between 1960-1970, 
highway systems as of 1960, and the study area (3 mile buffer of
1960  urbanized area boundary) defined for developing logit model.   For this  1960-1970 model, both DIST_INT and 
DIST_UA unveil significant explanatory  power on UA_CHANGE.  DIST_UA plays a more important role in predicting  
the change of urbanized status than DIST_INT.  The negative coefficients  of DIST_INT and DIST_UA support previous 
hypothesis which suggest that  both the distance to nearest interchange and the distance to the nearest  urbanized cell have 
negative effects on the probability of changing  urbanization status for non-urbanized cells.  Nevertheless, this  1960-1970 
model is not predicting any cell with urbanization status  change even though with 90.25% overall fit percentage.  My 
explanation is  that the sample set is highly skewed with 657:71 no-change/change ratio  and two distance variables can 
only explain a limited portion of the  dependent variable's variance although both of them are statistically  significant.   The 
beltway effect does not appear to be significant.  In  fact, based on the status of the Oklahoma City highway systems as of  
1960, as shown in figure 5, no beltway effect should have been expected.  
Table 1, Logit Modeling Results: 10-Year Models  
Dependent Variable      UA_CHANGE                                         Study Period            1960-1970               1970-
1980               1980-1990  
DIST_INT                -0.1757( .0000)         -0.0519( .1707)         -0.1834( .0000) DIST_UA                 -0.6911( .0000)         -
1.1726( .0000)         -0.6823( .0000) INT_60                                          0.0803( .6784)          -0.5089( .0343) 
INT_70                                                                  -0.1093( .5499) INT_BELT                -0.1305(.6824)          0.0162
(.9619)           3.4991(.0010)  
Constant                .1853( .5875)           0.5575( .0085)          1.0476( .0000)  
Observations            728                     908                     1075 Change                  71                      208                     327      
Predicted          0                       0                       95      % Predicted        0%                      0%                      29.05% No 
Change               657                     700                     748      Predicted          657                     700                     696      % 
Predicted        100%                    100%                    93.05% Overall Fit             90.25%                  77.09%                  
73.58%  
Note: Numbers in the parenthesis show the t statistics for the  corresponding variables.  Numbers with bold font are 
statistically  significant at 0.05 level.  
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1970-1980 Model         Figure 6 shows the urbanized area expansion between 1970-1980,  highway systems as of 1970, and 
the study area defined for developing  logit model.  A total of 908 cells are covered by 3.5-mile buffer of 1970  urbanized 
area.  Similarly, in the second, 1970-1980 model, the signs of  coefficients of both distance variables, DIST_INT and 
DIST_UA, are  negative as expected (-0.0519 and -1.1726 respectively).  The coefficient  of DIST_UA is once again larger 
than the coefficient of DIST_INT which  indicates that the distance to the nearest urbanized area cell (spatial  neighboring 
effect) played a more important role in predicting urbanized  area expansion during 1970-1980.  In fact, the coefficient for 
DIST_INT  appears to be insignificant with its P value equals to 0.1707.  The  positive coefficient (0.0803) of INT_60 (time 
lag effect dummy variable)  suggests that a cell would have a better chance to become an urbanized  cell between 1970 to 
1980 if its closest highway interchange was  completed by 1960 (rather than 1970).  However, this coefficient is not  
statistically significant (p = 0.6784).  The beltway effect once again  does not appear to be significant (b = 0.0162, p = 
0.9619).  Same as the  1960-1970 model, this 1970-1980 model is not predicting any cell with  urbanization status change 
even though with 77.09% overall fit  percentage.  The same explanation as mentioned in the previous 1960-1970  section 
can also be applied here. 1980-1990 Model         Figure 7 shows the urbanized area expansion between 1980-1990,  
highway systems completed by 1980, and the defined 4-mile buffer (of 1980  urbanized area) study area.  The total number 
of observed cells equals to  1075.  The signs of coefficients for both distance variables are negative  and significant as 
expected.  Consistently, the distance to the nearest  urbanized areas continues to act as a more influential factor than the  
distance to the nearest highway interchange.  The strong significance  level (relatively high t statistics) of both coefficients 
reflects that  both distance variables are justified to have their own effects on the  change of urbanization status.  The 
negative signs of time lag variables,  INT_60 and INT_70, shows that the newer interchanges completed between  1970 and 
1980 are more likely to be associated with new development.   Meanwhile, the coefficients for both time lag effect dummy 
variables,  INT_60 and INT_70, are not proven to be statistically significant.   Surprisingly enough, unlike previous two 
decades, the beltway effect  comes up significantly (p = 0.001) with a relatively large coefficient  (3.4991).  The beltway 
effect has become as a strong factor along with  others that influence urban sprawl directions in the 1980s.  Twenty-nine  
percent (29%) accuracy of predicting urbanized cells is achieved by this  model compare to 0% in previous models. 
Limitations of 10-year Models and the Concepts of 20-year Models
        Because of the inherent constraint of our arbitrarily defined 
study areas, e.g., 3-mile buffer, 4-mile buffer, etc., it would be unfair 
to conclude that the widely held expectation that highways encourage 
urban sprawl has proven to be incorrect.   For example, figure 5 shows 
the change of urbanized area boundaries between 1960 and 1970.  It is 
obvious that south portion of urbanized area growth is well beyond the 
3-mile buffer of 1960 boundary.  In order to avoid the potential of 
losing information, we developed another set of models which examine the 
urbanized status change in every 20 years.  That is, two models, one for 
year 1960 to 1980, the other for year 1970 to 1990, are developed based 
on a very similar framework.  For the 1960 - 1980 model, the distance to 
the nearest highway interchange is recorded for each cell based on 
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highway networks completed by 1970.  The distance to the nearest existing 
urbanized area cell is measured based on 1960 urbanized area boundary.  
Correspondingly, for the 1970-1990 model, the distance to the nearest 
highway interchange is based on highway networks by 1980 while the 
distance to the nearest urbanized cell is measured based on 1970 
urbanized area boundary.  Table 2 summarizes the results of both models.
1960-1980 Model
        Figure 8 shows the urbanized area expansion between 1960-1980, 
highway systems completed by 1970, and the defined 3.5-mile buffer (of 
1970 urbanized area) study area.  For 1960-1980 model,  both distance 
variables coefficients show significant explanatory power.  Unlikely 
previous 10 year period models, the distance to the nearest highway 
interchange variable (b = -0.1881) becomes a more influential factor in 
changing urbanization status than the distances to the nearest existing 
urbanized cell variable (b = -0.0752).  Once again, the time lag 
variables, INT_60, is not a significant factor in this model.  As 
expected, the beltway effect, INT_BELT (b = 0.2775), is not a significant 
predictor.  The accuracy rate of prediction is 68.32%.  Apparently, this 
model is much more reliable when predicting a cell as no change (0 to 0, 
96.71% accuracy rate) than it is when predicting a cell as change (1 to 
1, 11.68% accuracy rate).  However, this is already an improvement in 
contrast to the 1960-1970 model and the 1970-1980 model where cells with 
changed urbanization status are predicted with 0% accuracy rate.  
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Table 2, Logit Modeling Results: 20-Year Models
Dependent Variable      UA_CHANGE       
                
Study Period            1960-1980                       1970-1990
DIST_INT                -0.1881( .0000)                 -0.1486( .0000)
DIST_UA                 -0.0752( .0044)                 -0.4223( .0000)
INT_60                  0.1015( .5195)                  -0.4539( .0267)
INT_70                                                  -0.2396( .1333)
INT_BELT                0.2775(.3468)                   3.3636(.0011)
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Constant                0.1672( .2704)                  1.3990( .0000)
Observations            1051                            1299
Change                  351                             551
     Predicted          41                              313
     % Predicted        11.68%                          56.81%
No Change               700                             748
     Predicted          677                             597
     % Predicted        96.71%                          79.81%
Overall Fit             68.32%                          70.05% 
Note: Numbers in the parenthesis show the t statistics for the 
corresponding variables.  Numbers with bold font are statistically 
significant at 0.05 level.
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1970-1990 Model
        Figure 9 shows the urbanized area expansion between 1970-1990, 
highway systems completed by 1980, and the defined 4-mile buffer (of 1980 
urbanized area) study area.  In this 1970-1990 model, both distance 
variables appear significantly with negative coefficients as expected. 
The distance to the nearest urbanized area cell, DIST_UA (b = -0.4223) is 
a more important factor in terms of its impact on urbanization status 
change than DIST_INT (b = -0.1486).  Table 3 compares the coefficients of 
two distance variables derived from both 1960-1980 model and 1970-1990 
model.  On one hand, the decrease of coefficient value of DIST_INT 
indicates that the impact of highway systems on suburbanization is 
declining.  On the other hand, the increase of coefficient value of 
DIST_UA suggests that the spatial 
neighboring effects on suburbanization is growing.  A further discussion 
regarding this phenomenon will be made in the concluding section.  The 
coefficient of INT_BELT unveils the same information as previous 
1980-1990 model that beltway effect has tremendous predict power (b = 
3.3636, p = 0.0011) during the last 10 to 20 years or so.  The negative 
and significant coefficient of INT_60 suggests that having a more than 20 
years old highway interchange as the nearest interchange, a non-urbanized 
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land cell would have less chance of changing its urbanization status than 
others.
Table 3, Comparison of Distance Variables' Coefficients between 20-year models
Variable                1960-1980 model         1970-1990 model         % change
DIST_INT                -0.1881                 -0.1486                 - 21%
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DIST_UA                 -0.0752                 -0.4223                 + 462%
Stronger Predictor*     DIST_INT                DIST_UA 
* Predictor's strength is decided by its absolute value of coefficient
Interpretation of Models' Coefficients
        Because logit model is a nonlinear probability model, the  
influence of each predictor is not constant.  In other words, the  
interpretations of coefficients are not very straight forward.  Using  
1960-1980 model as an example, each mile increase in the distance to the  
nearest highway interchange is estimated to decrease the odds of changing  
from non-urban to urbanized cell by a factor of 0.829 ( = exp(-0.1881)),  
or about 100 ( 1-0.829) = 17.1 %.  Similarly, each mile increase in  
distance to the nearest urbanized cell is estimated to reduce the odds of  
changing from non-urbanized to an urbanized cell by a factor of 0.924 ( =  
exp(-0.0792)).  Coefficients in the 1970-1990 model can be interpreted  
accordingly.  For example, one is examining a non-urbanized cell in 1970  
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which is 1.25 miles away from existing urbanized cell, 2 miles from the  
nearest interchange.  Its nearest highway interchange was completed by  
1970.  The value of odds is e (0.1979 - 0.19008 * 2 - 0.0792 * 1.25) = e  
-0.28126 = 0.7548.  For the case of logit model with dichotomous  
dependent variable, P / (1 - P ) is equal to 0.7548, and therefore P  
equals to 0.4301 < 0.5.  The predicted value for this land cell would  
equal to 0 (no change).  Correspondingly, in 1970-1990 model, a cell with  
identical conditions (1.25 miles to urbanized cell and 2 miles to  
interchange) would have odds equal to exp (1.4357 - 0.13728 * 2 - 0.45936  
* 1.25 - 0.2167) = 1.4481.  P is then equal to 0.5915 (P / ( 1 - P ) =  
1.4481) which is greater than 0.5.  The predicted value for this land  
cell would be 1 (change). 
Spatial Effects Transitional Analysis  
        Based on previous modeling results, I conclude that the spatial  
neighboring effect is playing a more important role than the spatial  
correlation effect, which was a dominant factor during the massive  
highway construction era.  In order to explore this phenomena more  
clearly, I use curve fitting techniques to depict this transition  
graphically, as well as to predict the future urbanization probabilities  
for non-urban lands with different physical properties, e.g., distance to  
interchange.  Twenty-year modeling results are used as the base of this  
transition analysis.  
        Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the probabilities of urbanization of  
lands with various distances to the existing urbanized area and the  
nearest interchange.  As indicated, the impact of the two spatial effects  
can be examined through the differences of slopes.  A larger difference  
between the slope of the axis and the slope of observed probabilities,  
when controlling for the other axis (effect), reveals a greater impact of  
that spatial effect.  We can see in Figure 10 that the slope facing the Y  
axis (spatial correlation effect) is steeper than that facing the X axis  
(spatial neighboring effect).  Once again, a stronger spatial correlation  
effect for the 1960-1980 period is confirmed.  In Figure 11, the opposite  
result is observed.  The slope facing the X axis is much steeper than  
that facing the Y axis in the 1970-1990 period.  Clearly, a spatial  
effect transition took place between the two time periods.  If there are  
no other major technological and policy changes in the near future, the  
spatial neighboring effect is expected to play a more important role in  
population suburbanization in the next few years.  
        Figure 12 shows the probabilities of changing urbanization status  
for lands 1) five miles from nearest interchange and one mile away from  
existing urbanized area (UA1INT5, solid line in the Figure), or 2) one  
mile from nearest interchange and five miles away from existing urbanized  
area.  Both types are controlled for the age of the nearest interchange  
as "1970" and the type of the nearest interchange variables as  
"beltway".  Time period 0 reflects the probabilities during the 1960-1980  
period while time period 1 stands for 1970-1990 period.  In other words,  
curve segments beyond time period 1 are the predicted probabilities.  The  
logistics curve fitting model is used due to its desirable bounded growth  
property (probability * 0 and * 1).  As expected, distance to the  
existing urbanized area is becoming more and more decisive in terms of  
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influencing the urbanization probabilities.  Any developable land which  
is close to the existing urbanized lands, e.g., UA1INT5, has a tremendous  
potential to become urbanized land in the near future.  
  
Figure 12, Transitional Trend of Probability of Urbanization  
Note: UA1INT5 stands for lands with one mile away from existing urbanized  
area and five miles from the nearest interchange.  UA5INT1 stands for  
land with five miles away from existing urbanized area and one mile from  
the nearest interchange. 
Conclusions 
1. In the late sixties and early seventies, most people, including some  
planners, proposed opening up the suburbs to achieve most American's  
dreams. Experience has taught us that unless properly planned, urban  
sprawl is very costly and detrimental to our society in a variety of  
ways. For example, utility lines were extended to provide services; more  
roads were constructed to support travel needs, and more police forces  
were put on the streets to protect people's security  Obviously, an  
enormous amount of public money has been used to pay for some peoples'  
decisions to live in the suburbs. Most people believe that interstate  
highway systems are responsible for the population suburbanization since  
the 1960s'. This research provides readers with a clear picture showing  
how and the extent to which highway system development can be  
geographically related to urbanized area growth. The consistently  
negative and significant coefficient for distance to the nearest highway  
interchange variable suggests the existence of spatial correlation  
between highway construction and urbanized area growth. Non-urbanized  
areas close to highway interchanges have a better chance of "urbanizing"  
than areas far away from highway interchanges. This spatial correlation  
effect was relatively stronger during the massive highway construction  
era (1960s' -1970s' ) than the neighboring effects represented by the  
distance to the nearest urbanized land. As the interstate highway system  
approached its thirtieth birthday, its geographical effects on the  
expansion of urbanized areas were fading, and the neighboring effect  
becoming a stronger determinant in the probabilities of non-urbanized  
lands being "urbanized". I propose the following two reasons to explain  
why the highway effects on suburbanization have been fading since the 1980s'. 
A) According to  urban development theories and past experiences, we know 
that American people tend to live and work in low-density areas.  From 
the lessons we learned from opening interstate highway systems, we 
conclude that many people are willing to trade travel time savings for a 
suburban living environment.  In other words, people are willing to move 
as far away from high density areas, especially the central city, as they 
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possibly can, if the commuting time remains unchanged.  The combination 
of the above two facts suggests that travel time, not distance, is the 
key in deciding the directions of suburbanization.  During the massive 
interstate highway construction era (1960s' and 1970s') when people were 
able to travel on the highway at a relatively high speed, living in a low 
density suburban neighborhood became affordable as long as the 
neighborhood  was close enough to a highway interchange.  Not 
surprisingly, this research found that the shapes of urbanized area 
expansion were heavily influenced by the directions of interstate highway 
systems during this period of time.  However, since the 1980s', when many 
metropolitan areas started suffering traffic congestion problems, the 
daily commute between suburbs and central cities became a nightmare for 
many commuters.  Interstate highway systems were mostly overloaded, with 
the average vehicle travel speed down to about 30mph or lower during peak 
hours.  Apparently, the travel speed and travel time advantage for 
interstate highway systems no longer exists.  This may explain why the 
highway effects on shaping urbanized areas are fading.
B) The other possible explanation for this phenomena is suburbanization 
of employment since the 1980s.  As mentioned, during the massive highway 
construction era, residential suburbanization was the major tendency.  
During the 1980s', the local economic climates, e.g., labor force supply 
and transportation accessibility,  and the emergence of telecommunication 
technologies made the suburban environment attractive to many employers.  
American businesses began to show a preference for low-density 
workplaces.  Nodal development around the traditional center cities is a 
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common land use development pattern since the 1980s. (Levine, 1992)  The 
development since then tends to infill those vacant lands between center 
cities and new town centers rather than moving further out.
2. The beltway effect has become a dominant factor in predicting urban 
area boundaries since the 1980s.  With all other predictors in the model 
controlled, any non-urban land cell with a beltway interchange as its 
nearest interchange would increase the odds (P/1-P) of changing its 
urbanization status by a factor of 28 (= e 3.36, based on 1970-1990 
model) or more.  This conclusion is consistent with the conclusion 
derived before the urban sprawl during the 1980s had a tendency of 
in-filling the surrounding non-urban land, rather than stretching along 
the radial highway corridors.
3. Even though both spatial correlation effects and spatial neighboring 
effects appear to have significant prediction power, there still exist 
some other crucial determinants which are influential factors in 
predicting urbanized area growth, but are not included in the models.  
Throughout all developed models, the accuracy rates of predicting changed 
cells (dependent variable = 1) are consistently much lower than the 
accuracy rates of predicting non-changed cells.  All five models tend to 
over predict non-changed probabilities.  The skewed sample distribution 
is the fundamental cause of this tendency.  The combined prediction power 
of the two distance variables appears to be insufficient to detect those 
underrepresented cells correctly under this circumstance.
4. The 10-year time lag effects are consistently insignificant through 
all logit models.  The signs and magnitudes of the 10-year time lag 
variable also vary from model to model.  However, the 20-year time lag 
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variable shows negative and significant coefficients in both the 
1980-1990 and the 1970-1990 models.  It seems that having an older 
highway interchange as the nearest interchange makes a non-urban land 
cell less likely to urbanize.  Unfortunately, from a modeling point of 
view, there exists less than 40 years of history about the interstate 
highway system.  And my observation time interval is limited to every ten 
years due to the limited availability of census data.  The inherent 
limitation also keeps us from exploring any time lag effect of less than 
10 years.  The results must be viewed with caution.
Policy Implications
        Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) is considered by some as 
a major contribution to transportation technology as we move toward year 
2000.  The deployment of ITS technologies is expected to influence 
people's travel behavior in the near future.  Among various ITS goals, 
saving travel time, both individual time and commercial time, is one of 
the most important components.  Many time-saving related technologies, 
such as adaptive traffic signal control systems and dynamic route 
guidance systems, are either commercially available or under field test 
status.  From the lessons of interstate highway development in the past 
forty years, we have already learned that people show their willingness 
to trade travel time savings for greater travel distance to meet their 
desires for low density neighborhoods and low density workplaces.  Urban 
sprawl in the past decades has indeed caused enormous social and 
environmental costs.  We have made mistakes and have paid for them.  We 
want to make sure that ITS can be deployed in such a way that people are 
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encouraged to preserve the benefits of travel time saving rather than 
substitute them with any other potentially detrimental decisions, such as 
moving further away.  While we are lucky enough to see that the driving 
force for suburbanization is getting weaker, we have to prevent other 
causes from emerging.  The potentials of some ITS technologies, such as 
Automated Traffic Management Systems (ATMS) and Automated Traveler 
Information Systems (ATIS) for encouraging urban sprawl should be 
properly addressed.  And the benefit cost analysis of ITS deployment 
should also be conducted with extreme caution so as not to overestimate 
ITS benefits, e.g., travel time saving, with the assumption of current 
travel patterns remaining unchanged.
        From experiences, our society has learned that a net increase in 
people's mobility tends to enhance the magnitude of urban sprawl, i.e., 
the amount of urbanized area expansion.  An unbalanced distribution of 
social resources, e.g., income and mobility, will contribute to the 
sprawl of urban forms.  The combination of rapid and unbalanced urban 
area expansion causes enormous problems, such as traffic congestion and 
some derived environmental problems, such as air pollution.  Many 
transportation-land use studies in the past explored many different 
solutions, such as job-house balancing strategy, to cure the urban sprawl 
problems.  According to Levine (1995), one extreme of thought argues that 
we should let the market mechanism work by itself.  In contrast, the 
other extreme of thought, in contrast, proposes that a stricter land use 
control procedure should be enforced.  Both ideas have proven to be  
inefficient solutions.  If the market could work by itself, we would not 
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have had this urban sprawl problem in the first place.  There exist 
negative externalities associated with the residential location decisions 
which create the improperly distribution of social resources.  We saw 
richer people moving to the suburbs, with the social costs of their 
relocating behaviors burdening the whole society.  This distorted market 
then creates some inefficient results.  On the other hand, local land use 
control seemed to serve richer people better than it did to the poor.  In 
many cases, we saw clearly that richer people moved to the suburbs and 
then used land use control as an excuse to keep poor people from 
following.  Even the job-house balancing policy does not appear to be an 
effective solution to this sprawl problem for several reasons, such as 
the fact that many household have two or more workers going in various 
directions. 
        Considering the fact that the highway effect on suburbanization 
is diminishing and ITS technologies are emerging, I am proposing the 
following four policy suggestions to cope with the current transportation 
problems and related issues.
1. Internalize suburbanization externalities
        People who move to suburban areas and generate negative 
externalities should be paying for the "true social cost" of their 
choice.  The higher cost would have the effect of discouraging urban sprawl.
2. Re-prioritize ITS deployment procedures
        Many social policies, such as taxation, aim at income 
redistribution.  In many respects, mobility can be treated as another 
type of property owned by individuals.  Most ITS development efforts in 
the U.S. seem to focus on the private and commercial transportation 
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services.  It is important that public transportation applications of ITS 
are also promoted in such a way that public transit users are not 
discriminated against by this technology.  This is very crucial in the 
sense that unbalanced distribution of mobility is also a major cause of 
urban sprawl.  The potentials of ITS for private transportation are 
expected to enhance the users' mobility significantly.  The deployment 
process of ITS user services should be scheduled in such a way that 
public transit users (usually having less mobility) can receive the 
benefits of ITS at the same time as private mode users, if not earlier.
3. Equip people with resources and provide them with more options
        The major reason why job-house balancing did not work well is 
that no one knows how to meet people's needs better than people 
themselves.  Instead of offering people the "assumed" best choice, people 
should be given the power to make their own choices.  In this case, 
people should be allowed to live any place they want (of course, with 
certain restrictions), as long as they are willing to pay the "true 
cost".  Government's role is to provide people with similar resources, 
e.g., income, education, etc. so that they will have adequate knowledge 
and information to maximize their personal utilities.
4. Let market run by itself when the situation "matures"
        In most cases, government interventions became the biggest cause 
of inefficiency and society loss.  I agree that to a certain extent 
government intervention is necessary.  But the goal of government 
intervention should aim at maintaining a healthy environment and social 
justice (i.e., prevent the more powerful from ripping off weaker people), 
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instead of providing people with "end products" that government believes 
are best.  In the ITS-transportation case, the government should make 
sure of the existence of equal opportunities in terms of selecting house 
and workplace locations.  Then, let the market mechanism generate the 
optimal solution. 
        It has been 38 years since the passage of Federal-Aid Highway Act 
of 1956.  The passage of Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act 
(ISTEA) of 1991 authorized $21 billion out of its $151 billion total 
budget over six years for national highway system construction and 
maintenance.  As a response to the ISTEA, the Secretary of 
Transportation, Federico Pena, brought the proposed 158,000-mile National 
Highway System (NHS) before Congress in December 1993, giving birth to 
the National Highway System Designation Act of 1994.  In other words, 
tremendous attention to and action on the interstate highway system is 
foreseeable.  Being urban planners, we have observed the profound impact 
of highway systems on urban forms.  We have recognized the problems with 
certain types of urban sprawl.  Hopefully, this research will contribute 
to clarifying factors influencing social benefits of highway investments.
Future Study Suggestions
Expand the Scope of this Study
        This research can be expanded on three different dimensions: 
issue, space, and time.  On the first dimension - issue, I would like to 
explore the transitional dynamics between interstate highway systems and 
other social phenomenon, such as population, migration, and environment 
dynamics.  On the second dimension - time, I intend to include a longer 
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period of time, e.g., starting from the pre-auto era to the present.  
Finally, on the third dimension - space, I wish to extend the study to 
examine more cities in the U.S. or even the rest of the world, in order 
to categorize transitional patterns.  This study should be treated as a 
pilot study, to be followed by a series of  further in-depth 
explorations. The final goal of this study is to develop a comprehensive 
methodology which is replicable to other urbanized areas in/out of the 
U.S.  
Accommodate Multi-Level Model Structure
        Apparently, the proposed model would encounter the dilemmas of a 
hierarchical data structure.  The Level-1 units are grid-cells, which are 
nested within the Level-2 units of highway completion year.  As indicated 
by A. S. Bryk and S. W. Raudenbush (1992), the most common concerns 
regarding hierarchical data analysis include aggregation bias, 
misestimated precision, and the "unit of analysis" problem.  
Nevertheless, this study would still use a conventional dichotomous logit 
model to predict the probability of urbanized status change due to the 
following two reasons:
1. First of all, unlike a hierarchical linear model, which is 
substantively developed, there is not yet any hierarchical nonlinear 
model which is universally accepted.
2. Empirical evidences, e.g., school effects on teacher efficacy study by 
Bryk and Driscoll (1988), show that there is no significant difference 
between results from hierarchical linear models and these from 
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conventional single level models in terms of the magnitudes of coefficients.
Add Zoning/Land Use Information to Exclude those Undevelopable Lands
        In this study, only water body is excluded from the sample set.  
In the real world, many types of lands are not developable due to 
limitations, such as unsuitable soil type, and environmentally sensitive 
and preserved areas.  The forecast accuracy rate would be improved, if, 
before establishing models, future studies excluded these non-qualified 
areas from the sample set.
Use Discrete Network Distance to Measure Real Travel Time rather than 
Making Continuous Space Assumption
        This study uses a simplified distance measurement method, 
Euclidean distance, to acquire distance information.  An effort to apply 
the discrete network concept to measure actual travel time hopefully 
would improve the models' prediction capability.
Conduct Residual Autocorrelation Analysis for each Prediction Model
        This study relies on the "eyeballing" method to examine modeling 
residuals' spatial autocorrelation phenomena.  In fact, there are several 
spatial autocorrelation models available to explore the intensity of 
autocorrelation in a quantitative manner, e.g., Moran's I statistics and 
joint-count statistics (Upton and Fingleton, 1985).  It is desirable to 
apply these available analytical tools to justify the models' assumptions 
and to improve their 
Definition of Beltways
        The most commonly used method to define and label a beltway is to 
base it on the highway numbers, such as found in Payne-Maxie Consultants, 
1980.  For example, I-96 is a main line while I-696 is a beltway.  The 
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same is true for I-75 vs. I-275.  In this study, I also used this 
intuitive way to define beltway for the case study area.  Nevertheless, I 
recognize that a set of objective and scientific criteria are necessary 
for academic research purposes, especially for a geographic analysis like 
this.  I am currently developing a method of defining beltway from a 
geometric perspective.  Hopefully, the follow-up study can apply this new 
method to objectively defined beltways.
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SUSTAINABLE BUILDING MATERIAL TRANSITION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE
Not so long  ago Buckminster Fuller reminded us that we are all travelers 
on Spaceship Earth.  Since that time there has been a growing concern and 
awareness about how we manage the natural environment and resources 
within that environment.  One need only look at the increase in fuel 
efficiency in automobiles to see evidence of this trend.  Evidence of 
this trend may also be found in the building industry.  That industry is 
constantly looking for new technology to save energy.  The explosion in 
the number of materials with increased insulative capacities is just one 
example of this search for better technology.
     It is important that planners, architects, engineers, builders, and 
governmental bodies realize the necessity for responsible use of natural 
resources.  The building industry uses these resources in both the 
construction and the operation of buildings.  In addition, the industry 
uses vital resources at the end of the life of a building.  These 
resources are used for the demolition and disposal of materials from a 
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building.  As fuller reminded us, we are part of an intricate system.  
That system has its limitations and advantages.  Some of the resources 
within the system can be regenerated, some cannot.  
     While it is important to understand that technology plays an 
important role in the building industry, it is equally important to 
realize that money may play an even bigger role.  Clearly these new 
technologies come at a cost to the consumer.  Thus, in addition to the 
building industry's responsibility, there is a large measure of 
responsibility placed on the consumer.
     It is the focus of this paper to deal with the issues of resource 
use in the building industry.  Specifically, this paper will deal with 
the topic of renewable and nonrenewable resources as they apply to the 
materials used for the structure of buildings.  Of interest are the 
choices people in the United States make with regard to the way they 
build in the context of the environment as a whole.  Of particular 
interest is the comparison of the impact of traditionally popular 
methods/materials of construction and "Green" or "Sustainable" 
methods/materials of construction.
     It may be of some great use to define sustainability in terms of its 
use within this paper.  In this paper sustainability is best defined in 
the words used by the Rainforest Action Network to define sustainability 
for their home page on the World Wide Web.  "Sustainability is when the 
functions and processes of an ecosystem can be maintained (or sustained) 
while the needs of the present are met without compromising the needs of 
future generations."(Rainforest Action Network, 1995)
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     This notion of sustainability has a great deal of importance in the 
discussion and evaluation of new technologies.  There are many new 
building materials and methods of construction developed each year.  What 
is important to evaluate is not just the performance of these materials 
and methods, but the impacts these materials/methods have on the 
environment.  The manufacture of new materials can have profound 
ecological ramifications.  Too often these ramifications are not weighed 
in the overall evaluation of new materials.  The example of asbestos 
insulation comes to mind.  We are now faced with finding ways of removing 
and disposing of a health threatening material used in hundreds, if not 
thousands, of buildings here in the United States.  It is now clear that 
the costs of manufacture, removal, and disposal (or recycling) of 
building materials must be taken into account when evaluating building 
materials.  Another cost to consider is the cost involved in developing a 
sustainable replacement.
Life Cycle Assessment
     At this point it is useful to bring up the issue of life-cycle 
assessment.  Life-cycle assessment is a means of  applying a 
"cradle-to-grave" or "cradle-to-cradle" approach to looking at buildings 
and building materials.(Wilson, 1995)  In other words, it is looking at 
buildings and their components from their origins to the eventual demise 
and/or the potential reuse of specific components or the building as a 
whole.  How are materials obtained?  What types and amounts of 
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pollutants, if any, are given off during manufacture?  Are there health 
concerns during manufacture, installation, use or disposal?  What happens 
at the end of the material's useful life?
     It is important to note the difference between life-cycle assessment 
(LCA) and life-cycle cost analysis (LCCA).  "Life-cycle costing applies 
economic principles for the specific purpose of improving design and 
management of resource allocation decisions by considering the total 
long-term costs of facility ownership."(Johnson, 1990)  In other words, 
life-cycle cost analysis allows us to consider purchase, operating, and 
maintenance costs of a piece of equipment.  This enables one to make the 
choice between several options and potentially justifies the selection of 
an initially more costly system, such as compact fluorescent lights, over 
an initially cheaper alternative, such as incandescent lights.  The key 
difference being that LCCA takes into account only traditional economic 
factors.  Brandle (Brandle, 1995) expresses the following concerns:
"1)  The prices of nonrenewable resources are low.  They do not reflect 
the real costs, only the production and marketing costs.  The costs of 
depletion are not included.
 2)  The burden of paying for inefficiencies and waste, mostly as 
pollution, is often not carried by those who cause it.  This is most 
evident in the difficulties of assigning responsibility for the pollution 
of air, water, and earth.
 3)  The dangers from depleting nonrenewable resources and the benefits 
from using renewable resources for overall society are not well 
understood by the general public."(Brandle, 1995)
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     It is apparent that some form of ecological currency is necessary.  
Some have argued that ecological currency is a part of economic 
currency.  These individuals usually point to the example of gasoline.  
Currently gasoline prices in the United States hover somewhere around $1 
per gallon.  In the United Kingdom the cost is over $2 per gallon.  In 
Italy the price is nearly $4 per gallon.1  In his course Energy, Entropy, 
and the Environment, Rycus argues that as accessible reserves are 
diminished the cost of oil will increase.  This price increase, in turn, 
is evidence of ecological 
currency being a factor of economic currency.  However, Rycus is quick to 
point out that the point at which this price increase begins to affect 
the general populace's thinking and buying habits can be at a point 
beyond that of sustainability.
     It is evident that some means of translating ecological cost into 
economic costs at earlier stages may be necessary.  However this is not 
without certain risks.  Classical economic theory holds that correct 
prices are an essential factor for maximizing economic benefits.  Some 
may argue that this may also hold true for prices reflecting the truth 
about external costs.  This does not necessarily hold true at all times.  
Unforeseen or abrupt changes, even for the better, may cause massive 
upheavals and economic losses.  The painful restructuring of the 
economies of Eastern Europe are a good example of this.(Dutch Committee 
for Long-Term environmental Policy, 1994)  Great care must be taken in 
introducing ecological costs at earlier stages of the proposed building 
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materials transition.
     One can also see that it is necessary that better systems of 
accountability for pollution should be devised.  Those parties wasting 
materials should bear the burden of doing so.  This burden should also be 
heavy enough so as to encourage the reduction, if not the elimination, of 
inefficiencies in material usage.
     It is also apparent that the general population should be made aware 
of the dangers of depleting nonrenewable resources.  As the general 
population in the U.S. elects the officials who control many resource 
management policies, the education of the general population would aid in 
obtaining governmental officials who are sensitive to the very same issues.
     Another pitfall of conventional life-cycle cost analysis is that it 
traditionally considers the life of a building to be 20-40 years.  There 
are wood structures all across the United States with ages exceeding 100 
years.  Within the confines of conventional thinking a building becomes 
disposable after a 20-40 year lifetime.  This is somehow appropriate 
coming from the land of disposable diapers.  This type of thinking cannot 
exist if sustainable development is to occur.  Greater attention must be 
given towards the adaptive reuse of structures.  
     In addition to the reuse of structures, Brandle (Brandle, 1995) 
encourages the exploration of design for recycling.  He states, "the 
concept of recycling must become as much a part of building design as the 
other concepts of design that we are so familiar with, such as functional 
integrity and aesthetic appearance."(Brandle, 1995)  He points to the 
work of the German auto manufacturer BMW as an example.  BMW is pushing 
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for as near complete recyclability of an automobile as possible.  They 
are literally designing some of their cars for disassembly.  Brandle 
points to the obvious transfer of this type of thinking into building 
terms.  He points to the graduate level design studio he recently 
conducted as an example of this type of thinking.  Students were 
encouraged to design such structural systems as pre-cast concrete panels 
with bolt connections to enhance the reusability of these elements.  
Traditionally these systems are connected by welding or site-cast 
concrete joints.  These types of joints make recyclability very tenuous 
at best.  Brandle also encouraged students to specify components made 
from recycled wood, automobile tires, and aluminum or steel.(Brandle, 1995)
     Life-cycle assessment is clearly necessary.  It will develop 
somewhat differently than traditional life-cycle cost analysis.  Though 
LCA may development differently than LCCA its development is necessary 
for both sustainable design and for the successful building materials 
transition proposed by this text.
Conditions and Trends
     Over the years building construction methods  in the United States 
have gone through a series of changes.  Early methods used timber framing 
for structural support.  Later, brick and stone were used.  Then came an 
interesting system called "balloon framing".  This system uses a series 
of repeated small dimensional structural members.  This method has been 
popular for quite some time.  The major application of this building 
file:///C|/545/1995/tracy.htm (7 of 24) [6/18/2008 10:58:35 AM]
545\tracy
system has been in the arena of housing.  It appears that this method of 
construction became popular for several reasons.  First, with increased 
population the supply of stone and brick materials was too small to meet 
building needs.  Secondly, the new system of building was less 
economically expensive than the prior systems.  However, recently there 
has been a trend away from this system of building structure.  The use of 
steel and pre-engineered wood structural products seems to be increasing.
   It appears that the United States is in a transition of building 
materials.  As mentioned above, one of the options is steel.  Another 
option is pre-engineered wood products, some of which use recycled wood 
materials.  As prime dimensional lumber is used up, there may be an 
increased use of laminated and recycled wood chip products.  The 
following two graphs show and project the growth of roundwood production 
and the decline of steel production.
 
     From the two graphs (graph; next graph) one sees a steady decline in steel 
usage and a 
steady increase in sawnwood production.  This is somewhat different than 
what is occurring in the architectural world today.  Presently, in some 
markets in the U.S. it is cheaper to use residential scale steel 
structural members than it is to use wood.  This is an alarming trend 
when put in the total ecological context.  Steel is a nonrenewable 
resource.  We should carefully consider how we use this resource.  In 
light of the more environmentally friendly option that engineered wood 
products offer, the application of steel on the residential market seems 
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a bad move in the long run. 
 
     The graphs bear witness to the economic pressures put on the 
market.  With decreasing steel production the demand appears to be low 
and the price must therefore be low.  With the steadily increasing 
sawnwood production we see an increased demand and an increased price.  
Current national average prices bear out this line of thinking.  As an 
example, a typical wall assembly consisting of 2x4 stud with 5/8 fire 
resistant drywall on both sides of the stud costs roughly $2.98 per 
square foot of the wall assembly.  A comparable assembly substituting a 
35/8 metal stud for the wood member costs roughly $2.80 per square foot 
of the wall assembly.  However, we should also bear in mind the 
ecological as well as the economic costs involved.
Building Materials
       At this point it may be useful to discuss the definitions of some 
of the terms that will be used frequently in this paper.  First among 
these terms is "dimensional" lumber.  Nearly everyone has heard of a 
"two-by-four".2  This is a piece of wood with nominal dimensions3 of two 
inches thickness and four inches width producing a simple rectangular 
cross section.
     The same follows for other pieces of dimensional lumber: 2"x6", 
2"x8" and so forth.  The largest pieces used in typical house 
construction are 2"x12".  These are used primarily for the support of 
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floors on long spans.
     Traditionally, these pieces of wood were cut from the large, old 
trees of the forest.  These trees yielded better quality lumber than 
smaller, faster growing trees.  In addition to quality there is also the 
factor of quantity.  The larger the tree cut for lumber is the greater 
the dimension of the lumber cut from that tree.
Two-by-four cross section
Glue-laminated timber
                     
     Once spans stretch beyond the capacity of a 2"x12" a different type 
of lumber may be necessary.  This type of lumber is the glue laminated 
timber.  This type of lumber is constructed of a series of 1.5" wood 
laminations.(Wright, 1994)  
                        
This type of structural member can be manufactured in a variety of 
different sizes to fit various spanning conditions.  These timbers are 
manufactured under tightly controlled conditions.  Another important type 
of wood based building product is LVL or Laminated Veneer Lumber.  This 
type of lumber generally consists of a series of thin wood layers affixed 
to one another with a resin of some sort.  The fibers of each layer can 
be oriented so as to give the structural member the greatest strength.  
LVL construction is similar to plywood except that the grain of alternate 
layers is not oriented at right angles to that of adjacent layers.
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Laminated Veneer Lumber
This type of lumber can be manufactured in any number of sizes.  It can 
be used similarly to plywood and is an important component in the next 
type of wood structural member.  Again, this type of lumber is 
manufactured under tightly controlled conditions.
     The next type of wood structural member is the wooden I-joist.  This 
element, like LVL is manufactured under rigidly controlled conditions.  
It consists of two flanges made up of a series of 1/10-inch wood veneers 
or stress-rated (high quality dimensional) lumber.  The other component 
of I-joists is the web which is commonly made with plywood or oriented 
strand board (OSB).  Oriented strand board is a panel type material made 
from wood strands that have face wafers oriented in the long direction to 
provide additional strength in that direction.(Wright, 
1994)
OSB/Plywood Web
     One may ask why it is important to manufacture the above mentioned 
elements under tightly controlled conditions.  The answer lies in the 
fact that when these controls are in place, the load bearing capacity of 
the member can be more precisely determined.  This allows for a savings 
in the amount of wood materials used.  With traditional dimensional 
construction only "mother nature" controls the production of the 
materials.  The load bearing capacity of a member can thus vary 
significantly from one 2"x4" to the next.  This then requires a large 
margin of safety in the structural design process and leads to a greater 
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degree of overdesign of the structural systems.  Clearly this has an 
environmental impact.
     The last structural building element this paper will deal with is 
the metal (or steel) stud.  This is a piece of metal, usually a roughly 
hollow tube-like construction, that is often used in place of traditional 
dimensional lumber in wall assemblies.  The load bearing capacity of this 
type of material is even better known than the manufactured wood products 
mentioned above.  Thus these elements can be used with even greater 
structural efficiencies.  This type of material is seen as a significant 
competitor to wood.  Such thinking could have serious repercussions on 
the environment.  In addition to being a nonrenewable resource steel is 
also a good conductor of heat.  The application of steel/metal members in 
an exterior wall structural system leads to an increased loss of heat 
through the buildings skin.
     Engineered wood products have a few drawbacks.  They pose potential 
off-gassing hazards as well as potential chemical pollution from their 
manufacture.  This leads to potential health and ground water problems.  
In the past one of the biggest pollution problems was the use of 
formaldehyde as part of an adhesive in manufactured wood products.  The 
use of this material is being quickly phased out.  In fact, some of the 
newer products use a process or pressing wood scraps under great pressure 
to form a beam.  The pressure and resultant heat release chemicals in the 
wood scraps that form a binding agent.
     Pre-engineered wood products have some potential benefits as well.  
First, as mentioned above they can be made using recycled wood 
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materials.  A quick look at construction site waste is very telling.
Survey of Construction Waste (GBB, 1995)
Concrete         32.9%
Dimen. Wood      15.1%
Roofing          9.6%
Metal            8.8%
Other            8.1%
Cardboard        7.5%
             
Brick            6.7%
                                              
Drywall          6.6%
                                           
Pallets          2.6%
                                           
Asphalt          0.6%
                                           
Plastic          0.5
Plywood          0.5%
Clearly dimensional wood is one of the top contributors to construction 
waste.  It is estimated that as much as 11% of traditional lumber may be 
thrown away on job sites due to poor quality.  When engineered lumber is 
used that number drops below one 1%.(Wright, 1994)  The use of  finger 
jointing this scrap wood, formerly put into landfills or burnt for fuel, 
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into larger pieces is a viable solution to the waste problem that leads 
to an additional saving of wood.(Loken, Miner, Mumma; 1994)  
     In addition to the waste at the job site there is waste at the 
manufacturing site of all wood products.  One company, Trus Joist 
MacMillan, claims that its manufacturing process for engineered wood 
I-joists converts 43% more of a log into structural lumber than does 
solid-sawn (dimensional) lumber.(Wright, 1994)  Traditional sawmilling 
converts 40.6% of any given log, by weight, into dimensional lumber.  
Trus Joist MacMillan says that its process converts 58% of a given log 
into its TJI/15 joists, in addition to yielding a small amount of 
plywood.(Wright, 1994)  It is apparent that some headway is being made 
towards the more efficient use of our forests.
     Secondly, engineered wood products can provide structural lumber 
from fast growing, small trees.  This would add great value to the 
smaller diameter trees of second and third growth forests.(Loken, Miner, 
Mumma; 1994)  With a dwindling supply of straight, dimensionally stable 
heartwood it may be argued that builders will turn, more and more, to 
other options such as engineered wood and metal products.
     Finally, engineered wood products allow for a greater efficiency in 
structural design.  This directly translates into a savings, both in the 
number of elements used per project versus dimensional lumber and less 
lumber per element versus dimensional lumber.  That  means that not only 
are you using fewer pieces of wood, you are using less wood per piece.
     At this point it may be of particular use to look at a series of 
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transitions that affect and interact with the proposed building materials 
transition.  The other transitions examined will be the demographic 
transition, the forestry transition, and the urbanization transition.  
Each of these transitions has potential consequences for the building 
materials transition.
Demographic Transition
     Drake (Drake, 1993)characterizes the demographic transition as 
follows.  At the onset of the transition the numbers of births and deaths 
are high and are in relative equilibrium with each other.  During the 
transition death rates drop dramatically.  After a period of time the 
birth rates begin to fall.  If these two rates track on another then 
growth may be significant, yet manageable.(Drake, 1993)  The graph below 
roughly shows the crude birth and death rates tracking one another.  
Clearly, the United States is in a period of relative equilibrium 
following a demographic transition.  The U.S. is in a position of 
manageable population growth and thus has some hope of being able to 
sustainably manage its natural resources.  If the birth and death rates 
do not track one another there can be a population explosion.  The second 
graph below shows the birth and death rate for Africa.  Clearly Africa is 
in the midst of a demographic transition.  Africa has little hope of 
being able to sustainably manage its natural resources while it is in the 
grip of a demographic transition.
Crude birth and death rate for the United States
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 It is important to note that all data in the graphs beyond 1995 is 
projected.
     What impact does this have on the proposed building materials 
transition in the United States?  One obvious relationship is drawn from 
the population.  A greater population size means a greater usage of 
resources.  More specifically, a greater number of buildings are built 
and thus more steel, concrete, wood, and other materials are used.  This 
puts a direct stress on those resources.  With a manageable population, 
i.e. one that has gone through the demographic transition, there is hope 
of managing those resources sustainably.   A prolonged demographic 
transition could lead to a collapse/depletion of natural resources.  In 
that situation the population would be growing at a great rate and using 
an ever increasing amount of natural resources.  A population undergoing 
a demographic transition has very little, if any, hope of managing its 
resources sustainably in the short term.  
     Included directly above is a graph showing the demographic 
transition for the continent of Africa.  On the whole the graph shows a 
wide gap between the crude birth and death rates.  This is an indicator 
of rapid population growth for the continent.  The graph is included to 
show a region undergoing the population transition.  Any country, 
continent, or geographical region at a similar point in the demographic 
transition would not be in a position favorable to the proposed building 
materials transition.  The population growth pressure would put great 
pressure on building material resources.  People would be looking to 
obtain whatever building materials they could, as cheaply as they could.  
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This could potentially slow or even halt a transition towards sustainable 
building materials.
Forestry Transition
     The forestry transition is similar to the demographic transition.  
At its outset a large percentage of a region is covered with forest.  
During the transition rapid deforestation occurs.  At the end of the 
transition forest cover stabilizes at a level lower than was previously 
the case.(Drake, 1993)  The graph below shows an increasing gap between 
the total forest cover and the extent of the natural forest cover.  The 
gap shows that the extent of natural forest cover as a portion of the 
total forest cover is decreasing.  This is significant for two reasons.  
The first is that the United States is continuing to use up its old 
growth forests.  The  second significance of this graph is that there is 
an attempt being made to replace wood harvested, although the decline of 
total forest cover is evidence that this replacement is not on a one for 
one basis.
Total Forest vs. Natural Forest Extent in the United States
      With respect to the proposed building materials transition, the 
forestry transition has several implications.  First is the eventual 
necessity of using faster growing, smaller diameter trees form second and 
third growth forests.  This shift occurs either because of the total 
depletion of old growth forests or it  occurs as a result of conservation 
efforts.  As noted earlier in this text this shift towards the use of 
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smaller, faster growing trees is occurring in the United States.  This is 
evidenced by increases in the use of glue laminated lumber, LVL, and 
engineered wood I-joists.
Roundwood Production--industrial
      The graph above clearly shows the link between increased population 
and increased demand for roundwood.  A shift towards utilization of 
smaller, faster growth tree species could aid in meeting this demand 
while slowing or reversing total forest area depletion.  This can be an 
important factor with respect to the environment as a whole.  As forest 
land is depleted, there is more soil erosion.  This erosion can lead to 
ground water contamination and the reduction of arable land.  Both of 
these factors directly affect the lives of the population in terms of 
drinkable water and the amount of food produced.  This can put the 
population (human, plant and animal) at risk.
     What bearing does this have on other countries?  Certainly any 
country at the start of, or midst of, a sustainable building materials 
transition should look to information about their forestry assets and 
practices.  If large numbers of old growth trees exist the price of 
products made from these old trees may be smaller than the prices of 
sustainable materials.  In turn, this could slow or halt a transition 
towards sustainable building materials.  Attention must also be paid as 
to what is being done to replace the trees harvested.  Are the species 
being planted the same as the ones that are harvested?  Perhaps faster 
growing trees are being planted.  If the latter is the case it must be 
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made clear that the same building materials are not obtained from the two 
different types of trees.  There is a reduction in size and quality of 
materials that can be obtained.
Urbanization Transition
     As with the above transitions, the urbanization is characterized at 
the outset by a large rural population and a small urban population.  
This transition is driven by two factors.  The first is the rural to 
urban migration of the population.  The second is the growth of the 
existing urban population.(Drake, 1993)
Rural vs. Urban Population in the United States
 In the later stages of the transition urban population growth declines 
and potentially reverses itself.
     The above graph shows that the United States is in a period 
following an urbanization transition.  Urban population growth may be 
slowing.  With the rapid growth of the suburbs, some may argue that the 
trend is reversing.
     The graph below shows the beginnings of an urbanization transition 
in Africa.  Currently the urban population is increasing at a rate that 
is beginning to surpass the rural growth rate.  Again it should be 
brought to the readers attention that all post 1995 data in the graphs is 
projected data.  From this projected data it appears that the rural and 
urban populations of Africa will reach the turning point somewhere near 
the year 2020.
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Rural vs. Urban Population in Africa.
     Again, what does this information mean in terms of the proposed 
building materials transition?  As with the demographic transition there 
are obvious connections between the number of people and the number of 
dwelling units.  This, as before, impacts the natural resources of the 
region.  However, the urban transition is likely to lead to higher 
population densities.  The graph below clearly represents the occurrence 
of this trend in the United States.  Higher densities also usually lead 
to different building materials.  These are traditionally nonrenewable 
materials.  The significance of this is that there is some savings in the 
amount of materials used for construction in high density construction 
although those materials may be nonrenewable.  Higher density 
construction means a potentially smaller total exterior building surface 
area.  This not only saves materials, and thus natural resources in the 
form of building materials, but also allows for a savings in energy usage.
     
Population Density in the United States
Policy Implications
     There are several policy implications fostered by a proposed 
transition of building materials.  First, forest management policies will 
be impacted.  As evidenced in the graph entitled "Total Forest vs. 
Natural Forest Extent in the United States" which appears in the Forestry 
Transition section of this text, the amount of total forest cover in the 
United States is decreasing.  Steps must be taken to halt this reduction 
of forest cover or a transition to sustainable building materials may not 
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be possible.  Great care must be used in halting this forest cover 
reduction.  Sandra Postel and John C. Ryan point out that, "When diverse 
populations of trees are replaced with genetically uniform stands, future 
timber harvests are put at risk."(Postel & Ryan, 1991)  Efforts must be 
made to maintain biodiversity.
     Secondly waste disposal policies must be changed.  The cost of 
disposing of materials in a landfill should carry some weight in the 
decision of discard materials.  An example of this is the formal plan to 
recycle wastes during the construction of the $262 million Portland 
Trailblazers' Arena project in Portland, Oregon.  All contractors' bid 
specifications included a section on waste management.  With 62% of 
construction complete, nearly 97% of construction debris was sent to 
recyclers.  This saved and estimated $141,000 in landfill dumping 
fees.(Building Design and Construction, 1995)  The fact that this 
recycling program was prompted by high dumping fees shows that this type 
of policy change can be an effective way of channeling ecological costs 
into economic costs.
     Lastly, the general public and governmental bodies must be made 
aware of the ramifications of their choices of building materials and 
policies.  While this may be difficult, it is a worthwhile endeavor.  One 
need only look at the spiraling national debt of the federal government 
of the United States to see the consequences of ignoring future costs.  
That government is facing substantial cuts in its programs of elderly 
health insurance and student financial aid.  The short sighted approach 
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to policy can clearly have drastic, long term repercussions.
Recommendations
1)  A transition towards sustainable building materials/methods should be 
encouraged.  This could be the encouraged use of potentially renewable 
materials such as wood.  It could also take the form of adaptive reuse of 
structures.  In addition, it could also take the form of reuse of 
specific, nonrenewable building components.  Certainly this should become 
a part of the education of every designer and builder.
2)  As the earlier discussion of Life-Cycle Assessment suggested, the 
early merging of ecological and economic costs should be studied and 
striven for.  This has been described by others as a series of phases:
Phase 1:        Environmental pollution as a side effect.
Polluters regard environmental problems as a minor irritation for which authorities sometimes 
make unnecessarily  
strict regulation. Many of the legal measures are cost-raising  
emission restrictions(end of pipe approach).
 
        Phase 2:        Environmental pollution as a cost factor  
                        Polluters begin to see that it may be beneficial to reduce pollution  
                        levels (adaptations at process level). 
        Phase 3:        The environment as a boundary condition  
                        Polluters incorporate the environmental factors when planning new  
                        investments, and are thereby forced to produce or consume  
                        differently (adaptations at process and product levels). 
        Phase 4:        The environment as a policy-determining factor  
                        The environment factor plays a role for polluters when optimizing  
                        their activities, and this leads to different system designs (adaptation  
                        at system level). 
        Phase 5:        The environment as an objective  
                        Society incorporates the environment as a logical factor and goal in  
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                        social and economic policy.  As a result of this, there will be  
                        changes in the pattern of production and consumption as well as in  
                        the mental attitudes (adaptations at structural level){Dutch Committee for Long-  
                        Term Environmental Policy}  
  
Currently the United States is in Phase 2.  The example of the Portland  
Trailblazers project clearly demonstrates that environmental pollution is  
beginning to be seen as having a cost.  This train of thought leads  
directly to the next recommendation. 
3)  The cost of dumping materials in landfills should be raised to a  
level which encourages builders to minimize the amount of materials they  
dump.  Certainly this should go hand in hand with an increased recycling  
effort to re-use those items that are, at present, thrown away on a  
construction site. 
4)  The widespread use of sustainable materials should be encouraged  
through governmental actions.  This could take the form of building  
design standards that specify the amount of nonrenewable materials that  
can be used in a building.  Several states already mandate the maximum  
amount of energy a building can use during one year.  Similar thinking  
and legislation could apply to nonrenewable building materials. 
5)  An effort should be made so that all people, from the business  
executive to the factory worker, are aware of how their decisions about  
building materials affect the environment.  This may sound like grand,  
abstract thinking.  However, each of us spends countless hours of our  
lives in buildings of one sort or another.  Our use of these structures  
implies a responsibility for these structures: for their design, use and  
eventual demolition, recycling, or reuse.  We all make decisions  
regarding our responsibility, whether it be to take an active role in the  
decision making process or to ignore the decision making process  
entirely.  Those decisions are of vital importance to the continued  
existence of humankind on the spaceship Earth.  
   
   
  
NOTES  
1. All dollar amounts are in U.S. dollars.  
2.  Common designation 2x4.  
3.  It is important to note the difference between nominal and actual  
dimensions.  For example; a 2x4 has actual dimensions of 1.5x3.5.  
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RELATIONSHIPS AMONG PAPERS NOTED BY AUTHORS
Aishton
During the lecture portion of SNR&E 545 the students were exposed to a 
variety of topics, which included the use of transition dynamics, 
mathematical applications such as curve fitting and Geographical 
Information Systems (GIS).  The students comprising the class came from 
several different academic disciplines, most commonly Public Health, 
Natural Resources & Environment and Urban Planning.   Class members had 
a 
broad range of interests and expertise about topics relating to many 
different parts of the world.  I understood, conceptually, how these 
subject areas overlapped, yet to write how the students semester 
projects 
were similar seemed nearly impossible.  My first impression ascribed to 
the notion that we were linked through the usage of similar evaluative 
techniques.  Perhaps we also have a connection which relates to 
policy-making strategies, since we were encouraged to propose policy 
formation or modification schemes.  My initial concept is about the 
association of material is accurate, but only at a superficial level.  
To 
fully understand the correlation between papers there is a need to 
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investigate the underlying structure and purpose which binds the class 
members at a more fundamental level.  demonstrate
Until the official end of the Cold War, signified by the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the tearing down of the Berlin Wall the world centered 
on the concept of nuclear proliferation and the constant threat of 
mutual, nuclear annihilation from the two Super Powers of the world, the 
United States and the Soviet Union.  During the last 5 years this veil 
of 
fear has lifted only to reveal the fact that we are exposed to a threat 
equal in the magnitude to that of nuclear war but slower in its effect 
on 
mankind.  The term overshoot means to go beyond limits inadvertently and 
this definition relates about overshoot on a global scale according to 
chapter 1 of Beyond the Limits, (Meadows, Meadows & Randers, 1992).  
Global scale overshoot refers to dynamics among the human population, 
global economy, resource extraction and the waste produced by these 
actions.  It is possible that human society has overshot and the 
environment may no longer be sustainable.  In either case there is 
immediate need to initiate remediation strategies.  At the root of this 
remediation is the concept of incremental policy change.  This is the 
fundamental level about which I spoke in the previous paragraph.  
Although our research papers consider a myriad of topics in various 
parts 
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of the world they are interconnected just as is the modern world.  While 
the world focused its attention on a potential nuclear showdown world 
economics, through technological advances in communications, computer 
applications, transportation, finance and numerous other areas wrapped 
themselves in a network whereby the world is currently inextricably 
intertwined.  This new world community places huge demands on our global 
ecosystem.  Humans interact with each other and with the environment in 
which they live.   LeChatliers chemical principle states that a vapor 
system under stress readjusts itself to limit or neutralize this 
stress.  
Our planet is nearing the point whereby it cannot regulate its systems 
naturally to accommodate its inhabitants.  Therefore, people of our 
world 
must combine intellectual resources to devise strategies to reduce the 
stress on the planet and simultaneously allow for continued growth, 
change and development.  According to  Beyond the Limits, (Meadows, 
Meadows & Randers, 1992) population and industrial capital are the 
driving forces behind exponential growth in the world system.  
Population 
and capital draw materials and energy from the earth and return wastes 
and heat, a normal function of the law of conservation of matter and 
energy.  The exact limits to which we can extract resources is such a 
complicated dynamic that it is virtually impossible to predict. Evidence 
from depleted energy supplies, population growth and environmental 
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conditions would suggest, however, that we are approaching those limits 
and presumably at an increasing rate if, in fact we have not reached 
that 
point already (overshoot).  It is appropriate to add a principle from 
Institutions for the Earth (Haas, Keohane, Levy, 1992).  The authors 
stated that non-renewable resources will never be completely used up but 
renewable resources will be used to their virtual end.  They contend 
that 
non-renewable resources will be extracted until it is monetarily 
feasible 
to extract any longer and presumably there will be a small amount of the 
resource left.  Since renewable resources are  simply that then there 
will be exploitation but most likely at a rate exceeding the natural 
replenishment, subsequently rendering the renewables, at least for some 
finite term, virtually extinct.  
In order to insure a sustainable human population and sustainable 
existence on this planet it is necessary to adopt a comprehensive policy 
which is mutually agreeable and adopted by all the leaders of the world 
community.  As I review the complicated problems currently occurring in 
the world community the task of establishing a viable policy to insure 
the survival of the planet appears formidable.  The theoretical and 
practical solution to this problem is evinced in the SNR&E 545 course.  
The changes which will take place do not originate from one particular 
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office or happen all at once.  The type of change required will occur 
from many different sources and at different administrative, economic, 
academic, technological and intellectual levels.  These changes will 
occur incrementally.  Our class is a microcosm of the world community.  
We have seen presentations which not only reflect different geographic 
areas of the world but these presentations also address policy decisions 
at various levels of the respective intra-governmental or 
inter-governmental hierarchies which exist in the world today.  No one 
person or country will, alone, be able to solve the serious 
environmental 
remediation facing the global community.  Fundamental changes in 
environmental policy must occur.  The strategy behind these changes will 
come from a concerted, world-wide effort.  Presently I have an even 
higher-level understanding of this task.  Twenty students conducted 
research in twenty specific subject areas and each topic delineated 
specific and serious environmental implications requiring policy 
changes.  When viewed from the perspective of our class the global 
problems appears insurmountable.  However, I believe that an individual 
can still make a difference in the world.  Individual or groups of 
individuals can identify problems, implement remediation strategies and 
incrementally influence the movement of a global process.  By focusing 
on 
one specific problem at a time an individual will not be as apt to be 
overwhelmed by the enormous task ahead.  This is the valuable lesson I 
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have learned from my project and the projects of my colleagues.
Birkelund
The obvious connection between all of the chapters in this volume is 
population.  As the global population continues to rise, the pressures 
to 
utilize environmental resources increases.  In this respect, the 
Birkelund Chapter could benefit from following some of the policies 
advocated in the Cheatham Chapter on reducing fertility rates in India.  
The forestry transition in Indonesia and Malaysia (Birkelund Chapter) is 
directly tied to the demographic transitions in these countries.  The 
demographic transition in India is similar to both that of Indonesia and 
Malaysia.  All three countries are still developing and have a long way 
to go before their demographic transitions are completed.  Cheatham 
proposes a unique solution to reducing fertility rates; increasing the 
employment opportunities available to women has a significant negative 
effect on fertility, this implies that private industry has the 
opportunity to affect positive social change in the course of normal 
profit-seeking operations.  By employing women and creating economic 
growth, Indonesia and Malaysia could reduce fertility rates.  This would 
help alleviate the problem of landless peasants who follow logging 
companies into the tropical forests and convert land into agricultural 
fields.
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Deforestation problems are a common link between the Birkelund, Heydir, 
and OConnell Chapters.  Heydir deals specifically with tropical 
deforestation in Indonesia.  His approach focuses on agriculture as the 
main cause of deforestation while the Birkelund Chapter focuses on 
trade.  However, both papers are interrelated and do recognize that 
there 
are numerous factors (a web of causality) contributing to the 
destruction 
of forests in this region.  The Heydir Chapter gives mention to 
commercial logging and the Birkelund Chapter states logging practices 
can 
be seen in conjunction with agriculture as the first step in permanently 
removing trees in many of these areas.  Both papers recognize the 
problem 
of government corruption, the role of population pressures, and the need 
for new forestry management strategies.  The two Chapters differ in 
their 
proposals for changing the existing forestry management.  Heydir 
advocates bottom-up (local level) solutions to deforestation while I 
advocate top-down (domestic and international government) solutions to 
deforestation.  Correcting the problem of deforestation could involve a 
combination of the two proposals.  A more comprehensive approach might 
combine the bottom-up and top-down solutions to attack deforestation 
from 
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all levels.  
The OConnell Chapter on Costa Rica is an interesting contrast to the 
problems in Indonesia and Malaysia.  Costa Rica has almost passed 
through 
its forestry transition and today, Costa Rica is widely regarded as a 
model for other tropical nations in the area of conservation (OConnell 
Chapter).  Thus, Indonesia and Malaysia could benefit from examining the 
past successes of Costa Rica in preserving its tropical forests.  More 
precisely, the extensive system of national parks and reserves in Costa 
Rica could be modeled as part of the solution to deforestation in the 
countries of Indonesia and Malaysia.    
In regards to the trade and environment nexus, there are ties between 
deforestation in Indonesia/Malaysia; hydropower in Nepal; and aids in 
Thailand.  In all these situations, international demands can provide an 
incentive to destroy the environment and human health.  As seen in the 
Birkelund chapter, tropical forests are being destroyed for the economic 
profit of selling timber to foreign countries.  In Nepal, one of the 
primary reasons to build large hydroelectric dams is to trade energy to 
India in exchange for income.  However, this would expose Nepal to 
numerous environmental risksflooding, landslides, and seismic hazards.  
Ultimately, Rowe advocates small dams over the large dams.  It will be 
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interesting to see how Nepal deals with this issue in the future and how 
international trade pressures will effect the outcome.  
A more tenuous link exists with the Landweber chapter on aids in 
Thailand.  One of the major causes for the rapid spread of aids in this 
area has been the infamous sex trade.  Policy towards prostitution on 
the 
national level does not help matters either, since it is intertwined 
with 
the booming tourist industry (Landweber Chapter).  In this case, the 
international community could deem aids in Thailand a global problem and 
provide financial support to help stop the spread of this disease.     
As a whole, all of the Chapters deal with population-environment issues 
that are in some way related to the international community and trade.  
The nexus between trade, the environment, and population could be 
further 
refined by examining trade and the different environmental problems 
faced 
in each one of the Chapters presented in this Volume.
Cheatham
I feel that my paper is most closely related to that of Ajay Gupta.  In 
his paper, Ajay presents a clear view of the pressure that the sheer 
size 
of Indias population places its on resources and its people.  His 
outline 
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of a number of transitions and current and past government economic 
policies provides a detailed account of Indias current economic and 
political environment that is missing from my paper.  Although I hope 
that at least some of my theorizing is generalizable across the 
developing world, I have chosen to concentrate on India as a case study; 
unfortunately, in an attempt to be concise, I may have dealt with the 
characteristics of Indias population in too cursory a manner.  Ajays 
paper compensates for this by describing Indias situation at length, 
setting up the environment in which my model works.  Ajays paper, to a 
large extent, may be required for those less familiar with India to 
truly 
understand the purpose of and the thinking behind my paper.
Similar, also, to my paper is that of Lilly Lombard.  Much like my own 
paper, Lillys is concerned with family planning issues.  I feel that 
Lillys paper works nicely with my own, as they both address exogenous 
means of increasing the demand for contraceptive technologies.  By 
reviewing cookstove programs as they exist today and discussing their 
potential to reduce fertility, Lillys paper suggests that private 
enterprise can effectively reduce birth rates in the developing world.  
While my paper concerns itself with increasing the opportunity costs of 
large families by providing more financially beneficial alternatives, 
Lillys paper considers increasing the temporal efficiency of cooking to 
free up more time for other tasks as a means to increase the opportunity 
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costs of large families by reducing the benefits associated with large 
numbers of children.  Lillys paper is valuable to mine because it shows 
that my paper is but one of a broad range of approaches to a single, 
overriding goal in family planning:  Engineering currently low 
opportunity costs of high fertility so that they might increase to a 
level at or near the associated costs to society.
Cunningham
The chapter I wrote on the effects of Global Warming on the South Sahel 
region of West Africa fits in with many of the other chapters in several 
ways.  Most simply, it fits in geographically and helps to flesh out the 
information available here about Sub-Saharan Africa.  Alice Nambalamba, 
Erin Perry wrote about Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Southern Benin. Time 
and space did not permit us to cover all of the countries or even 
regions 
of Africa, but together we provide a good overview of several aspects of 
the dynamic across the continent, most especially the population 
transition.  
My work fits perhaps especially well with that of Marisa Sifontes.  She 
covers in detail the transitions effecting the fisher people of Southern 
Benin who are experiencing lower and lower fish catches every year in 
much the same way as the cultivators of the north of Benin who I 
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investigated are experiencing lower crop yields each year.  Not 
surprisingly, many of the reasons for the decreasing yields of both fish 
and crops appear to be the same:  increasing population placing greater 
pressure on the available resources, decreasing time allowed for the 
replenishment of those resources, and  a deep desire by both groups of 
people to remain in their homes and the continue the work that they 
traditionally do.
My chapter, unlike many of the other chapters on either Africa or other 
parts of the developing world deals with the effects of an external 
condition (global warming) on the region.  Since many of the people in 
the developing world live in tightly constrained ecosystems,  and are 
therefore highly influenced by any changes in the environment, an 
eternality may influence a population in much the same way that any 
change in the environment does whether it is created elsewhere or caused 
by the government or other people within the country.  In this way, my 
paper is related to deforestation in Indonesia as described by James 
Birkelund and dams in Nepal as described by Karen Rowe who explore in 
detail the effects of environmental changes, or potential changes on 
people living in highly constrained ecosystems.
Lilly Lombards chapter on improved cook stove potentials in the third 
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world may provide a partial solution to some to some of the 
environmental 
problems described in my own chapter.  Micah Cheathams chapter on 
fertility in India offers a  theoretical model through which to view 
overpopulation in many settings and may be applicable to the people of 
the South Sahel in  many respects.  Similarly, Michael Landwebers 
chapter 
on Malaria and AIDS in Thailand offers ideas for improved health care at 
the village level which may be applicable to the problems arising in the 
epidemiology transition in the South Sahel.
All of the chapters are highly related in that we focused our attention 
on policy and ways in which the potential negative trends caused by  
transitions could be slowed or reversed.  As my chapter points out, in 
todays interdependent world, the action or lack of action of the people 
of one region can and do highly influence many other regions of the 
world.  This fact alone is a strong link between all the chapters in the 
monograph since the policies enacted in any region are important not 
just 
for that regions people, but for the world.
Frank
Franks work on the population dynamics and urbanization transition is 
related to many of the other projects in one form or another. However 
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there are some projects that are more closely related and help to 
emphasize the complexity of the urban-environment dynamics and 
urbanization transition; these projects are Perrys Urbanization - 
Environment Case study of Kenya, Nabalambas comparative urbanization 
study of Uganda and Tanzania, Torngs study on the effects of the 
Interstate Highway System on Suburbanization and Guptas study of the 
economic transition and its implications in India.
In her work Frank studies the different effects of technology on urban 
shape. It is suggested that there is a link between urban shape and 
available technology (especially transportation) at the time of urban 
growth. Two American cities serve as example - El Paso and Boston. El 
Paso experienced a major growth period post World War II and the 
introduction of automobile. Urban density is fairly low with 2216 
persons/square mile in comparison to other cities of comparable in size 
such as Boston, MA (11398 persons/sqm) or Seattle, WA (6193 persons/
sqm). 
El Pasos urbanization pattern traces the paths of the three major 
Interstate Highways in the area. Torng studied the effects of 
highway/expressway systems on urbanized area growth. His analysis 
supports the dependency of land use on transportation system changes and 
the relationship between transportation and land use respectively. 
However the modeling results show that there is no single causal 
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relationship between Highway interchange proximity and urbanization of 
land. The factors leading to urbanization are manifold and their 
interactions are complex - as suggested by Frank. They seem to change 
over time in their importance. Torng points out that the spatial 
correlation of Highway interchange and likelihood of urbanization of 
adjacent land is decreasing from the 1960-80 model to the 1970-1990 
model. Instead the importance of the neighboring effect for predicting 
future land use changes and urbanization is increasing in the more 
recent 
model.
Perry discusses the dilemma of urban-environment dynamics in the case of 
Kenya, a country at the beginning of the urbanization transition 
(Pattern 
B). Urban growth and development often degrades the environment in 
adjacent rural areas due to an increased demand of high quality produce 
and food, energy and water. Some research however indicates that 
urbanization in combination with education for women could successfully 
reduce fertility and thus reduce population growth. In terms of urban 
growth pattern Frank is content that urban shape has a major impact on 
the efficiency of an urban system. Spread out urban areas tend to 
increase individual transportation and thus pollution. A more compact 
city shape might help minimize the negative effects on the environment 
while it maximizes the benefits from urbanization such as reduced 
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fertility. The optimal shape of a city will depend on many variables 
such 
as size, level of technology, topography etc. An improved understanding 
of the optimal shape of cities could help to mitigate or prevent 
negative 
environmental effects form rapid urbanization in lesser developed 
countries (LDCs).
Gupta however cautions that urbanization, decreasing birth rates and 
decreasing population growth will not necessarily stop pressures on 
natural resources and the environment. His premise is that affluence 
will 
increase consumerism and thus will increase the demand of natural 
resources, energy and food. So, the carrying capacity of a landscape is 
defined by culture and the level of technology. Hence urbanization 
policies must promote efficient energy and resource use in order to 
reduce overall energy and resource demand offsetting higher demands 
created by affluence.
Nabalambas work is interesting in respect to devising policies to 
control 
or manage urbanization. Despite an anti-urban policy in Tanzania, 
urbanization continued steadily since liberation of the country. This 
means that policies hardly can reverse the trend of urbanization. In 
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fact, it seems that the redistribution of funds to rural villages had no 
long term effects at all. Since little or no money and planning effort 
went into managing urbanization, living conditions in cities and 
education have not been improved much. As a consequence, the fertility 
rates in urban Tanzania have not declined as observed by Perry for Kenya 
but increased. Thus, influencing urban pattern by policy will be a 
difficult task. Policies cannot stop natural trends such as 
urbanization, 
only modify them in favorable ways. If used intelligently urban land use 
probably can be managed by providing services at the desired places to 
attract settlement, for example.
Gupta
My colleagues, in their papers have dealt with many of the same 
transitions I addressed in my paper on India, focusing, however, on 
different regions of the world. Reading their papers, I have been struck 
by the similarity of situations faced by countries throughout the world. 
Although regions differ, and policy responses also differ, most of the 
transitions are exacerbated by poverty, inequities and population 
pressures. A set of papers written by Andrea Frank, Erin Perry, Maureen 
Cunningham and Alice Nabalamba  discuss issues and transitions in 
different parts of the world  very similar to the ones India is 
undergoing. Urbanization pressures in Kenya and Uganda, for example are 
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very similar to pressures India is facing. Since it can be argued that 
India is further into its transitions than most African nations the case 
of India could be used to predict the effects of the transitions Africa 
is undergoing. Similarly lessons from transitions in developed parts of 
the world can be applied to India. A potentially exciting topic is the 
similarity of changes and pressures buffeting both India and Russia, 
both 
countries started reforms around the same period in the nineties. 
However, although reform in Russia seems to be virtually an unregulated 
free for all, India is proceeding more cautiously. The outcome remains 
to 
be seen
Another series of papers deal with transitions which are in a more 
advanced stage than India is currently undergoing. Papers by Diane 
OConnell, James Birkelund, Michael Landweber provide a predictive 
glimpse 
of how the transitions which have started recently, may turn out. 
Lessons 
from these papers can be invaluable policy tools in order to avoid 
making 
the same mistakes, or to take advantage of the experiences of other 
nations. 
Finally a third set of papers, notably by Micah Cheatham, Lilly Lombard, 
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Richard Tracy analyze transitions and offer suggestions into methods of 
alleviating pressures on transitions through resource saving methods, 
and 
innovative techniques. Lilly Lombards paper on fuelwood efficiency 
through improved cookstoves presents a short term solution to 
alleviating 
forest degradation which is prevalent in many parts of the world. Micah 
Cheathams paper on private sector solutions to fertility reduction 
presents an innovative way that might lead to strategies for decreasing 
the population growth momentum.
Han
The world is big.  It would be ludicrous for any one study to proclaim 
global authority over any topic.  However, it is possible to present a 
piece to the overall puzzle.  This is how both research and the people 
it 
effects work.  This attempt to link twenty such pieces created by fellow 
colleagues will undoubtedly reinforce this concept.
Using Transition Theory as a Tool
Transition theory was a major driving force for many of the studies 
conducted.  Each researcher used transitions in slightly different ways, 
emphasizing that transition theory can be a very flexible method that 
can 
adjust to various needs given the proper perspective.  Landweber, by 
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studying one epidemiological topic, malaria, with the expressed 
intention 
of applying the basic concepts discovered to another topic, AIDS, has 
somewhat paralleled the intention of this paper, Energy Recovery from 
Landfill Gas.  Similarly, the motive was to study the situation of the 
United States and extrapolate the information globally.  And just as 
natural gas production was used to approximate the state of 
infrastructure for distributing natural gas, indirect relationships were 
also used in Shaffers study of Northern Iroquois origins [a possible 
late 
entry not included in this volumeeds.].  In fact, it was perhaps the 
crucial technique used to study civilizations far removed.  There is, 
naturally, always room for expansion.  A few examples of transitions 
were 
used in this paper, but they were by no means all inclusive.  Savarino 
used an interesting technique to study the rapidly developing country of 
India [another possible late entryeds.].  The method of examining 
transitions of bordering countries to obtain a clearer perspective and 
to 
predict transitions in India is a method that may be quite effective 
when 
attempting to apply energy recovery technology to various countries of 
the world.  Its a solid method to find information for a particular site 
when information on that site is sketchy or unreliable.  
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Looking for a Need
Some of the pool of research topics can be applied to this paper in 
terms 
of the particular example transitions used.  As was stated, urbanization 
is a key in determining whether an energy recovery project can be 
economically sited nearby.  In terms of shear growth by numbers, Preston 
found that urban population in Sikkims East section was in the midst of 
a 
positive feedback loop.  Therefore, population continued to boom 
although 
the boom created scarcer resources.  General urbanization trends showing 
these types of population changes may be used, but two studies in  
particular, by Frank and Torng, delved into urban morphologies.  Torng 
noted that cities are no longer expanding along the highway corridors, 
rather they are filling in the gaps equally expanding all around.  This 
centralizes a population even more so within the context of 
urbanization.  A more centralized population is advantageous for energy 
recovery as a result of the increased amount of waste produced in a more 
concentrated space.  The more the waste, the more the gas that will be 
produced by its decomposition.  The more an urban center is centralized, 
the less the distance there is to transport the waste to the landfill, 
and the less the distance there is to transport the energy to the urban 
center.  Frank separated urban morphologies into three categories, each 
with distinguishing characteristics.  These three categories along with 
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the supposition of the effect of automobiles on the urban growth pattern 
may be applied to probable sites around the world to determine if the 
urban morphology complements a recovery project.  Nabalambas dual study 
on urbanization and policy in both Tanzania and Uganda provided an 
example of how policy can have a serious impact on urbanization.
Policy Implementation
The feasibility of energy recovery projects can be immensely influenced 
by governmental policy with the most profound example being the Section 
29 tax break that enables landfills to theoretically recover more than 
75% of methane instead of just 50% without it.  Birkelund and Shaffer 
warn us of facets that may incorrectly be overlooked.  Birkelund 
suggests 
that a ban on Indonesian and Malaysian wood exports is probably not the 
answer to their deforestation problems, although a study of just the 
surface of the problem would seem to suggest so.   Therefore, seemingly 
quick and direct answers may not always be the correct course of 
action.  
Shaffers study emphasizes the importance of history to obtain a solid 
background of the situation and to possibly forecast future trends.  
As is the case with the vast majority of the world and the way it works, 
it is not only important to determine what needs to be implemented but 
also how it is implemented.  Government is not always a constant, 
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exemplified by Aishtons study on Komi, a location recently subjected to 
tremendous political upheaval.  However, if a stable government is 
achieved, a positive structure must be found.  OConnell suggests the 
organizational structure of Costa Rica as a model for other countries.  
Costa Ricas hierarchy of regional, national, and local authorities seems 
to work brilliantly in curbing the countrys deforestation.  Landfill 
construction and operation is, by nature, a local issue, just as the 
enforcing of anti-deforestation policies is ultimately a local issue.  
However, policy for both energy recovery and deforestation must be 
issued 
from a larger, federal level with a better general perspective.  Other 
countries may possibly adopt Costa Ricas structure, which would 
presumably be advantageous to successfully implementing policies 
affecting landfill energy projects.    It is important to note that not 
all stable governments are capable of implementing stable policies.  The 
case of Lahat, presented by Heydir [not includededs.], highlights a 
unique problem.  A successful landfill energy project insists upon an 
organized, long term commitment.  If the government is essentially 
controlled by the whim of one individual, such as the case for Lahat, 
chances of a solid, long term commitment are quite slim.  
On the positive side, it is still possible.  Even if institutions act in 
self interest as opposed to public interest, energy recovery will still 
file:///C|/545/1995/relation.htm (23 of 51) [6/18/2008 10:58:45 AM]
file:///C|/545/1995/relation.htm
create a beneficial situation.  Tracys study on the use of greener 
materials in construction had the same inherent obstacle as widespread 
use of landfill energy.  Both attempted to convert to newer 
technologies.  People often view new technologies as risky with a high 
cost potential.  However, Tracys example of the Portland construction 
showed that greener technologies may cost a bit more up front, but will 
save money in the long run.  It can work as long as the overall picture 
is taken into account from the beginning.  Similarly, landfill energy 
recovery projects have a more expensive capital cost compared to a total 
absence of recovery, but the deficit can be more than compensated for in 
the long run through a positive operational cost when revenue from sale 
of the gas is included.   
Possible Effects of Landfill Energy Recovery Around the World
These twenty papers exemplified a large portion of the globe.  Some of 
the information discovered brought to light situations that may be 
impacted by a landfill energy recovery project.  Both Cheatham and Gupta 
focused on the country of India, which was one of the example countries 
in this paper.  It was surmised that India is poised for a situation 
that 
would encourage energy recovery.  Both Cheatham and Gupta reinforce this 
supposition.  If Cheathams economic theory of lowering fertility is 
successful, overall population growth may be retarded, but urban growth 
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will still climb because women would migrate into the city workforce.  
In 
this theory, income for many people would also increase which implies 
more people would be able to afford a more processed type of energy such 
as landfill gas.  This aspect was expanded upon in Guptas study.  He not 
only hinted on what would shape the urbanization transition  in India, 
but also its impact on energy demand;  The urbanization transition in 
India will be determined primarily by economic and agricultural 
transitions...Urbanization tends to create more demand for all forms of 
energy.  
Although urbanization is beneficial through the landfill perspective, 
care must be taken not to let this fact blur the detrimental effects.  
Everything in this world is in a balance.  The possible environmental 
destruction by urbanization illustrated in Perrys study warns of such 
consequences.  Still, in this case, energy recovery projects can assist 
in dampening these harmful effects.  Perry states that pressure for coal 
and fuel resources from rural areas will increase due to urbanization.  
In the U.S., 50% of all landfills are sited in rural areas.  Therefore, 
landfill energy may be used to supplement the solution for this 
increased 
energy need.  Furthermore, industry tends to grow alongside 
urbanization.  Industry is, far and away, the main user of medium grade 
BTU fuel, the most cost effective product of landfill gas.  Perry also 
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sites growing carbon dioxide emissions as a concern.  As has been 
stated, 
burning landfill gas greatly reduces CO2 emissions since the main 
constituent other than methane is CO2.  
This emphasizes the important issue of global warming, an issue 
researched by Cunningham with respect to the effects on Africa.  She 
illustrated the detrimental effects on the population, agricultural, and 
epidemiological transitions.  Both main constituents of landfill gas, 
methane and carbon dioxide, are major players in the greenhouse effect.  
With 70% of methane emitted by anthropogenic sources, the majority of 
which emanate from landfills, recovering these gases can have a great 
effect on global warming.  
Rowe described a more localized situation in Nepal.  She emphasized 
Nepals need for energy independence, advising local hydroelectric power 
over large, national dams.  The local electricity could then be used to 
create light industry, thus decreasing the effect of traditional fuels 
and farming on the environment.  It may be beneficial to explore solid 
waste as another possible resource Nepal may exploit for its energy 
needs.  Granted, Nepal does not have the technology to implement such a 
project at this time.  However, more industrialized countries, such as 
the United States, could offer the know-how required for Nepal engineers 
file:///C|/545/1995/relation.htm (26 of 51) [6/18/2008 10:58:46 AM]
file:///C|/545/1995/relation.htm
to develop the technology.  These recovery facilities would most likely 
be small, but large enough to support light industry.
The world is not uniform.  Different areas are experiencing different 
changes at different times.  Landfill energy is not the start of the 
solution to anybodys energy needs, nor is it the final solution.  
Rather, 
it is one solution in a serious of steps.  Lombards examination of the 
use of cook stoves as an alternative for open fuel wood  consumption is 
a 
preliminary step most countries must probably take before converting to 
more processed forms of energy.  However, once this has been 
accomplished, it may be advantageous to examine in greater detail the 
transition from using one type of energy source to another.  This and a 
multitude of other research topics must and will be researched in the 
future.  And one more piece may be found and fitted to the puzzle.
Landweber
At first glance, this paper on AIDS and malaria in Thailand does not 
seem 
to have a great deal in common with the others in this publication. 
Although some of them touch on the epidemiological transition, it is 
rarely more than a passing mention. Also, only one other paper in this 
monograph deals with the region of Southeast Asia, focusing on the 
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forestry transition in Indonesia. However, beneath the surface, the 
underlying presumptions of this paper and the others provide an 
interesting juxtaposition to keep in mind. For most of these papers, 
population growth is a factor contributing to various problems. However, 
in the case of epidemiology, the problem at handdiseaseis actually a 
limiting factor for  population. In terms of AIDS, an epidemic of the 
proportion foreseeable could have devastating effects on the population 
in many of the countries discussed. While such epidemics are not 
unavoidable, it is an interesting factor to consider, particularly in 
regards to the papers in which burgeoning populations are pegged as a 
major problem. Although it is not desired by anyone, it must be realized 
that in many of these countries AIDS may end up controlling population 
to 
a greater extent than many of these monographs policy recommendations. 
Specifically, some of the connections to other papers are clearer. 
Deforestation in Indonesia could help the spread of malaria as people 
come into contact with previously unknown strains of the disease. Also, 
the papers on urbanization in India raise important epidemiological 
issues. As mentioned, disease is a major problem within the squatter 
colonies in crowded cities. The extensive health infrastructure in 
Thailand may be taken as an example of how to deal with such 
epidemiological concerns. Finally, and probably most crucial, many of 
these papers deal with countries where population issues and AIDS will 
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be 
intertwined over the course of the next twenty years. Particularly, in 
many African countries and India, the epidemic appears to be spreading 
unchecked. For this reason, it is probably crucial for many of these 
papers to consider the ramifications of AIDS in their area of study, 
especially when making any projections about population. 
Lombard
Among those students who chose topics related to developing countries, I 
asked myself two questions while reviewing their research: 1) How would 
cookstove diffusion projects fare in their regions of interest? and,  2) 
What about their research furthers my understanding of  effective 
cookstove diffusion in light of broad population-environment dynamics 
and 
sectoral transitions?  While my answers were as inconclusive as they 
were 
varied, this was nevertheless a valuable exercise in looking beyond the 
narrow confines of my topic.
The South Sahel , for instance, (Maureens focus) suffers indeed from 
acute fuelwood shortages. Given the  poor, agriculturalist population 
that she describes,  it seems unlikely that widespread diffusion of 
market-produced/consumer-purchased stoves would take place.  In Mali, 
for 
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instance, (as I uncovered during my research) the government last year 
officially banned the use of three-stone fires in a desperate attempt to 
lower fuelwood consumption, but has had little success in promoting 
fuel-efficient stoves.  Can cookstove diffusion play a part in the No 
Regrets policies that Maureen outlines?  I believe so, although 
initially 
only to wealthier pockets of  people. Given the poverty of most 
governments in this region, here is where international organizations 
may 
play a valuable role. They might, for example, test the acceptance of 
the 
inexpensive, rurally adapted Maendeleo stove (from Kenya) , modify it to 
meet local needs, and seek out indigenous artisans to see to 
production.  
As Maureen noted, however, issues such as global warming seem far 
removed 
in countries struggling with few resources and more pressing issues of 
survival.  So too, unfortunately, must fuelwood shortages reach 
unbearable levels before populations of the Sahel are capable of 
addressing the issue.
Certainly Alices countries of interest, Uganda and Tanzania, with their 
rapid urban transition, as well as Tanzanias economic liberalization, 
seem likely candidates for the welcoming of improved 
cookstovesespecially 
within their growing urban centers where woodfuel is commercial. In 
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fact, 
Kenyan jikos have already been introduced into these countries.  Given 
the cultural similarities of these East African countries, few major 
modifications may need to be made to stoves disseminated in Tanzania, 
although areas of higher elevation may need to be adapted for the 
purpose 
of heating.
India, the topic of Ajay and Micah, was discussed in my paper at 
length.  
Nevertheless, Ajays assessment that structural reformincluding the 
commercialization of public enterprisesis underway in many parts of the 
Indian economy, helps explain why India is currently revolutionizing its 
formerly government-run cookstove program and turning it over to private 
hands.  Micahs argument that  diffusion of contraceptive technology in 
India will not take place until women become wage-earners (so that their 
opportunity cost for fertility becomes unacceptably high) paralleled my 
outlook for cookstove diffusion in rural areas.  Until womens labor is 
recognized monetarily, so that the opportunity cost for collecting wood 
is unacceptable, this technology will not reach many populations that 
may 
need it.
Most of the populations in Costa Rica and the Newly-Independent States, 
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with higher income levels than in most developing countries, have 
already 
climbed the fuel preference ladder and are now using other forms of fuel 
with which to cook (for I was not able to identify any cookstove 
projects 
in these areas). And Thailand, as mentioned in my paper, is already 
equipped with its own improved cookstove, the Thai bucket, although I do 
not know to what extent this stove has been diffused. 
Finally, although climatically opposite from the South Sahel, 
impoverished Nepal shares similar traits in terms of cookstove 
diffusion. 
Fuelwood scarcity in select regions is becoming critical, but households 
are unable to afford the investment of efficient stoves.  Worse, 
Nepalese 
rely on fuelwood for heating much more than people in the Sahel, making 
the attractiveness and benefits of cookstoves all the less.  As Karen 
noted, Nepal is still very early in the energy transition, and faces the 
choice between building a massive national dam, or several smaller 
regional dams in order to supply the nation with a new form of energy.  
Since the probability of widespread diffusion of cookstoves in Nepal 
seems so unlikely, I agree that small dams that can provide household 
energy, may be the best solution for this country.
Cookstove projects, clearly, are not appropriate for all the developing 
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countries that my peers have studiedeven those countries suffering from 
significant fuelwood deficit.  Improved cookstoves may be tossed into 
the 
bag of  policy options available to help regions progress through 
transitions of energy, urbanization, and perhaps deforestation.  But 
they 
should be swiftly expelled if there does not appear to be a significant 
population eager to diffuse and employ them.
Nabalamba
The various papers presented had one inherent elementthat there is a 
direct relationship between people the environment they live in and that 
environmental resources that sustain people were depleting at a rate 
faster than they could reasonably be replaced.  A considerable number of 
papers were prepared on Developing countries or newly industrializing 
nations, an indication that these countries were experiencing far 
greater 
danger of environmental depletion than their Western/industrialized 
counterparts.  The various population and environmental transitions 
discussedforestry, epidemiology, economic, water resources, agriculture, 
and urbanization indicate a very complex world we live in.  These papers 
also showed that, regardless of size, the greatest danger that 
Developing 
nations were faced with was manageability of environmental resources and 
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changes.  Many economies examined have limited resources and far too 
many 
other priorities to restrain environmental degradation.  In addition, 
the 
majority of Developing  societies discussed are only recently beginning 
the democratization transition such that the people whose lives are 
affected by environmental degradation/changes have had little no effect 
on policy formulation that would reverse trends or that have had 
positive 
effects in the more democratic societies.  The papers on Forestry 
transition in Indonesia and Waste Landfills in the United States are a 
case in point two comparable examples of the significance of liberalized 
political systems on environmental protection.  
My paper which examined political choices made by two African 
governmentsUganda and Tanzaniaand the effects of these choices on 
population and environment dynamics appropriately provides the linkage 
between the developing and developed country cases presented. The 
developing country focused papers all directly or indirectly  identify 
the state as the principle actor involved with decision making and thus 
have directed policy recommendations to this entity.  Policy 
recommendations have ranged from a request for a change in forestry 
management in Indonesia to include the people whose lives are affected 
by 
environmental shifts in the decision making process to an appeal to the 
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international donor community in order to reverse deforestation in Costa 
Rica. These are the same issues I highlight in my paper as well.  
The exercise was intended to be data intensive and thus in an effort to 
make sense of a complex situation, all papers examined important 
demographic variablesbirth rates, death rates, population growth 
ratesand 
linked them to the changing environment in the various world regions. 
Most papers concluded that population numbers more than economic growth 
had the most adverse effects on the natural environment.
OConnell  
Transition theory provides a model to describe changes in sectors, such 
as the agricultural, industrial, urbanization, energy, forestry, and 
epidemiological sectors, over time.  The most challenging part of a 
transition is when the rate of change is exceptionally fast, and the 
society must adapt immediately to these changes.  Since all societies 
experience change in one or more sectors, transition theory can be 
applied to any society.    The papers presented in this monograph  
examine transitional changes in  many sectors, and for both developed 
and 
developing societies. Sectors analyzed include demographic, 
epidemiological, toxicity, urbanization, forestry, agricultural, and 
energy sectors for societies located in South Asia, Southeast Asia, 
Latin 
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America, Europe, Africa and North America.  Despite the apparent 
variability in the papers that follow, several common themes can be 
found.  
The papers can be categorized by either geographic similarity  or sector 
analyzed.  Six papers focus on the Indian subcontinent, including Nepal, 
India, and the State of Sikkim.  Four papers look at transitions in the 
African countries of Benin, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. The Southeast 
Asian countries of Thailand, Malaysia,  and Indonesia are described in 
three papers.  Three papers examine sectors in North America.   The 
Republic of Komi and Costa Rica are each the focus of one paper.  Many 
different sectors are covered in the monograph papers.  Urbanization 
transition is the model applied to papers covering the growth of urban 
areas in Oklahoma City, policy impact on urbanization in both Uganda and 
Tanzania, urbanization trends in Kenya, and changes in global 
urbanization trends.   The forestry transition is the focus of papers on 
Sikkim, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Malaysia, and India.  The epidemiological 
transition is applied to both Republic of Komi and Thailand.  One paper 
examines the  energy transition for the United States. All of the papers 
incorporate some aspect of the demographic transition in the analysis.   
All of the countries, except the United States and Komi Republic,  are 
in 
Stage 2 of the Demographic Transition Model, which is the fastest 
file:///C|/545/1995/relation.htm (36 of 51) [6/18/2008 10:58:46 AM]
file:///C|/545/1995/relation.htm
growing 
stage.  Rapidly growing populations often magnify the problems 
associated 
with rapid change in many sectors.  
All of the papers examine the relationship between human societies and 
the environment.  This is a very complex and dynamic relationship, and 
is 
difficult to simplify for the purposes of analysis.  A further 
complication is that many societies go through several transitions at 
one 
time, which makes it more difficult to analyze the effects of one 
transition, and make appropriate recommendations for that society.   The 
Republic of Komi is currently going through both the epidemiological and 
toxicity transition.  Nepal is experiencing rapid change in the 
agricultural, forestry, and energy sectors.  India is going through 
multiple transitions, including the forestry, agricultural, and energy 
transitions.  Costa Rica has completed the forestry transition, but is 
experiencing rapid change in the energy, agricultural, and toxicity 
sectors.   Sustainable building materials are directly related to the 
demographic, forestry, and urbanization transitions.  The Sahel is going 
through the agricultural, epidemiological, and demographic transitions.  
Societies experience multiple sectors at once, which makes it difficult 
to implement policy measures that adequately address the problems 
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associated with rapid change.   
The outcome of rapid change depends upon the way the society chooses to 
manage change in any sector.  Public policy can mitigate the negative 
impacts of rapid change, if policy measures are quickly and effectively 
implemented.   The governments of Costa Rica and Thailand responded with 
public policy measures to ease the  crisis in the forestry and 
epidemiological transitions, respectively.  However, both of these 
countries may enter into a second transition; Costa Rica may see 
deforestation of protected forests if the population continues to grow 
and stresses related to deforestation increase, and Thailand may enter 
into a second epidemiological transition because of the current spread 
of 
HIV infection.  These national governments must be constantly alert to 
any changes in sectors, and develop a new response plan.  However, some 
countries, such as India, Indonesia, Benin,  have not yet developed and 
implemented appropriate policy measures to address problems associated 
with transitions. The environmental, economic, and social problems may 
be 
enhanced if policy measures do not address problems related to rapid 
change.   Some papers recommend a local solution to environmental and 
social problems resulting from transitions, such as bottom-up management 
in Indonesia, biome-related policy in Republic of Komi, and watershed 
management in Costa Rica.  All of the papers include  policy 
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recommendations; however, the challenge is create policy recommendations 
with the paucity of data available.  
Many papers recognize the increasing importance of global factors in the 
analysis of transitions for a country or region.  Global demand for 
tropical wood and other products has a direct impact on the loss of 
forests in Indonesia, Malaysia, India, and Costa Rica.  Many developing 
countries, such as India and Costa Rica,  suffer from a massive external 
debt.  The pressure to service this debt plays a key role in economic 
choices made in the country.  The International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank initiated a structural adjustment program for nations with 
poor economic performance.  Costa Rica, Uganda, and Tanzania are among 
those countries that must make significant changes in their national 
governments under the structural adjustment program.   National policy 
measures can be  instrumental in  mitigating the harmful effects of 
rapid 
change; however, all nations must recognize the powerful role of the 
international community.  Implementing policy on an international scale 
may be the ultimate challenge for the worlds nations.  
Transition theory is a powerful tool that can be used to analyze sectors 
that are experiencing rapid change.  This information provides 
decision-makers with important feedback about areas in the society that 
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may benefit from public policy measures.  The papers in this monograph 
describe transitions for many different geographic locations, and yet 
there are similarities among the topics.  Human populations have  a 
dramatic impact on the environment, and the demographic transition plays 
a key role in all of the papers.  Every paper presents policy 
recommendations designed to mitigate the potentially harmful impacts 
associated with rapid change, and most papers must make these 
recommendations without adequate data.  Often, countries need to think 
beyond their borders when addressing social, economic, and 
environmental  
problems.  The world is increasingly moving towards a global village, 
and  impacts associated with some transitions may require an 
international rather than a national solution.  Longitudinal analysis of 
multiple sectors completes a picture of what is occurring in the society 
and where potential problems may be found.  Decision makers can be 
guided 
by this analysis, and develop and implement policy measures directed to 
sectors experiencing rapid change.   
Preston
Despite the wide array of research topics, there is a surprising amount 
of overlap and interrelationships among them.  Each of us has used Dr. 
Drakes transition theory as the basis of our hypotheses.  Using this as 
a 
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fundamental tool to show change over time we have been able to analyze 
population and environment changes in other countries and our own.  The 
focus has been on using this tool as a way to develop more effective 
policies.  Only by looking at a phenomenon over time can policy makers 
even attempt to make predictions about the future.  Such an approach, 
however, is often not used when policies are needed immediately to deal 
with a specific problem. 
My project was particularly relevant to those projects that either deal 
with South and Southeast Asia or those projects that deal with 
deforestation.  The combination of these two aspects include a variety 
of 
research projects.  Karen Rowes paper deals with a very similar 
mountainous environment and therefore involves similar variables and 
factors.  She has focused on rivers and hydropower dams while I have 
focused on trees and deforestation.  However, her research is entirely 
applicable to all the issues in Sikkim.  In fact, a large dam project 
was 
recently rejected in Sikkim because of many of the factors outlined in 
Karens paper.  
Lillys project is also very relevant in that she deals with a potential 
solution to the deforestation dilemmathe use of cook stoves.  Policy 
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makers in Sikkim could greatly benefit by the information obtained in 
her 
study.
Another relevant project is the one on forestry issues in Southeast Asia 
by James.  He looks at deforestation from an entirely different 
perspective, yet one which may be very relevant to policy makers in 
Sikkim because Sikkim has discussed harvesting its timber if it can find 
the appropriate technology to do so given its mountainous terrain.  
Ajays project, although not directly related to forestry, is also of 
particular importance because it would be beneficial for Sikkim to 
conduct a similar economic analysis at some point.  Being part of India, 
I am sure that Sikkim has very similar statistics to those that Ajay 
presented. 
There are plenty of other projects which, although they do not deal with 
forestry or South Asia are very related.  Maureens project on global 
warming probably applies to all of our research since global warming is 
occurring all over the world and the actual effects of this are still 
largely unknown.  In developing environmental policies in the future, 
global warming will have to be considered as an important factor.  
Even the two papers on urbanization in Africa are very related to 
Sikkims 
situation because urbanization has been a major threat to deforestation 
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in Sikkim.  Similarly, the research on diseases and epidemiology is 
applicable to Sikkim in the same way that it would be relevant to almost 
any developing nation who does not have high quality health facilities.
Since all the research projects discussed the relationship between human 
populations and environmental conditions, each one provides valuable 
insight into the dilemmas facing our future generations.  The population 
- environment nexus is finally receiving the attention and study that it 
deserves by academics.  However, although some of the relationships are 
being established, most of the complexity of population environment 
issues are still largely unknown and debated.  Thus, by using a variety 
of research endeavors, such as is presented in this document, 
researchers 
will continue to put the pieces together and not only understand the 
population-environment problems, but also work toward interdisciplinary 
solutions to these problems.
Rowe
In examining Nepals potential for exploiting its one renewable energy 
source - hydropower, it was necessary to examine conditions in other 
relevant sectors such as agriculture, forestry, and energy.  It was also 
important to understand Nepals demographic situation.  A number of other 
papers in this class have also examined the demographic situation and 
have used the information to illustrate its importance in the 
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population-environment dynamic.   Nepals poor demographic situation, 
characterized by high population growth rates and  high total fertility 
rates (TFR), can be compared to those in other developing countries such 
as Kenya, Uganda, and India, discussed by Perry, Nabalamba, and Gupta 
and 
Savarino respectively.  These countries too, are looking for 
interventions to slow the population growth rate and TFR so that the 
population total does not continue to grow at exponential rates.  The 
population pressures found in these countries has caused an increase in 
poverty and environmental degradation.  In addition such poor 
demographic 
situations have made it difficult for these countries to complete 
successful transitions in other sectors.  In contrast, Heydir highlights 
the benefits of a strong Family Planning program in Indonesia that have 
been effective in lowering the TFR and overall population growth rate.
Three additional papers in particular can be directly related to Nepals 
situation.  First Lombard discusses the importance of fuel-efficient 
cook 
stoves and she argues that they not only benefit the environment by 
decreasing deforestation, but may also trigger a positive feedback loop 
of lowering population growth and lowered prevalence of poverty.  This 
is 
certainly relevant to Nepals situation where deforestation rates are 
high 
and there continues to be an overexploitation of forest products.  While 
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the government debates over other energy alternatives,  the people in 
Nepal would benefit immensely by using their fuelwood in a more 
efficient 
manner.  In fact, mud made cook stoves are now being promoted in  
Nepal.  
Lombard also provided a rationale for the importance of targeting womens 
groups in initiating  these projects, and Nepal is currently making this 
effort, as a number of NGOs have been involved with small smokeless 
stove 
projects in the rural areas.    Nepal too, will benefit by using more 
energy efficient stoves that also reduce the amount of open fire and 
smoke in the kitchens.  Again as Lombard points out, there are a number 
of  health risks, such as reducing respiratory diseases and reducing 
burns in children, that make the idea of promoting these stoves even 
more 
appealing.   
A second area directly related to Nepal is the forestry situation in 
Sikkim, India.  Preston investigates deforestation in Sikkim and 
clearly  
points out that causes for deforestation are directly linked to 
increased 
population growth, increased tourism and additional factors.   The 
situation is very similar in Nepal as both population growth and 
increased tourism are contributing factors to the deforestation 
occurring 
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there.  Her analysis and conclusion to implement a more comprehensive 
forestry policy to account for such factors would also prove beneficial 
to Nepal.
Finally, Guptas examination of the current situation in India can be 
both 
compared and contrasted to Nepals situation across sectors.  Gupta 
asserts that India still has a significant number of people working in 
the agricultural sector.  Yet he explains that the country is aiming to 
shift workers from less productive rural farmers to more productive 
urban 
jobs.  He acknowledges that there is debate over the feasibility of  
accomplishing this without worsening conditions.  This government action 
of shifting workers points out the fact that India is striving to 
industrialize and urbanize at a much faster pace than Nepal.  Also 
Savarino, in her paper addressing forestry and agriculture in India,  
acknowledges that India has expressed a definite need for better 
irrigation to improve the agricultural productivity.  These facts; 
Indias 
desire for major irrigation schemes,  and high commercial energy needs 
due to its fast increasing urbanization and industrialization, cause it, 
like Nepal, to consider large dam projects as an alternative to meet the 
countrys demands and needs.    
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Torng
In this section, I explore the connections between my own work, A 
Spatial 
Perspective of the Interstate Highway Systems Effects on 
Suburbanization, 
and other colleagues works.  But first, I wish to define my work as a 
study which examines a small part (both in space and time dimensions) of 
the whole population environment dynamic system in a little greater 
detail.  In this class, Africa and many other third world countries seem 
to be the most popular case study areas for issues of transitional 
dynamics.   In many respects, these developing or underdeveloped third 
world countries and areas are currently following the steps which the 
U.S. went through several decades ago.  In terms of urban-rural 
population migration dynamics which is the major focus of my work, many 
of these countries, such as India (discussed by Ajay and Theresa), Benin 
(discussed by Marisa), Kenya (discussed by Erin), Nepal (discussed by 
Karen), and areas, such as South Sahel region (discussed by Maureen), 
are 
experiencing large scaled population in-migration into urban areas 
because of significant population and environment transitions.  People 
move toward urban areas for better economic opportunities and quality of 
life.  In the U.S., several major cities, such as Detroit, have been 
facing intensive population out-migration (suburbanization) phenomenon 
over recent decades.  This is hitting the local government with various 
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kinds of social problems, e.g., unemployment, crime, etc.  If no major 
policy adjustment is made, I  foresee that these third world countries 
future urban-rural transition patterns will be somewhat similar to the 
ones which U.S. had experienced.  As a population transition pioneer, 
the 
U.S.s and other developed countries experience is a very valuable 
reference source for those countries approaching the transition stages.  
Being a world community leader, it is important for the U.S. to conduct 
research regarding we learned from the past experience.  Then we can 
make 
this knowledge and information available to other countries in the world.
Finally, in terms of individual papers, I think my paper is very well 
connected to Andreas work about population dynamics and urban growth 
patterns.  In her paper, many direct (e.g., infrastructure, topology, 
and 
climate) and indirect (e.g., culture and income) factors are identified 
as having potential influences on urban forms.  I regard her paper as an 
overview of the general trend of population dynamics and urban growth 
patterns in the world.  Each relationship, as identified in the figure 
Influences on Urban Forms in Andreas paper, is a single research topic 
for further investigation.  My work can then be defined as a more 
detailed discussion of a small part of her analysis.  That is, the 
relationship between transportation systems and urban form.  As a matter 
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of fact, one of my future research suggestions is how to 
three-dimensionally expand the scope of this study to examine more 
identified influential factors (1st dimension, factors), regions (2nd 
dimension, space),  and study time period (3rd dimension, time), in 
order 
to conclude the research with more clear transition patterns, which 
hopefully can help other countries in their population and urban 
development policy making. 
Tracy
The research of my paper links to the work of others in the form of two 
groups.  My research links fairly well with the research of the 
following 
individuals:  James Birkelund, Lynelle Preston, and Diane OConnell,.  My 
research also has some links to the work of Andrea Frank, Karen Rowe, 
Lilly Lombard, and Erin Perry.
The first groups research deals primarily with forestry practices and 
deforestation.  There are several obvious links.  The first is to 
OConnells work.  Her research focuses on the forestry practices of Costa 
Rica.  In her paper she clearly demonstrates the dwindling supply of old 
growth trees in Costa Rica.  Certainly if the technology can be obtained 
by Costa Rica they should implement the manufacture of some of the wood 
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products I recommend in my paper.  The same can be said of the work of 
Birkelund and Preston.
Another connection is that if the developed countries of the world would 
implement the strategies I recommend, there would be less of a demand 
for 
the timber of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Costa Rica.  While this may have 
severe economic repercussions for these countries, it could go a long 
way 
toward helping those countries preserve a large portion of their 
biodiversity.
Yet another link is in the trend towards urbanization.  As I state in my 
paper this trend usually increases density and therefore increases the 
efficiency of building resources.  However, this increased efficiency 
may 
apply to predominantly nonrenewable resources.  In turn this has 
implications for the sustainability of such practices and pollution from 
such practices.
The second group's research research is a little more wide spread and 
the 
connections are a little more indirect.  Frank writes about population 
dynamics with respect to urban growth.  Perry writes about urbanization 
and the environment in Kenya.  In my paper I point out the implications 
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of urban growth on the sustainable building material transition.  The 
papers of Frank and Perry serve as examples of how other transitions 
affect the urbanization transition.  This in turn helps to validate the 
connections of transitions I make in my paper.
Rowe touches on the topic of Hydropower in Nepal.  As she points out the 
construction of hydroelectric projects has profound implications on the 
neighboring environment.  Certainly the decision to build a 
hydroelectric 
project should have impact upon a government's forestry policies.
Lastly, Lombard's paper deals with the topics of improved cook stoves, 
women's education, a fertility in developing countries.  Lombard clearly 
makes a case for improved cook stoves on the basis of reducing cooking 
time.  Clearly the productivity of women is increased.  This allows 
those 
women to increase their economic potential and thus helps lower 
fertility.  The link with my paper is that these stoves increase the 
efficiency of the use of wood resources.
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